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Political agency concerns the transformation of the conditions of social organization 
through collective action. In order to treat the set of necessary conditions for such agency, 
I develop a detailed reconstruction of Michel Foucault’s political philosophy, placed in 
relation to the work of Immanuel Kant and Gilles Deleuze. I argue that the key to 
Foucault’s political thought is contained in two crucial but neglected concepts, verticality 
and transversality, and that the systematic exposition of these concepts yields an account 




CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Overview: On the Problem of Political Agency in Capitalist Society 
While philosophy dissertations are often depicted as either detailed studies on a 
philosopher or interventions concerning a more general philosophical problem, the 
present thesis, if it is to be successful, must be both. It takes form largely as an exegetical 
analysis, aiming to be as precise and comprehensive as possible, of a figure in the history 
of philosophy – namely, Foucault, though also (and necessarily) Deleuze and Kant; and it 
gives itself the task of constructing the beginnings of a political theory that would 
respond to the problem of political agency in capitalist society. Political agency refers to 
the power of individual or collective action to transform the conditions of social 
production. To pose political agency as a philosophical problem, is both to inquire into its 
necessary conditions and to diagnose the forces that undermine them. And to pose the 
problem of political agency in the context of capitalism, is to suggest the historical 
singularity of the power relations that defuse, exclude, or appropriate potentially 
transformative agential force.  
I will argue that this problem is the guiding impetus of Foucault’s political 
philosophy, and indeed, of Foucault’s thought tout court, insofar as he situates his own 
work in the critical tradition and takes its measure through its transformative effect. 




two concepts that have remained almost entirely untreated, verticality and transversality, 
and that their conceptual treatment provides the basis for a theory of political agency. 
‘Verticality,’ philosophically grounded in both Kant and Nietzsche, refers in Foucault to 
either (1) an intensive form of limit-experience irreducible to historical determination, or 
(2) a critical ‘history of limits’ that shows how the exclusion of such experience plays a 
constitutive role in the formation of western culture. ‘Transversality,’ a concept that 
emerges through Foucault’s decades long exchange with Deleuze, refers to a 
compositional principle of connection for creating dynamic lines of alliance between 
various excluded or marginal groups over whom a common form of power is exercised.  
Carefully charting the trajectory of Foucault’s work across thirty years, I aim to 
show how vertical experience, transversal connection, and vertical critique satisfy, 
respectively, political agency’s necessary conditions of possibility, realization, and 
sustainability. I would also suggest that from popular uprisings, to sovereign debt crises, 
to the basic inadequacies of representative democracy, the problem of political agency in 
capitalist society is still, and especially, ours today. Indeed, if there is a reason to take 
such care in reconstructing an original political theory from Foucault’s work, one that 
would outline the set of necessary conditions for transformative politics, it is not only its 
scholarly value but also its contemporary salience. 
Now, in order for such salience and scholarship to be borne out, it must actually be 
the case that Foucault took the contemporary exercise of power in capitalist society to be 
problematic and its transformation, desirable. Such a claim, however, might seem to be 
controverted by the recent view, centered on his 1979 Birth of Biopolitics lecture course 




For example, someone as close to Foucault as François Ewald has been able to maintain 
that Foucault, in fact, offers “the apology of neoliberalism – especially the apology of 
Gary Becker,”1 insofar as the “Chicago School” theory of human capital allows for the 
problem of government (how to govern or manage the conduct of individuals, of groups, 
of the population) to be posed in non-moral and non-juridical terms (namely, in economic 
terms of calculable self-interest). 
Therefore, in order to clear the way for reconstructing Foucault’s critical political 
philosophy of agency, I will introduce my thesis by arguing (1) that Foucault’s relation to 
liberalism is best understood on the model of his relation to Kant, and (2) that doing so 
provides the ground for denying that Foucault was an apologist for neoliberalism in any 
sense, including Becker’s theory of human capital. This reading of Foucault also supports 
the position taken recently by Frédéric Gros, who argues that a distinction must be drawn 
between two forms of liberalism.2 On the one hand, there is “economic” or “political” 
liberalism, which designates the biopolitical production and capture of the active forces 
of a population for the profit of a dominant arrangement of power relations – in other 
words, the form of governmentality corresponding to modern capitalism, which 
intensifies the operation of power by exacerbating non-egalitarian social divisions (e.g., 
growing rates of economic inequality) while de-politicizing economic agents (as self-
interested private citizens) and impoverishing the possibilities for collective relations of 
                                                
1 François Ewald, “American Neoliberalism and Michel Foucault’s 1979 Birth of Biopolitics Lectures: A 
Conversation with Gary Becker, François Ewald, and Bernard Harcourt,” The University of Chicago – May 
9, 2012, 4. Ewald, philosopher and historian in his own right, was an assistant to Foucault at the Collège de 
France in the 1970s. 
2 Frédéric Gros, “Y a-t-il un sujet biopolitique?”, Nóema, IV-1/2013. 
3 Michel Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics, edited by Michel Senellart, translated by Graham Burchell, 319. 
4 Ibid, 319-20. 
5 I have opted to translate minoritaire as ‘exclusive’ here so as to avoid confusing Gros’s use of 
‘minoritarian’ – which I take to mean something like ‘the 1 percent’ – with Deleuze and Guattari’s use of 




solidarity (e.g., amongst workers, as in the decline of unions, of labor as an organized 
political force, etc.). On the other hand, there is what Gros calls “critical liberalism,” or, 
as Foucault puts it, liberalism as a “tool for the criticism of reality” and “form of critical 
reflection on governmental practice,”3 which functions as a critique of excessive 
government and activates or realizes the rights of the governed. In short, there would be a 
positivist economico-political liberalism, a “regulative schema of governmental practice,” 
but also a critical liberalism, “a sometimes radical oppositional theme”4 to excessive 
forms of governance.   
Further, these two forms of liberalism are not just distinct but diametrically opposed 
to one another. Such is the upshot of Gros’s argument: (1) Foucault conceives 
“biopolitical resistance” in terms of “the right of the governed,” a right realized or 
expressed when those who are governed by an exercise of a power they deem unjust 
“assert the will to exist otherwise”; (2) historically, on Foucault’s view, “this activation 
of a right of the governed” is made possible by critical liberalism; therefore (3) critical 
liberalism can be seen as the basis for resisting the biopolitical exercise of power proper 
to economic or political liberalism.   
Before being the doctrine of the sacred rights of the individual or the ideological 
justification for capitalism, liberalism is that form of thought which, in the West, 
posed the question of ‘too much government.’  Are we overly governed, and in 
what sense? … Thus, if economic liberalism justifies a biopolitics that exploits vital 
forces for the profit of exclusive [minoritaire5] politico-economic forces, critical 
liberalism nourishes the forms of biopolitical resistance.6  
 
                                                
3 Michel Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics, edited by Michel Senellart, translated by Graham Burchell, 319. 
4 Ibid, 319-20. 
5 I have opted to translate minoritaire as ‘exclusive’ here so as to avoid confusing Gros’s use of 
‘minoritarian’ – which I take to mean something like ‘the 1 percent’ – with Deleuze and Guattari’s use of 
the term. 




Gros’s view thus has the virtue of accounting for the apparent ambivalence of 
Foucault’s relation to liberalism, and the divergent interpretations that result: Foucault 
could be read as both a critic of liberalism, taken as an economico-political regime, and 
proponent of liberalism, taken as a mode of critique targeting the undue exercise of 
power. 
Indeed, the general distinction Gros draws between a form of positivism, which 
Foucault would resist, and a form of critique, which would provide the means for such 
resistance, runs deeper than even Gros suggests. I will argue that it fundamentally orients 
Foucault’s view of his own philosophical project, expressed in his career-long 
ambivalence toward Kant and culminating in his reflections on the Enlightenment.7 One 
merit of this reading is to deny the view that Foucault’s lectures on liberalism mark an 
inflection point along his political trajectory, one purportedly tending toward de-
radicalization or even conservatism, since what interests Foucault in critical liberalism is 
consistent with his earliest formulations of critique.  
Further, I will argue that such a consideration of Foucauldian critique provides the 
basis for rejecting the view of Foucault as neoliberal apologist. Foucault’s favorable 
remarks on Becker’s analysis of drug policy notwithstanding, he would ultimately not 
defend neoliberalism as a critical form of thought, let alone as an economico-political 
regime of power; for neoliberalism takes homo economicus – i.e., the neoliberal subject, 
the form of individual as self-interested decision-making agent – as something 
                                                
7 In Foucault’s early work, such as Introduction to Kant’s Anthropology (1961), “Preface to Transgression” 
(1963), and The Order of Things (1966), Kant is both the thinker of constitutive finitude – hence opening a 
tradition of reflection on transgressive forms of limit-experience, radicalized by Nietzsche and running 
through Bataille – as well as the thinker of anthropological positivism, by which a more radical kind of 





universally given or methodologically presupposed, and thus cannot analyze this form of 
subject as being itself the contingent effect of historical power relations. Moreover, as 
will be shown in the last section of Chapter 4, neoliberal governmentality effectively 
impoverishes what Foucault calls the ‘relational fabric’ of society, and thus constitutes 
precisely that biopolitical administration of social life that Foucault’s own ethico-politics 
aims to resist. 
 
1.2 Neoliberal Governmentality and the Two Kantian Traditions 
By the end of his life, Foucault situated himself philosophically within a certain 
tradition of Kant.8 However, in a manner perfectly analogous with the distinction drawn 
between positivist and critical liberalism, he does so by sharply differentiating between 
two opposed Kantian strains.9 On the one hand, there is the Kantian tradition that 
Foucault calls the “analytic of truth”: coming out of Kant’s surreptitiously 
anthropological critical project, the analytic of truth is an epistemological interrogation 
into “the conditions of possibility of a true knowledge.”10 On Foucault’s view, this 
tradition gives rise to a form of scientific and logical positivism that informs the “science 
of the State,” that is, the form of governmental rationality that “selected as its instruments 
procedures to rationalize the economy and society”11 – which is to say, precisely, liberal 
governmentality. Indeed, Foucault analyzes liberalism itself in decidedly Kantian terms, 
                                                
8 See, e.g., Foucault, “Foucault,” Aesthetics, Method, and Epistemology: Essential Works of Foucault, 
Volume 2, edited by James Faubion, translated by Robert Hurley, 459. 
9 Foucault makes this distinction several times specifically with regard to Kant, e.g., in “What is Critique?” 
(1977), in the The Government of Self and Others (1983), and in “What is Enlightenment?” (1984). 
10 Foucault, The Government of Self and Others, edited by Gros, translated by Burchell, 20-1. 





indicating the extent to which they belong to the same tradition: for example, echoing the 
Copernican turn of transcendental idealism, liberal government does not act on “things in 
themselves,” such as individuals, wealth, and land, but rather on the “phenomena of 
politics,” namely, interests.12 Neoliberalism, in turn, rigorously follows the Kantian 
notion of a regulative idea, specifically with respect to regulating rather than determining 
the conditions of the market, e.g., achieving price control by stabilizing inflation through 
credit policy (i.e., by managing interest rates) rather than by determining or fixing 
prices.13 The market itself becomes a site of veridiction, e.g., of the ‘true’ or ‘natural’ 
price of commodities. Liberalism, in its positivist form as regulative schema of 
governmental practice, is thus an analytic of truth linked to the science of the State, or to 
a form of governmentality that acts upon interests (and thus upon the possible actions of 
individuals) by regulating the conditions of the market. 
On the other hand, there is, as Foucault emphasizes, a properly “critical tradition of 
Kant,”14 stemming from Kant’s writings on Enlightenment and the French Revolution, 
which critiques the forms of subjugation by which human beings are maintained in a 
subordinate condition to an excessive form of authority. Precisely like critical liberalism, 
the second Kantian tradition problematizes governance from the perspective of those who 
are governed, thereby seeking to limit or reverse the exercise of power through a critical 
movement that would itself constitute a practice of freedom. Foucault refers to this 
second Kantian tradition, running from Hegel through Nietzsche and Weber to the 
                                                
12 Foucault, Birth of Biopolitics, 44-5. 
13 Ibid, 138-9. 




Frankfurt School, as the “critical attitude”15 or “limit-attitude,”16 which couples a “call 
for courage” for humanity to lift the “minority condition” in which it has been 
“maintained in an authoritative way,”17 together with an “ontology of ourselves,” which 
interrogates the historically contingent conditions, the techniques of 
“governmentalization” that have delimited what it is possible to be, say, think, or do.18 
As with the two kinds of liberalism, then, the two Kantian traditions are not merely 
distinct from one another, but diametrically opposed: on the one hand, a positivist 
analytic of truth enlisted to support the governmental rationality of a state system, and on 
the other, a “critical attitude” that would precisely resist this form of governmentality. In 
a general sense, these would be like the two strands of modernity, the one (major, 
dominant) marked by the historical emergence of capitalism and general intensification, 
proliferation, and diffusion of power relations, and the other (minor, oppositional), a 
potentially revolutionary form of critique and practice of freedom. Foucault, of course, 
locates himself in this second, more radical tradition of Kant. And indeed, even when 
Foucault turns to Antiquity in the 1980s, in an apparent break from his research on power, 
it is “to construct a genealogy of the critical attitude in Western philosophy,” finding in 
the Greek concept of parrhesia (‘free speech,’ ‘outspokenness’) “the roots of what we 
could call the ‘critical’ tradition in the West,” which he again opposes to the “analytics of 
truth.”19 Thus, if Foucault is interested in liberalism, it is to the extent that it constitutes a 
kind of critical attitude – and, more specifically, to the extent that this strand of critical 
                                                
15 Foucault, “What is Critique?”, 42. 
16 Foucault, “What is Enlightenment?”, Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth: Essential Works of Foucault, 
Volume 1, edited by Paul Rabinow, translated by Catherine Porter, 315. 
17 Foucault, “What is Critique?”, 47-8. 
18 Foucault, The Government of Self and Others, 20-1. See also, Foucault, “What is Enlightenment?”, 315-6. 




liberalism is not only separate from dominant politico-economic liberalism, but in fact 
would allow one to contest the latter.  
Now, to defend the claim that critical liberalism is opposed to economic or political 
liberalism in the way that the critical attitude is opposed to the analytic of truth, it must be 
true that for Foucault, economic-political liberalism is in fact a form of ‘governing too 
much.’ And indeed, throughout the Birth of Biopolitics, there are various ways in which 
liberal governmentality is depicted as excessive: to pick three examples, (1) “liberal 
reason is correlative with activation of the imperial principle,”20 allowing the worldwide 
expansion of capitalist power relations through colonialism (including endo-colonization) 
and later globalization; (2) liberalism is the form of governmentality proper to biopolitics, 
the liberal State assuming “the task of continuously and effectively taking charge of 
individuals and their well-being, health, and work, their way of being, behaving, and even 
dying, etc.”21; and (3) liberalism is the form of governmentality to which corresponds the 
historical emergence and exercise of what Foucault calls ‘disciplinary power,’ for “the 
Panopticon is the very formula of liberal government.”22  
More generally, we can say that for Foucault, liberalism is the form of 
governmentality that corresponds to the economico-political function of power in 
capitalist society. By this, I mean the following: if the economic refers to the problem of 
capital accumulation and the political refers to the problem of the accumulation of human 
beings (e.g., integrating the ‘floating populations’ into the industrial apparatus of 
production through factory discipline; managing processes of urbanization and the 
                                                
20 Foucault, Birth of Biopolitics, 21. 
21 Ibid, 62. Foucault would seem to have in mind here the Welfare State. 




productive forces of a population), then the fundamental operation of modern power – 
whether it be disciplinary power, biopower, or ‘debt power’ (Lazzarato) – will be 
economico-political insofar as its “primary function” is to adjust the “accumulation of 
men” to the “accumulation of capital.”23 Therefore, positivist liberalism, as the 
“framework of political rationality”24 for the economico-political exercise of power, 
constitutes precisely the kind of excessive form of governance that the critical attitude 
would contest, insofar as this “power is exercised the way it is in order to maintain 
capitalist exploitation.”25 
However, one might argue that while this critical analysis is appropriate for 
classical liberalism, it is less so for neoliberalism, especially Chicago School 
neoliberalism, since Foucault himself speaks optimistically of the latter as suggesting a 
non-normalizing possibility for governmental rationality, proceeding not through 
coercion but by intervening at the level of interests.26 That is, the neoliberal exercise of 
                                                
23 Foucault, Psychiatric Power, edited by Jacques Lagrange, translated by Burchell, 110. This holds just as 
much for disciplinary power at the micropolitical level (producing politically docile, economically 
productive subjects; controlling the plebeian population) at it does for biopolitics at the macropolitical level 
(regulating, capturing the vital forces of a population). See Foucault, Discipline and Punish, translated by 
Alan Sheridan, 218-21; and History of Sexuality, Volume 1, translated by Hurley, 140-1. We will return to 
the topic of the economico-political function of power at greater length in Chapters 4 and 5. 
24 Foucault, Birth of Biopolitics, 317. 
25 Foucault, “Intellectuals and Power,” Language, Counter-Memory, Practice, edited by Donald Bouchard, 
translated by Bouchard and Sherry Simon, 216. 
26 For example, Foucault seems sympathetic to Becker’s analysis of delinquency and penal policy, precisely 
because it effaces the anthropology of the criminal and, by referring instead to his or her calculable 
interests, is not moralizing, pathologizing, or normalizing: “First of all, there is an anthropological erasure 
of the criminal. It should be said that this does not mean that the level of the individual is suppressed 
[manuscript note: “not a nullification of the technologies aiming to influence individual behavior”], but 
rather that an element, dimension, or level of behavior can be postulated which can be interpreted as 
economic behavior and controlled as such. … In other words, all the distinctions that have been made 
between born criminals, occasional criminals, the perverse and the not perverse, and recidivists are not 
important. We must be prepared to accept that, in any case, however pathological the subject may be at a 
certain level and when seen from a certain angle, he is nevertheless ‘responsive’ to some extent to possible 
gains and losses, which means that penal action must act on the interplay of gains and losses or, in other 
words, on the environment; we must act on the market milieu in which the individual makes his supply of 




power would act on the conditions of action, on the field of possible actions, 
disincentivizing undesirable behaviors and incentivizing desirable ones, rather than 
disciplining the bodies and forces of individuals. Thus, on such a view, Foucault might 
turn out to be an apologist for neoliberalism after all, not only in the sense of a critical-
liberal right of the governed, but from the perspective of government itself, that is, in 
terms of a positivist schema for managing the conduct of the population. 
The key for understanding why such a view is misguided is the recognition that, 
despite its pretentions to the contrary, neoliberal governmentality involves a fundamental 
intensification of power’s exercise. This is because the economico-political function of 
power, ever adjusting the double process of capitalization and control of conduct, has 
come to capture and commodify the mental life of subjectivity: the very ‘freedoms’ that 
the market provides, the arrays of individual choice that neoliberalism makes possible, 
are themselves merely so many instruments for our subjection, that is, for producing and 
putting to work our ‘interests, desires, and aspirations.’ Here is how Jason Read puts the 
point: 
As a mode of governmentality, neoliberalism operates on interests, desires, and 
aspirations rather than through rights and obligations; it does not directly mark the 
body, as sovereign power, or even curtail actions, as disciplinary power; rather, it 
acts on the conditions of actions. Thus, neoliberal governmentality follows a 
general trajectory of intensification. This trajectory follows a fundamental paradox; 
as power becomes less restrictive, less corporeal, it also becomes more intense, 
saturating the field of actions, and possible actions.27 
 
Thus, just as disciplinary power, despite being less corporeal and restrictive than 
sovereign power, is by no means an ‘improvement’ (pace humanist reformists) but 
instead a more insidious and effective redoubling of power; so, too, neoliberal 
                                                




governmentality is a more insidious and effective redoubling of power when compared to 
discipline, despite being even less corporeal and restrictive.  
This point is indeed central to Foucault’s very analytic of power. The logic of 
discipline is what Foucault terms ‘mildness-production-profit’ (rather than ‘levying-
violence’ proper to sovereign power), and the function of disciplinary power is to make 
human multiplicities and the individuals who compose them more productive and more 
docile (e.g., in factories, schools, army barracks, prisons, and hospitals). To the extent 
that panopticism as a general strategy is effective, power will operate without ever having 
to be coercively imposed, since individuals themselves become the relay and instruments 
for power’s exercise.  
Read’s argument is that we must say the very same thing about neoliberal 
governmentality since it realizes the logic of mildness-production-profit, only to an even 
greater degree: the seamless efficiency of a power that operates without having to coerce, 
but rather through incitation, that is, by having been internalized and reproduced through 
the actions and mental lives of individuals. Such actions appear to be freely chosen, such 
mental lives to be freely experienced and pursued, but both are circumscribed within a 
field of possibility precisely delimited by power. That is, neoliberalism allows an 
intensification of political techniques of control: ever milder and less coercive in their 
application, such techniques form individuals who are more productive and profitable, 
governable and docile, precisely to the extent that individuals as economic agents are de-
politicized, privatized, removed from (and set competitively against) collective relations 




exercise, for power has already operated upon the conditions of action and the field of 
what is possible, which is to say, upon the interests of the subjects it helps to produce. 
We may thus conclude that just as Foucault situates himself in the Kantian tradition 
of the critical attitude, which would contest the positivist tradition of Kant, so, too, 
Foucault critiques the excessive economico-political function of neoliberal 
governmentality. The view that Foucault would be an apologist for neoliberalism, 
however, might have one more recourse: might it not be the case that the Beckerian 
theory of human capital provides a form of critical neoliberalism that would call into 
question the undue exercise of power?  
I would suggest that the answer must be ‘no,’ and that it is here where we see the 
essential difference between Becker and Foucault. The Chicago School takes the 
individual neoliberal subject – homo economicus, understood as an indivisible atom of 
self-interested decision-making agency, attended by a naturalized form of rationality 
(rational choice theory) – to be in some sense a universal given, or at least a necessary 
methodological presupposition. What neoliberalism will not do is conceive of this form 
of economic man as itself a product of power – an effect of a very specific process of 
subjection –, one whose interests, preferences, desires, projects, etc. are themselves 
produced in accordance with conditions of action made possible and regulated by 
neoliberal governmentality (that is, the market principles of competition and private 
enterprise). In other words, neoliberalism cannot adopt a critical attitude toward what is 
the very site, effect, and relay of power in contemporary capitalist society.  
For Foucault, the critical Kantian tradition contests the positivist analytic of truth by 




ourselves,’ posing the question: “In what is given to us as universal, necessary, obligatory, 
what place is occupied by whatever is singular, contingent, and the product of arbitrary 
constraints?”28 Because neoliberalism cannot put this question to its own formulation of 
homo economicus, it cannot critique what is, in fact, the excessive exercise of 
government proper to capitalism today.
                                                




CHAPTER 2. THE DEGREE ZERO OF VERTICALITY: FREEDOM AND 
TRANSGRESSION IN THE KANTIAN SUBLIME  
“For Nietzsche, Bataille, Blanchot, …[w]hat is required is the maximum of intensity and 
the maximum of impossibility at the same time…. [E]xperience has the function of 
wrenching the subject from itself, of seeing to it that the subject is no longer itself, or that 
it is brought to its annihilation or its dissolution.” 
— Foucault29 
 
“Taste promises everyone the happiness of an accomplished subjective unity; the sublime 
speaks to a few of another unity, much less complete, ruined in a sense, and more ‘noble.’” 
— Lyotard30  
 
Before excavating the foundations of the concept of verticality that will be basic to 
the account given here of ethical and political agency, the term itself must be unburdened 
of some of its common connotations. ‘Verticality’ does not refer to a hierarchical relation, 
the line of force of which would travel from above to below, or to associated notions like 
social stratification and institutional centralization. Nor does it refer to a religious axis of 
transcendence, construed in terms of otherworldliness above or below. Rather, a clue for 
understanding the special sense given to ‘verticality’ by Foucault happens to be contained 
in the etymology of the word sublime, the origins of which lie in the Greek noun hupsos 
(height). ‘Sublime’ is derived from the Latin word sublīmus (uplifted, high, elevated, 
exalted, towering), which the standard etymology renders as sub (up to) + līmen
                                                
29 Foucault, “Interview with Michel Foucault,” Power: Essential Works of Foucault, Volume 3, edited by 
Faubion, translated by Hurley, 241. 




(threshold of a building). However, as Timothy Costelloe notes, there is a compelling 
alternate etymology, suggested in 1967 by A. Ernout and A. Meillet in their Dictionnaire 
étymologique de la langue latine, histoire des mots, that  
…involves the connection made over time between sub (under or at the bottom) and 
super (to raise, to bring to a standing position from below), and the postclassical 
confusion among three different words and, consequently, three possible roots from 
which it might arise: līmen (threshold or lintel), limes (a road bordering and 
delimiting a field), and līmus (sidelong/oblique). Ernout and Meillet argue for līmus, 
rendering sublīmis as ‘moving upward from a position below: hence rising 
diagonally, or more specifically from below to above, along a diagonal path.’31 
 
As should be clear later on, this oblique trajectory of sublime up-rising comes quite close 
to describing the directionality of the vertical vector in Foucault, an elevating movement 
emerging ‘from below’ that also involves a crossing-over of thresholds and trans-gressing 
of delimitation.  
It is indeed fitting, then, that the philosophical basis of Foucault’s concept of 
verticality can be reconstructed out of Kant’s account of the sublime32 in the Critique of 
Judgment. The very category of the limit-experience, central to a certain lineage of tragic 
thought in which Foucault situates himself,33 finds perhaps its first distinctively modern 
philosophical expression in the Kantian sublime. However, just as Foucault identifies a 
deep tension between two opposed Kantian traditions, the critical limit-attitude and the 
positivist analytic of truth, so a similar ambivalence can be discerned in Kant’s own 
treatment of sublime feeling. On the one hand, Kant articulates the limit-experience of 
                                                
31 Timothy M. Costelloe, “The Sublime: A Short Introduction to a Long History,” in The Sublime: From 
Antiquity to the Present, edited by Costelloe, 3. 
32 The German noun and adjective for ‘sublime’ – respectively, Das Erhabene and erhaben – derive from 
the Middle High German verb erheben (to raise aloft). The same general point about the vertical 
connotations of the ‘sublime’ and its etymology thus also applies. 
33 I have in mind here, for example, Nietzsche, Heidegger, Levinas, Blanchot, and Bataille. Foucault also 
identifies as belonging to this tradition such literary writers as Sade, Hölderlin, Nerval, Mallarmé, Artaud, 





radical finitude by which the constitutive structures of the thinking subject and the 
empirical world are undone. On the other hand, as though sensing some danger in this 
‘abyss-deep thought’ (Nietzsche), Kant moralizes the aesthetic experience of sublime 
terror and delight, invoking by way of explanation our ratio-volitional vocation and 
respect for the moral law.34  
In what follows in this chapter, I will analyze both of these aspects of the Kantian 
sublime, beginning with the latter by examining the relation between sublime and moral 
feeling. While this first reading of the sublime, since it takes Kant’s appeal to the moral 
law at face value, is in some sense more traditional (or naïve) than the one to follow, my 
interpretive strategy will be to invert the standard relation between moral and sublime 
feeling, according to which the latter is parasitic on the former. Rather than merely 
moralize sublime feeling by locating its source in our respect for the moral law within us, 
my aim is, as it were, to ‘sublime’ moral feeling: I will argue that moral feeling serves for 
Kant as the ratio cognoscendi of human freedom, and that such feeling can play this role 
precisely by virtue of its aesthetic expression in the sublime.35 In short, I will argue that it 
is sublime experience which satisfies a necessary condition of realization for ethical 
                                                
34 In his lectures on Kant’s Critique of Judgment given at the New School for Social Research in Fall 2007, 
Jay Bernstein refers to this moralizing gesture as Kant’s ‘containment strategy.’ See Bernstein, “The 
Sublime – 11.28.2007,” http://bernsteintapes.com/3rdCritiquelist.html. 
35 In her article “The Moral Source of the Kantian Sublime” (2012), Melissa McBay Merritt argues that 
since, for Kant, “our capacity to appreciate the sublime in nature is grounded in the development of sound 
moral disposition”; and since such development is the proper vocation of human beings; it follows that “the 
sublime and its connection to morality is not a peripheral curiosity for Kant … [but] runs, rather, to the very 
heart of his critical philosophy” (Merritt, “The Moral Source of the Kantian Sublime,” in The Sublime: 
From Antiquity to the Present, 49). While I agree with Merritt’s conclusion regarding the centrality of the 
sublime for Kant, on her account, the sublime remains epiphenomenal to ethical agency: that is, sublime 
experience (and specifically, one’s unwearied enjoyment of it) may appear as a sign of a sound moral 
disposition, but it does not play a role in bringing the latter about. By contrast, what I am arguing for is not 
the moral source of the Kantian sublime, but the sublime source of Kantian morality: sublime experience, 
for Kant, is that through which we can become aware of our freedom as rational agents, which awareness is 




agency, a claim which anticipates an analogous and fundamental role played by vertical 
experience in Foucault’s theory of political agency.  
The second part of this chapter, in turn, will examine in greater detail the structure 
of the sublime as a form of limit-experience, for it is here that we see how the Kantian 
sublime supplies the conceptual foundations for Foucauldian verticality. Drawing from 
Lyotard’s interpretation in Lessons on the Analytic of the Sublime, I will demonstrate how 
the sublime is an intensive experience of finitude – the precursor to what Nietzsche will 
call the ‘tragic’; Heidegger, ‘transcendence’; Bataille, ‘transgression’; and Blanchot, ‘the 
thought of the outside’ – by means of which thought is elevated to its highest vocation as 
critique. 
 
2.1 The Sublime Source of Ethical Agency 
In arguing for the view that, for Kant, moral feeling is the ratio cognoscendi of 
freedom, I am largely in agreement with the position recently advanced by Dieter 
Schönecker, who interprets Kant as a special kind of ethical intuitionist insofar as the 
moral feeling of respect is that through which “we recognize the validity of the moral 
law.”36 What I aim to show, however, is that we can only understand how moral feeling 
performs the ratio cognoscendi function – that is, to make us first aware of our practical 
                                                
36 Dieter Schönecker, “Kant’s Moral Intuitionism: The Fact of Reason and Moral Dispositions,” Kant 
Studies Online, 2013, 2. As Schönecker later elaborates: “…we cognize the binding validity of the moral 
law through an immediately given feeling. Thus the thesis not only implies that respect prompts us to do 
what is morally right, and that respect is therefore an incentive. Respect is also a feeling through which I 
cognize something; it is through the feeling of respect that the CI is given to us in its absolute validity. We 
could therefore also say that Kant is an ethical intuitionist, precisely because consciousness of the CI as a 
fact of reason is itself an intuition, in the sense that it is a non-inferential, epistemically fundamental, and 
reliable (though not necessarily unrevisable) emotional act of cognition with regard to binding validity. The 




freedom – by situating such feeling in relation to the sublime, with which it is “akin”37 in 
formal conditions and structure. For Kant, the sublime is that form of aesthetic 
experience by which we gain access to moral feeling, or which stirs such feeling in us. 
Indeed, by disclosing to us our duty to the moral law within us, and by thus calling the 
mind to its higher vocation, sublime feeling plays the same role as the controversial “fact 
of reason” that is so central to the argument of the second Critique. The strategy, then, 
will be to read the third Critique back into the second, analyzing the relations between 
sublime and moral feeling so as to illuminate their essential place in Kant’s critical 
system. 
Basic to this interpretation will be to show how Kant’s account of both moral and 
sublime feeling follows from his philosophical anthropology, where what distinguishes 
the being of human being is to have a double nature as simultaneously sensible and 
intelligible, homo phaenomenon and homo noumenon.38 I will use the term constitutive 
limit to refer to the boundary that separates these two heterogeneous aspects (‘attributes,’ 
‘domains’) of our being – a dividing line which is the very site of sublime and moral 
                                                
37 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Judgment, translated by Werner S. Pluhar,“General Comment on the 
Exposition of Aesthetic Reflective Judgments,” 267 
38 See Kant’s solution to the apparent contradiction of having a duty to oneself in The Metaphysics of 
Morals: “When a human being is conscious of a duty to himself, he views himself, as the subject of duty, 
under two attributes: first as a sensible being, that is, as a human being (a member of one of the animal 
species), and secondly as an intelligible being (not merely as a being that has reason, since reason as a 
theoretical faculty could well be an attribute of a living corporeal being). The senses cannot attain this latter 
aspect of a human being; it can be cognized only in morally practical relations, where the incomprehensible 
property of freedom is revealed by the influence of reason on the inner lawgiving will. Now the human 
being as a natural being that has reason (homo phaenomenon) can be determined by his reason, as a cause, 
to actions in the sensible world, and so far the concept of obligation does not come into consideration. But 
the same human being thought in terms of his personality, that is, as a being endowed with inner freedom 
(homo noumenon), is regarded as a being that can be put under obligation and, indeed, under obligation to 
himself (to the humanity in his own person). So the human being (taken in these two different senses) can 
acknowledge a duty to himself without falling into contradiction (because the concept of a human being is 





feeling. This divide, which it is the singularity of human being to encompass, reflects the 
‘immense gulf’ that separates the sensible and supersensible domains in general, and that 
can only be bridged practically through the exercise of our freedom39: that is, through the 
pursuit and cultivation of our supersensible vocation, for which we first require the 
awareness of our autonomy, enabled by the feeling that manifests both the moral law 
within us and the rational determinability of our will by this law. 
Indeed, what is so “singular” and “peculiar”40 about moral and sublime feeling is 
that through them – that is, through sensibility, albeit in a negative manner – we become 
conscious of our freedom as rational agents or moral persons, which is to say, of a 
supersensible power of the mind (rational volition). It is just insofar as moral and sublime 
feeling involve both our sensible and intelligible aspects that we can recognize and 
experience a freedom within ourselves that gives us practical access to that which 
exceeds all standards of sense. And these special forms of feeling involve both our 
sensible and intelligible aspects precisely insofar as they are experiences of our 
constitutive limit. In this sense, human freedom and ethical agency cannot be grasped 
independently of human finitude, of the limit that simultaneously divides our being and 
makes possible the experience (in moral or sublime feeling) of this division as both pain 
(from the perspective of our sensible side) and respect or elevation to our highest 
vocation (from the perspective of our intelligible side). 
                                                
39 See the Preface to the Critique of Judgment: “Hence an immense gulf is fixed between the domain of the 
concept of nature, the sensible, and the domain of the concept of freedom, the supersensible, so that no 
transition from the sensible to the supersensible (and hence by means of the theoretical use of reason) is 
possible, just as if they were two different worlds, the first of which cannot have any influence on the 
second; and yet the second is to have an influence on the first, i.e., the concept of freedom is to actualize in 
the world of sense the purpose enjoined by its laws” (Kant, Critique of Judgment, §46, 175-6). 




2.1.1 The Sublime as Aesthetic Expression of Moral Feeling 
Let us begin with the sublime. Sublime feeling is an aesthetic reflective judgment 
the quality of which is complex or double, containing two analytically distinct moments of 
anguish (pain or displeasure) and exaltation (elevating respect). In the experience of the 
mathematical sublime, which is occasioned by the immensity of a boundless object of 
nature (e.g., a raging tempestuous sea or a craggy glacial pass) that carries with it the idea 
of infinity, reason demands that the imagination present in sensibility an extensive 
magnitude that is absolutely large, i.e., that takes as its basic unit of measure “the absolute 
whole of nature, which, in the case of nature as appearance, is infinity comprehended.”41 In 
turn, the imagination, because of its limitations as a finite faculty, necessarily fails and 
cannot provide the requisite schema to form a sensible intuition of such an infinite 
magnitude. But precisely because of this failure, which is first experienced as anguish, the 
mind as a whole is called to a higher vocation insofar as sublime feeling calls to mind an 
idea of reason (here, the idea of the supersensible substrate of nature) to which all 
phenomenal presentations in nature are inadequate.  
Accordingly, what is sublime is not the sensible object of nature at all but, rather, 
the supersensible power of the mind: “For what is sublime, in the proper meaning of the 
term, cannot be contained in any sensible form but concerns only ideas of reason, which, 
though they cannot be exhibited adequately, are aroused and called to mind by this very 
inadequacy, which can be exhibited in sensibility.”42  This ‘arousal’ and elevation of the 
mind is then felt as exaltation, which not only is made possible by the inadequacy of 
                                                
41 Kant, Critique of Judgment, §26, 255. 




imagination’s finite powers, but is indissociable from this very inadequacy: “Yet this 
inadequacy itself is the arousal in us of the feeling that we have within us a supersensible 
power.”43  
Indeed, the two feelings of anguish and exaltation are one and the same experience 
(the sublime), the first felt from the perspective of our sensible being and its limitations, 
the second felt from the perspective of our supersensible being and its power to exceed 
these limitations through the ideas of reason that we give to ourselves. It is important to 
note that this second feeling of what exceeds sensible limits is not a special kind of 
positive intuition. Rather, it is like the flip side of the negative feeling of inadequacy and 
inadequation by which our imagination, constrained in its power of aesthetic estimation 
by the standards of sensibility, feels its own limitations in impossibly striving to realize 
an unattainable idea of reason; yet because this ceaseless striving also expresses our 
respect for our ‘supersensible power,’ we are aroused by virtue of this negative feeling to 
discover in our power of reason that which is superior to nature in us. This arousal, which 
is the feeling of the imagination’s inadequacy, is also the feeling by which we are 
elevated to a higher vocation than that of our career as sensibly determinable beings. And 
this apparently ambivalent quality of sublime feeling, which is both an anguished 
disliking and a ‘soul-stirring delight,’ can only be explained by the double nature of 
human beings as simultaneously homo phaenomenon and homo noumenon.  
At the interior limit that divides and doubles human being, the mathematical 
sublime is thus the feeling of a limit-relation between the phenomenal and noumenal 
dimensions of our being. In other words, the mathematical sublime is a limit-experience 
                                                




of the constitutive division that structures the being of human being as a rational and free 
yet sensuously dependent creature. 
The dynamical sublime possesses a similar structure: confronted by the destructive 
chaos of nature in all its might (e.g., “volcanoes with all their destructive power, 
hurricanes with all the devastation they leave behind”44), we face our own fragile 
sensuous finitude and “recognize our physical impotence”45 to resist such might; yet at 
the same time, and by virtue of first encountering our sensible powerlessness, we also 
feel within ourselves a different, non-sensible power which is undominated by and hence 
superior to nature. We thus judge the terrible forces of natural disaster as sublime because 
“they raise the soul’s fortitude above its usual middle range,” stoking in us the courage to 
believe that we could resist “nature’s seeming omnipotence” – not insofar as we could 
oppose it with equal natural might, but insofar as we discover in ourselves a greater 
strength of a higher order, that is, the “strength … to regard as small the [objects] of our 
[natural] concerns: property, health, and life….”46  
In other words – and indeed, in words that distinctly echo the famous ‘gallows  
example’ by which Kant aims to illustrate the fact of reason in the second Critique – the 
exaltation of the dynamical sublime is the feeling that nature’s might, irresistible though 
it be with respect to our natural being, exerts no “dominance over us, as persons, that we 
should have to bow if our highest principles were at stake and we had to choose between  
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upholding or abandoning them.”47 The dynamical sublime thus “keeps the humanity in 
our person from being degraded,”48 for, as in the gallows example, the power to ‘regard 
as small’ even our strongest natural inclination (love of life) demonstrates the 
motivational and ratio-volitional force of morality within us, which is irreducible to 
sensible determination. In such a way does the sublime serve as the ratio cognoscendi of 
human freedom. 
There is thus a double movement that animates sublime feeling, reflecting the 
double nature of human being from each side of the divide: on the one hand, we 
experience anguish when we confront our own sensible limitation, yet ‘at the same time,’ 
the very inadequacy of our sensible finitude reveals to us a heterogeneous and 
supersensible power of our minds that is superior to either the immensity or might of 
nature. In the mathematical sublime, the mind is elevated by the idea of the supersensible 
substrate of nature, which contains infinity under itself as a unit; in the dynamical 
sublime, the mind is elevated by the ideas of rational volition (freedom as unconditioned 
causation) and the absolute worth of ‘the humanity of our person,’ which empower us to 
uphold our ‘highest principles’ regardless of natural pressures or inclinations to the 
contrary, even at the risk of our most basic material concerns. In both cases, the pain of 
                                                
47 Kant, Critique of Judgment, §28, 262. Cf.: “Suppose someone asserts of his lustful inclination that, when 
the desired object and opportunity are present, it is quite irresistible to him; ask him whether, if a gallows 
were erected in front of the house where he finds this opportunity and he would be hanged on it 
immediately after gratifying his lust, he would not then control his inclination. One need not conjecture 
very long what he would reply. But ask him whether, if his prince demanded, on pain of the same 
immediate execution, that he give false testimony against an honorable man whom the prince would like to 
destroy under a plausible pretext, he would consider it possible to overcome his love of life, however great 
it may be. He would perhaps not venture to assert whether he would do it or not, but he must admit without 
hesitation that it would be possible for him. He judges, therefore, that he can do something because he is 
aware that he ought to do it and cognizes freedom within him, which, without the moral law, would have 
remained unknown to him” (Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, 5:30). 




encountering our own sensible finitude in its failings or limitations is simultaneously the 
exalting feeling by which “the mind can come to feel its own sublimity, which lies in its 
vocation and elevates it even above nature.”49  
What is sublime, then, is the auto-elevating power of the mind by which we become 
aware of our dignity and calling as rational agents that contain within ourselves the power 
to autonomously determine our will. It is by demanding of ourselves the realization of an 
idea of reason, to which we strive to become adequate and which striving becomes a law 
for us, that we simultaneously come up against our own sensible “limits and inadequacy” 
and discover the feeling of “respect for our own vocation,”50 a vocation that exceeds all 
sensible mensuration and, as Kant puts it in the second Critique, “elevates a human being 
above himself (as part of the sensible world).”51  
Such respect – which Kant defines as the “feeling that it is beyond our ability to 
attain to an idea that is a law for us,”52 and which is already active in the imagination’s 
impossible striving to meet the demand of reason in the mathematical sublime – is the 
aesthetic expression of what in moral feeling will be understood as duty to the moral law 
within us. For indeed, moral feeling forms the very basis of sublime judgments: “But it is 
this idea [of the supersensible] that is aroused in us when, as we judge an object 
aesthetically, this judging strains the imagination to its limit, whether of expansion 
(mathematically) or of its might over the mind (dynamically). The judging strains the 
imagination because it is based on a feeling that the mind has a vocation that wholly 
                                                
49 Ibid. 
50 Ibid, §27, 257. 
51 Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, 5:86. 




transcends the domain of nature (namely, moral feeling)….”53 The imagination is pushed 
to the limit of its exercise, compelled to confront the boundary of its sensible finitude in 
sensibility (anguish) and, at the same time, to awaken the mind through this feeling to its 
supersensible vocation as a free rational agent (respect), which ‘wholly transcends’ the 
limits of nature’s domain. And this feeling of the mind of respect for its supersensible 
vocation just is moral feeling, by which we disclose to ourselves the rational 
determinability of our will.  
However, sublime feeling seems to naturally involve a certain subreptive illusion 
whereby the object of the sublime is mistaken as a sensible object of nature rather than a 
moral vocation of the powers of the mind.54 Therefore, in order to in fact become 
conscious of our freedom as moral agents through sublime feeling, sublime judgment 
must offer a critical corrective to the fallacy of subreption, identifying the anguish and 
exaltation not with respect to the immense or mighty object of sensible nature (which is a 
mere occasion for sublime judgment) but to a sublime attunement of the mental powers. 
Indeed, if we mistook the sublime object as something sensible (a hurricane, crashing 
waterfall, etc.); and if we correctly understood the sublime as disclosing an idea of reason 
that “even to be able to think proves that the mind has a power surpassing any standard of 
sense”55; then sublime feeling would degenerate into the dangerous delusion of 
fanaticism, that is, “the delusion of wanting to SEE something beyond all bounds of 
                                                
53 Ibid, “General Comment on the Exposition of Aesthetic Reflective Judgments,” 268, my emphasis. 
54 “But by a certain subreption* (in which respect for the object is substituted for respect for the idea of 
humanity within our[selves as] subject[s]) this respect is accorded an object of nature that, as it were, 
makes intuitable for us the superiority of the rational vocation of our cognitive powers over the greatest 
powers of sensibility” (Ibid, §27, 257). Where asterisked, the editor notes Kant’s definition of the 
subreptive fallacy from the Inaugural Dissertation (1770): “We may call fallacy of subreption (by analogy 
with the accepted meaning) the intellect’s trick of slipping in a concept of sense as if it were the concept of 
an intellectual characteristic.” 




sensibility….”56 By critically restricting the sublime to a “pure, elevating, and merely 
negative exhibition of morality”57 – one which is expressed through the aesthetic 
reflective feeling of anguish and exaltation – the idea of freedom can be disclosed to us 
without our lapsing into fanatical delusion.   
Moreover, because the sublime object proper is the vocation of the mind, involving 
a mental attunement or discordant harmony of the faculties that universally pertains to all 
human beings qua free, rational, sensibly dependent beings, sublime aesthetic reflective 
judgments are therefore necessary judgments, for they have their  
…foundation in human nature: in something that, along with common sense, we 
may require and demand of everyone, namely, the predisposition to the feeling for 
(practical) ideas, i.e., to moral feeling. This is what underlies the necessity – which 
we include in our judgment about the sublime – of the assent of other people’s 
judgments to our own. … [W]e presuppose moral feeling in man. And so we 
attribute necessity to this [kind of] aesthetic judgment as well.58 
 
The predisposition to moral feeling in human beings – that by which pure reason 
becomes practical and our wills rationally determinable insofar as the moral law holds a 
practical (rather than pathological) incentive for us – is the necessary and universal 
(hence a priori) condition of possibility for sublime feeling, as well as that which grounds 
sublime judgment’s modal claim to (subjective) necessity. As we will see below, moral 
feeling is itself cognizable a priori, just as humiliation is a universal and necessary feeling 
for all human beings who contrast their sensibly dependent self-conceit to the austere 
majesty of the moral law within them. Kant can thus help himself to the presupposition of 
‘moral feeling in man,’ and he does so by again relying upon the double nature of human 
                                                
56 Ibid, “General Comment,” 275. 
57 Ibid. 




beings, i.e., the limit-relation between the phenomenal and noumenal dimensions of our 
being.59 
A triple relation therefore obtains between sublime and moral feeling. First, the 
universality of moral feeling in human beings grounds the necessity of sublime 
judgments and thereby secures sublime feeling its licensed place within transcendental 
philosophy.60 Second, the two feelings are “akin” with respect to their structure and 
“formal conditions” inasmuch as both elevate us to respect our supersensible vocation as 
autonomous moral agents by “overcoming” the “obstacles” of our sensual dependence.61 
Indeed, sublime judgments disclose to us our duty toward an idea of reason – the 
attainment of which we give to ourselves as a law but can yet never be adequate to – and 
thus express (negatively exhibit) the rational determinability of our will, “which 
determinability is moral feeling.”62 Thus, third, sublime feeling is the aesthetic expression 
of moral feeling that makes manifest our duty to the moral law in ourselves and elevates 
us through respect for our supersensible vocation. Indeed, in (dynamical) sublime feeling 
we take an intellectual liking to the moral law because we experience our rationally 
determinable will as a might that is independent of and superior to the sensible might of 
nature outside or within us. In short, moral feeling, realized aesthetically through the 
                                                
59 Further, if it is true that moral feeling is the ratio cognoscendi of freedom, then this would also allow 
Kant to presuppose universal moral feeling: for if all human beings have the ability to be conscious of 
themselves as free, and if moral feeling is itself the ratio cognoscendi of freedom, then we may infer that 
moral feeling is something for which all human beings have the disposition or ability. 
60 See Kant, Critique of Judgment, §29, 266. 





sublime, discloses to us our vocation as free rational agents; it thus serves in sensibility as 
the ratio cognoscendi of freedom.63 
 
2.1.2 Moral Feeling as the Ratio Cognoscendi of Human Freedom 
In light of this reading of the third Critique, let us now approach moral feeling in 
the second, inquiring further into its structure and the role it plays in the practical 
incentive of the moral law. Insofar as the moral law commands that our free will be 
exclusively determined by the law, the law provides a negative incentive, for it rules out 
the sensible inclinations and impulses that stem from our pathological determinations as 
sensibly affected creatures. Yet this proscriptive effect, which ‘can be cognized a priori’ 
since it is merely negative, is itself felt precisely as the pain of privation by the 
pathologically determinable self:  
So far, then, the effect of the moral law as incentive is only negative, and as such 
this incentive can be cognized a priori. For, all inclination and every sensible 
impulse is based on feeling, and the negative effect on feeling (by the infringement 
upon the inclinations that take place) is itself feeling. Hence we can see a priori that 
the moral law, as the determining ground of the will, must by thwarting all our 
inclinations produce a feeling that can be called pain; and here we have the first and 
perhaps the only case in which we can determine a priori from concepts the relation 
of a cognition (here the cognition of pure practical reason) to the feeling of pleasure 
and displeasure.64 
 
                                                
63 Of course, the duty remains to exercise this freedom through practicing our moral agency by making the 
moral law the determining ground of our will: “For here the liking concerns only our ability’s vocation, 
revealed in such cases, insofar as the predisposition to this ability is part of our nature, whereas it remains 
up to us, as our obligation, to develop and exercise this ability.” (Ibid, §28, 262) We can thereby resist and 
overcome the sensible obstacles that threaten us by means of the moral principles that preserve respect for 
our humanity. Indeed, this just is the practice of virtue, and it is here that the importance of the Categorical 
Imperative can be situated as an ethical test of the moral worth of our actions. However, the exercise of this 
ability is only possible under the condition that we are first made aware of this ability as our supersensible 
vocation, a condition satisfied by moral feeling and expressed in sublime anguish and exaltation. 




Specifically, when the moral law serves as the sole and immediate determining 
ground of the will, the inclinations belonging to self-love are brought into line with the 
demands of agreement with the law, and the inclinations belonging to self-conceit – 
which are antecedent to the law, and upon which we base our arrogant self-satisfaction – 
are nullified insofar as “certainty of a disposition in accord with this law is the first 
condition of any worth of a person.”65 Self-conceit, which robs human personality of its 
dignity, is the form of deluded self-worth of a human being who, having never 
encountered her constitutive limit, takes her sensible self (homo phaenomenon) to 
constitute her entire being (to the exclusion of homo noumenon), treating self-love as 
though it were “the unconditional practical principle.”66 
Further, the delusion of self-conceit contains a subreptive illusion, for we mistake 
our sensibly determinable self for our rational lawgiving self. When we fall under this 
illusion, we treat our own subjective determining grounds, our self-love, as though it 
were a universal and objectively valid principle for acting. This is, moreover, precisely 
how Kant here defines ‘delusion,’ namely, as “the internal practical deception of taking 
what is subjective in a motive for something objective.”67 Accordingly, in the critical first 
moment of moral feeling, we feel humiliated because our self-conceit – that by which we 
prescribe “as laws the subjective conditions of self-love”68 – is disclosed, belied, and 
                                                
65 Ibid, 5:73. 
66 See Ibid, 5:74: “[W]e find our nature as sensible beings so constituted that the matter of the faculty of 
desire (objects of inclination, whether of hope or fear) first forces itself upon us, and we find our 
pathologically determinable self, even though it is quite unfit to give universal law through its maxims, 
nevertheless striving antecedently to make its claims primary and originally valid, just as if it constituted 
our entire self. This propensity to make oneself as having subjective determining grounds of choice into 
the objective determining ground of the will in general can be called self-love; and if self-love makes itself 
lawgiving and the unconditional practical principle, it can be called self-conceit” (ibid, my bold). 
67 Kant, VA 7:274; cited in Allen Wood, Kant’s Ethical Thought: 266. 




debased. This humiliation, suffered by our pathologically determinable selves at the 
hands of the moral law, is necessary and universal (hence cognizable a priori) for all 
human beings: “Now, what in our own judgment infringes upon our self-conceit 
humiliates. Hence the moral law unavoidably humiliates every human being when he 
compares with it the sensible propensity of his nature.”69 Thus, in feeling the proscriptive 
force of the moral law within us and ‘our own judgment’ restrict the sway of our 
inclinations, we compare ourselves in our sensuous finitude to the moral law “in its 
solemn majesty”70 and feel ourselves degraded. 
However, this first negative moment of pain and humiliation flows directly into a 
second, positive moment of moral feeling, for the humiliation itself by which self-conceit 
is ‘struck down’ is simultaneously the feeling of respect: “inasmuch as it even strikes 
downs self-conceit, that is, humiliates it, it is an object of the greatest respect and so too 
the ground of a positive feeling that is not of empirical origin and is cognized a priori.”71 
Insofar as the moral law is “something in itself positive – namely the form of an 
intellectual causality, that is, of freedom”72; and insofar as we freely give ourselves this 
law by legislating it as the determining ground of our own will; the law elicits the 
positive feeling of respect. Kant writes: “If something represented as a determining 
ground of our will humiliates us in our self-consciousness, it awakens respect for itself 
insofar as it is positive and a determining ground.”73  
                                                
69 Ibid, 5:74, my emphasis 
70 Ibid, 5:77. 
71 Ibid, 5:73. 
72 Ibid. 




It is what humiliates us, then, that stirs the feeling of respect; the negative feeling is 
a precondition for the positive. Indeed, in a formulation strikingly similar to that of the 
dynamical sublime, Kant argues that this feeling of respect is owed to the moral law 
overcoming the resistance of our pained sensuous inclinations that struggle against it:  
As the effect of consciousness of the moral law, and consequently in relation to an 
intelligible cause, namely the subject of pure practical reason as the supreme 
lawgiver, this feeling of a rational subject affected by inclinations is indeed called 
humiliation (intellectual contempt); but in relation to its positive ground, the law, it 
is at the same time called respect for the law; there is indeed no feeling for this law, 
but inasmuch as it moves resistance out of the way, in the judgment of reason this 
removal of a hindrance is esteemed equivalent to a positive furthering of its 
causality. Because of this, this feeling can now also be called a feeling of respect for 
the moral law, while on both grounds together it can be called a moral feeling.74 
 
Moral feeling is thus always double and ambivalent, for, like sublime feeling, it is an 
experience of our constitutive limit. The moral law in us humiliates us in our self-
consciousness as pathologically determinable beings; yet in so doing, this law clears the 
way of any sensuous obstacles that would prevent it from being the sole determining 
ground of the will, and it thereby commands respect. In this regard, as in the dynamical 
sublime, we are conscious that nature in us (our inclinations) has no sway or dominance 
over us (since it need not determine the ground of our will), and we are thus elevated 
above the heteronomous and contingent conditions of our natural or sensuous being.  
Our debasement and our elevation therefore belong to the same movement, the 
same feeling of the mind, and differ only insofar as they reflect separate sides of the 
divided self: “the lowering of pretensions to moral self-esteem – that is, humiliation on 
the sensible side – is an elevation of the moral – that is, practical – esteem for the law 
                                                




itself on the intellectual side.”75 Accordingly, there is no temporal priority between 
humiliation and respect, for they are each a different perspective (one of homo 
phaenomenon, the other of homo noumenon) on the same experience. When Kant does 
write in a manner that suggests a serial relation between humiliation and respect, the 
priority of the former might be best understood as logical priority. In this sense, as with 
the inadequacy of the imagination in sublime feeling, humiliation is indeed a necessary 
first condition for respect, which is why respect – felt in the wake of the removal of 
resistance to the determination of the will by the moral law, a removal the proscriptive 
force of which unavoidably humiliates every human being who feels it – is an indirect 
effect of the moral law. As Kant writes: “respect for the moral law must be regarded as 
also a positive though indirect effect of the moral law on feeling insofar as the law 
weakens the hindering influence of the inclinations by humiliating self-conceit….”76  
Further, because the moral law is one that we give to ourselves as the determining 
ground of our will, the respect that we feel for the law in us elevates us to a higher 
vocation as autonomous though finite beings. In other words, moral feeling gives us 
insight into our freedom as moral persons, for through respect we feel within ourselves an 
incentive of pure practical reason that is both free and arises from the moral law itself: 
As submission to a law, that is, as a command (indicating constraint for the sensibly 
affected subject), it therefore contains in it no pleasure but instead, so far, 
displeasure in the action. On the other hand, however, since this constraint is 
exercised only by the lawgiving of his own reason, it also contains something 
elevating, and the subjective effect on feeling, inasmuch as pure practical reason is 
the sole cause of it, can thus be called self-approbation with reference to pure 
practical reason, inasmuch as he cognized himself as determined to it solely by the 
                                                
75 Ibid, 5:79, my emphasis. 




law and without any interest, and now becomes conscious of an altogether different 
interest subjectively produced by the law, which is purely practical and free….77 
 
The supersensible vocation to which we are elevated in the feeling of respect is precisely 
our duty to act from the moral law in such a way that the law (which we freely give to 
ourselves) exclusively and immediately determines our will. And it is respect, and the 
duty it discloses, that the moral law must effect in the mind insofar as there can be an 
incentive of pure practical reason.  
Indeed, this moral feeling of the mind reveals to the human being her personality, 
which is to say, her freedom as a moral agent. Inquiring into the origin of duty,78 Kant 
answers:  
It can be nothing less than what elevates a human being above himself (as a part of 
the sensible world) … It is nothing other than personality, that is, freedom and 
independence from the mechanism of the whole of nature, regarded nevertheless as 
also a capacity of a being subject to special laws – namely pure practical laws given 
by his own reason, so that a person as belonging to the sensible world is subject to 
his own personality insofar as he also belongs to the intelligible world…. This idea 
of personality [awakens] respect by setting before our eyes the sublimity of our 
nature (in its vocation) while at the same time showing us the lack of accord of our 
conduct with respect to it and thus striking down self-conceit….79 
 
So it is by virtue of this affection of the mind – the elevation of respect following the 
debasement of humiliation – that we are able to feel the free incentive of pure practical 
reason and, thereby, to become aware of our duty or vocation as moral persons who are 
autonomous with respect to nature and free unconditioned causes with respect to 
ourselves.  
                                                
77 Ibid, 5:80-1. 
78 “Duty! … [W]hat origin is there worthy of you, and where is to be found the root of your noble 
descent…?” (ibid, 5:86). 




In this sense, our nature and its vocation are sublime because we are not dominated 
by the might of nature in us, yet it is only insofar as we feel degraded by the moral law 
that we can have the elevated feeling of respect. That is, in order to overcome or ascend 
above our heteronomous limitations as sensibly affected beings, we must precisely 
encounter the painful failings of those limitations and feel shame when comparing these 
to the austere perfection of the moral law. Again like sublime feeling, moral feeling is 
made possible by the power of reason in us to confront our constitutive limit.  
Moral feeling is not, of course, the objective ground of the moral law, but it is the 
subjective sign through which we are affected by and made aware of the moral law; and 
the capacity for this feeling is a necessary condition for the determinability of the will by 
the moral law, which is also to say, for the exercise of human freedom. So it is by virtue 
of moral feeling – respect for the law, and also the law in us, the self-giving law that 
thereby elevates us in our supersensible vocation above our pathologically determinable 
selves – that we are made conscious of our freedom, which consciousness is identical to 
the fact of reason. Thus, if the moral law is the ratio cognoscendi of freedom – that is, 
“the condition under which we can first become aware of freedom”80 – it is so by virtue 
of moral feeling, for it is through moral feeling that the moral law becomes a subjective 
determining ground or incentive of pure practical reason. Moral feeling is that by which 
we can become aware of our supersensible vocation, that is, our duty and its origin in 
moral personality, that is, the dignity of our humanity, which is elevated above the limit-
conditions of our finite, pathologically determinable sensuous selves. However, such 
moral feeling is made possible precisely because we are finite sensuous selves who feel 
                                                




humiliation when the moral law in us determines our will and restricts our sensuous 
inclinations and pathological desires, thereby inciting pain and degradation.  
In short, only by encountering the constitutive limit of our ontological self-division 
can we feel and cognize what exceeds our sensible finitude in us: namely, our 
supersensible vocation as free rational beings.81 And as we have seen, it is in the 
experience of the sublime that we are confronted by this limit. Indeed, more than any 
merely hypothetical formulation, such as the gallows example, it is the anguish and 
exaltation of sublime feeling that awakens in us the ‘idea of personality’ by means of 
which our freedom becomes binding for us. That is, the auto-elevating movement of 
sublime experience, once a critical corrective to the natural subreption it involves has 
been applied, calls to mind our proper vocation, eliciting the moral feeling on the basis of 
which we recognize our freedom. Operating in sensibility to open thought to that which, 
in thought, is irreducible to sensibility, the sublime therefore provides the conditions of 
realization – what, in the context of Foucault, I will call the conditions of material 
expression – for ethical agency. 
 
                                                
81 It might be objected that moral feeling cannot be the ratio cognoscendi of freedom because it can only 
come after our representation of the law. Indeed, this seems to be just how Kant elsewhere distinguishes 
moral from pathological feeling: “The state of feeling here (the way in which inner sense is affected) is 
either pathological or moral. – The former is that feeling which precedes the representation of the law; the 
latter, that which can only follow upon it” (Metaphysics of Morals, 6:399). However, I would suggest that 
though moral feeling does not precede the representation of the law, neither is this representation somehow 
independent of moral feeling. Rather, moral feeling just is that by which we represent the moral law to 
ourselves, for we cannot form a representation of the law before being made aware of the law, and we are 
only made aware of the law through our humiliation before it, a humiliation which is cognizable a priori 
and which issues into our respect for the moral law in ourselves. In other words, our representation of the 
law is that by means of which we become aware of the law, but we become aware of the law by feeling its 
proscriptive force in us as the feeling of constraint, which is the feeling of humiliation proper to the first 
moment of moral feeling. So it is moral feeling that forms the basis of the representation of the moral law 
by means of which we become aware of the law in ourselves. This helps makes sense of how Kant, in the 
sentence following the one last quoted, can consistently write: “…any consciousness of obligation depends 




2.2 Anguish and Exaltation: The Limit-Experience of Transgression and the Critical 
Vocation of Thought 
“The limit-experience is the answer man receives once he decides to call himself 
radically into question. … To man, such as he is and such as will be, there belongs an 
essential lack, from which comes this right to call himself forever into question. … If he 
comes to feel this surplus of nothingness, …if he lets himself be seized by the infinity of 
finality [l’infini de la fin], then he must respond to another exigency, no longer to 
produce but to expend… Inner experience demands this event that does not belong to 
possibility; it opens in completed being an infinitesimal interstice by which all that is lets 
itself be suddenly overcome and deposed by a surfeit that escapes and exceeds it. Strange 
surplus …, surplus of void, surfeit of ‘negativity’ that is in us the infinite heart of the 
passion of thought.”    
— Blanchot82  
 
“But such an experience … discloses as its own secret and clarification, its intrinsic 
finitude, the limitless reign of the Limit, and the emptiness of those excesses [le vide de ce 
franchissement] in which it spends itself and where it is found wanting. In this sense, the 
inner experience is, throughout, an experience of the impossible (the impossible being 
both that which we experience and that which constitutes the experience).” 
— Foucault83  
 
Like the Kantian sublime, Foucault will articulate the concept of an intensive form 
of experience that enables the realization of human agency and the practice of freedom. 
Of course, Foucauldian verticality will make no appeal to the universal validity of a 
moral law or our supersensible vocation84, so the reading of the sublime given above may 
appear to be of limited instruction. However, a closer analysis of the mathematical 
sublime in the third Critique reveals another possible interpretation of sublime experience, 
one that allows us to dispense with Kant’s invocation of either a supersensible substrate 
of nature or a transcendent moral law. Indeed, what such a reading prepares is the tragic 
                                                
82 Maurice Blanchot, L’entretien infini, “L’expérience-limite,” 302-8, my translation.  
83 Foucault, “Preface to Transgression,” Aesthetics, Method, and Epistemology, 71. 
84 In his late lectures on the ancient Greek concept of parrhesia, Foucault will, however, invoke a concept 




concept of a vertical form of limit-experience, which Foucault paradigmatically refers to 
as transgression, by which the constituent subject or ‘moi-sujet’ (Bataille) is undone 
through an auto-intensifying movement of thought. It is this auto-elevating movement 
proper to the sublime, I will argue, that discloses thought’s highest vocation as vertical 
critique. 
The general form of the limit-experience can be provisionally characterized 
according to the following eight traits:  
i. Fundamentally, it is an experience of radical or absolute finitude: that is, the 
limit experienced not (or not only) as privation or limitation but as constitutive 
condition of possibility. 
ii. This experience of absolute finitude arises through an encounter with that 
which radically exceeds the limits of possible (phenomenal) experience – e.g., 
the idea of the infinite – and is thus an experience of the impossible.   
iii. In this movement by which the conditions of sensible experience and 
cognition are transcended or transgressed (yet still within sensibility itself), 
the experience of the impossible ruptures the unity of the subject (opening it 
to that which absolutely exceeds it) and at the same time ruptures the unity of 
the object (as an object of possible knowledge).85 
                                                
85 “I am open, yawning gap, to the unintelligible sky and everything in me rushes forth, is reconciled in a 
final irreconciliation. Rupture of all ‘possible’, violent kiss, abduction, loss in the entire absence of all 
‘possible’…. And above all no more abject. Ecstasy is not love: love is possession for which the object is 
necessary, and at the same time possession of the subject, possessed by it. There is no longer subject-object, 
but a ‘yawning gap’ between the one and the other and, in the gap, the subject, the object are dissolved; 
there is passage, communication, but not from one to the other: the one and the other have lost their 
separate existence. The questions of the subject, its will to know are suppressed: the subject is no longer 
there; its interrogation no longer has either meaning or a principle which introduces it. In the same way no 
answer remains possible. The answer should be ‘such is the object’, when there is no longer a distinct 




iv. Because the forms of subject and object are themselves the products of 
processes of limitation, the fracturing of these forms opens thought to the 
absolute or limitless, to an abyss (‘strange surplus of void’) that is at once a 
source of terror and joy. 
v. In the face of this unboundedness, thought is compelled to express the 
absolute, but precisely because thought itself is finite, it can only do so 
negatively by presenting the absolute as irrecoverable absence. 
vi. Since it exceeds the conditions of phenomenal experience yet takes form 
through an expanded mode of sensibility, this negative presentation of the 
absolute, which elevates thought to the very heights of its powers, can take 
form only in the feeling that thought experiences when confronting the 
absolute. 
vii. This feeling – which constitutes the proper object and criterion of the limit-
experience – is simultaneously anguish suffered in the face of thought’s 
proper limit (the impossibility of positively presenting the absolute) and 
exaltation affirmed in the movement by which thought is transported to this 
very limit and able to apprehend it as such;86 for only in this way can thought 
                                                
86 “Anguish is given in the theme of knowledge itself: as ipse, through knowledge, I would like to be 
everything, therefore to communicate, to lose myself, however to remain ipse. The subject (me, ipse) and 
the object (in part undefined, as long as it is not entirely grasped) are presented for communication, before 
it takes place. The subject wants to take hold of the object in order to possess it …, but the subject can only 
lose itself: the nonsense of the will to know appears, nonsense of all possible, making ipse know that it is 
going to lose itself and knowledge with it. As long as ipse perseveres in its will to know and to be ipse, 
anguish lasts, but if ipse abandons itself and knowledge with it, if it gives itself up to non-knowledge in this 
abandon, then rapture begins. In rapture, my existence finds a sense once again, but the sense is referred 
immediately to ipse; it becomes my rapture, a rapture which I ipse possess, giving satisfaction to my will to 
be everything. As soon as I emerge from it, communication, the loss of myself cease; I have ceased to 




touch upon its own absolute, the limit being the a priori (hence unconditioned) 
condition of possibility for thought itself. 
viii. As such, the limit is itself limitless (‘the limitless reign of the Limit’) and, by 
becoming an object of thought, opens thought to the only form of the infinite 
to which it has proper access: an infinite or radical finitude, ‘l’infini de la fin.’ 
In brief, and to invoke Lyotard: the limit-experience is a differend of feeling 
(anguish and exaltation: what Bataille calls ‘ravishment’ and Blanchot, ‘ravaging joy’) 
that is the feeling of the differend of absolute finitude and the absolute infinite on the 
occasion of thought’s being propelled to its own fundamental limit and taking this limit 
as its proper object. 
The remainder of this chapter, then, will offer an analysis of the Kantian sublime 
oriented by these eight aspects or moments of the limit-experience. This interpretation 
becomes possible if, as Lyotard suggests, the rational idea proper to the sublime, which 
reason demands that the imagination present to thought in sensation, is understood to be 
the idea of the limit, rather than the idea of nature as supersensible substrate or the idea of 
absolute freedom as unconditioned causality. In sublime experience, for a mode of 
thought capable of feeling (or, to speak with Lyotard, of tautegorically87 reflecting upon) 
                                                
87 Lyotard uses the term ‘tautegorical’ to refer to the character of aesthetic reflective judgments whereby 
the basis of the judgment – its criterion as well as its object – is the feeling itself, the pleasure or 
displeasure, that thought feels on the occasion of judging: “tautegorical [is] a term by which I designate the 
remarkable fact that pleasure and displeasure are at once both a ‘state’ of the soul and the ‘information’ 
collected by the soul relative to its state” (Lyotard, Lessons on the Analytic of the Sublime, 4). See also: 
“Any act of thinking is thus accompanied by a feeling that signals to thought its ‘state.’ But this state is 
nothing other than the feeling that signals it. For thought, to be informed of its state is to feel this state – to 
be affected. The sensation (or the feeling) is both the state of thought and a warning to thought of its state 
by this state. Such is the first characteristic of reflection: a dazzling immediacy and a perfect coincidence of 
what feels and what is felt. … Pure reflection is first and foremost the ability of thought to be immediately 





its constitutive finitude, it is precisely the idea of the limit that indicates the absolute of 
thought itself (its a priori condition), opening the power of thinking to what is, for it, 
infinite. 
 
2.2.1 The Sublime as (i) Experience of Absolute Finitude and (ii) Experience of 
Impossibility 
Whereas a judgment of beauty (aesthetic reflective judgment of taste) is occasioned 
by the singular form of an object, which exhibits a “purposiveness” (though without a 
determinant purpose) “by which the object seems as it were predetermined for our power 
of judgment, so that this beauty constitutes in itself an object of our liking”88; sublime 
judgment, on the other hand, is occasioned “by a formless object, insofar as we present 
unboundedness”89: “in what we usually call sublime in nature there is such an utter lack 
of anything leading to particular objective principles and to forms of nature conforming 
to them, that it is rather in its chaos that nature most arouses our ideas of the sublime, or 
in its wildest and most ruleless disarray and devastation, provided it displays magnitude 
and might.”90 Beauty, given in the superabundant richness of form, delights the mind by 
facilitating the harmonious and free interplay of imagination and understanding, which 
are faculties that in their cognitive employment operate on the basis of limitation and 
determination to render knowledge possible (schematization in the case of the 
imagination, subsumption of intuitions under concepts in the case of the understanding). 
By contrast, the sublime, which is also a source of delight, appears “contrapurposive for 
                                                
88 Kant, Critique of Judgment: §23, 245. 
89 Ibid, 244. 




our power of judgment”91 precisely because of the formlessness or limitlessness of the 
magnitude or might of nature that in its chaos gives rise to sublime feeling.  
This unboundedness exceeds the delimitative operations of aesthetic comprehension 
and mensuration by which the imagination presents to the understanding a sensible object 
taken as extensive magnitude. This is why, as we have seen, there is strictly speaking no 
phenomenal object of sublime experience, though there are phenomenal occasions for it. 
Confronted with the impossibility of presenting what it must nonetheless struggle to 
present, the imagination, at the limit of what it can do, feels its own failing; and it is 
precisely this failing that ‘can be exhibited in sensibility’ and thereby form the sensible 
basis (anguish) for the sublime feeling by which thought is called to that which 
transcends the conditions of possible experience.92  
The finitude of the imagination is thus itself a necessary condition for the possibility 
of an experience (in sublime feeling) of that which exceeds the very limits of possible 
experience. Despite (or, rather, by virtue of) the fact that it is contrapurposive for the 
imagination, the sublime bespeaks another, more elevated purposiveness of the mind by 
which thought encounters the absolute. The sublime is thus an experience of the 
impossible in two distinct but indissociable senses: (1) the impossibility that the 
imagination suffers when faced with the demand to present the unbounded (absolute) in 
intuition; and (2) the impossible as the sublime object proper, which ‘cannot be contained 
                                                
91 Ibid, 245. 
92 “If a sensible form cannot contain ‘the thing,’ then the latter has some relation to the Ideas of reason, for 
the objects of these ideas precisely never give an adequate presentation of themselves in a form that would 
be adapted, angemessen, to them. However, even in the case of this unpresentability of principle, what 
remains presentable for the objects of rational Ideas is the inadequacy, the Unangemessenheit, the de-
mensuration of all presentation. Presented in the sensible to and through the imagination, this ‘discrepancy’ 
reminds the mind of the Ideas that are always absent to presentation and thus revives them” (Lyotard, 




in any sensible form’ and thus exceeds the limits of possible experience that condition 
objects of sense, yet which is nevertheless presented (negatively) in sensibility through 
sublime feeling.  
This dynamic of double impossibility is on display in Kant’s account of the 
mathematical sublime:  
Hence, considered on this basis, nothing that can be an object of the senses is to be 
called sublime. [What happens is that] our imagination strives to progress toward 
infinity, while our reason demands absolute totality as a real idea, and so [the 
imagination,] our power of estimating the magnitude of things in the world of sense, 
is inadequate to that idea. Yet this inadequacy itself is the arousal in us of the 
feeling that we have within us a supersensible power; and what is absolutely large is 
not an object of sense, but is the use that judgment makes naturally of certain 
objects so as to [arouse] this (feeling), and in contrast with that use any other use is 
small. Hence what is to be called sublime is not the object, but the attunement that 
the intellect [gets] through a certain presentation that occupies reflective 
judgment.93 
 
Considered in its mathematical aspect, the sublime is “what is absolutely [schlechthin] 
large,”94 which is to say, “what is large beyond all comparison,”95 an absolute magnitude 
that exceeds any form of comparative measurement. The sublime is a kind of measureless 
measure or ‘mesure démesurée’ (Foucault): an infinite magnitude that admits of no 
numerical measurement; an absolute magnitude that gives to itself its own measure. 
“Clearly, in that case [viz., the sublime], we do not permit a standard adequate to it to be 
sought outside it, but only within it. It is a magnitude that is equal only to itself.”96 There 
can be no adequation between the absolutely large and anything outside it, for 
inadequation is the very mark of the absolute. And for that reason, the imagination can 
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possess no sensible standard by means of which it could present an adequate estimate of 
the sublime.  
Let us consider the problem in more detail. The imagination is ‘our power of 
estimating the magnitude of things in the world of sense,’ which is to say, the power of 
thought to give an aesthetic “estimation of magnitudes in mere intuition (by the eye).”97 
Aesthetic estimation of magnitude is distinguished from the mathematical estimation of 
magnitude, which employs the understanding and operates “by means of numerical 
concepts (or their signs in algebra).”98 Although “all logical estimation of magnitude is 
mathematical” insofar as “we must use numbers …, whose unity is [the unit we use as] 
the measure” in order to obtain “determinate concepts of how large something is,” 
mathematical estimation presupposes that the “magnitude of the measure” is known.99 
That is, the measure used to estimate mathematical magnitude is also a magnitude that 
must be measured in turn, and thus cannot itself be constituted mathematically. Rather, 
all mathematical estimation of magnitude depends upon a “first or basic measure,” which 
can only by given by an aesthetic estimation of magnitude as the limit of what we are 
able to “take in [fassen] directly in one intuition.”100 Lyotard puts the point as follows: 
“the very notion of measure ... proceeds from the ‘aesthetic’ limitation of the 
comprehension of the manifold in a single presentation. This is the ‘first or fundamental 
measure’ by which all mathematical measure is made possible as numerical 
                                                







determination. The ‘horizon’ of comprehension is the magnitude of the measure that 
makes the measure of magnitudes possible.”101  
Now, because the sublime is the absolutely large, the experience of the sublime 
presents to thought a magnitude that exceeds the first measure of aesthetic estimation and 
thus cannot be determined by means of numerical concepts: “estimation has been pushed 
to the point where the ability of our imagination is inadequate to exhibit the concept of 
magnitude.”102 Indeed, this is the constitutive inadequacy of the imagination that makes 
sublime experience possible. The ‘idea of the sublime’ is awakened at the very moment 
that thought, struggling to present that which surpasses its ‘power of estimating 
magnitude in the world of sense,’ confronts its own ‘first or basic measure’ as the 
absolute subjective limit of aesthetic comprehension:  
Now even though there is no maximum for the mathematical estimation of 
magnitude (inasmuch as the power of numbers progresses to infinity), yet for the 
aesthetic estimation of magnitude there is indeed a maximum. And regarding this 
latter maximum I say that when it is judged as [the] absolute measure beyond 
which no larger is subjectively possible (i.e., possible for the judging subject), then 
it carries with it the idea of the sublime and gives rise to that emotion which no 
mathematical estimation of magnitude by means of numbers can produce….103  
 
The idea of the sublime arises through a reflection by thought upon its proper finitude – 
upon the absolute limit of its powers of presentation and comprehension – and this 
reflection is occasioned by those “appearances” of nature “whose intuition carries with it 
the idea of their infinity.”104  
In a way that must still be clarified, the idea of the infinite (which attends an 
appearance of nature in its chaotic and ruleless disarray) – by virtue of the intrinsic 
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excess by which it surpasses, as absolute magnitude, the limits of the presentable – 
prompts thought to judge its own first measure as an absolute limit (the absolute of the 
finite). It is this reflective judgment of thought upon its constitutive limit that opens 
thought to the idea and feeling of the sublime: “This limit is the absolute, felt subjectively 
or aesthetically, of what the faculty of presentation can grasp in terms of presentable 
magnitude. It is enough for thought to feel this measure as insurmountable, as 
subjectively absolute, for this aesthetic maximum to convey ‘the idea of the sublime’ and 
to call for the ‘emotion’ that characterizes this feeling.”105 
It remains to articulate this ‘idea of the sublime’ in its specificity. No doubt it is an 
idea of reason, and it might seem to be simply the idea of the infinite as a whole or 
‘absolute totality,’ which reason (impossibly) demands that the imagination present in 
sensibility. However, the text of the Critique cited above suggests a more complicated 
story, for it is precisely because the ‘first or basic’ limit of the imagination is judged to be 
an ‘absolute measure’ that the thought and feeling of the sublime become possible. That 
is, the idea of the sublime owes at least as much to the absolute of the finite as to the 
absolute infinite: “The only way for this [viz., for nature to be sublime in those of its 
appearances whose intuition carries with it the idea of their infinity] to occur is through 
the inadequacy of even the greatest effort of our imagination to estimate an object’s 
magnitude.”106 Indeed, both of these absolutes are at work in the experience of the 
impossible that constitutes sublime feeling. Let us take a closer look, then, at the infinite 
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demand of reason that compels the imagination to “advance toward what is impossible 
for it.”107  
When working in conjunction with the understanding in the mathematical 
estimation of magnitude, the imagination has no difficulty progressing toward infinity by 
means of numerical concepts. However, because reason “demands totality for all given 
magnitudes,” “reason demands comprehension in one intuition, and exhibition of all the 
members of a progressively increasing numerical series, and it exempts from this demand 
not even the infinite (space and past time). Rather, reason makes us unavoidably think of 
the infinite … as given in its entirety (in its totality).”108 By requiring totalization, the 
command of reason that issues in the sublime is contrapurposive for the imagination with 
respect to the latter’s powers of ‘comprehension’ and ‘exhibition’: the thought that 
presents cannot think the infinite as an absolute and actual whole.  
But what exactly does the imagination’s failure consist in? Precisely the inability of 
the subjective syntheses of apprehension and comprehension (comprehensio aesthetica) 
to take in – in one intuition, at one time, and as a whole – a progression the magnitude of 
which exceeds the first measure of aesthetic estimation:  
Hence it must be the aesthetic estimation of magnitude where we feel that effort, 
our imagination’s effort to perform a comprehension that surpasses its ability to 
encompass [begreifen] the progressive apprehension in a whole of intuition, and 
where at the same time we perceive the inadequacy of the imagination – unbounded 
though it is as far as progressing is concerned – for taking in and using, for the 
estimation of magnitude, a basic measure that is suitable for this….109 
 
The imagination’s powers of comprehension falter before the infinite demand of reason, 
not only because comprehension (and thus aesthetic magnitude) has a limit, but because 
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comprehension itself is a delimitative operation and thus necessarily inadequate for 
presenting what is formless or limitless: “Comprehension … is limitation itself before 
any conceptual rule, for it consists in a putting into form, and form is a limitation.”110 
This point, to which we will return below, will be crucial for the claim that the idea of the 
limit is that by which thought thinks its own absolute, its proper a priori condition of 
possibility. 
 
2.2.2 The Sublime as (iii) Rupture of the Unities of Subject and Object and (iv) Opening 
of Thought to the Absolute 
It is difficult to overstate the devastation that this impossibility of comprehension 
wrecks upon the constitutive basis of the subject. To begin with, the violence the 
imagination does to itself (under the command of reason) consists in a violation of the 
three syntheses (apprehension, reproduction, recognition) that Kant analyzes in the A 
Deduction of the first Critique, and which constitute the “‘subjective sources’ that 
establish the transcendental possibility of the knowledge of objects.”111 The synthetic 
activity of comprehension is the power of the imagination to apprehend and hold together 
the unity of the manifold in intuition and to reproduce this unity over time as a condition 
for temporal succession (which, when employed for cognition, enables objects of 
intuition to be recognized and subsumed under concepts). As we have seen, the limit of 
(and condition for) the synthesis of apprehension is the first measure of aesthetic 
estimation, the maximum that we can ‘take in directly in one intuition.’ Therefore, when 
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this limit is exceeded (by the absolute largeness of the sublime) and can no longer 
function to give unity and form to the manifold, the comprehensive synthesis breaks 
downs, for apprehension is overwhelmed and intuition itself rendered impossible.  
In this way, the experience of the sublime disrupts the unities of both self and world. 
On the side of the world, by forcing thought beyond the limit of its “subjective absolute 
in the presentation of a magnitude,”112 the encounter with absolute magnitude undoes the 
unity of the manifold (by disabling the synthetic activity of the mind that holds together 
this unity). Dizzied before the abyss it beholds in the absence of presentable intuition and 
blinded in the face of its proper limit, thought is seized by the terror characteristic of 
sublime experience: “at the moment of passing beyond this absolute limit, the 
comprehensive synthesis of magnitude becomes impossible, and the quality of the state, 
in which the thought that imagines finds itself, is reversed: it is afraid of this 
Überschwengliche, of this transcendent, this movable and confused (schwingen) beyond 
(über) ‘like an abyss [Abgrund] in which it fears to lose itself.’”113 Thought trembles 
before the unpresentable ‘presence’ of the absolute, the object of the sublime which 
cannot be grasped or contained in sensible form.114 
On the side of the self, there is a breakdown of all three elementary syntheses that 
are the ‘subjective sources’ by which understanding is made possible: the failure of the 
apprehensive synthesis consigns to the same fate the reproductive synthesis that is 
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“inseparably bound up with”115 it, as well as the recognitive synthesis that requires 
objects of intuition to be comprehended (formed, delimited) so as to bring them under 
concepts. Moreover, sublime experience, by thus undermining object- and world-
awareness from a point of view (that of the subject, the absolute subjective limit of which 
has been transgressed), fractures the originary synthetic unity of the ‘I think.’ There can 
be no “formal unity of consciousness in the synthesis of the manifold of 
representations”116 if this manifold cannot be synthesized. As Kant says, “the mind could 
never think its identity in the manifoldness of its representations, and indeed think this 
identity a priori, if it did not have before its eyes the identity of its act, whereby it 
subordinates all synthesis of apprehension … to a transcendental unity”117; but since the 
sublime forecloses ‘all synthesis of apprehension,’ the latter cannot be subordinated to a 
transcendental unity, and the mind is thus deprived the identity of the act by which it 
could think its proper identity. 
Indeed, given Kant’s claim that the “original and necessary consciousness of the 
identity of the self is thus at the same time a consciousness of an equally necessary unity 
of the synthesis of all appearance according to concepts,”118 it follows that the failure of 
the three subjective syntheses in sublime experience (which renders impossible the ‘unity 
of the synthesis of all appearance according to concepts’) subverts the consciousness of 
self-identity and disables transcendental apperception. “One does not see how in the 
absence of the elementary syntheses, ‘subjective sources’ that ‘make possible 
understanding,’ the unity of a subject (here, the subject of sublime feeling) could be 
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deduced. … There seems to be no question that the most elementary conditions (the 
syntheses of time) for the synthesis of a Selbst are lacking here.”119  
How does the experience of the sublime undermine ‘the syntheses of time’? We 
have already seen that the reproductive synthesis (indissociable though analytically 
distinct from apprehension) enables the progression of the imagination and its 
presentation of temporal succession. This progression or form of successive apprehension 
provides what Kant calls ‘the condition of time’ proper to the imagination, which makes 
it possible for the imagination to follow the understanding in providing the measure for 
mathematical estimations of ever-greater magnitudes.  
Now, in the sublime, reason demands that the imagination comprehend and exhibit 
‘in one intuition … all the members of a progressively increasing numerical series’: the 
imagination must “comprehend in one instant what is apprehended successively,” an 
operation of thought termed “regression” that “cancels the condition of time in the 
imagination’s progression.”120 Since time, for Kant, is “the form of inner sense, that is, of 
the intuition of ourselves and of our inner state,”121 the canceling procedure of regression 
inflicts violence upon the constitutive condition of the subject: “Hence, (since temporal 
succession is a condition of the inner sense and of an intuition) it [viz., regression] is a 
subjective movement of the imagination by which it does violence to inner sense, and this 
violence must be the more significant the larger the quantum is that the imagination 
comprehends in one intuition.”122 Because sublime magnitude is absolutely large, the 
regression demanded by reason in the experience of the sublime inflicts, by the auto-
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violation of imagination, an infinite violence upon the very foundation of the subject, the 
temporal condition of the ‘I think.’123 
 
2.2.3 The Sublime as (v) Negative Presentation of the Absolute, (vi) Elevation of 
Thought, and (vii) Feeling of Anguish and Exaltation 
Nevertheless, sublime experience must speak to some form of subjectivity insofar 
as it is an aesthetic reflective judgment based upon feeling, and insofar as it contains a 
higher (subjective) purposiveness for the power of judging (which alone, for Kant, can 
account for the sublime’s affirmative dimension as ‘soul-stirring delight’). The 
experience of the impossible is not itself an impossible experience: sublime experience is 
empirically real, and so an account must be given of how it can elevate thought despite 
(or by virtue of) the absence of the ‘I think.’ Indeed, the point is not that thought falters 
when the subject is undermined but, rather, that it thereby receives a higher calling: “this 
same violence that the imagination inflicts on the subject is still judged purposive for the 
whole vocation of the mind.”124 
We have seen what the failure of the imagination consists in, but we must more 
closely examine how it is constitutive of sublime experience. That Kant takes this failure 
to be constitutive is clear: the confrontation of the imagination with its absolute 
(subjective or aesthetic) limit ‘carries with it the idea of the sublime and gives rise to that 
emotion’; the imagination strives to present what it cannot, yet ‘this inadequacy itself is 
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the arousal in us of the feeling that we have within us a supersensible power.’ Or again: 
“the subject’s own inability uncovers in him the consciousness of an unlimited ability 
which is also his, and … the mind can judge this ability aesthetically only by that 
inability.”125 So the feeling of the imagination’s inadequacy yields (to) the feeling of a 
boundless power proper to thought, which is, in the end, the real object of the sublime: 
‘what is to be called sublime is not the object, but the attunement that the intellect [gets] 
through a certain presentation that occupies reflective judgment.’  
The situation, then, is as follows: a formless object provides the occasion for 
thought to feel the absolute limit of its presentational power (anguish, terror) and, thereby, 
to feel another power of thinking that is unlimited, which is to say, unconditioned, 
absolute (exaltation); and it is this other power or ‘way of thinking’126 that is properly 
judged sublime. Accordingly, we must inquire into this exaltation that thought feels as it 
is called to its proper vocation. 
Now, as we saw in our discussion of the formlessness of the appearances in nature 
that occasion the sublime, the inadequacy of the imagination ‘arouses and calls to mind’ 
‘ideas of reason’ because such ideas are precisely what cannot be presented in intuition. 
“In the case of the sublime, the without-form immediately suggests a concept of 
speculative reason, for the object of such a concept is by definition forbidden presentation 
and there is no presentation without form.”127 (We will return in the following section to 
the crucial question of which particular idea of reason is called to mind in the sublime.) 
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Nevertheless, reason makes the impossible demand that imagination present this idea of 
reason; and imagination, answering the call of reason to breach the absolute limit of its 
first measure, feels, at the threshold of what exceeds the sensible, the expansive thrill of 
boundlessness: “For though the imagination finds nothing beyond the sensible that could 
support it, this very removal of its barriers also makes it feel unbounded, so that its 
separation [from the sensible] is an exhibition of the infinite; and though an exhibition of 
the infinite can as such never be more than merely negative, it still expands the soul.”128 
The imagination exhibits, bears witness to the infinite negatively in the very 
movement by which it separates itself from the sensible. In this nearly impossible and 
uncertain gesture, which borders on delirium, the imagination finds itself unsupported 
and without ground; yet it is not the Ab-grund that it beholds, the abyss that had filled the 
imagination with terror on the occasion of the breakdown of its elementary subjective 
syntheses. Rather, the demand reason issues to the imagination, which Kant describes in 
the Dynamical Sublime as “the dominance that reason exerts over sensibility”129 by 
which reason qua might is superior to the might of sensibility that resists it,130 expands 
the very powers of the imagination, “letting it look outward toward the infinite, which for 
sensibility is an abyss.”131 But in what sense is the imagination, separated from sensibility 
yet remaining the power of thought to present, able to ‘look outward toward’ what is 
infinite? What precisely is ‘the infinite’ in this case, and what more does the imagination 
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‘look’ upon there where sensibility perceives only the void? Surely not a positive ‘vision,’ 
which would collapse thought into fanaticism and mania, for, as we have seen, the 
imagination’s presentation of the infinite must remain strictly negative. Of what, then, 
does the exhibition of the absolute consist if “it is neither the absence of presentation nor 
the presentation of nothingness,” and if “it is negative in the eyes of the sensible but at 
the same time is still a ‘mode of presentation”?132 
The answer, which concerns the nature of aesthetic reflective judgment itself, lies in 
feeling, for such judgments have no criterion other than the feeling (pleasure or 
displeasure) of thought itself occasioned by the form of the object (in the case of beauty) 
or the lack thereof (in the case of the sublime).133 This is the ‘tautegorical’ character of 
aesthetic reflection that Lyotard emphasizes, the ‘perfect coincidence of what feels and 
what is felt’: that is, “the identity of form and content”134 of the judgment, the doubling of 
thinking (la pensée) by what is thought (le pensé) in the ‘dazzling immediacy’ of 
thought’s auto-affection.135 Accordingly, if in sublime judgments thought is able to 
(negatively) present the absolute to itself, it must be through the feeling that thought itself 
experiences, a feeling that is the proper object of the sublime: “Only through its sensation 
can the thought that imagines be aware of this ‘presence’ without presentation.”136 
What is this feeling? Precisely that of thought itself as it withdraws from the 
sensible by judging, on the basis of its anguish, its ‘first measure’ as an absolute 
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subjective limit – a judgment which thus frees the imagination (however momentarily) 
from the delimitative operations of comprehension, insofar as it (imagination) can reflect 
upon the fundamental condition (first measure, absolute of the finite) that makes such 
operations possible. In this reflexive feeling, which is a negative presentation because the 
condition for the feeling is the sacrifice of the imagination’s powers of comprehension by 
which it could present an object of intuition,137 the imagination takes possession of its 
expanded powers: the feeling of the imagination when it touches upon its constitutive 
limit, which contains an ineliminable moment of anguish, gives way to a feeling of 
unboundedness – groundlessness experienced as an elevation or exaltation that ‘expands 
the soul’ – as thought discovers in the order of presentation the power to reflect upon its 
own absolute (its own a priori condition of possibility). 
Indeed, as we saw above, what is properly called sublime (infinite, absolutely large) 
is the employment of thought itself when it thinks the absolute and thus exceeds the 
limits of sensibility; or, more precisely, the feeling of thought on the occasion of (and as 
the basis for) this employment.  Therefore, not only must the absolute be felt in order to 
be ‘present’ to thought, but the feeling of thought must itself be felt as absolute. These are, 
in fact, two sides of the same tautegorical coin:  
Because it is a reflective judgment, the Idea of the absolute is only ‘present’ and 
this presence is that of the ‘soul-stirring delight’ that thinking feels on the occasion 
of the object it judges sublime. This sensation, and this sensation alone, signals the 
call of reason that the critique makes explicit. Thus for reflective judgment it 
matters less that the object of this Idea is absolute …. What matters is that the 
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delight is felt to be absolute. The reflective absolute predicates not an object, but a 
state of thought.138 
 
The infinite that the imagination ‘looks outward toward’ is thus not an infinite beyond but 
the feeling of a particular power of thought, one that is auto-expansive (hence soul-
stirring) by virtue of violently suspending the normal operations of the subject and 
transgressing the limits that condition the sensible. But how are we to characterize this 
power of thought, and in what sense can the feeling of it be understood as absolute? As 
we will see, these questions concern what is essential to the sublime as a limit-experience 
and to critical thought as a whole. 
 
2.2.4 The Sublime as (viii) Thought of the Limitless Limit 
As we examined in the first part of this chapter, Kant terms ‘supersensible’ the 
expanded power of thought by which the imagination, by virtue of both its finitude and 
its ability to reflect (through feeling) upon the absoluteness of this finitude, calls to mind 
idea(s) of reason. I have suggested that this our second interpretation of the sublime 
allows us to dispense with Kant’s specific explanatory appeal to the ideas of a 
supersensible substrate of nature and universal moral law. The time has now come to 
articulate the alternative idea of reason by and toward which the imagination is 
impossibly and irresistibly summoned. 
Let us return once more to Kant’s treatment of the mathematical sublime. The first 
measure that the imagination employs in making aesthetic estimations of magnitude is 
overwhelmed on the occasion of the sublime, and thought’s synthetic activity of 
                                                




comprehension is thus violently disrupted, but this failure is itself purposive for the 
vocation of the mind as a whole. In order to explain this purposiveness, Kant transposes a 
problem from the first antinomy in the first Critique. The imagination falters in the 
mathematical sublime not simply because its basic aesthetic measure is exceeded but, 
further, because the measure it would need to estimate the absolute magnitude or 
largeness of the sublime is the ‘absolute whole of nature’: “Now the proper unchangeable 
basic measure of nature is the absolute whole of nature, which, in the case of nature as 
appearance, is infinity comprehended. This basic measure, however, is a self-
contradictory concept (because an absolute totality of an endless progression is 
impossible).”139   
Within the sensible conditions of nature as appearance, to grasp nature in its totality 
as an absolute whole would be to comprehend the infinite, which would require the 
synthetic comprehension in intuition of an unlimited progression. Not only is this an 
impossibility for the imagination, which cannot provide the requisite schema to form a 
sensible intuition for the understanding to cognize, but the very concept of the whole of 
nature as an absolute totality is self-contradictory within the phenomenal sphere.  
The reason is given in the analysis of the first antinomy, where Kant raises the 
aporetic question of whether the world is spatiotemporally limited or unlimited, showing 
that it can be neither so long as the question is posed at the level of nature as appearance. 
It is the latter impossibility that is of particular relevance to the sublime: “It [viz., the 
world] cannot be unlimited because a spontaneous totality (space) or a successive totality 
(time) of states of things cannot be given in the forms of sensibility if totality is 
                                                




infinite.”140 This is indeed why the basic measure of nature as an absolute whole – which 
reason, demanding ‘absolute totality as a real idea,’ effectively requires the imagination 
to deploy in the mathematical sublime – is self-contradictory within the limits of the 
sensible. We can begin to understand how sublime feeling is an experience of 
impossibility that contains, as Lyotard puts it, the differend of the absolute finite and the 
absolute infinite: “Thinking feels a sublime feeling when it comes up against the aporia 
expounded in the first antinomy, but in the order of presentation rather than of concepts. 
Yet it must still be pushed or attracted by an almost insane demand of reason.”141 
Since an infinite totality cannot be given in intuition, Kant concludes that the 
encounter with absolute magnitude in the sublime and the constitutive failure of the 
imagination “must lead the concept of nature to a supersensible substrate.”142 He does so 
again by virtue of his reasoning in the first antinomy: since, considered as appearance, 
nature can be neither unlimited nor limited,143 the question cannot be determined by 
understanding (lacking, as it does, “the sensible intuition corresponding either to the 
unlimited or to what the limited leaves ‘outside’ of itself”144) but, rather, must be referred 
to speculative ideas of reason belonging to the supersensible sphere.  It is thus only by 
virtue of rational ideas that the mind, without contradiction, is “able even to think the 
infinite as a whole,” and this ability “indicates a mental power that surpasses any 
standard of sense”: “If the human mind is nonetheless to be able even to think the given 
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infinite without contradiction, it must have within itself a power that is supersensible, 
whose idea of a noumenon cannot be intuited but can yet be regarded as the substrate 
underlying what is mere appearance, namely, our intuition of the world.”145   
However, Kant’s insistence notwithstanding, it is not at all clear that the speculative 
idea of reason aroused by the experience of the mathematical sublime must be the idea of 
nature as supersensible substrate. A look at Lyotard’s reading of the resolution of the first 
antinomy suggests why: “Both claims [the thesis that the world is unlimited and the 
antithesis that the world is limited] are nonsuited, at least as theses of understanding. 
Nonetheless, the very concept of the limit persists, even when it can only be speculative. 
The limit is the object of an Idea of reason, a ‘being of reason.’”146 Transposed into the 
mathematical sublime, the idea of the limit is called to mind at the moment when the 
imagination – overwhelmed, distressed, and displaced – takes the limit itself as an object 
of thought by judging its own first measure as an absolute (subjective) limit; for “an 
absolute limit … cannot be a phenomenon, because it is always supposed to be 
unconditioned.”147 It is for this reason that the inadequacy of the imagination – its 
finitude felt first as privation, then as the ‘presence’ in sensibility of the absolute – is 
constitutive of sublime experience and purposive for the powers of thought as a whole. 
Yet if it is not to refer us to the concept of the supersensible substrate of nature and 
to the idea of freedom as unconditioned causation, how are we to understand the higher 
purposiveness of the sublime attunement by which the mind is called to its proper 
                                                
145 Kant, Critique of Judgment, §26, 254-5. 
146 Lyotard, Lessons on the Analytic of the Sublime, 59, my emphasis. “The limit is only conceivable with 
an outside and an inside. The limit, that is, immediately implies both the limited and the unlimited. 
However, there is no determinable concept of the unlimited. Moreover, the limit, the limited, and the 
unlimited, taken as objects, can only be objects of the Ideas of speculative reason” (ibid). 




vocation? And if, given the tautegorical character of aesthetic reflective judgment, it is 
only insofar as sublime feeling feels itself to be absolute that the absolute itself can be felt 
as such, what explains the absoluteness of the delight? 
The answers can only emerge when thought is considered in its critical vocation. 
We have already seen that the imagination, as the power of comprehension, operates on 
the basis of delimitation (‘comprehension is limitation itself before any conceptual rule’), 
as does the understanding with which it collaborates in cognition. For this reason, neither 
faculty can take the limit itself as an object, not only because the idea of the limit belongs 
to speculative reason (the limit implying an unlimited ‘outside’ it that cannot be given in 
sensible form) but, further, because the limit itself is the ‘method’ of imagination and 
understanding – their a priori ground or constitutive condition – and, as such, constitutes 
their absolute:  
It is the limit itself that understanding cannot conceive of as its object. … The limit 
is not an object for understanding. It is its method: all the categories of 
understanding are the operators of determination, that is, of limitation. Furthermore, 
the faculties of intuition or presentation, sensibility and imagination, respectively, 
also proceed, in their order, by means of limitations: schemas when these 
limitations work for knowledge, and free forms when they work toward the pleasure 
of the beautiful. This is precisely what the Preliminary Remark to the deduction of 
the pure concepts of understanding in the first Critique shows: understanding 
cannot be ‘deduced’ in the critical sense, that is, legitimated in claiming to know the 
givens of intuition by determining them through concepts, if the concepts have not 
been delimited beforehand, that is, puts into elementary forms by the three 
syntheses of apprehension, reproduction, and recognition. This is where the limit 
first operates, making all presentation possible.148 
 
It is precisely these elementary subjective syntheses that sublime experience 
subverts; and yet, in the very movement of the subject’s collapse and the object’s 
dispersal, the imagination feels its powers expanded as it beholds the infinite and 
                                                




negatively presents the absolute in the feeling of its proper unboundedness. This is only 
possible insofar as the imagination judges its first measure to be an absolute limit on the 
occasion of its transgression: that is, insofar as the thought that presents can think (feel) 
the limit itself as an object of thought. And since this judgment is one of aesthetic 
reflection, the idea of the limit – which contains “the differend to be found at the heart of 
sublime feeling … of the absolute of the infinite and the absolute of the finite”149 – can 
only be ‘present’ to thought on the basis of the feeling of thought itself that is both 
anguish and exaltation. 
Now, since the first measure of aesthetic comprehension is also ‘where the limit 
first operates’ as the a priori condition ‘making all presentation possible,’ it follows that 
the limit is the absolute of thought itself, its unconditioned condition of possibility, and 
thus that the limit as an idea of reason can only arise by virtue of the feeling of thought 
by which thought reflects upon, touches its proper absolute. Indeed, this ‘idea of the 
sublime’ arises in the very elevation by which the imagination, groundless, takes its own 
ground (or its ruins) as a (negative) object in the order of presentation. Only in such a 
way can thought, which “is destined for the absolute,”150 both discover and achieve this 
destination. The feeling of thought reflecting upon its own absolute limit and first 
condition awakens the calling by which thought comes into possession of its proper 
vocation: 
Thus in sublime feeling thought feels sensation as … a soul-stirring delight, a sharp 
pleasure. Why is this? Because this appeal actualizes the destination (Bestimmung) 
of our Geistesvermögen, of our spiritual faculty – of the power of thought at its 
strongest – as it discovers this destination. One hears the Stimme in the vocation of 
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the Bestimmung, the destination. … If the appeal exalts thought it is because it 
comes from the very ‘place,’ the transcendental place toward which it is already 
turned, toward which (to which?) it ‘is going and giving itself’….151 
 
The expansive, auto-elevating power of thought, which Kant takes to be supersensible, 
can thus be understood as properly critical: the sublime feeling of exaltation expresses, 
realizes the freedom of thought in its critical vocation when, in aesthetic reflective 
judgment, thought takes as an object its own constitutive condition of possibility (‘the 
limitless reign of the Limit,’ ‘l’infini de la fin’).  
It is a general feature of critical thought that its only access to the absolute 
(thought’s destination) is by way of transcendental conditions: “A priori conditions of 
possibility must, by hypothesis, be unconditioned, or else they would not be a priori.  Yet 
if the critical examination can establish them as such, it must be able to see the 
nothingness of the condition that is ‘behind’ them”152; and this is precisely what is 
achieved in the sublime through the negative presentation of the absolute. If the 
imagination in its expanded powers is able to ‘look outward toward the infinite’ and ‘see’ 
there more than mere abyss, this is by virtue of the sublime feeling through which 
thought beholds its constitutive finitude, first as inescapable limitation (anguish) and then 
as limitless limit (exaltation). On the basis of sublime feeling, then, thought is elevated to 
the absolute, called to its destination, elected to its vocation as critical reflection; and the 
feeling itself of soul-stirring delight, which is the proper object and criterion of sublime 
experience, “is an absolute delight, because it is the absolute vocation of thought to think 
the absolute.”153 
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In our first interpretation of the Kantian sublime, situated in relation to moral 
feeling as the ratio cognoscendi of freedom, sublime feeling was shown to be a form of 
aesthetic experience that enables the realization of ethical agency. The sublime, an 
experience arising in sensibility, gives material expression to that which is irreducible to 
sensibility, which expression is a necessary condition for the practice of human freedom. 
In turn, our second interpretation of the sublime, while retaining its crucial feature 
as an experience of the irreducible (experience of impossibility), allowed us to jettison 
Kant’s explanatory strategy that refers sublime feeling to a form of moral transcendence. 
Rather than appeal to the supersensible vocation of human personality (homo noumenon), 
the sublime can instead be understood as a limit-experience of radical finitude. The 
vertical movement of auto-elevation by which ‘the mind can come to feel its own 
sublimity, which lies in its vocation and elevates it even above nature,’ finds its source in 
the nature of thought qua critique: that is, in the expansive, auto-affective relation of 
thought to itself when it takes its own constitutive limit as unconditioned condition of 
possibility. If the vocation of critical thought is super-sensible, that is, if it is elevated 
above the field of sensibility, this is by virtue not of some transport ‘beyond,’ but the 
movement of reflection by which thought feels – and in feeling, thinks – its own absolute 
limit as an a priori condition for the field of sensibility itself. And indeed, it is only in the 
transgression of this absolute limit, when the constitutive syntheses of self and world are 
undone, that thought ‘can come to feel its own sublimity’: as Foucault puts it in this 
chapter’s first epigraph, ‘what is required is the maximum of intensity and the maximum 




Understood in such a way, the Kantian sublime anticipates Foucault’s twofold 
concept of verticality as both (1) a form of intensive limit-experience (transgression) and 
(2) a mode of critical thought, the double function of which is to enable the practice of 
freedom by ‘wrenching the subject from itself’ and ‘seeing to its dissolution’ (Foucault). 
Like the sublime, the vertical is the experience of that which is irreducible to the causal 
order of the given – whether this ‘given’ be the sensible manifold or history, where the 
latter is construed as the set of determining political, economic, social, and cultural 
conditions, relations, and processes. And like the sublime, the vertical is also the auto-
critical activity of thought that is necessary for the realization of human agency insofar as 
it confronts or transgresses the constitutive conditions of the given. Where Foucauldian 
verticality goes beyond the Kantian sublime is in the transformative agency to which it 
gives rise: for as we will see, what begins for Foucault as an aesthetic experience of 





CHAPTER 3. FOUCAULT’S ‘SECRET VERTICALITY’: TOWARD THE 
POLITICAL PROBLEM OF MATERIAL EXPRESSION 
The concept of verticality has gone almost entirely unnoticed by Foucault 
scholarship despite playing a truly fundamental role in his thought, from his first essay on 
existential psychology to his late ethico-politics. What Foucault terms the ‘vertical 
dimension’ or ‘axis’ orients his initial engagement with Dasein analysis, his subsequent 
history of madness, his writings over the next decade on literature and aesthetics, his 
formulation of genealogical critique as historical ontology, and his account of popular 
revolt. What’s more, the concept of verticality sheds light on the transformative aims of 
Foucault’s work and his conception of political resistance, from the contestation of 
western culture’s forms of exclusion, to the dislocation of the subject effected through 
modern literature’s ‘transgressive fold,’ to the critical intervention of thought in the 
historical field of force relations.154  
Perhaps it would be more remarkable that such an important concept has remained 
nearly invisible were it not for the obscurity of the concept itself. Foucault’s discussion of 
verticality, especially prominent in his earlier work, tends to appear in some of the more
                                                
154 At least one thinker has, albeit in limited fashion, offered a conceptual treatment of Foucauldian 
verticality: namely, Louis Althusser, who interpreted the vertical as an “original or transcendental abyss,” 
the “conceptual foundation of the transcendentalist tendency” that Foucault would subsequently overcome 
through a more properly historical account of constitutive division (Warren Montag, “‘Foucault and the 
Problematic of Origins’: Althusser’s Reading of Folie et déraison,” borderlands e-journal, Vol. 4 No. 2, 
2005: §29-31). This view will be discussed below. In addition, Timothy O’Leary has identified Foucault’s 
concept of the “‘verticality’ of literary language,” linking verticality to a fundamental doubling or mirroring 
relation between language and death (O’Leary, Foucault and Fiction: The Experience Book, 45-6); we will 




abstruse passages of his corpus: for example, in his analyses of the existential coordinates 
of the death dream in Binswanger; the tragic expression and experience of unreason in 
History of Madness; and the being of literary language made manifest in writing from 
Mallarmé to Klossowski. Nevertheless, as I hope to show, the concept of the vertical is a 
key for grasping the trajectory of Foucault’s thought, opening a new interpretation of his 
oeuvre that sets into relief the basic philosophical problematic to which his work would 
serve as a response. 
Foucault’s formulation of verticality can be roughly divided into three periods: (1) 
an extended early period (1954-1970), from his initial work on Binswanger and madness 
through The Birth of the Clinic to his many essays on literature; (2) a brief middle period 
(1970-1971), centered around Foucault’s engagement with Deleuzian metaphysics and 
Nietzsche’s Genealogy; and (3) a late period (1979ff.), in which the vertical resurfaces in 
Foucault’s writings on revolt and historico-critical ontology. In what follows in this 
chapter, I will map and analyze the first period.155 Our peregrination from the death 
dream, through unreason, to vertical critique and literary language will provide the 
resources for a preliminary conceptual treatment, showing how verticality grounds 
Foucault’s early politics of transgression and epistemic transformation. In turn, the results 
of this analysis will prepare the account of political agency given in Chapter 6; for, as 
already indicated by the Kantian sublime, the concept of the vertical refers to both a form 
of experience and a form of critique, and these two aspects of verticality serve, 
respectively, as necessary conditions for the possibility and sustainability of political 
agency. 
                                                




3.1 The ‘Vertical Axis’ of the Death Dream: Foucault’s Existential Poetics of Tragic 
Expression 
Foucault’s first published essay, an introduction to Binswanger’s “Dream and 
Existence,” explores the application of existential psychology’s Dasein analysis to 
dreams, or to that “most original form of human freedom,” the existentially singularizing 
self-constitution of the dreaming imagination.156 Like the dizzying freedom of anxiety, 
the dream is a transcendent157 limit-experience – what Heidegger, referring to the 
“moment of vision” by which one’s being-toward-death is disclosed, calls a “limit-
Situation”158 – in which Dasein hovers relationless, suspended beyond the limits of the 
diurnal world before its originary encounter with the nothing.159  
                                                
156 “[T]he dream is the bearer of the deepest human meanings …insofar as it brings to light the freedom of 
man in its most original form. … [The dream] is free genesis, self-accomplishment, emergence of what is 
most individual in the individual” (Foucault, Dream and Existence, translated by Forrest Williams, 53-4). 
Although Foucault will come to problematize this ‘original freedom of man,’ ceaselessly critiquing 
humanism and the ‘man-form’ of the subject, this appeal to ‘what is most individual in the individual’ will 
remain central to his thought. See, for example, “The Subject and Power,” where Foucault lists as a 
fundamental feature of the forms of resistance he champions that they “are struggles that question the status 
of the individual. On the one hand, they assert the right to be different and underline everything that makes 
individuals truly individual. On the other hand, they attack everything that separates the individual, breaks 
his links with others, splits up community life, forces the individual back on himself, and ties him to his 
own identity in a constraining way” (Foucault, “The Subject and Power,” Power, 330, my emphasis). 
157 “The imagination, sign of transcendence; the dream, experience of this transcendence under the sign of 
the imaginary” (Foucault, Dream and Existence, 45, translation slightly modified). 
158 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, 400, II.4, “Temporality and Everydayness.”  
159 On the relations among transcendence, freedom, and anxiety as the experience of the nothing, see 
Heidegger’s “What is Metaphysics”: “Anxiety reveals the nothing. We ‘hover’ in anxiety. More precisely, 
anxiety leaves us hanging because it induces the slipping away of beings as a whole. This implies that we 
ourselves – we humans who are in being – in the midst of beings slip away from ourselves. At bottom 
therefore it is not as though ‘you’ or ‘I’ feel ill at ease; rather, it is this way for some ‘one.’ In the 
altogether unsettling experience of this hovering where there is nothing to hold onto, pure Da-sein is all that 
is still there. … Da-sein means: being held out into the nothing. Holding itself out into the nothing, Dasein 
is in each case already beyond beings as a whole. This being beyond beings we call ‘transcendence.’ … If 
in the ground of its essence Dasein were not transcending, which now means, if it were not in advance 
holding itself out into the nothing, then it could never be related to beings nor even to itself. Without the 
original revelation of the nothing, no selfhood and no freedom” (Heidegger, “What is Metaphysics,” Basic 
Writings, 101-3, my emphasis). Note that the seat of this limit-experience of the nothing is not the subject, 
which could be designated by a personal pronoun in the first or second person, but ‘some “one”’; as such, it 
is already quite close to the experience of the being of literary language, or the thought of the outside, that 




The dream is the work of existence making itself into a world prior to and as a 
condition for its entrance into the public world: “it’s the originary movement of freedom, 
the birth of the world in the very movement of existence.”160 In dreams, then, the being of 
Dasein can be grasped in the primordial movement of its becoming, which “is why the 
analysis of dreams is decisive for bringing to light the fundamental meanings of 
existence.”161 True to early Heideggerian form,162 for Foucault, it is the death dream that 
“fulfills the ultimate vocation” of the dream insofar as the dreamer encounters her proper 
being-toward-death and experiences the authenticity or inauthenticity of her ownmost 
mode of existence: “In the depth of his dream, what man encounters is his death, a death 
which in its most inauthentic form is but the brutal and bloody interruption of life, yet in 
its authentic form, is his very existence being accomplished. … The dream of death 
appears as what existence can learn that is most fundamental about itself.”163 The death 
dream is thus a privileged mode of access for Dasein, by way of the dreaming 
imagination, to encounter its ontological ground in the very movement of its self-
constitution; and the experience of death in the dream as either “anguished or serene”164 
expresses the existential inauthenticity or authenticity of the dreamer. 
                                                
160 Foucault, Dream and Existence, 51. 
161 Ibid, 59. See also, from the preceding paragraph: “The dream is existence carving itself out in barren 
space, shattering chaotically, exploding noisily, netting itself, a scarcely breathing animal, in the webs of 
death. It is the world at the dawn of its first explosion when the world is still existence itself and is not yet 
the universe of objectivity. To dream is not another way of experiencing another world, it is for the 
dreaming subject the radical way of experiencing its own world. This way of experiencing is so radical, 
because existence does not pronounce itself world. The dream is situated in that ultimate moment in which 
existence still is its world; once beyond, at the dawn of wakefulness, already it is no longer its world” (ibid). 
162 In addition to being strongly suggested by his discussion of Dasein analysis in Binswanger, Foucault 
confirms the Heideggerian tenor of his early interest in existential psychology in an interview with Duccio 
Trombadori from 1978. See Foucault, “Interview with Michel Foucault,” Power, 257.  
163 Foucault, Dream and Existence, 54-5. 




Now, crucially, within the “primitive coordinates” of “oneiric space” that disclose 
the existential-temporal modality of the dreaming imagination, it is the vertical axis of 
the death dream, “the movement of ascent and fall,” that indicates the form of 
authenticity or inauthenticity of the dreamer.165 Simplifying somewhat: when Dasein falls, 
it flees from the nothing before which it is suspended, and its death in the dream is 
experienced as sinking or violent anguish; on the other hand, when Dasein ascends, it 
confronts the nothing serenely and experiences in its own death the joy of existential 
achievement. “It is along this vertical direction of existence, and according to the 
structures of temporality, that the authentic and inauthentic forms of existence can best be 
allocated. … One must turn to the vertical dimension to grasp existence making itself, 
turn to the vertical dimension in that form of absolutely original presence in which 
Dasein is defined.”166 
The vertical axis thus holds the key for understanding the primordial directionality 
and existential authenticity of a singular existence (Dasein) as it constitutes itself through 
the radical expressive freedom of the dreaming imagination. Foucault emphasizes that 
this vertical form of expression is decidedly tragic in structure: a limit-experience at the 
summit of existence by which one encounters the nocturnal face of death in an authentic 
mode, the very accomplishment of which, however, anticipates already the imminence of 
                                                
165 Ibid, 60-4. “Binswanger himself analyzed the vertical axis of space in its existential meaning: the theme 
of the slow, raw power of enthusiasm, of joy; the theme of the glittering peak where the light mingled with 
shadow is purified into an absolute brightness, whose movement is fulfilled and comes to rest in the 
serenity of the movement. But upward movement does not imply only an existence transcending itself in 
enthusiasm. It is not only the direction of that selfsurpassing by which man, torn from himself, accedes, 
according to Fink, to ‘the greatest being,’ to the ‘theon’. The vertical axis can also be the vector of an 
existence that has lost its place on earth …. Then it indicates flight into excess, and from the start is marked 
by the vertigo of a fall…. With the movement of ascent and fall, …one can grasp temporality in its 
primitive meaning” (ibid, 62-4, my emphasis).  




one’s fall. “[T]he axis of tragic expression is located along the vertical axis of existence. 
The tragic movement is always of the order of ascent and fall. Its special mark is that 
privileged moment in which it completes its rise, and balances imperceptibly, still, yet 
oscillating, before faltering.”167 Yet if the ‘privileged moment’ of ascent is always 
followed by a downward collapse, the vertex always succumbing to vertigo, then this 
raises the problem of how to maintain oneself authentically in the space of this limit-
experience through the freedom of vertico-tragic expression – a problem which we will 
see reappear at the heart of History of Madness.  
In addition, there is a more general problem with dreams as forms of limit-
experience. On the one hand, dreams are perhaps the most universal form of limit-
experience, one to which everyone has access. But on the other hand, the dream is in 
effect universally inaccessible since the waking light of day and the reified images it 
recollects from the preceding night never fail to betray the nocturnal movement of the 
dreaming imagination. If oneiric experience is divided from diurnal consciousness as a 
limit one can only traverse by falling into dream, how can the freedom of the dreamer be 
connected back into that social world in which Dasein, precisely as being-in-the-world, 
must necessarily dwell? Indeed, Foucault specifically raises the question of this “paradox” 
as his chief interest in Binswanger, this “gamble to want to circumscribe the positive 
content of existence by reference to a mode in which it is least engaged in the world.”168   
Foucault’s own response here to this problem is suggestive but sketchy: “to be 
authentic,” the imagination must be “purified in the fire of the dream” so that it can 
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express – “as its absolute truth, its ‘unshatterable kernal of night’” – the elemental 
movement of existence constituting itself.169 “But on the other side of the dream, the 
movement of imagination continues”: having experienced, in the depths of oneiric space, 
“that which in existence is most irreducible to history,” the nocturnally sanctified powers 
of imagination must now be deployed in the socio-historical world, “taken up in the work 
of expression that gives a new meaning to truth and freedom.”170 That is, the imagination 
must learn to express, without the betrayal of reification, the vertical axis of existence in 
concrete works; and this expressive project, which directs the imagination on “its path of 
freedom,” constitutes “an ethical task and an historical necessity”: “expression is 
language, work of art, the ethical….”171  
Thus, anticipating by nearly three decades a convergence of the historical, ethical 
and aesthetic lines that will later appear in his notion of an ‘aesthetics of existence,’ 
Foucault calls for a kind of existential poetics as a practice of freedom. The task is to 
cultivate a form of tragic expression, faithful to the vertical limit-experience of the death 
dream, that could open the dreaming imagination onto the world and thereby create new 
possiblities for thought. And far from being merely the enigmatic and little known fancy 
of a young Foucault, this vertico-existential poetics is Foucault’s first response to a 
fundamental problem that will continue to orient the direction of his work: namely, what 
I will term the problem of material expression.  
At this early stage, the problem might be put thusly: how can the force of that which 
is ‘most irreducible to history’ – that which, at a remove across the oneiric divide from 
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the world of social reality and historical causation, nevertheless discloses a more 
originary truth about the constitution of that public world and those existences which 
compose it – be expressed, realized, sustained in the form of a work, such that it be 
capable of both crossing over the limit that separates it from the socio-historical world 
and transforming the conditions of the latter? In other words, if the concept of the vertical 
designates an axis of existence that is irreducible to history, situated at its (history’s) limit 
or degree zero; then the problem of material expression refers to the challenge of 
realizing or constructing the force of this verticality so that it can act upon history – the 
work of vertical expression thereby constituting transformative agential force, or freedom. 
And if Foucault’s initial response to this problem remains underdeveloped, the problem 
itself will not cease to function as the obscure impetus animating his thought.  
In sum, then, we may conclude that the death dream is a kind of tragic limit-
experience by which the dreaming imagination expresses, along its vertical vector, the 
mode of in/authenticity proper to the movement by which existence constitutes itself. 
Further, precisely in light of this basic existential movement, the death dream can be 
understood as an ontologically productive event of thought, for as we have seen, 
thought’s passage along the vertical axis of the dream expresses ‘the originary movement 
of freedom, the birth of the world in the very movement of existence.’ In short, the death 
dream is a vertical form of experience and expression by which the auto-generative event 
of (an) existence constituting itself is realized. The ethical task becomes one of 
introducing this evental force or constituent power into historical reality through forms of 
expression and experience that would not fall on the other side of the oneiric limit. 




behind, proceeding toward other forms of tragic limit-experience and -expression: 
namely, unreason and literature. 
 
3.2 The ‘Constant Verticality’ of Unreason in History of Madness 
3.2.1 The ‘Vertical Dimension’ of Tragic Experience in Foucault’s ‘History of Limits’ 
The second place to locate Foucault’s concept of verticality is in the figure of 
unreason in the History of Madness, where Foucault imports something like the vertical 
analysis of ontologico-existential authenticity from Dream and Existence. Foucault 
situates his work on madness “beneath the sun of the great Nietzschean quest”172 in Birth 
of Tragedy, according to which the history of reason begins with Socrates 
misunderstanding, forgetting and excluding the truth of tragic experience. What tragic 
works of art express is a disquieting vision of the nothing, ‘the gaze seared by gruesome 
night’ (Nietzsche)173: an abyssal vision that discloses the intrinsic groundlessness and 
contingency not only of human being, but of existence itself, or the structure, foundation 
and intelligibility of reality (and with it, reason, morality, religion, etc.). Foucault’s thesis, 
in brief, is that the exclusion of this limit-experience of the tragic – which opens onto and 
                                                
172 Foucault, History of Madness, translated by Jonathan Murphy and Jean Khalfa, xxx. 
173 See Nietzsche’s account of Sophocles and the optical inversion produced by tragic expression: “If we 
penetrate to the myth which projects itself in these bright reflections, we suddenly experience a 
phenomenon which inverts a familiar optical one. When we turn away blinded after a strenuous attempt to 
look directly at the sun, we have dark, coloured patches before our eyes, as if their purpose were to heal 
them; conversely, those appearances of the Sophoclean hero in images of light …are the necessary result of 
gazing into the inner, terrible depths of nature—radiant patches, as it were, to heal a gaze seared by 
gruesome night” (Friedrich Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy and Other Writings, translated by Ronald 
Spiers, §9, 46). Note also the implicit inversion of the Platonic regime of light, which held the sun to be the 




discloses “the nothing of existence,”174 or what he sometimes calls the “void”175 – 
grounds and makes possible the historical formation of western reason and culture:  
We could write a history of limits—of those obscure gestures, necessarily forgotten 
as soon as they are accomplished, through which a culture rejects something which 
for it will be the Exterior …. [T]his is the originary thickness in which a culture 
takes shape. To interrogate a culture about its limit-experiences is to question it at 
the confines of history about a tear that is something like the birth of its history. … 
At the center of these limit-experiences of the Western world is the explosion, of 
course, of the tragic itself—Nietzsche having shown that the tragic structure from 
which the history of the Western world is made is nothing other than the refusal, the 
forgetting, and the silent collapse of tragedy.176  
 
The world of reason constitutes itself, to use Foucault’s earlier Heideggerian 
terminology, ‘inauthentically’ insofar as it repels the tragic encounter with the groundless 
void of existence and then disavows this originary gesture of exclusion – the very act of 
division by which a culture “gives itself the face of its positivity”177 –, instead assuming 
for itself a putatively necessary foundation and installing itself along a line of teleological 
progress. It is therefore by contrast to this ‘horizontal’ vector of western reason that 
Foucault locates a vertical vector, which “would confront the dialectics of history with 
                                                
174 Foucault, History of Madness, 31. 
175 See, for example, Foucault’s discussion of “classical unreason” as “reason dazzled. Dazzlement is night 
at noon [la nuit en plein jour] …. Dazzled reason opens its eyes to the sun and sees nothing, i.e. it does not 
see. … To say that madness is dazzlement is to say that the madman sees the day, the same day that rational 
men see, as both live in the same light, but that when looking at that very light, nothing else and nothing in 
it, he sees it as nothing but emptiness [comme vide], night and nothingness. Darkness for him is another 
way of seeing the day” (Foucault, History of Madness, 243). It will be the ruse of tragic works of unreason 
to transvalue this optical relation to light and dark: rather than one who cannot see, the poet of unreason 
will become the one who sees the nothing, who possesses, as Artaud puts it, the ‘superior lucidity’ of 
abyssal vision; rather than la nuit en plein jour, unreason will behold le jour en plein nuit, just as 
Nietzsche’s madman, beholding the death of God and lighting “a lantern in the bright morning hours,” sees 
the world “straying as through an infinite nothing” and feels “the breath of empty space” (Nietzsche, Gay 
Science, translated by Walter Kaufman, §125, 181). For another instance of Foucault referring to ‘void,’ 
see his discussion of Nietzsche’s madness, which “is the way in which that thought opens onto the modern 
world. … By the madness that interrupts it, an œuvre opens a void, a moment of silence, a question without 
an answer, opening an unhealable wound that the world is forced to address” (Foucault, History of Madness, 
537). 
176 Foucault, History of Madness, xxix-xxx, trans. Murphy and Khalfa. 




the immobile structures of the tragic,”178 contesting the dominant historical forms and 
practices of western culture from the site of its exclusion: 
Where might this interrogation lead, following not reason in its horizontal 
becoming, but seeking to retrace in time this constant verticality, which, the length 
of Western culture, confronts it with what it is not, measuring it with its own 
extravagance [démesure]? Towards what region might it take us, which is neither 
the history of knowledge nor history plain and simple, which is commanded neither 
by the teleology of the truth nor the rational concatenation of causes, which only 
have value or meaning beyond the division? A region, no doubt, where it would be 
a question more of the limits than of the identity of a culture.179 
 
Just as in Dream and Existence, where the ‘vertical direction of existence,’ that 
which is ‘most irreducible to history,’ alone renders graspable, through a mode of tragic 
experience, the auto-generative event of ‘existence making itself’; so, too, verticality here 
refers to a liminal dimension or ‘region’ of existence – accessible through a tragic form 
of limit-experience, irreducible to conditions of historical causation, and unintelligible 
according to the standards of diurnal consciousness – that discloses the ontologically 
productive movement of a world constituting itself. However, while the vertical axis of 
the death dream opens onto the ‘absolutely original presence’ proper to Dasein, in the 
History of Madness, the origin made manifest along the tragic-vertical vector, like the 
“original contradiction and original pain at the heart of the primordial unity”180 in 
Nietzsche’s Birth of Tragedy, is riven by division. Or rather, what is originary is the very 
activity of division itself: “The gesture that divides madness is the constitutive one…. 
The caesura that establishes the distance between reason and non-reason is the origin 
[originaire]….”181  
                                                
178 Ibid, xxx. 
179 Ibid, xxix, translation slightly modified, my emphasis. 
180 Nietzsche, Birth of Tragedy, §6, 36. 




In the theoretical development, then, from the existential-phenomenological 
framework of Dasein analysis to a tragic proto-genealogical one – which is to say, in the 
philosophical movement from Heidegger to Nietzsche182 – Foucault’s concept of 
verticality attains critical political force, positing the thought of constitutive division and 
thereby anticipating his later formulation of historical ontology.183 Indeed, in opposition 
to the teleological horizontality of the human sciences – e.g., psychiatry, which “grows 
up in the calm that returns after the division is made”184 and narrates reason’s progressive 
mastery or neutralization of non-reason –, the excessive and ‘constant verticality’ that is 
excluded as an exterior limit of the social formation ‘confronts the dialectics of history’ 
by attesting to the unacknowledged and unjustifiable first condition of reason, the 
groundless ground of western culture.  
As a vertical mode of ‘interrogation,’ the History of Madness is thus a ‘history of 
limits’ in at least two senses: (1) because madness in its tragic form is itself an experience 
of the limit, “the still undivided experience of division itself”185; and (2) because this very 
                                                
182 This interpretation of the successive Heideggerian and Nietzschean moments in Foucault’s thought 
would account for Foucault’s well-known late claim that while Heidegger had always been for him “the 
essential philosopher,” his reading of Heidegger had been transported, swept along, or prevailed over 
(emporté: the word is translated as “outweighed” by Thomas Levin and Isabelle Lorenz, which is not 
incorrect but fails to convey the sense of ‘being carried along by’) by his reading of Nietzsche. See 
Foucault, “The Return of Morality,” Michel Foucault: Politics, Philosophy, Culture, edited by Lawrence D. 
Kritzman, 250. 
183 Two years later in “Preface to Transgression,” with reference to Nietzsche’s thought of the ‘origin’ in 
Birth of Tragedy (as the ‘original contradiction and original pain at the heart of the primordial unity’ 
(Nietzsche)), Foucault will depict this thought of constitutive division – of “the instantaneous play of the 
limit and of transgression” – as “the essential test for a thought that centers on the ‘origin,’ for that form of 
thought to which Nietzsche dedicated us from the beginning of his works and one that would be, absolutely 
and in the same motion, a Critique and an Ontology, an understanding that comprehends both finitude and 
being” (Foucault, “Preface to Transgression,” 75, my emphasis). Foucault will later develop this 
simultaneous ‘critique and ontology’ into his method of historico-critical ontology; see, e.g., “What is 
Enlightenment?” We will return to this point in our discussion of late vertical critique in Chapter 6. 
184 Foucault, History of Madness, xxviii. 




division, situated at the “degree zero of the history of madness,”186 is constitutive not only 
for madness but for western culture, a ‘tear’ at the ‘confines of history’ that ushers in ‘the 
birth of its history.’ The limit-experience of madness, in other words, bears witness to the 
originary or genetic violence that institutes the order of the social world and must be 
covered over as a condition for that order’s retroactive and tacitly reactive self-
legitimation. Foucault’s work will thus function both as “the archeology of that 
silence,”187 aiming to recover the vertical experience of the tragic and make visible the 
arbitrary violence of its refusal, as well as a critical counter-history of reason, locating in 
this ‘silent collapse of tragedy’ a singular and contingent (rather than universal and 
necessary) condition of possibility for the western social formation. A vertical history of 
limits, then, conducted at the vertical limits of history.  
Further, within the history of madness itself, there is a division between two 
different regimes of madness that correspond to the horizontal and vertical vectors, 
respectively: mental illness, which becomes the object of scientific knowledge and 
medico-juridical discourse, undergirded by institutional structures of confinement and 
subjection; and unreason, which is a form of tragic limit-experience expressed through 
works of art, contesting the authority of rationalist thought and its horizontal history. The 
cleft between these two regimes first emerges during the early Renaissance in the 
disparity between the moralizing humanist discourse on folly (Erasmus) and the 
apocalyptic phantasmagoria of tragic painting (Bosch).188 Along the horizontal line, 
which ultimately issues into the positivism of clinical psychiatry, madness becomes 
                                                
186 Ibid, xxvii. 
187 Ibid, xxviii. 





appropriated by the language of reason to designate the broad field of abnormal human 
attributes and activities: to use Foucault’s language, madness takes the form within man 
of an errant and defective self-relation for which he is ultimately to blame. An experience 
of madness thus emerges that is bound up in normalizing relations of moral guilt, social 
division and political exclusion, all of which constitutes the continuity of “the passage 
from the medieval and humanist experience of madness to the experience that is our own, 
which confines madness in mental illness.”189  
Along the vertical line, by contrast, the tragic-cosmic experience of madness 
discloses “the vertiginous unreason of the world”190 through the painterly delirium of 
chaotically concatenated bestial images, which, unmoored from the rigorous theological 
organization of Gothic symbology, herald a double revelation: (1) that madness, as “that 
which goes against nature, or the seething mass of a senseless presence immanent in the 
earth,”191 expresses an abyssal or subterranean truth beyond the order of God; and (2) that 
this terrible truth is none other than the secret of man’s own nature in its infernal and 
contingent animality,192 “the experience of an animal unreason that formed the absolute 
limit of the incarnation of reason, and the scandal of the human condition.”193 We can 
                                                
189 Ibid, xxxiii. Cf.: “The dark cosmic forces at work in madness that are so apparent in the work of Bosch 
are absent in Erasmus. Madness no longer lies in wait for man at every crossroads; rather, it slips into him, 
or is in fact a subtle relationship that man has with himself. … In that respect, madness now opens out onto 
an entirely moral universe. Evil was no longer a punishment or the end of time, but merely a fault or 
flaw…– in short, every possible irregularity invented by man himself [tout ce que l’homme a pu inventer 
lui-même d’irrégularités dans sa conduite]” (ibid, 23-4). 
190 Ibid, 13. 
191 Ibid, 18. 
192 “By a strange paradox, that which was born of the most singular delirium was already hidden, like a 
secret inaccessible truth, buried in the bowels of the earth. When the arbitrary nature of madness was 
exhibited, man encountered the sombre necessity of the world: the animal that haunted his nightmares and 
visions born of ascetic deprivation was man’s own nature, revealed in the unpitying truth of hell” (ibid, 21).  
193 Ibid, 158, my emphasis. Cf.: “The animality that raged in madness dispossessed man of his humanity, 
not so that he might fall prey to other powers, but rather to fix him at the degree zero of his own nature” 




thus already see that the tragic expression of unreason in apocalyptic painting cryptically 
announces the double death of God and man, which will find its fuller articulation 
centuries later in the works of Nietzsche,194 Artaud,195 and Bataille – that is, the discovery 
that the “death of God restores us not to a limited and positivistic world but to a world 
exposed by the experience of its limits, made and unmade by that excess which 
transgresses it.”196 Indeed, this disclosure of radical finitude through the limit-experience 
of unreason is the key for threading together “the great broken line that stretches from the 
Ship of Fools to the last words of Nietzsche and perhaps Artaud’s cries of rage….”197     
Taken as a whole, then, the History of Madness tells the story of the fracture and  
divergence within the experience of madness of its horizontal and vertical vectors.198 As 
in Dream and Existence, Foucault orients his project along the privileged vertical axis, 
                                                
194 See, for example, Foucault’s remarks on Nietzsche at the end of Introduction to Kant’s Anthropology, 
Foucault’s secondary doctoral thesis, which was written contemporaneously with History of Madness: “The 
Nietzschian enterprise can be understood as at last bringing that proliferation of the questioning of man to 
an end. For is not the death of God in effect manifested in a doubly murderous gesture which, by putting an 
end to the absolute, is at the same time the cause of the death of man himself? For man, in his finitude, is 
not distinguishable from the infinite of which he is both the negation and the harbinger; it is in the death of 
man that the death of God is realized. Is it not possible to conceive of a critique of finitude which would be 
as liberating with regard to man as it would be with regard to the infinite…?” (Foucault, Introduction to 
Kant’s Anthropology, translated by Roberto Nigro and Kate Briggs,124)  
195 See Artaud’s pithy formulation in “To Have Done with the Judgment of God”: “although nobody 
believes in god any more everybody believes more and more in man. / So it is man whom we must now 
make up our minds to emasculate” (Antonin Artaud, Selected Writings, edited by Susan Sontag, translated 
by Helen Weaver, 570). 
196 Foucault, “A Preface to Transgression,” 72. 
197 Foucault, History of Madness, 344. As suggested in the last chater, it is this tragic tradition, here 
characterized by Foucault in terms of unreason, that finds its distinctively modern philosophical expression 
in the Kantian sublime. 
198 Cf.: “In this disparity between the consciousness of madness and the consciousness of unreason, we find, 
in the late eighteenth century, the starting point of what was to be a decisive moment, where the experience 
of unreason, such as is evident in Hölderlin, Nerval and Nietzsche, always leads back to [remonter toujours 
plus haut vers] the roots of time – unreason thereby becoming the untimely within the world par excellence 
– while the knowledge of madness sought on the contrary to situate it ever more precisely within the 
direction of nature and history in their development. It is from this period onwards that the time of unreason 
and the time of madness were to be affected by two opposing vectors: unreason becoming an unconditional 





only now the tragic structures that this axis expresses, the same which ‘confront the 
dialectics of history,’ are “the great structures of unreason in their most general form – 
those which slumber beneath the surface of Western culture, just below the temporality of 
historians”199:  
The linearity that led rationalist thought to consider madness as a form of mental 
illness must be reinterpreted in a vertical dimension. Only then does it become 
apparent that each of its incarnations is a more complete, but more perilous masking 
of tragic experience – an experience that it nonetheless failed to obliterate. When 
constraints were at their most oppressive, an explosion was necessary, and that is 
what we have seen since Nietzsche.200  
 
When reinterpreted ‘vertically’ – that is, from the perspective of tragic limit-experiences 
and the constitutive force of their exclusion –, the history of the discursive and 
institutional forms by which reason apprehends madness as mental illness can be grasped 
as so many attempts to refuse and forget the tragic truth of groundlessness at the heart of 
existence. And if tragic experience fails to be ‘obliterated’ under the ‘linearity’ of 
rationalist thought, this is owed to the works of unreason that provide it with a form of 
expression through literature, painting, and philosophy. 
 
3.2.2 The Critical Force of Tragic Expression: ‘Ruse and New Triumph of Madness’ 
Along the vertical axis of Foucault’s counter-history, then, there emerges a 
discontinuous lineage of artists and poets – from Bosch, through Goya and Sade, to 
Nietzsche, Van Gogh, and Artaud – who give voice and force to the tragic. As we have 
seen, the limit-experience of unreason is akin to that of the death dream, for both concern 
                                                
199 Ibid, 344. Note that this phrase ‘just below the temporality of historians’ anticipates Foucault’s depiction 
of revolt 18 years later as that which, “a bit beneath history, …cleaves it and stirs it” (Foucault, “Useless to 
Revolt?”, Power, 453). 




‘the nothing of existence’ and the fundamental finitude it discloses; but whereas death is 
the terminal external expression of this nothingness as the end of an existence, unreason 
expresses the internal folding of the nothing at the core of existence itself: “The 
substitution of the theme of madness for that of death is not the sign of a rupture, but 
rather of a new twist within the same preoccupation. It is still the nothingness of 
existence that is at stake, but this nothingness is no longer experienced as an end exterior 
to being, a threat and a conclusion: it is felt from within, as the continuous and constant 
form of existence.”201 Though Foucault is here discussing the emergence of the tragic-
cosmic experience of madness within the cultural imagination of the early Renaissance, 
his own substitution of a history of madness for the previous death dream analysis 
suggests that unreason provides a response to the problem of material expression first 
posed at the end of Dream and Existence: namely, the problem of realizing a vertical 
form of tragic expression that, by opening onto the social world, would in turn transform 
that world by giving ‘a new meaning to truth and freedom.’  
Whereas the dream had provided a form of access to one’s ownmost being-toward-
death that nevertheless remained on the other side of the oneiric limit, unreason opens a 
new relation to the nothing at the heart of diurnal existence, which is to say, historical 
reality. Articulating the conditions for sustaining the expression of this relation thus 
becomes one of the central problems taken up in History of Madness. Though cast within 
a more complex historico-political framework than the work on Binswanger, this problem 
is still inflected by the existential accents of Dasein analysis, for the tragic vision of 
unreason contests the normative and exclusionary ordering of reality precisely by 
                                                




disclosing the most singular and primordial forms of human experience. Like the dream, 
both an expression and experience of transcendence where man, in the night of his 
solitude, encounters what is most fundamental about himself: “But in that night [of 
Goya’s Sleep of Reason], man communicates with what is deepest in himself, what is 
most solitary. … Through Sade and Goya, the Western world received the possibility of 
transcending its reason in violence, and of recovering tragic experience beyond the 
promises of dialectic.”202  
Rather than revealing ‘the freedom of man in its most original form,’ however, the 
vertical axis of tragic expression now instead bespeaks “the end of man, who sinks into 
[sombre dans] the night.”203 Rather than unveiling the temporal forms of authenticity as 
the truth of existence, the vertical vector discloses the inauthenticity of a primary act of 
division, the sovereign and dominant gesture of reason, which founds and cleaves the 
modes of being of western culture, constituting the very form of man qua subject. And 
thus, if transcendence is still a vertical limit-experience or ‘original revelation of the 
nothing’ (Heidegger), what arises in the depths of this experience is no longer akin to the 
Heideggerian ‘being beyond beings’ but, rather, something closer to the ‘original 
contradiction and original pain’ invoked by Nietzsche: an abyssal vision, given 
expressive force through unreason’s tragic poets, of genetic violence, that is, of an 
originary rupture which, in its absolute contingency, serves as the unjustifiable and 
                                                
202 Ibid, 531, 535. 




disavowed condition of possibility for the constitution of given historico-ontological and 
-epistemic forms.204 
The subversive effect of the works of unreason is therefore to call into question the 
authenticity and positivist foundation of reason and its sciences of man, arraigning reason 
before its inauthentic fleeing of groundlessness by which it expels the tragic from itself: 
“Ruse and new triumph of madness: the world that thought to measure and justify 
madness through psychology must justify itself before madness, since in its struggles 
[effort] and agonies [débats] it measures itself by the excess [démesure] of works like 
                                                
204 As noted at the beginning of this chapter, Althusser is one of the few to have treated Foucauldian 
verticality as a concept. As Warren Montag shows, Althusser takes verticality in History of Madness’s 
original preface to refer to an “original or transcendental abyss…, an atheology that would preserve the 
place of God in the order of creation, even as it left that place empty” (Montag, “‘Foucault and the 
Problematic of Origins’: Althusser’s Reading of Folie et déraison,” Borderlands E-journal, 4: 2, 2005, §29): 
“Foucault's book is thus really as much a book about reason as about madness…. This border freely 
constituted is haunted by the temptation of being an original abyss, a verticality that is no longer a break 
(coupure) in history but the originary rupture of time” (Althusser, cited in Montag, §2). Althusser then 
contrasts the vertical dimension of History of Madness, which would attest to “the transcendentalist 
tendency in Foucault’s preface,” to its properly historical dimension: “To the search for the genesis of the 
opposition of reason and madness in that original negativity that is itself negated even as it remains present 
in its negation and thus to the ‘verticality’ of an ever present origin, Althusser counterposes, by citing 
Foucault against himself, the notion of ‘a history of limits’” (Montag, §31). Althusser is correct to link 
verticality to a kind of abyssal degree zero; and his identification of a ‘transcendentalist tendency’ in 
Foucault would be especially appropriate to a reading of verticality in Dream and Existence (which, 
however, neither Montag nor Althusser mention), where the vertical axis is privileged insofar as it discloses 
that absolutely original presence of Dasein in the limit-Situation by which it encounters the nothing. 
However, in insisting on a movement in History of Madness “from the abyss to the limit” that he then 
construes as Foucault’s passage “from a transcendental conception to a historical conception” (Althusser, 
cited in ibid), Althusser’s mistake is to oppose the originary abyss and the limit. For Foucault, the limit 
itself is originary insofar as division is constitutive. Indeed, this is precisely the insight that Foucault, on the 
topic of Bataille, attributes to Nietzsche as the first thinker of critical ontology, which he will later call 
‘genealogy’ and the ‘historical ontology of ourselves’: “In our day, would not the instantaneous play of the 
limit and of transgression be the essential test for a thought that centers on the ‘origin,’ for that form of 
thought to which Nietzsche dedicated us from the beginning of his works and one that would be, absolutely 
and in the same motion, a Critique and an Ontology, an understanding that comprehends both finitude and 
being?” (Foucault, “A Preface to Transgression,” 75). In other words, Althusser neglects the critical aspect 
of verticality – the sense in which Foucault’s ‘history of limits’ is itself an explicitly vertical form of 
critical analysis, that is, an interpretation from the perspective of constitutive division –, identifying only 
verticality’s ‘ontological’ aspect as abyss or groundless ground. It is symptomatic of this neglect that 
Althusser and Montag cite only the one reference to ‘constant verticality’ in the original preface, and not 
the reference to ‘reinterpreting’ the history of madness ‘in a vertical dimension,’ which appears in the first 
chapter of History of Madness. More generally, the recurrence of the concept of verticality throughout 
Foucault’s oeuvre, which we will chart over the remainder of this chapter and Chapter 6, also demonstrates 




those of Nietzsche, of Van Gogh, of Artaud. And nothing in itself, especially not what it 
can know of madness, assures the world that it is justified by such works of madness.”205 
Like the death dream, unreason is also a tragic mode of limit-experience that beholds the 
abyssal forces of the night; but this mode of experience is now imbued with an explicit 
political charge because the nocturnal forces it expresses – which doubly displace the 
forms of God and man that organized the epistemic formations of the classical and 
modern periods, respectively206 –, threaten to destabilize the foundations of western 
reason and culture: 
This madness, which knots and divides time, which curves the world in the loop of 
night, …does it not utter to those who can hear them, like Nietzsche and Artaud, the 
scarcely audible words of classical unreason, where all was nothingness and night, 
but now amplified into screams and fury? Giving them for the first time expression, 
a droit de cité [‘right of abode’], and a grasp on Western culture, a point from 
which all contestation becomes possible, as well as the contestation of all things [la 
contestation totale]?207 
 
The historical, aesthetic, and ethical task outlined at the end of Dream and 
Existence to develop a vertical existential poetics thus becomes, in addition, a political 
project to recover and give voice to unreason as the vertical form of tragic expression 
uniquely capable of transforming the conditions of the social world. Indeed, it is precisely 
at the point where unreason acquires the powers of expression that ‘all contestation 
becomes possible.’ And this ‘work of expression’ is thus a necessary condition of 
                                                
205 Foucault, Madness and Civilization, translated by Richard Howard, 289; cf. History of Madness, 538. I 
have cited Howard’s older translation of this passage because, among other advantages, it retains 
Foucault’s language of ‘justification,’ which is a more faithful rendering. The original French reads: “Ruse 
et nouveau triomphe de la folie: ce monde qui croit la mesurer, la justifier par la psychologie, c’est devant 
elle qu’il doit se justifier, puisque dans son effort et ses débats, il se mesure à la démesure d’œuvres comme 
celle de Nietzsche, de Van Gogh, d’Artaud. Et rien en lui, surtout pas ce qu’il peut connaître de la folie, ne 
l’assure que ces œuvres le justifient” (Foucault, Histoire de la folie à l’âge classique, 663). 
206 For an analysis of the God-form and Man-form that organized the classical and modern historical 
formations, see “Appendix: On the Death of Man and Superman” in Deleuze, Foucault, translated by Sean 
Hand, 124-7. 




possibility for radical contestation because the expulsion and silencing of unreason 
institutes the historical unfolding of reason. Foucault’s theorization of transformative 
political agency first emerges, then, through this concept of the verticality of unreason 
that disrupts the horizontal history of reason, problematizing the latter’s forms of thought 
and institutional structures and practices. In other words, the problem of material 
expression becomes the problem of resistance.  
However, if, from the perspective precisely of expression, the promise unreason 
holds as a form of limit-experience is that it opens on the near side of the oneiric limit, 
the downfall is that its painters and poets collapse into madness. Like the unsustainability 
of the dreamer’s ascent to the summit of the vertical axis, the tragic artists of unreason 
are deprived the support necessary to prolong their limit-vision, and the height of their 
lucidity anticipates or even precipitates their breakdown into catatonia or suicide. Here 
again, the vertical vector has become political, for the dividing practices of western 
culture that exclude the tragic are the very same that render the experience of unreason 
unsupportable.208 And if the expression of unreason is a condition of possibility for ‘the 
total contestation’ against the organization and structure of western culture and society, 
                                                
208 Foucault here follows Artaud, whose thesis in his essay on Van Gogh is that the ‘authentically insane’ – 
those artists, such as Hölderlin, Nerval, Nietzsche and Van Gogh, who possess a form of ‘superior lucidity’ 
that psychiatry institutionalizes and treats as mental illness – become suicided by society because the 
dangerous subversive force that their works express would undermine the foundation of social institutions. 
See Artaud, “Van Gogh, the Man Suicided by Society”: “And what is an authentic madman? / It is a man 
who preferred to become mad, in the socially accepted sense of the word, rather than forfeit a certain 
superior idea of human honor. / So society has strangled in its asylums all those it wanted to get rid of or 
protect itself from, because they refused to become its accomplices in certain great nastiness. / For a 
madman is also a man whom society did not want to hear and whom it wanted to prevent from uttering 
certain intolerable truths” (Artaud, Antonin Artaud: Selected Writings, 485). See also: “This is why a 
tainted society has invented psychiatry to defend itself against the investigations of certain superior 
intellects [lucidités supérieures] whose faculties of divination would be troublesome. / …For it is not a 
certain conformity of manners that the painting of van Gogh attacks, but rather the conformity of 




an analysis of the conditions of impossibility for sustaining this expression will pose a 
problem of power that is central to the very ‘essence of the modern world.’ Naming 
Hölderlin, Nerval, Nietzsche, Van Gogh, Roussel, and Artaud, all of whom pursued the 
experience of unreason unto death, Foucault writes: 
And each of those existences, each of the words that made up those existences 
repeats with the insistence of time the same question, which probably concerns the 
essence of the modern world: why is it not possible to remain in the difference that 
is unreason? Why is it that unreason always has to separate from itself, fascinated in 
the delirium of the sensible and trapped in the retreat that is madness? How was it at 
this point deprived of language? What is this power that petrifies all those who dare 
look upon its face, condemning to madness all those who have tried the test 
[l’épreuve] of Unreason?209 
 
This set of questions cuts to the heart of Foucault’s work and allows us to 
summarize his conceptual development from Dream and Existence, where the problem 
was one of maintaining oneself authentically in the vertical space of a nocturnal limit-
experience and transposing the truth of this transcendence into the historical world 
through the expressive freedom of the imagination. Foucault’s reformulation of this 
problem in History of Madness is twofold. First, it is in artistic works of unreason that we 
can locate a vertical mode of tragic expression in the world, one which restores to the 
world a form of limit-experience that it has systematically excluded, and which contests 
the horizontal course of rationalist thought. The transposition of the truth of 
transcendence through a vertico-existential poetics, which was already a question of 
crossing over a limit (the oneiric divide), now attains political force as transgression. 
Second, if the fugitive vertical space of unreason remains irrespirable – such that its 
tragic poets, like the ‘authentically insane’ in Artaud who are ‘suicided by society,’ 
                                                




cannot maintain themselves in its difference and collapse instead into madness –, this is 
both an indictment of the inauthenticity of western culture and an insight into the 
fundamental violence that founds the modern world. 
The vertical dimension thus performs two functions in Foucault’s analysis, both of 
which culminate in the event of the ‘ruse and new triumph of madness’ with which the 
History of Madness ends: (1) the critical function of confronting and arresting the linear 
development of reason (and the forms of mental illness through which rationalist thought 
seeks to apprehend, institutionalize and control madness) by disclosing the historically 
contingent and arbitrarily violent dividing practices that betray reason’s own lack of 
ground and justification; and (2) the affirmative function of manifesting and realizing, 
through the transgressive force of tragic expression, the abyssal vision of groundlessness 
at the heart of existence – which is to say, the radicalization of finitude that the death of 
God had enabled, but which had been defused and territorialized in the form of man.210 In 
other words, the ‘constant verticality’ of unreason (1) suspends and breaks with the 
dominant organization of the epistemic and social formations of western culture, and it 
does so (2) by recovering or realizing a form of limit-experience and -expression along 
the vertical axis that opens thought (and, through it, the social world) to a production of 
the new. 
                                                
210 See Deleuze’s analysis of the two moments or phases of finitude that follow the fall of the form of God 
and usher in that of man: “While we were once told only that man becomes aware of his own finitude, 
under certain historically determinable causes Foucault insists on the necessity of introducing two distinct 
phases. The force within man must begin by confronting and seizing hold of the forces of finitude as if they 
were forces from outside: it is outside oneself that force must come up against finitude. Then and only then, 
in a second stage, does it create from this its own finitude. All this means that when the forces within man 
enter into a relation with forces of finitude from outside, then and only then does the set of forces compose 




This double critical-affirmative function of verticality helps to unpack the two 
senses of the vertical operative in our earlier formulation of Foucault’s work on madness 
as a vertical history of limits at the vertical limits of history. In the first instance, the 
vertical refers to a form of historico-critical analysis – here, an ‘archeology of silence’ – 
that takes as its object the constitutive dividing practices through which western reason, 
as both epistemic and social formation, takes shape and takes hold. In the second instance, 
the vertical refers to the experience of a dimension or axis of existence of and at the limit: 
that is, a limit-experience situated at the degree zero of history, hence irreducible to 
historical determination and thereby capable, in principle and by virtue of its exteriority, 
of generating a kind of radically transformative force. There are thus two aspects or 
dimensions of verticality – Critique and Experience – that form essential moments in the 
process of transformative political agency, entering into complex relations with one 
another. Here, they function as each other’s double, which is to say, their relation is one 
of (1) reciprocal determination – critique serves as the condition for recovering the 
experience (archeology of silence), while experience provides the condition for directing 
the critique (experience of the limit qua constitutive division) – and (2) superimposition, 
for the History of Madness is composed as a critical counter-history that is itself a tragic 
work, giving expression to a kind of disquieting limit-experience that would prepare the 
conditions for ‘total contestation.’211  
At its most ambitious, then, the History of Madness can be read as Foucault’s own 
answer to the problem of material expression: that is, as an effort to realize a vertical-
                                                
211 It is in just this sense that History of Madness as a book is itself an experience. Cf. Foucault’s 
interpretation of his own books as forms of limit-experience (or, as Timothy O’Leary in his Foucault and 




tragic poetics that would facilitate emergent forms of thought and practices of freedom. 
In this way, Foucault quite clearly positions his own work within the disrupted and 
disruptive lineage of unreason – precisely there, in the wake of Nietzsche and Artaud, 
where the tragic limit-experience has acquired ‘for the first time expression,’ and thereby 
a grip on and against western culture. More modestly, the aim of the book would be to 
attune its readers to the transformative force of such limit-experiences, given expression 
along the broken chain of unreason, as well as to the myriad marks of silencing and 
exclusion that scar the confines of history. In both capacities, the political problem, which 
is also (and still) the ‘ethical task and historical necessity’ from the end of Dream and 
Existence, is ultimately to provide the conditions of material expression that would 
support and sustain the vertical limit-experience of unreason. And as we will see, this 
exigency will inform Foucault’s literary politics of transgression over the following 
decade. 
* 
Before proceeding to map the vertical axis in Foucault’s thought throughout the 
1960s, let us pause to venture some brief interpretive hypotheses, both to distill where we 
have come and to signpost where we are going. First, the problem of material expression, 
whether with respect to the radical freedom of the poetic imagination or the radical 
resistance of unreason, orients the direction of Foucault’s early work; one of the 
exegetical aims of this thesis going forward will be to show how this problem remains 
fundamental in determining the trajectory of Foucault’s thought, from his work on 
aesthetics and epistemology through his analytic of power to his late ethico-politics. 




for it is the tragic-expressive force of the vertical axis, at the irreducible limit of history, 
that must be provided with the conditions of support necessary for its realization within 
historical reality, precisely in order to transform the normalizing and impoverishing 
conditions governing the social order; verticality is thus the first concept through which 
Foucault theorizes resistance, and it will remain essential to his political thought. Third, 
verticality is analyzable in general according to its two attributes or aspects: (1) the 
verticality of critical thought and (2) the verticality of the limit-experience.  
The remainder of this chapter will be devoted to analyzing the two attributes of 
verticality through to the end of Foucault’s early period: that is, the vertical critique of 
positivism and the vertical experience of literature. 
 
3.3 Early Critique: The ‘Vertical Investigation’ of Positivism 
3.3.1 The Medical Capture of Death in The Birth of the Clinic 
Having established a form of ‘vertical reinterpretation’ as the analytical method for 
an archeology of silence, Foucault will deploy a similar kind of critical-vertical analysis 
in his subsequent book. While smaller in scope than the work on madness, The Birth of 
the Clinic, set at the same historical moment as the ‘birth of the asylum,’212 “concerns 
one of those periods that mark an ineradicable chronological threshold: the period in 
which illness, counter-nature, death, in short, the whole dark underside of disease came to 
                                                
212 This phrase, the title of the penultimate chapter of History of Madness, announces the transformation 
from the classical to the modern period in the late 18th century, marked iconically in the history of 




light, at the same time illuminating and eliminating itself like night, in the deep, visible, 
solid, enclosed, but accessible space of the human body.”213  
Just as unreason, as ‘that which goes against nature,’ had constituted the tragic inner 
torsion of the relation with the nothing at the heart of existence, so, too, the ‘dark 
underside of disease’ is a nocturnal and counter-natural force by which the relation to 
existential void becomes internalized, experienced obscurely from within. And just as the 
tragic threat of unreason is defused and silenced by the reassuring monologue of reason 
about madness (psychiatry), appropriated as the naturalized and normalized phenomenon 
of mental illness and thus captured as an object of medico-moral positivism; so, too, the 
threat of disease in its cryptic relation to death and transgression of right natural order is 
“exorcized” insofar as disease itself, rather than being linked to “the metaphysic of evil,” 
becomes the object of a medical positivism that can know and master it.214  
This abrupt shift in the structure of medical discourse, which announces a more 
fundamental transformation in the epistemic formation of western culture, emerges 
historically together with “the anatomo-clinical method” of pathological anatomy, in 
which the previously sealed off contours of the corpse become an operable field of 
visibility and intelligibility. The definitude of death thereby becomes situated in the body 
with surgical precision and etiological clarity:  
Conceived in relation to nature, disease was the non-assignable negative of which 
the causes, forms, and manifestations were offered only indirectly and against an 
                                                
213 Foucault, The Birth of the Clinic: An Archaeology of Medical Perception, translated by A.M. Sheridan 
Smith, 195. 
214 Ibid, 196-8. The fuller passage reads: “This structure, in which space, language, and death are 
articulated – what is known, in fact, as the anatomo-clinical method – constitutes the historical condition of 
a medicine that is given and accepted as positive. Positive here should be taken in the strong sense. Disease 
breaks away from the metaphysic of evil, to which it had been related for centuries; and it finds in the 




ever-receding background; seen in relation to death, disease becomes exhaustively 
legible, open without remainder to the sovereign dissection of language and of the 
gaze. It is when death became the concrete a priori of medical experience that death 
could detach itself from counter-nature and become embodied in the living bodies 
of individuals. It will no doubt remain a decisive fact about our culture that its first 
scientific discourse concerning the individual had to pass through this stage of death. 
… [F]rom the experience of Unreason was born psychology, the very possibility of 
psychology; from the integration of death into medical thought is born a medicine 
that is given as a science of the individual.215 
 
The limit-relation to death, emplaced in the body as the ‘concrete a priori of medical 
experience,’ is akin to the limit-experience of unreason, due not only to its tragic 
dimension or proximity to nothingness, but also to the fact that its confinement, 
neutralization, or corporeal circumscription is a condition of possibility for the horizontal 
development of a form of rationalist thought that would take as its object the individual 
subject. In both cases, what was once a terror linked to obscure cosmic forces becomes 
territorialized in the form of man.  
Indeed, among all the human sciences, clinical medicine enjoys not only a 
“methodological” privilege, but an “ontological” one “in that it concerns man’s being as 
an object of positive knowledge. The possibility for the individual of being both subject 
and object of his own knowledge” – which, for Foucault, will later come to define the 
individualizing process of subjection216 – “implies an inversion in the structure of 
finitude.”217 Whereas finitude in the classical period, having “no other content than the 
                                                
215 Ibid. 
216 See Foucault, “The Subject and Power,” Power: “There are two meanings of the word ‘subject’: subject 
to someone else by control and dependence, and tied to his own identity by a conscience or self-knowledge. 
Both meanings suggest a form of power that subjugates and makes subject to” (331). Moreover, already in 
the Introduction to Kant’s Anthropology, Foucault underscores as the hallmark of anthropological thought 
that man becomes tied to his own identity as an object through a form of self-knowledge of which he is also 
subject: anthropology “is the knowledge of man, in a movement which objectifies him,” and, “at the same 
time, it is the knowledge of the knowledge of man, and so can interrogate the subject himself” (Foucault, 
Introduction to Kant’s Anthropology: 117). 




negation of the infinite,” had been grasped privatively in relation to the God-form that 
organized the production of knowledge and subjectivity, “the thought that was born at the 
end of the eighteenth century gave it,” finitude, “the powers of the positive: the 
anthropological structure that then appeared played both the critical role of limit and the 
founding role of origin.”218  
At the philosophical level, this “reversal”219 is inaugurated through the Copernican 
turn of Kantian critique, whereby the finite conditions of the transcendental subject, 
rather than the infinitude of God, become constitutive for knowledge. Yet precisely what 
interested Foucault in Kant’s Anthropology, which he had translated and written an 
introduction to as his secondary doctoral thesis two years prior, is the slippage from 
critical to anthropological thought, in light of which the three Critiques appear to have 
taken as their “secret guide” “a certain concrete image of man.”220 Thus, while Kant’s 
thought of “constituent finitude” displaces the idea of “original infinity”221 as epistemic 
foundation, thereby opening a new form of possible thought, “Kant ended by closing this 
opening when he ultimately relegated all critical investigations to an anthropological 
question….”222  
                                                
218 Ibid. 
219 Ibid. 
220 Foucault, Introduction to Kant’s Anthropology, 19. Four years later in The Order of Things, Foucault 
will locate the explicit mark of this slippage in “Kant’s Logic, when to his traditional trilogy of questions he 
added an ultimate one: the three critical questions (What can I know? What must I do? What am I permitted 
to hope?) then found themselves referred to a fourth, and inscribed, as it were, ‘to its account’: Was ist der 
Mensch?” (Foucault, The Order of Things, 371). 
221 Deleuze, Foucault, 127. 
222 Foucault, “A Preface to Transgression,” 76. It is worth noting that this essay, Foucault’s homage to 
Bataille, was published in 1963, the same year as The Birth of the Clinic. While I cannot develop the point 
here, I would suggest that “A Preface to Transgression” serves as a kind of minor double to The Birth of the 
Clinic; and that a similar relation obtains between “The Thought of the Outside,” Foucault’s homage to 




Rather than conceiving constitutive finitude in a way that, by deposing God, 
unmoors reason from any positive foundation, grasping the absolute contingency and 
arbitrary violence of ‘a world exposed by the experience of its limits’ – which is to say, 
rather than conceiving the finite tragically –, the Kantian critical turn surreptitiously 
installs a kind of anthropological positivism: “the Anthropology indicates the absence of 
God, and occupies the void that the infinite leaves in its wake.”223 This double movement 
in Kant, which collapses a more radical possibility for critical thought by referring it to 
the horizontal enterprise of reason, reflects, as though in germ form, the birth of the 
modern episteme and its circumscription by the ‘anthropological circle,’224 wherein man 
serves as both the starting-point in the inquiry for truth and the end-point to which this 
knowledge refers back.225 Whence arises the need for “the Nietzschean figures of tragedy, 
of Dionysus, of the death of God, of the philosopher’s hammer, of the overman 
approaching with the steps of a dove, of the Return,”226 to which Foucault’s early work is 
devoted and which would restore to the finite its tragic force, thereby contesting the 
socio-epistemic formation of man.227 
                                                
223 Foucault, Introduction to Kant’s Anthropology: 120. 
224 This phrase is the title of the last chapter of Foucault’s History of Madness. 
225 Foucault, The Order of Things, 342. 
226 Foucault, “A Preface to Transgression,” 76, translation slightly modified. 
227 We have already detailed one version of this Nietzschean project: namely, the thesis in History of 
Madness that tragic works of unreason, be they Bosch’s paintings or Artaud’s ‘cries of rage,’ herald the 
double death of God and man. For Foucault as for Nietzsche, what the abyssal vision of groundlessness 
discloses is the intrinsic contingency of existence and the radical finitude of human being; and what the 
modern founding act of reason institutes through its exclusion of this ‘tragic truth’ (Nietzsche) is the reign 
of man, which is to say, a socio-epistemic formation (a set of discursive and social dividing practices 
productive of the major form of subjectivity proper to western culture) that takes as its positive ground the 
very finitude of human being. In a sense, the man-form doubles the God-form, repeating the latter’s 
ultimately groundless claims to a foundational moral and rational order. The ‘ruse and new triumph of 
madness’ with which Foucault’s work ends would thus consummate the death of God through the death of 
man by restoring to the tragic the full violence of its ungrounding insight, thereby unmasking the 




Now, if the ‘anthropological structure’ of thought establishes “the philosophical 
condition for the organization of a positive medicine,” conversely, the latter provides the 
former with the empirical condition for its realization as a form of experience: “medicine 
offers modern man the obstinate, yet reassuring face of his finitude; in it, death is 
endlessly repeated, but it is also exorcized; and although it ceaselessly reminds man of 
the limit that he bears within him, it also speaks to him of that technical world that is the 
armed, positive, full form of his finitude.”228 The development of clinical medicine 
introduces “that fundamental relation that binds modern man to his original finitude”229 
by positing as an object of knowledge his own death, situated in the living body as 
disease; yet insofar as modern man is also the subject of this knowledge, he retains a 
measure of control over its object, which is to say, over his proper death, the tragic force 
of which he has through ‘armed’ expulsion ‘exorcized,’ repelled from the ‘limited and 
positivistic world’ in which he would install himself. In such a way, Foucault’s project in 
The Birth of the Clinic once again suggests the problem of recovering a counter-natural 
force of the tragic from its neutralization, appropriation, or exclusion by the 
anthropological circle of rationalist thought.230  
Foucault will thus characterize his critical counter-history of ‘positive medicine’ 
precisely as “a vertical investigation of this positivism.”231 As in History of Madness, 
vertical critique, rather than following the progressive linearity of reason, locates this so-
                                                
228 Foucault, Birth of the Clinic, 198. 
229 Ibid, 197. 
230 The Birth of the Clinic is smaller in scope than History of Madness in two ways: most obviously, in the 
shorter duration of the historical period it concerns; but more fundamentally, in the fact that it does not, in 
addition to its critical project, give itself the task of an affirmative realization of vertical-tragic experience 
(in this case, the limit-experience of, or limit-relation to, death). This affirmative task will be taken up in 
Foucault’s writings on the thought of transgression and the thought of the outside articulated through 
modern literature (especially Bataille and Blanchot).   




called positivism (whether psychiatry or clinical medicine) in the historically contingent 
conditions of its realization. And like the vertical re-interpretation of mental illness, so, 
too, this ‘vertical investigation’ of clinical disease situates these conditions for the 
emergence of modern medicine in the experience of a limit (in this case, death, or the 
‘original finitude’ of human being), the tragic force of which is rejected, forgotten, or 
silenced beneath the reassuring monologue of reason. In other words, a critical vertical 
analysis will be one that confronts a form of rational positivism, grounded in the 
epistemic formation of man, with the contingent conditions of its own historical 
emergence (‘Pudenda origo,’ as Foucault was fond of citing from Nietzsche232); and 
these conditions are themselves shown to be rationally unjustifiable insofar as they betray 
a reactive or inauthentic gesture that would seek to exorcise the thought of tragic 
groundlessness and its threat to any horizontal form of knowledge. 
 
3.3.2 ‘For That I Must Ascend into the Depths’: Critical Renewal along the ‘Vertical 
Line’ of Nietzschean Interpretation 
From History of Madness to The Birth of the Clinic, then, there is the continuity of a 
vertical critique mounted against the positivism of the human sciences, understood 
broadly as the dominant form of thought and experience of modern western culture. This 
line of critical verticality – which, beginning ‘under the sun of the great Nietzschean 
quest,’ is first oriented by the double death of God and man and will later issue into the 
                                                
232 See, e.g., Foucault, “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History,” Aesthetics, Method, and Epistemology, 370. Cf.: 




more fully articulated concept of genealogy – receives further elaboration in the essay 
Foucault presented in 1964 at a conference on Nietzsche organized by Deleuze:233 
There is in Nietzsche a critique of ideal depth, of depth of conscience [conscience], 
which he denounces as an invention of philosophers; this depth would be the pure 
and interior search for truth. Nietzsche shows how it implies resignation, hypocrisy, 
the mask; so that the interpreter must, when he examines signs in order to denounce 
them, descend along the vertical line and show that this depth of interiority is in 
reality something other than what it says. Consequently, it is necessary that the 
interpreter descend, that he be, as Nietzsche says, ‘the good excavator of the lower 
depths.’ But, in reality, when one interprets one can trace this descending line only 
to restore the glittering exteriority that was covered up and buried. For if the 
interpreter must go to the bottom himself, like an excavator, the movement of 
interpretation is, on the contrary, that of a projection [surplomb], of a more and 
more elevated projection, which always leaves depth above it to be displayed in a 
more and more visible fashion; and depth is now restored as an absolutely 
superficial secret, in such a way that the flight of the eagle, the ascension of the 
mountain, all the verticality that is so important for Zarathustra is in the strict sense 
the reversal of depth, the discovery that depth was only a game and a surface 
fold.234 
 
                                                
233 Several years later, Foucault will twice refer to his books on madness and illness as vertical works: first, 
in “On the Ways of Writing History” (1967), and then again in “Interview avec Michel Foucault” (1968). 
In the former, Foucault, commenting on his archeological method for analyzing discursive formations in 
The Order of Things, insists that “there is nothing to be gained from describing this autonomous layer of 
discourses unless one can relate it to other layers, practices, institutions, social relations, political relations, 
and so on. It is that relationship which has always intrigued me, and in Histoire de la folie [Madness and 
Civilization] and Naissance de la clinique [Birth of the Clinic], I tried to define the relations between these 
different domains..., the discursive domain and the nondiscursive domain. In The Order of Things I covered 
the horizontal axis [‘of the theoretical models common to several discourses’], in Madness and Civilization, 
the vertical dimension of the figure” (Foucault, “On the Ways of Writing History,” Aesthetics, Method, and 
Epistemology, 284-5). In other words, the vertical “axis of description” anticipates the inquiry into power-
knowledge relations that Foucault will pursue throughout the 1970s. Further, in another interview the 
following year, Foucault again comments that both History of Madness and The Birth of the Clinic “treat of 
this vertical dimension,” which is to say, “the relations that are able to obtain between a form of knowledge 
and the social, economic, political, and historical conditions in which this knowledge is constituted” 
(Foucault, “Interview avec Michel Foucault,” Dits et écrits I, 1954-1975, 684-5, my translation). The 
vertical axis of critical analysis thus situates any given form of knowledge or discourse in relation to the set 
of historical (read: economic, social, political) structures and processes that both make it possible and are 
impacted by it, in turn. That is, the vertical dimension of analysis concerns the event of thought itself, in all 
its historical contingency and effectivity, in terms of its immanent emplacement in the materiality of 
practices, discursive and non-discursive alike – practices which, as we have seen, can take the violent form 
of constitutive division. It is therefore the critical mode of verticality that grasps the production of thought: 
both in the sense of thought as the object of production, a historically contingent product, and in the sense 
of thought as itself a productive or potentially transformative force. We can already see, perhaps, the 
outlines of genealogical critique emerging through this sketch of the vertical ‘axis of description’ and the 
relation between thought and historical force relations.  




In order to understand this paradoxical vertical movement of Nietzschean 
interpretation, let us first briefly examine Nietzsche’s critique of the ‘depth of conscience,’ 
noting before doing so that Foucault’s phrase, la profondeur de conscience, can equally 
mean ‘the depth of conscience’ and ‘the depth of consciousness.’ While the former is the 
more natural rendering, especially given the context of Nietzsche’s critique of bad 
conscience, both senses must be kept in mind simultaneously since, on Nietzsche’s 
account, the historical origin of bad conscience, “the internalizing of man,”235 is the same 
process that gives rise to the idea of the soul, that is, the ‘ideal depth’ which would house 
consciousness as the seat of the subject. Indeed, it is precisely the consciousness of 
rational thought that purports to be ‘the pure and interior search for truth,’ a positivist 
mask belied by vertical critique, which will ‘show that this depth of interiority is in 
reality something other than what it says.’ And on Nietzsche’s view, in reality, the birth 
of bad conscience or the modern soul is the result of a doubly reactive process proper to 
herd society: namely, that of ressentiment turning against itself.  
Ressentiment, as exemplified in slave morality, is a reactive structure of 
identification predicated upon a kind of constitutive division, a primary gesture of 
rejection that “says ‘no’ to an ‘outside,’ to a ‘different,’ to a ‘not-self’ …. [T]he very 
nature of ressentiment […is to] need, psychologically speaking, external stimuli in order 
to be able to act at all, – its action is, from the ground up, reaction.”236 In this light, the 
structure of positivism itself – that is, the form of rational thought that requires the 
exteriorization and rejection of the tragic as its own condition of possibility – is 
                                                
235 Nietzsche, On The Genealogy of Morality, translated by Maudemarie Clark and Alan J. Swensen, 
Second Treatise, §16, 57. 




fundamentally reactive in nature, a reactivity that must be constantly covered over on 
pain of exposing reason’s lack of founding justification. Such is also the case for modern 
morality, which emerges through what Nietzsche terms ‘the slave revolt in morality,’ the 
original gesture of which is to reject as ‘evil’ what had previously constituted the ‘good’ 
of noble morality (in brief, auto-affirmative active force); only afterward is a new ‘good’ 
then posited, namely, as what is not-evil (that is, precisely what is opposite active force 
and had designated the ‘bad’ in the older system of values). The modern value of the 
good, which purports to serve as the positive foundation of moral truth, is thus, in fact, 
merely the derivative of this primary rejection. 
Now, for Nietzsche, the formation of any herd society is contingent upon some 
“stronger power” establishing, through force and “as soon as it is in any way strong 
enough to do so,” a system of law or “justice” to control and “put an end to the senseless 
raging of ressentiment among weaker parties subordinated to it (whether groups or 
individuals).”237 Individuals within a herd society therefore cannot exercise their desire 
for revenge upon others; yet the motive principle of agency for these individuals, 
precisely as creatures of ressentiment (for whom ‘action is, from the ground up, 
reaction’), is this very desire. Thus, rather than somehow disappearing through an 
historical process of acculturation and domestication, such reactive drives, blocked from 
external realization, become re-directed internally; there is a kind of second order 
reaction where the desire for revenge, itself a reaction, reacts in the face of what blocks it 
and returns within and against the one who desires it. The interior dimension carved out 
                                                




through this process of folding or doubling back defines the psychical topos of modern 
man: 
All instincts that do not discharge themselves outwardly turn themselves inwards – 
this is what I call the internalizing of man: thus first grows in man that which he 
later calls his ‘soul.’ The entire inner world, originally thin as if inserted between 
two skins, has spread and unfolded, has taken on depth, breadth, height to the same 
extent that man’s outward discharging has been obstructed. … Hostility, cruelty, 
pleasure in persecution, in assault, in change, in destruction – all of that turning 
itself against the possessors of such instincts: that is the origin of ‘bad 
conscience.’238 
 
Through Nietzsche’s critique of the ideal depth of conscience and consciousness, 
the soul, as both subject and object of a certain moral positivism, is unmasked as ‘in 
reality something other than what it says.’ That is, the coordinates of psychological 
inwardness proper to modern man, rather than defining the mental or spiritual domain of 
the ‘pure and interior search for truth,’ are instead disclosed as the historically contingent 
effect of the play of forces in herd society. Depth’s ‘absolutely superficial secret’ is that 
the seat of reason is neither a divine trace nor itself a rational ground, but the product of a 
reactive modality of will to power, a ‘surface fold’ in the historical field of force relations. 
Nietzschean interpretation thus functions as a form of vertical critique insofar as it 
unearths the singular and contingent conditions of realization for a form of positivism, 
illuminating the disavowed reactive structure that belies this positivism’s own claims to 
rational justification and, in the same movement, ‘restor[ing] the glittering exteriority that 
was covered up and buried.’ Hence Foucault’s assertion that ‘the interpreter must 
                                                
238 Ibid, §16, 57. Nietzsche continues: “The man who, for lack of external enemies and resistance, and 
wedged into an oppressive narrowness and regularity of custom, impatiently tore apart, persecuted, gnawed 
at, stirred up, maltreated himself; this animal one wants to ‘tame’ and that beats itself raw on the bars of its 
cage; this deprived one, consumed by homesickness for the desert, who had to create out of himself an 
adventure, a place of torture, an uncertain and dangerous wilderness – this fool, this longing and desperate 




descend along the vertical line’ to reveal the depth of man’s interiority as other than what 
it claims. Foucault’s formulation here strongly suggests the opening movement of 
Zarathustra – the passage initially published as the final paragraph of The Gay Science, 
entitled “Incipit tragoedia,”239 and doubling as the first paragraph of Thus Spoke 
Zarathustra – when, greeting the sun, Zarathustra announces his ‘going-under’: “For that 
I must descend to the depths [Dazu muss ich in die Tiefe steigen], as you do in the 
evening when you go behind the sea and still bring light to the underworld, you over-rich 
star.”240  
Nietzsche’s very language, in fact, provides a key to understanding Foucault’s 
counter-intuitive imagery of an excavation of the depths that gives rise to ‘a more and 
more elevated projection [surplomb],’ for the German word translated as ‘descend,’ 
steigen, refers to a rise or upward climb.241 Thus, in order to begin his tragic undergoing, 
Zarathustra must ascend into the depths. And this is not merely a semantic ‘reversal of 
depth’ at the level of diction or image, for unlike the ideal depth of psychological 
inwardness, which would belong to the diurnal coordinates of consciousness, what opens 
in Nietzsche’s ‘abyss-deep thought,’ expressed through ‘all the verticality that is so 
important for Zarathustra,’ is the nocturnal or tragic dimension of the vertical axis – the 
privileged point of which remains, as in Dream and Existence, that instant of hovering at 
the vertex, overhanging and projected out into the nothing.  
                                                
239 The Latin title means ‘The tragedy begins.’ This paragraph, the end of Book IV, served as the original 
conclusion of Gay Science, which Nietzsche first published only in four parts.  
240 Nietzsche, Gay Science, §342. 
241 Steigen, which is related to the obsolete English verb, ‘sty’ (to go up, ascend), derives from the Indo-
European root steigh- (to climb, ascend, rise; to go, stride, march) – a fact of which Nietzsche, trained in 




Indeed, Foucault describes the activity of Nietzschean critique precisely in terms of 
such an overhanging projection: Foucault’s word, surplomb, translated as ‘projection,’ 
principally means ‘overhang’ and is defined in French as both (1) the part that is ‘en 
saillie’ in relation to the base, i.e., the vertical position projected above, out and over 
empty space, and (2) the position of that which fait saillie, i.e., that which advances out 
into the void. Unlike the ‘tragic movement’ of the dreaming imagination, however, which 
‘completes its rise’ at the summit of the authentic death dream, ‘the movement of 
interpretation is that of a more and more elevated projection’: the motive force of critique 
is never completed and, like ‘the sun of the great Nietzschean quest’ or Zarathustra’s line 
of becoming (metamorphosis, going-under), passes ever along its vertical axis, crossing 
over the limit of the horizon. 
The trajectory of vertical critique thus constitutes a kind of transgressive experience 
of continuous passage that would ‘restore the glittering exteriority,’ the silenced Exterior, 
that had been ‘covered up and buried’ beneath the reactively structured foundations of 
positivism. And in this affirmative dimension of critique – as in the recovery of the limit-
experience of unreason and the project of vertical-existential poetics –, Foucault 
formulates a response to the problem of material expression that would be situated along 
the vertical vector. If the tragic expression of the dreaming imagination ran aground of 
the oneiric divide; and if the tragic expression of unreason faltered at the intensive 
threshold where its poets fall into madness; the movement of critical interpretation, by 




restore and sustain the force of vertical expression and thereby ‘bring light to the 
underworld’ (Nietzsche), which is to say, to the social world of man.242  
What, then, accounts for this auto-recreative activity of vertical interpretation, this 
ceaselessly renewed labor of critique?243 Foucault provides a clue at the end of 
“Nietzsche, Freud, Marx” when he writes that “interpretation finds itself with the 
obligation to interpret itself to infinity, always to resume. … [A] hermeneutic that wraps 
itself in itself enters the domain of languages which do not cease to implicate themselves, 
that intermediate region of madness and pure language. It is there that we recognize 
Nietzsche.”244 Because Nietzschean interpretation, by contrast to semiology, eschews any 
appeal to essences as a foundational bedrock of meaning, it follows that the 
hermeneutical task is infinite: not in the sense of a pernicious regress but, rather, in the 
sense that there are only interpretations, so interpretation will necessarily take itself as an 
object, referring back to, implicating, or doubling itself in an infinitely recursive process. 
It is this doubling or auto-implicative function that imbues interpretation with its powers 
                                                
242 I hope it is clear that I am using gender-specific language to indicate the man-form that structures the 
dominant mode of modern subjectivity in herd society, a thesis shared by Nietzsche and Foucault.  
243 This notion of the permanent reactivation of critique will remain something of a constant in Foucault: 
see, for example, his formulations in “What is Enlightenment?” of “a permanent critique of our historical 
era,” “a permanent critique of ourselves,” and “the principle of a critique and a permanent creation of 
ourselves in our autonomy” (Foucault, “What is Enlightenment?”, 312-4). We will return to this point in 
Chapter 6 when discussing the conditions of sustainability of political agency. 
244 Foucault, “Nietzsche, Freud, Marx,” 278. In this same paragraph, Foucault writes: “The death of 
interpretation is to believe that there are signs, signs that exist primarily, originally, actually, as coherent, 
pertinent, and systematic marks. The life of interpretation, on the contrary, is to believe that there are only 
interpretations. It seems to me necessary to understand what too many of our contemporaries forget, that 
hermeneutics and semiology are fierce enemies. A hermeneutic that in effect falls back on a semiology 
believes in the absolute existence of signs: it abandons the violence, the incompleteness, the infinity of 
interpretations in order to enthrone the terror of the index or to suspect language. Here we recognize 
Marxism after Marx” (ibid). This ‘death of interpretation,’ which is also the death of critique, is the very 
founding of a positivism, e.g., historical materialism, which takes Marxist critique to be the ground for a 
positive science. It is a similar ‘semiological’ failure, the arresting of auto-critical interpretation, that can 
lead to the political failures of revolutions, as Foucault will later point out a propos of the Iranian revolution. 




of intrinsic renewal, linking it to the obscure liminal or ‘intermediate region of madness 
and pure language’ – the region, that is, of intransitive expression that does not take the 
extensive or diurnal world of things or objects as its field of reference. The general name 
Foucault will reserve for this vertical dimension of language is ‘literature.’ 
 
3.4 Early Experience: The Verticality of Literary Language 
3.4.1 The ‘Vertical Writing’ of Transgression: Literature’s Recursive Auto-Doubling 
Function 
Throughout the 1960s, and in conjunction with his development of vertical critique 
as a historico-philosophical form of analysis, Foucault will pursue the space of literature 
as a contemporary response to the problem of material expression; and the project of 
political contestation that first surfaces in History of Madness will take form as a certain 
literary politics of transgression. Indeed, the key to understanding “that strange proximity 
between madness and literature”245 and the political project emerging therein is once 
again provided by the concept of the vertical, for (as with critique) it is the verticality of 
literary language that accounts for its subversive and auto-transformative force.  
Now, notwithstanding Foucault’s wide-ranging impact on literature and language 
fields in the humanities,246 remarkably little scholarship has taken up Foucault’s 
conceptual treatment of literature itself in any great detail. One notable exception is 
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Timothy O’Leary’s recent book, Foucault and Fiction,247 which is also one of the only 
texts on Foucault that identifies the concept of verticality. Indeed, O’Leary, though 
without developing the concept, locates its centrality with respect to Foucault’s work on 
literature. Referring to Foucault’s essay “Language to Infinity,” O’Leary writes that for 
Foucault,  
…literature is born from a certain use of language as a means of keeping death at 
bay. … Language, in the image Foucault uses, sets up a vertical mirror in the face 
of death; and in the virtual space between this mirror and death an infinite mirroring 
and doubling is made possible…. For Foucault, therefore, literary language can be 
defined in terms of the virtual space that is created when a vertical mirror is set up 
in the face of death, thus creating the possibility of an infinite murmuring of 
language; while the non-literary or more straightforwardly communicative use of 
language is defined as a horizontal conveyance of meaning. … It is this relation 
between language and death, and the corresponding function of literature to keep 
open and constantly explore this relation, which Foucault characterized as the 
‘verticality’ of literary language.248  
 
O’Leary thus provides the argument that literature, for Foucault, is a specifically 
vertical form of language: if literary language is defined by the ‘virtual space’ it creates 
through a certain mirroring or doubling relation with death; and if ‘this relation between 
language and death’ is ‘characterized as the “verticality” of literary language’; then it will 
be verticality that defines literature as such. Literature would thus be contrasted to 
‘horizontal’ modes of language (e.g., any discourse that takes language to be a 
representational medium), the principle function of which is to communicate or convey a 
set of established meanings.  
We will return at greater length below to “Language to Infinity” and O’Leary’s 
interpretation of, as he puts it, the ‘vertical mirror’ that literary language erects ‘in the 
                                                
247 O’Leary himself makes mention of this “surprising” paucity of “sustained engagement with Foucault’s 
work on literature,” giving credit to Simon During’s Foucault and Literature: Toward a Genealogy of 
Writing as the “major exception” (O’Leary, Foucault and Fiction: The Experience Book, 151n.). 




face of death.’ By way of approach, let us prepare a more thorough conceptual analysis of 
literary verticality by mapping its emergence in two of Foucault’s earlier essays.249  
Following History of Madness, the first major instance250 of Foucault discussing 
what he will term ‘vertical writing’ appears in 1962 in his “Introduction to Rousseau’s 
                                                
249 For purposes of economy, I will merely note in passing four other instances of the concept of verticality 
in Foucault’s writings on literature. The first occurs in “Distance, aspect, origine” (1963) when, on the 
topic of tense in the literature of the Tel Quel group (including J.-L. Baudry, M. Pleynet, and P. Sollers), 
Foucault writes that the past “assumes a vertical posture of superposition where the oldest is paradoxically 
the nearest the summit, ridgeline [ligne de faîte] and line of flight [ligne de fuite], high place of reversal” 
(Foucault, “Distance, aspect, origine,” Dits et écrits I, 304, my translation and emphasis). Note the 
similarity between this vertical superimpositional structure, ‘where the oldest is the nearest the summit,’ 
and the paradoxical movement of Nietzschean interpretation, which, in excavating the depths of historical 
time, gives rise to an upward movement of ever-elevating superimposition or overhanging projection. This 
passage may also be the first instance of the phrase ‘line of flight’ in Foucault’s work. The second case of 
verticality occurs in “Un «nouveau roman» de terreur” (1963), in which Foucault, discussing Les Aventures 
d’une jeune fille by Jean-Edern Hallier, describes how the novel constructs a fundamental spiraloid space 
“around the vertical axis of the double” (Foucault, “Un «nouveau roman» de terreur, Dits et écrits I, 315, 
my translation). The third instance of the vertical appears in Foucault’s “Afterword to The Temptation of St. 
Anthony” (1964), which is cited in the following footnote and concerns a profound vertical organization of 
the text. Finally, the fourth instance occurs in “Les mots qui saignent” (1964), where Foucault, reviewing 
Klossowski’s translation of Virgil’s Aeneid, characterizes it as a “vertical translation” (Foucault, “Les mots 
qui saignent,” Dits et écrits I, 452). A natural or horizontal translation would be one, based on a relation of 
resemblance, that tries to communicate the same meaning of words in a different language; by contrast, 
Klossowski renders a vertical translation, which does not juxtapose the original language with the one 
translated into but, instead, is ‘supra-linear,’ attentive to the poetics of the ‘verbal site,’ that is, the spatial 
order of the work (the poetic order of emplacement), making this structure visible while maintaining at a 
remove the syntactic network necessary for meaning. There are thus two kinds of translation: one, 
horizontal or linear, that aims to retain the identity (meaning, aesthetic beauty, etc.) of what it transposes 
from one language into another; and another, vertical, that pits one language against another, taking the 
original text as a projectile and aiming it at the secondary language as at a target, deforming the latter, 
opening it to new expressive possibilities. In this regard, vertical translation or literature would be opposed 
to the horizontal as, a decade or so later, Deleuze and Guattari oppose minor to major literature. 
250 There is one earlier, somewhat marginal instance of Foucault using verticality to describe a mode of 
textual organization, which occurs in his Introduction to Kant’s Anthropology, submitted (without being 
published) as a doctoral thesis in 1961. Here, Foucault refers to ‘the vertical dimension of the text,’ which 
is to say, a deeper textual logic or organization by contrast to a superficial linear or horizontal order: “On 
the surface, as if on the level of quasi-synonyms, Kant joins words designating other forms of invention, 
whether psychological or technical, together: entdecken, entfinden, etwas ausfindig, machen, ersinnen, 
ausdenken, erdichten. But if we look at the vertical dimension of the text, and follow the thread of the 
mental powers, we find first the ‘Vermoegen Ideen zu schaffen’ in a broad sense.” (Foucault, Introduction 
to Kant’s Anthropology, 99, my bold). This contrast between the vertical organization of a text and its 
superficial linear order will recur several years later in Foucault’s “Afterword to The Temptation of St. 
Anthony”: “The linear and visible sequence of sins, heresies, divinities, and monsters is merely the 
superficial crest of an elaborate vertical structure. … Each element (setting, character, speech, alteration of 
scenery) is effectively placed at a definite point in the linear sequence, but each element also has its vertical 
system of correspondences and is situated at a specific depth in the fiction” (Foucault, “Afterward to The 




Dialogues” – an essay closely aligned with the History of Madness insofar as the 
Dialogues compose a work of unreason, written at the limit of an imminent madness. 
What sets the Dialogues apart from the majority of Rousseau’s oeuvre is their stark 
contrast to the use of “linear” language, which is the “genre of writing,” exemplified by 
the Confessions, that Rousseau had “always privileged … because he saw it – in music 
and in language – as the most natural kind of expression, the one in which the speaking 
subject is fully present, without reserve or reticence, in each of the forms of what it 
says.”251 Such a horizontal form of writing, composed on the model of musical melody, 
issues from an immediately self-present, original, natural subject and aims for the pure 
transparency of a “continuous expression, indefinitely faithful to the course of time, and 
following it like a thread.”252  
As opposed to the linearity of this communicative discourse, “The Dialogues, on 
the contrary, are constructed on a vertical writing. The subject that speaks in that 
disciplined [dressé253], harmonically structured language is a disunited subject, 
superimposed on itself, lacunar, and incapable of being made present except through an 
addition that is never completed – as if it appeared at a receding point [un point de fuite] 
that only a certain convergence would enable one to locate.”254 What had been the 
absolute sincerity and immediate self-presence of the confessional subject’s continuous 
chronology now becomes a vertically fractured or schizoid subject, a discordant harmony 
                                                
251 Foucault, “Introduction to Rousseau’s Dialogues,” Aesthetics, Method, and Epistemology, 37. 
252 Ibid. 
253 This term anticipates Foucault’s formulation in “Madness, the Absence of an Œuvre” of literature as an 
excluded language that is dressé à la verticale au-dessus de lui-même, “erected vertically above itself” 
(Foucault, “Madness, the Absence of an Œuvre,” History of Madness, 549; cf. Foucault, “La folie, 
l’absence d’œuvre,” Dits et Écrits I, 448). We will return to this passage below.   




of multiple conflicting subjects: the “Jean-Jacques Rousseau” who had been author and 
subject of the Confessions “in his concrete unity is absent from the Dialogues – or, rather, 
through them, and perhaps by them, is disunited.”255  
Through the latter text, the speaking subject is fragmented into four characters: “an 
anonymous Frenchman,” who represents the French people “who have stolen Rousseau’s 
name”; his interlocutor, “a certain Rousseau, who, without any concrete determination 
other than his honesty, bears the name that the public has robbed from the real Rousseau,” 
and who knows the works that properly belong to Rousseau; “a third [tierce256] but 
constant presence, one who is no longer called anything but le Jean-Jacques,” the 
“singularity” about whom the Frenchman and Rousseau speak; yet, since the Frenchman 
envisions Jean-Jacques as the “author of crimes” while Rousseau knows him as the 
“author of books,” le Jean-Jacques is himself subdivided into Jean-Jacques-for-the-
Frenchman and Jean-Jacques-for-Rousseau, between whom there is an incompossible 
relation (“since the author of the crimes cannot be the author of the books whose sole 
purpose is to win hearts over to virtue”).257 If the subject of language is split into the 
subject who speaks and the subject that is spoken about, then we can say that whereas the 
horizontal language of the Confessions posits an indissociable subjective unity (the 
speaking subject and the subject spoken being exactly identical in the immediate self-
presence of a reflexive first person singular), the Dialogues, by contrast, mine and 
multiply the division, splitting in turn the subject who speaks (the Frenchman and 
                                                
255 Ibid. 
256 The French tierce can mean ‘third’ precisely in the sense of a musical third: that is, a vertical or 
harmonic interval. 




Rousseau) and the subject spoken about (Jean-Jacques-for-the-Frenchman and Jean-
Jacques-for-Rousseau). 
In such a way does vertical writing dislocate and disperse the position of the 
speaking subject. The ‘disunited subject,’ having proliferated into mutually exclusive 
parts, becomes both ‘superimposed on itself’ and ‘lacunar,’ marked by the fundamental 
or constitutive absence of a unity whose promised presence is but a ‘receding point’ that 
remains at an unbreachable distance, an irrecoverable limit:  
It is through these four characters that the real Jean-Jacques Rousseau (the one who 
said so simply and supremely ‘myself alone’ in the Confessions) is gradually 
identified. Even so, he is never presented in flesh and blood, and he never speaks…. 
That is how distant and inaccessible that character is now whose immediate 
presence made possible the language of the Confessions; henceforth he will be 
positioned at the outer limit of speech, already beyond it, at the virtual, never-
perceived vertex of the triangle formed by the two interlocutors and the four 
characters defined by their dialogue.258 
 
This impossible vertical ‘point de fuite’ indicates the Exterior, the ‘outer limit of speech,’ 
which is to say, the outside in relation to the conditions of enunciability and intelligibility 
that govern both the subjective investment of a speaker in language and the horizontal 
transmission of discourse. As with the exteriority of unreason in relation to the horizontal 
history of reason that excludes it; and as with the Nietzschean interpretation of ideal 
depth from the perspective of the vertical critique that transgresses it; so, too, vertical 
writing undoes the positivism of the rational subject in its original or ‘immediate 
presence,’ displacing the seat of thought in its fundamental self-relation and thereby 
calling into question the ground of socio-epistemic order.  
                                                




The vertical space of language that structures Rousseau’s Dialogues thus constitutes 
a ‘virtual’ region that is irreducible to history – which, in this context, means irreducible 
to the conditions of possibility that determine what can be said, perceived, or thought in a 
given episteme. Whence the subversive, anti-normalizing, and potentially transformative 
force of such literature, which, qua work of unreason, remains anterior and hostile to the 
division that would found the psychological category of mental illness: “The categories 
of the normal and the pathological, of madness and delirium, cannot be applied to this 
language; for it is a primary breakthrough [franchissement], a pure transgression.”259 
Foucault’s literary politics thus emerges from this conception of a transgressive 
limit-experience of language, the expression of which, by undermining the major form of 
subjectivation proper to the modern period (i.e., the man-form), would constitute a kind 
of contestation to the dominant discursive (hence social, historical) conditions of thought 
in western culture. Moreover, it is precisely this kind of transgressive vertical writing that 
takes as its task the recovery or recreation of those forces of ‘counter-nature’ which, as 
we have seen in The Birth of the Clinic, were exorcized by positive medicine. As 
Foucault suggests in “So Cruel a Knowledge” (1963), the “truly transgressive forms of 
eroticism are now found … in the direction of the counternatural,”260 a region mapped 
out and maintained through certain subversive literary works in the late eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries.  
One such example is Les Egarements du coeur et d’esprit, an erotic novel of terror 
by Claude-Prosper Crébillon. What this work gives voice to is the “deep geometry” that 
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structures the “system of ‘erotic knowledge,’” or that counter-knowledge proper to the 
modern period, in terms of “the experience of the Limit and that of the Light.”261 Here 
again, the concept of verticality will play an important role in Foucault’s analysis, for the 
figure of the veil, vital to the novel’s intimation of the “obscure, essential link … between 
Knowledge and Desire,” manifests the vertical line of this ‘deep geometry’:  
The veil is that thin surface which chance, haste, and modesty have placed and do 
their best to maintain; but its line of force is dictated by the vertical of the drop 
[chute]. The veil unveils, through a fatality which is that of its light fabric and its 
supple form. To play its role, which is to cover and to be exact, the veil must 
conform precisely to the surfaces, repeat the lines, course over the volumes without 
superfluous discourse, and highlight the forms with a glittering whiteness, stripping 
them of their shadow. … It plays its opaque and protective role well but only for the 
one who uses it to cover herself, for the groping, fumbling, feverish hand that 
defends itself. But for the one who witnesses all these efforts and who remains on 
the watch from a distance, this veil is revealing. Paradoxically, the veil hides 
modesty from itself and draws its attention away from its main object of caution; 
but in manifesting this caution to the indiscreet, it allows him to see indiscreetly that 
which it withholds. Doubly traitorous, the veil shows what it averts and conceals, 
from what it is meant to hide, the fact that it unveils it.262 
 
The vertical is thus an expressive ‘line of force,’ defining the trajectory of the fall, 
along which a ‘traitorous’ doubling function is performed, for the veil constitutes a kind 
of subversive repetition that unveils, by the very exactitude of its veiling, the fact and 
stark outlines of the object that it veils. Yet the structure is complicated further insofar as 
this simple betrayal of a concealment that reveals also conceals the fact of this reveal to 
the one who would remain concealed – and this, precisely, by virtue of the original 
enclosure of concealment. That is, the verticality of the veil is ‘doubly traitorous’: to the 
indiscreet gaze ‘at a distance,’ outside, the veil reveals what it conceals; and to the 
discrete one close at hand, inside, the veil conceals that it reveals. Like the vertical 
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writing of the Dialogues that doubles both sides of an already doubled subject, the 
doubling function of the veil is itself double: the vertical line of force thus enacts a kind 
of recursive doubling procedure. 
 
3.4.2 Radical Finitude and the Immanent Infinity of Literature’s ‘Vertical System of 
Mirrors’ 
We can perhaps begin to see in what sense the virtual space of literature is infinite: 
namely, in the vertical movement by which the doubling function of literary language is 
raised to an ever higher order or power. In this light, let us return to “Language to Infinity” 
and the discussion of the vertical mirroring relation between language and death.  
For Foucault, as we have seen O’Leary point out, literature begins as the power of 
language to hold death at bay: 
Before the imminence of death, language rushes forth, but it also starts again, tells 
of itself, discovers the story of the story and the possibility that this interpretation 
might never end. Headed toward death, language turns back upon itself; it 
encounters something like a mirror; and to stop this death which would stop it, it 
possesses but a single power – that of giving birth to its own image in a play of 
mirrors that has no limits.263  
 
Like the vertical trajectory of Nietzschean hermeneutics, which recursively interprets 
interpretations to infinity, literary language is auto-implicative, endlessly doubling back 
on itself. Taking as examples certain moments of language’s implicit self-reference – “in 
The Thousand and One Nights, where an episode recounted by Scheherazade tells why 
she was obliged for a thousand and one nights, and so on”; and “an episode in [Diderot’s] 
The Nun where Suzanne explains the history of a letter to a correspondent …[,] of 
                                                




precisely this letter in which she explains to her correspondent, and so on” –, Foucault 
argues that “the forms of this superimposition” are “essential to the construction of any 
work”: “The reduplication of language, even if it is concealed, constitutes its being as a 
work….”264 And in this ceaseless movement of auto-relay, as in the eternally returned 
reflec tion of infinite mirror play, there opens a “virtual space” where an actual infinite is 
immanent and “where speech discovers the endless resourcefulness of its own image.”265 
In this way, the recursive doubling function proper to vertical writing makes 
possible the infinite virtual space of literature, such that language constitutes a work 
(literature) only if it is a vertical writing, for “in every work language is superimposed on 
itself in a secret verticality.”266 The vertical dimension opened by this “mirror to infinity, 
to which every language gives birth once it erects itself vertically against death,”267 
“forms one of the most decisive ontological events of language,”268 establishing the 
historico-transcendental condition for the emergence of literature: “The possibility of a 
work of language finds its original fold in this duplication.”269 As in Dream and 
Existence, the vertical axis of existence, disclosed through the experience of an originary 
limit-relation with death, marks the site of an ontologically productive event of thought: 
in this case, the limitless auto-doubling of language, which constitutes the becoming-
literature of language, “a murmuring that repeats, recounts, and redoubles itself 
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endlessly.”270 However, unlike the undeveloped project of the earlier existential poetics, 
in which it remained unclear how the tragic vertical force of the dreaming imagination 
could translate across the oneiric limit, the ‘mirror to infinity’ provides the conditions for 
realizing and sustaining an irreducible vertical space; and unlike the tragic expression of 
unreason, which ultimately breaks down into the suicided silence of madness, literary 
language finds the principle of its auto-generative becoming precisely in the self-relation 
it maintains at the limit with death.  
Now, while Foucault suggests that speech in general may contain “an essential 
affinity between death, endless striving, and the self-representation of language,”271 he 
nevertheless argues that, strictly speaking, literature proper only appears in the modern 
period, emerging in the empty epistemic space left vacant by the death of God.  
It seems to me that a change was produced in the relationship of language to its 
indefinite repetition at the end of the eighteenth century – nearly coinciding with the 
moment in which works of language became what they are now for us, that is, 
literature. This is the time (or very nearly so) when Hölderlin became aware, to the 
point of blindness, that he could only speak in the space marked by the 
disappearance of the gods, and that language could only depend on its own power to 
keep death at a distance. Thus, an opening was traced on the horizon toward which 
our speech has ceaselessly advanced.272 
 
The vertical mirroring movement of a language that ‘discovers the endless 
resourcefulness of its own image’ is thus born from “a lyrical experience … bound up 
with a return to the forms of finitude”273: in the wake of the epistemic transformation by 
which an original infinite is displaced by a constituent finitude, language harnesses its 
own ‘power’ qua literature to ‘keep death at a distance.’ If literature, defined in terms of 
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the auto-superimposition or self-doubling of language, thus only appears at the advent of 
the modern epoch, in the “transformation … roughly indicated by the simultaneous 
appearance at the end of the eighteenth century of the works of Sade and the tales of 
terror”274; then this is because the infinity it constructs no longer refers to the 
immortalized glory of the epic – where, as with the transcendent God-form, “the work 
placed the infinite outside of itself,”275 in the promise of a heroic hereafter (that is, its 
reception and transmission across the ages) – but to an immanent infinitude generated 
through its intrinsic verticality. Literature is thus “a language fated to be infinite because 
it can no longer support itself upon the speech of infinity. But within itself, it finds the 
possibility of its own division, of its own repetition, the power to create a vertical system 
of mirrors, self images, analogies[,] …postpon[ing] death indefinitely by ceaselessly 
opening a space where it is always the analogue of itself.”276  
It is thus necessary to amend O’Leary’s reading of literary verticality when he 
writes that for Foucault, language ‘sets up a vertical mirror in the face of death; and in the 
virtual space between this mirror and death an infinite mirroring and doubling is made 
possible.’ Such an interpretation gives the impression that, by erecting a mirror ‘in the 
face of death,’ literature in some sense reflects the face of death, forming ‘an infinite 
mirroring and doubling’ ‘between this mirror and death’: thus, something like the mirror 
as a shield that, through the dazzling surface effect of its reflection, would captivate 
Medusa’s gaze, transfixing and neutralizing death. However, the mirror-play in 
Foucault’s image does not occur between language (or the mirror) and death; rather, as 
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Foucault writes, language ‘encounters something like a mirror’ when, ‘headed toward 
death, language turns back upon itself.’ It would therefore be more accurate to say that 
the mirror constitutes the doubling function of the relation of language with itself when 
language, ‘returning to the forms of finitude,’ enters into proximity with death (the 
liminal region of the vertical dimension, precisely): that is, an auto-mirroring self-relation 
that effects the becoming-literature of language, raising language to a higher order or 
power and thereby satisfying the condition of possibility for the language-work.  
Thus, when approaching the limit of death, language, discovering within itself this 
higher power – that is, constructing the vertical, virtual space proper to it as literature –, 
expresses an immanent, actual infinite capable of staying the imminence of death as a 
limit: not insofar as the poet would be immortalized, as in the Homeric model; nor, 
despite appearances, insofar as language would internally reflect back on itself in a 
perfect circle of incessant self-reference; but, rather, insofar as literary language opens 
onto the thought of the outside, the dispersal of the speaking subject, and hence the 
displacement of death itself as a limit. For none such exists for language in the infinite 
streaming of its abyssal and subjectless auto-production:  
…the event that gave rise to what we call ‘literature’ in the strict sense is only 
superficially an interiorization; it is far more a question of a passage to the ‘outside’: 
language escapes the mode of being of discourse – in other words, the dynasty of 
representation – and literary speech develops from itself, forming a network in 
which each point is distinct, distanced even from its closest neighbors, and has a 
position in relation to every other point in a space that simultaneously holds and 
separates them all. … The ‘subject’ of literature (what speaks in it and what it 
speaks about) is less language in its positivity than the void that language takes as 
its space when it articulates itself in the nakedness of ‘I speak.’277 
 
                                                




Along the vertical vector of literature’s line of force, generated through the event of 
language’s infinitely recursive auto-doubling function, ‘literary speech develops from 
itself,’ breaking with the classical epistemic formation (which had been governed by ‘the 
dynasty of representation,’ the horizontal mode of language’s being qua discourse) by 
giving voice to that which is irreducibly exterior to that episteme’s archaeological 
conditions (conditions of intelligibility, enunciability): in other words, by attaining, 
through the expression of vertical writing, to ‘the outer limit of speech.’  
Through the self-disclosure of the naked abyssal being of language, achieved 
through a fractured lineage of writers bearing remarkable resemblance to the tragic 
tradition of unreason (Sade, Hölderlin, Mallarmé, Nietzsche, Roussel, Artaud, Bataille, 
Klossowski, Blanchot278), ‘an opening was traced on the horizon toward which our 
speech has ceaselessly advanced.’ It is the same opening that emerged in the radical 
possibility of Kantian critique, which was closed off by Kant himself within the 
anthropological circle and remained philosophically shuttered until the tragico-critical 
thought of Nietzsche; and it will be the same portentous opening that recurs in The Order 
of Things, “a sign of the approaching birth, or, even less than that, of the very first glow, 
low in the sky, of a day scarcely even heralded as yet, but in which we can already divine 
that thought … is about to re-apprehend itself in its entirety, and to illuminate itself once 
more in the lightning flash of being.”279  
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Indeed, what we may now conclude is that it is precisely the verticality of literary 
language, as with the verticality of unreason before it, that opens this form of limit-
experience bespeaking the death of man and auguring thought’s production of the new: 
“From within language experienced and traversed as language” – which is to say, from 
within the virtual (vertical, infinite) space of literature –, “what emerges is that man has 
‘come to an end’ [l’homme est «fini»], and that, by reaching the summit of all possible 
speech, he arrives not at the very heart of himself but at the brink of that which limits 
him…. [T]he void left by man’s disappearance … is nothing more, and nothing less, than 
the unfolding of a space in which it is once more possible to think.”280  
Just as the anthropological structure of thought is transgressed and arraigned before 
the vertical critique that overhangs and ungrounds it, so, too, is the positivism of the man-
form undone when, at the vertical, exterior limit of language, it is confronted with its 
radical finitude by the experience of literature. Modern works open a ‘void’ in which the 
speaking subject is fractured and dispersed by the endless redoubling of the being of 
literary language. And like the tragic expression of the ‘gaze seared by gruesome night’ 
(Nietzsche), literature illumines ‘in the lightning flash of being’ the abyss in which the 
subject is scattered and language, freed. 
 
3.4.3 The Structural Esotericism of Madness and Literature: On the Material 
Expression of Transgression 
We are also now better positioned to understand the ‘strange proximity’ that 
connects the tragic experience of unreason with that of literature, as well as the 
                                                




conceptual movement that takes Foucault from the question of madness to that of literary 
language. If the experience of “madness par excellence – which psychiatrists term 
schizophrenia” – is that by which one “sees welling up … the very hollowness of our 
existence [,…] the finitude upon the basis of which we are, and think, and know”281; then 
it will be vertical writing, through the thought of the outside it makes possible, that best 
expresses this limit-experience of radical finitude:  
It was inevitable that this new mode of being of literature should have been 
revealed in works like those of Artaud or Roussel …. And as if this experiencing of 
the forms of finitude in language were insupportable, or inadequate (perhaps its 
very inadequacy was insupportable), it is within madness that it manifested itself – 
the figure of finitude thus positing itself in language (as that which unveils itself 
within it), but also before it, preceding it, as that formless, mute unsignifying region 
where language can find its freedom.282 
 
As in Dream and Existence, where oneiric space opens onto ‘the world at the dawn of its 
first explosion’ and the dreaming imagination expresses ‘the birth of the world in the very 
movement of existence,’ the matutine, still-obscure region from which vertical-tragic 
expression issues is both site and source of freedom. And as in History of Madness, the 
experience of this irreducible virtual dimension, deprived an adequate system of supports, 
is consigned to madness.  
In a manner still to be elaborated, the limit-experiences of literature and unreason 
thus bleed together as expression and content of a common vertical experiential form. 
This relation between unreason and literature receives perhaps its fullest articulation in 
“Madness, the Absence of an Œuvre,” an essay from 1964 which Foucault appended 
eight years later to the second edition of History of Madness at the behest of Deleuze.283 
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Taking up again the theme of the divergence, within the experience of madness, of its 
horizontal and vertical trajectories, Foucault locates in his historical present the near 
completion of their disassociation: 
We are at that point, that fold [repli] in time, where a certain technical control of 
sickness hides rather than designates the movement that closes the experience of 
madness in on itself. But it is precisely that fold [pli] that allows us to unfurl 
[déployer] that which has been curled up [impliqué] for centuries: mental illness 
and madness – two different configurations, which came together and became 
confused from the seventeenth century onwards, and which are now moving apart 
before our eyes, or rather inside our language. … To say that madness is 
disappearing today is to say that the implication that included it in both psychiatric 
knowledge and a kind of anthropological reflection is coming undone. But it is not 
to say that the general form of transgression of which madness has been the visible 
face for centuries is disappearing. Nor that transgression, just as we are beginning to 
ask what madness is, is not in the process of giving birth to a new experience.284 
 
The neuro-pharmacological control over mental illness, in which the positivism of 
psychiatry is doubled by that of clinical medicine, naturalizes madness as sickness so 
thoroughly that it, in fact, conceals the very effacement of madness itself as an essential 
problematic of human being. Whether as the scandal of an animal unreason that 
constitutes the degree zero of man’s nature and shows itself obscurely in the painterly 
bestial forms of the Renaissance; or as the modern experience of unreason “in the 
burgeoning transcendence of any act of expression [la transcendance naissante de tout 
acte d’expression], from the source of language itself, in the initial and final moment 
where man is suddenly [devient] exterior to himself”285; unreason had been that tragic 
form of experience by means of which man posed to himself the problem of his proper 
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being. In other words, if the distinguishing aspect of the being of human being (Dasein) is 
to be that being which takes up its own being as a problem, then unreason, for western 
culture, played a privileged existential role for over three centuries. It is this role, nearly 
forgotten in the contemporary social world, whose very erasure is covered over by 
positivism’s mastery of madness as mental illness.  
Yet if the vertical dimension of madness has all but disappeared, ‘the general form 
of transgression’ – that is, the fundamental limit-experience of the tragic, of which 
unreason had merely been the most recent historical visage – remains nonetheless; and 
the ‘new experience’ to which transgression is ‘in the process of giving birth’ will take 
form ‘inside our language’ as an excluded and subversive kind of vertical speech. Indeed, 
this is why, in a roundtable debate from the same year (1964), Foucault suggests that 
“[w]e now find the reason-unreason problem – in any case, the violence of the reason-
unreason problem – at the interior of language…. In the field … of language, what is 
fully at stake is most likely the possibility of contestation of our culture.”286 Just as, in 
History of Madness, the problem of material expression becomes the problem of 
resistance, so that the expression of unreason, whose historically contingent 
unsustainability derives from the very violence of constitutive division that founds 
western culture, by the same token constitutes ‘a point from which all contestation 
becomes possible, as well as the contestation of all things’; so, now, Foucault responds to 
the political problem of material expression by situating ‘the possibility of contestation’ 
against the dividing practices of the modern social formation within ‘the field of 
language.’  
                                                




To account for this emergent political force of language, Foucault provides a 
general typology of the four forms of excluded speech proper to, and (at least in part) 
constitutive of, western culture.287 The first interdiction, which, “at the border between 
taboo and impossibility,” regulates the exterior limit of meaning, is provided by “the laws 
that govern the linguistic code (the things that are called, so clearly, language faults 
[fautes de langue])”288: that is, errors in speech, meaningless or babbling words, etc., 
which fail to meet the minimum conditions of intelligibility for a given language. Second, 
from inside the established linguistic code, there are “blasphemous words” that, while 
perfectly intelligible, are forbidden utterance.289 Third, there are those forms of 
expression whose very signification, rather than the choice of terms, is “the object of 
censorship”: that is, statements which are both intelligible and uttered using permitted 
words, “but whose meaning is intolerable for the culture in question at a given 
moment.”290 The expression of any of these three forms of speech is, in a sense, 
transgressive, since they are all prohibited from being spoken in their different ways.  
However, Foucault’s chief interest lies elsewhere, in a mode of expression 
possessed, as he puts it in “Language to Infinity,” of a ‘secret verticality’ that will 
ultimately conjoin unreason’s vision and literature’s language: 
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Finally, there is a fourth form of excluded language: this consists of submitting 
speech that apparently conforms to the recognized code to a different code, whose 
key is contained within that speech itself, so that the speech is doubled inside itself; 
it says what it says, but it adds a mute surplus that silently states [énonce] what it 
says and the code according to which it is said. This is not a question of coded 
language, but of a language that is structurally esoteric. Which is to say that it does 
not communicate, while hiding it, a forbidden meaning: it sets itself up from the 
very first instant in an essential fold of speech. A fold that mines it from the inside, 
perhaps to infinity. What is said in such a language is of little importance, as are the 
meanings that are delivered there. It is this obscure and central liberation of speech 
at the heart of itself, its uncontrollable flight to a region that is always dark 
[toujours sans lumière], which no culture can accept immediately. Such speech is 
transgressive, not in its meaning, not in its verbal matter, but in its play.291 
 
Rather than either falling dumbly outside the governing conditions of a language or 
scandalizing from within these conditions (whether by force of diction or sense), 
‘structurally esoteric’ forms of expression act upon the conditions themselves, 
transforming the very code that regulates a given language by ‘submitting speech to a 
different code.’ That is – and here we perhaps glimpse an aspect of Deleuze’s interest in 
this essay –, the ‘fourth form of excluded language’ produces a decoded flow of speech, a 
line of ‘uncontrollable flight’ within language that constitutes the ‘obscure and central 
liberation of speech at the heart of itself.’ In this region at once matutine and nocturnal, 
which is toujours sans lumière (‘still without light’), language, returning to and 
developing from out of itself, finds its freedom by escaping its codification within the 
representational dynasty of discourse; and it does so through an auto-implicative function 
by which ‘speech is doubled inside itself,’ containing within itself the key to the different 
code that governs it. Like the ‘duplication’ of the auto-mirroring self-relation of literary 
language depicted in “Language to Infinity,” in which the ‘possibility of a work of 
language finds its original fold,’ structurally esoteric speech generates, from out of its 





own intrinsic excess, the ‘mute surplus’ that stealthily announces the secret of its brute, 
abyssal being as language: that is, the secret, as in “The Thought of the Outside,” of ‘the 
void that language takes as its space,’ only here described as that ‘essential fold of speech’ 
which hollows language ‘from the inside, perhaps to infinity,’ and which consummates 
the double death of God and man in the dispersal of the speaking subject. In other words, 
a structurally esoteric language is one which, mined from within, opens thought to 
without. 
By virtue, then, of an infinitely recursive auto-doubling function precisely akin to 
that of vertical writing, structural esotericism decodes what appears to be given as 
horizontal discourse, which is to say, what appears to conform to the established 
epistemic conditions of a discursive formation. Accordingly, Foucault privileges this 
mode of excluded speech, for its force as a form of transgression issues neither from its 
‘meaning’ (as with censorship), nor from its ‘verbal matter’ (as with language errors and 
blasphemy), but from its ‘play,’ that is, from the line of flight or creative mutation that it 
produces in the field of language. The secret verticality of such a language, like the tragic 
expression of unreason, is thus intolerable to the culture whose codes it threatens and 
whose conditions of thought it undermines. 
Now, having posited this general typology of excluded forms of speech, Foucault is 
able to rearticulate the project of History of Madness in terms of expression. Beginning 
with the Great Confinement of the classical period, madness enters into  
…the universe of language prohibitions; with madness, classical confinement 
encloses libertinage of thought and speech, obstinacy in impiety or heterodoxy, 
blasphemy, witchcraft, alchemy – everything in short that characterizes the spoken 
and forbidden world of unreason: madness is the excluded language – the one 




‘insane’, the ‘imbeciles,’ the ‘demented’), or the one which pronounces sacred 
words (the ‘violent’, the ‘frenzied’), or the one which puts forbidden meanings into 
circulation (‘libertines,’ the ‘obstinate’).292  
 
From the perspective of classical reason, as articulated by psychiatric discourse and 
reflected in institutional practice, the interdicted ‘world of unreason’ is organized 
according to the first three forms of excluded language and the species of mental illness 
that correspond to them.293 Indeed, the function of ‘classical confinement,’ which is later 
only intensified through the birth of the modern asylum, is precisely to structure and 
enforce this set of exclusions, to impose the silence of which Foucault will write the 
archaeology. 
The modern experience of madness, in turn, passes over into the fourth region of 
excluded speech. From reason’s horizontal point of view (and thus still in terms of mental 
illness), it is Freud who discovers in madness an esoteric language. Madness, no longer 
construed as “a language fault, a blasphemy spoken out loud, or an intolerable meaning,” 
appears “as speech wrapped up in itself, saying, below everything that it says, something 
else, for which it is at the same time the only possible code: an esoteric language perhaps, 
since its language is contained inside a speech that ultimately says nothing other than this 
implication.”294 As apprehended by psychoanalysis, madness is esoterically structured 
because it belongs to “the still transgressive region … of languages that imply 
themselves”295: folding its speech back upon itself, madness doubles what it says with an 
announcement of the language in which it says it, an announcement which is the secret 
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key to what is said – indeed, an announcement which, strictly speaking, is all that is said. 
For far from liberating madness to speak in its own name, Freud essentially disqualifies it 
from saying anything other than that it is mad, all the while compelling it to speak. All 
madness can now state is the language in which it speaks, namely, madness, i.e., that it is 
mad.  
The expression of the mad is debarred any possible positive content other than 
implicating the mad in their own madness, thereby constituting an ever more repressive 
form of subjection:  
Since Freud, Western madness has become a non-language because it has become a 
double language (a language which only exists in this speech, a speech that says 
nothing but its language) – i.e., a matrix of the language which, strictly speaking, 
says nothing. A fold of the spoken which is an absence of work. …[W]hat [Freud] 
did was silence the unreasonable Logos; he dried it out, he forced its words back to 
their source, all the way back to that blank region of auto-implication where nothing 
is said.296 
 
Here we see in what sense madness is the ‘absence of work’: namely, as the desiccation 
of a flow of speech, the silencing of a language which, divested of content and blocked 
from transitivity, becomes a useless and hollow ‘fold of the spoken.’ All such speech can 
communicate is that madness is its subject, that which speaks in it and that about which it 
speaks. And by saying the only thing it is authorized to state, madness undermines the 
very authority of the subject who speaks, who is indicted as mad and thus incapable of an 
œuvre – which is also to say, of producing a statement, of conveying an established 
meaning, of forming a work of expression that would take as its field of reference a 
shared world of objects. Thus, the ‘blank region of auto-implication’ to which the 
                                                




esoteric language of madness is forced back designates less the liberation of speech in its 
transgressive play than the rigorous exclusion of madness. 
Yet it is precisely here that Foucault will stage a reversal, for it is this auto-
implicative folding function of madness that enables it to make common cause with 
literature: “Literature (and this probably since Mallarmé), in its turn, is slowly becoming 
a language [un langage] whose speech states, at the same time as what it says and as part 
of the same movement, the language [la langue] that makes it decipherable as speech.”297 
Indeed, by virtue of its structural esotericism – that secret verticality through which 
literary language doubles itself endlessly –, writing, in the modern period, became “a 
speech that inscribed inside itself the principle of its own decoding; or in any case, it 
supposed, beneath each of its sentences, each of its words, the sovereign power to modify 
the values and meanings of the language to which despite everything (and in fact) it 
belonged; it suspended the reign of language in the present of a gesture of writing [dans 
un geste actuel d’écriture].”298 The transgressive force of literature thus issues from its 
power as an esoteric language to act upon and transform the conditions of language itself, 
that is, the code governing the ‘values and meanings’ of any given speech. By submitting 
the language that makes up the materiality of its being to a different code than the one 
governing the horizontal conveyance of received meaning, literature ‘suspends the reign 
of language,’ which is to say, disrupts that dynasty of discourse which grounds the 
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epistemic formation of positivism, opening, in the very experience of vertical writing, a 
space in which it may once again become possible to think.  
It will be the space of literature, then, that comes to house the general form of 
transgression which had been the expressive charge of unreason. In other words, for 
Foucault, writing in the 1960s, the limit-experience of the tragic, delivered from its last 
remaining ties to mental illness, has become l’expérience littéraire. If madness qua 
mental illness is the absence of a work – “a language silencing itself in its 
superimposition on itself”299; a form of speech so radically excluded that those who 
would speak it collapse into catatonia or suicide –, then, inversely, unreason expressed 
through literature will constitute the language-work as such, relaying speech in its 
freedom to the original fold of its being as literary language. For this “being of literature,” 
which is “related to auto-implication, to the double and the void that is hollowed out 
within it,”300 provides the conditions of material expression for the vertical-tragic mode 
of experience that western culture violently divides from itself. 
 
3.4.4 Foucault’s Literary Politics and Its Failure: Enter the Problem of Capitalism 
“Madness, the Absence of an Œuvre” thus allows us to take the full measure of the 
‘ruse and new triumph of madness’ that completes Foucault’s work on unreason and 
orients his theorization of literature. At the very moment that reason appears to have 
confined madness in mental illness so completely that all that remains is a clinically 
masterable pathology, “madness releases itself from its kinship … with mental illness,” 
                                                





entering the “region of excluded language … that is circumscribed, held sacred, feared, 
erected vertically above itself [dressé à la verticale au-dessus de lui-même], reflecting 
itself [se rapportant à soi] in a useless and transgressive Fold, and is known as 
literature….”301  
Escaping the medical gaze of psychiatry, madness is freed, through the formal 
esoteric structure of literature, to reconstitute a vertical line of force, just as speech is 
liberated at the heart of itself through the line of flight by which it is transported outside 
dominant discursive conditions. The ‘test, l’épreuve, of Unreason,’ which it had been the 
‘essence of the modern world’ to ‘petrify’ and ‘deprive of language,’ finds its support 
now in the literary experience of transgression, in the vertical space of literature where 
the “anthropological unity” of man as founding subject of positivism is “disappearing” 
like “a passing postulate”: “an experience is coming into being where our thinking is at 
stake….”302 
Indeed, the very traits that, from the horizontal perspective of reason, justify the 
silencing of madness, become transvalued when reinterpreted in a vertical dimension. 
The History of Madness had already performed one such reversal when the negative 
formulation by which classical reason defines unreason – namely, as reason dazzled, a 
thought which cannot see in the clear and distinct light of day – is transvalued by tragic 
works as the power of the ‘abyss-deep thought’ that can see the nothing bleeding through 
reason’s pale diurnal forms. Just so, now, the privative characteristics that since Freud 
have been ascribed to madness as an esoteric language become transfigured as 
                                                





affirmative features of unreason’s subversive expression qua literature. That literature is a 
double or auto-implicative language does not mean that it says nothing other than the fact 
of its raving, but that it develops from out of itself a decoded flow of speech which breaks 
with the horizontal reign of discourse and calls into question the latter’s conditions of 
intelligibility and enunciability. That literature’s auto-mirroring self-relation constitutes 
‘a useless and transgressive Fold’ does not indicate its sterility but its resistance to being 
consumed as communication. That literature is intransitive does not reduce it to the 
poverty of a fold of speech that refers nowhere, but opens language to the infinite 
resourcefulness immanent to its own image, to the ‘vertical system of mirrors’ that gives 
form to the irreducible virtual space of its abyssal being. That literature undermines the 
authority of the speaking subject does not disqualify its right to speak, but displaces any 
such subject-position through the thought of the outside that exceeds and undoes it, 
thereby preparing a form of radical contestation. 
In short: by way of response to the double problem of resistance and material 
expression, Foucault will advocate a literary politics of transgression; and the conceptual 
key to this politics – which also accounts for the strange proximity of madness and 
literature, as well as the passage of Foucault’s thought from the former to the latter – is 
the expressive form of verticality, that auto-superposition of a language ‘erected 
vertically above itself.’ For, as Foucault will remark six years later, it is the “vertical and 
nearly untransmissible activity of writing” that accounts for literature’s isomorphism with 
madness, with that excluded “language that takes up a vertical position [se tient à la 




exchange.”303 And it is by virtue of this vertical remove at the ‘outer limit of speech’ that 
literature can contest the coding of language that circulates throughout the social field 
and conditions what it is possible to think and say within the horizon of a given episteme.  
The political force of literary verticality, then, is twofold. First, literature expresses 
and sustains a form of thought, made possible philosophically by a minor strain of 
Kantian thought, that breaks with the epistemic formation of man – a break that is 
political precisely “to the extent that all the regimes of the East or the West peddle their 
defective wares under the banner of humanism.”304 Second, vertical writing, as “an act 
placed outside the socio-economic system,” remains exterior to the horizontal circuits of 
social production and exchange, existing “manifestly for itself and … independently of 
all consumption, all readership, all pleasure and all utility.”305 That is, literature’s 
“function of transgression” derives from “the intransitive character of writing,” which, by 
opposing the mode of value production proper to social circulation, constitutes “a force of 
contestation in relation to society.”306 As Deleuze puts it, “the thought of the outside is a 
thought of resistance”307; and the subversive political charge of literary verticality issues 
from its irreducible exteriority to the modern social formation. 
If Foucault’s politics of literary transgression has received little scholarly attention, 
however, this may be because he himself largely abandoned it just before undertaking 
what is considered to be his more properly political work: namely, his critical analytic of 
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power throughout the 1970s. For Foucault, the worldwide “revolutionary movements”308 
of the late 1960s – including the Cultural Revolution in China; the student struggles of 
May 1968 in Paris; and the student revolts of March 1968 in Tunisia, in which he directly 
participated309 – called into question the potency of writing, whether literary or otherwise, 
as a transformative political tactic. Signaling a turning point if not a crisis in his thought, 
Foucault confronts this problem in an interview conducted in Japan between September 
and October of 1970:  
Does the subversive function of writing still remain? Hasn’t the time already past 
when the sole act of writing … sufficed for expressing a form of contestation 
against modern society? Hasn’t the time now come to move on to truly 
revolutionary actions? Now that the bourgeoisie and capitalist society have totally 
dispossessed writing of these actions, doesn’t the fact of writing serve only to re-
enforce the repressive system of the bourgeoisie? Mustn’t we cease writing? Please 
understand that I am not kidding when I say all this. It is someone who continues to 
write who is speaking to you.310 
 
The issue, in short, is the problem of capitalism: whereas the activity of literary writing 
could be said to have subversive force in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the 
becoming-commodity of art has defused and re-appropriated this force. 
Indeed, Foucault sketches the historical trajectory of literature’s transgressive 
function in terms of the modern emergence and contemporary collapse of the vertical 
(virtual, infinite) space proper to literary language. Until the end of the seventeenth 
century, the practice of writing had implied writing for an audience, communicating 
                                                
308 Foucault, “Folie, littérature, société,” in Dits et écrits I, 983, my translation. Foucault will return to the 
importance of these political movements in his dialogue with Deleuze, “Intellectuals and Power,” which we 
will discuss in the following chapter. 
309 These events in Tunisia constituted, for Foucault, ‘une expérience politique’ – one, precisely, which 
takes a vertical form as the limit-experience of revolt, and which Foucault considered to be personally 
formative (see Foucault, “Interview with Michel Foucault,” Power, 278-282). We will return to this in 
detail below in Chapter 6. 




something (whether to teach, to inform, to entertain, etc.) by “circulating” a meaning 
“inside of a social group.”311 As we saw in Foucault’s “Introduction to Rousseau’s 
Dialogues,” such is the communicative function of linear or horizontal writing. By 
contrast (as we have also seen), modern literature “is oriented in another direction” 
insofar as it constitutes a ‘vertical and nearly untransmissible activity of writing’; and it is 
by virtue of its verticality or structural esotericism that literary language occupies a 
position of exteriority in relation to “the socio-economic system, such as the circulation 
and formation of values.”312 At least, that is how literature “has functioned until now,”313 
“until recently.”314  
The problem is precisely that literature’s vertical “exteriority”315 has been captured, 
absorbed, and reduced by the bourgeoisie’s “great force of assimilation”: literary writing 
has been divested of its subversive charge, reintegrated “inside of the social system” and 
repossessing the kind of “normal social function” it had performed before the modern 
period.316 That is, literary works have become horizontal once again, now as so many 
readily consumed commodities re-inscribed into the circuits of social circulation as 
                                                
311 Ibid, 981-2, my translation. 
312 Ibid, 982, my translation. Cf.: “I believe that in Europe, until the 19th century, literature was still a 
deeply institutionalized form of discourse. To write a play essentially meant wanting to please a well-
defined group of people; to write a book or novel meant wanting to please a certain category of individuals, 
or wanting to edify, or wanting to impart a lesson in morality. On the other hand, beginning in the 19th 
century, literature in Europe was in a way de-institutionalized, freed from its institutional status, and in in 
its most elevated formulations, which alone can be considered valid, tended to become absolutely anarchic 
speech, institutionless speech, profoundly marginal speech that crosses and mines all the other forms of 
discourse” (Foucault, “La folie et la société,” Dits et écrits II, 1976—1988, 489-490, my translation). 
313 Foucault, “Folie, littérature, société,” 982, my translation. 
314 Ibid, 995, my translation. 
315 Ibid, my translation. 




products of “our ‘system of writing,’” “a system that is absolutely characteristic of 
capitalist bourgeois society.”317 
Foucault thus concludes that “the bourgeoisie has succeeded in defeating 
literature,”318 a conclusion that will compel him to rethink his conception of political 
contestation; for the failure of the literary politics of transgression indicates “the strength 
of the enemy that we must combat and the weakness of the weapon that is literature.”319 
The problem is once again that of material expression: indeed, the precise deficiency of 
literary politics is that capitalism has neutralized its power to realize and sustain a vertical 
form of experience. L’expérience littéraire thereby goes the way of the tragic experience 
of madness, and in its wake, the problem must be posed anew of how to give expression 
to that which, at an irreducible remove from the contemporary social formation, would 
radically resist or transform it.320 This, in turn, will entail rethinking the irreducibility 
proper to the vertical.  
                                                
317 Ibid, 994, my translation. Foucault gives as an example the contrast between Flaubert’s Madame Bovary 
(1857) – “a story of adulterers and suicide,” which caused a scandal simply by “reproducing in a work the 
everyday reality of a bourgeois family” – and Pierre Guyotat’s Éden, Éden, Éden (1970), which was 
socially accepted as a work despite depicting homosexual practices that in actual fact went legally punished: 
“The transgressive force of literature has at this point been lost” (ibid, 985-6, my translation). 
318 Ibid, 987, my translation. 
319 Ibid, 988., my translation 
320 In a lecture given during the same trip to Japan, Foucault is explicit in linking the modern form of 
madness as mental illness to capitalism: “It is said that Pinel liberated the madmen in 1793, but those he 
liberated were only sick people, old people, idlers, prostitutes; he left the madmen in the institutions. This 
took place when it did because, at the beginning of the nineteenth century, the speed of industrial 
development accelerated, and, in accordance with the first principle of capitalism, the hordes of 
unemployed proletarians were regarded as a reserve army of labor power. For that reason, those who did 
not work but were able to work were let out of the establishments. But there, too, a second process of 
selection took effect: not only those who were unwilling to work, but those who did not have the ability to 
work, namely the mad, were left in the establishments and regarded as patients whose troubles had 
characterological or psychological causes. … [I]f this medicalization [of the madman] occurred, it was … 
essentially for economic and social reasons: that was how the madman was made identical to the mentally 
ill individual and an entity called ‘mental illness’ was discovered and developed. … It could be said that the 
madman is an avatar of our capitalist societies” (Foucault, “Madness and Society,” Aesthetics, Method, and 
Epistemology, 341-2). In this way, whether with respect to unreason or to literature, the political problem of 




There are two directions that Foucault’s thought will take in response to this new 
formulation of the problem of material expression as the problem of capitalism. One of 
these directions, oriented by an engagement with Deleuze’s metaphysics of intensive 
difference and Nietzsche’s genealogical critique of historical force relations, will subtly 
reformulate the concept of the vertical, preparing its subsequent reappearance at the end 
of the 1970s in Foucault’s writings on revolt as ‘l’expérience politique.’ Thus, though 
Foucault ultimately leaves behind the literary politics that had guided his work over the 
prior decade, he does not jettison its conceptual key. Yet while verticality will remain in a 
way irreducible to the horizontality of historical causation, it will no longer be posited as 
a spatial concept of exteriority321, but will instead be rearticulated in the language of 
intensities, events, and forces. Although this conceptual development begins 
contemporaneously with Foucault’s rejection of literary politics, we will be better 
situated to give a full interpretation of it in Chapter 5, after having elaborated in detail 
Foucault’s philosophical relationship or ‘block of becoming’ with Deleuze.  
The other direction Foucault’s thought will take, emerging precisely over the course 
of his relation to Deleuze, proposes the concept of ‘transversality’ as the basis for a new 
theory of political struggle – one that would better respond to the problem of material 
expression proper to capitalist society. It is this trajectory that we will explore at length in 
the following two chapters.
                                                
321 Foucault and Deleuze will both later provide a non-spatial conception of the thought of the outside, 
namely, as the ‘line of flight,’ a term which we have already seen Foucault use in “Distance, aspect, origine” 
with respect to the verticality of literary language. Deleuze, in reference to Foucault, will also call this the 
‘line of the outside.’ In this case, the ‘outside’ will refer not to an Exterior, but to an intensive vector that 




CHAPTER 4. THE CONCEPT OF TRANSVERSAL CONNECTION: CAPITALISM, 
POWER, AND RESISTANCE 
“A line of becoming is not defined by points that it connects, or by points that compose it; 
on the contrary, it passes between points, it comes up through the middle, it runs 
perpendicular to the points first perceived, transversally to the localizable relation of 
distant or contiguous points. … If becoming is a block (a line-block), it is because it 
constitutes a zone of proximity and indiscernibility, a no-man’s-land, a nonlocalizable 
relation sweeping up the two distant or contiguous points….” 
— Deleuze and Guattari322 
 
Between Foucault and Deleuze, cutting across three decades, there runs a 
transversal line whose trajectory impels both thinkers in a reciprocal process or block of 
becoming. This line, shaping the contours of an exceedingly rich philosophical friendship, 
charts a common project of transversal resistance, which, I will argue, is indispensable 
for understanding the political thought of both Deleuze and Foucault. Indeed, it is the 
concept of transversality that allows Foucault to escape the impasse of his literary politics, 
develop an analytic of power in response to the problem of capitalism, and, together with 
Deleuze, formulate a more compelling solution to the problem of material expression.    
Over the following two chapters, this ‘line-block’ of becoming will be mapped 
according to four segments: the first, running from Foucault’s History of Madness (1961) 
to Deleuze and Guattari’s Anti-Oedipus (1972), posits in incipient form the political
                                                
322 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, translated by Brian Massumi, 293-4, 




project of transversal resistance as a response to the problem of capitalism323; the second, 
running from Anti-Oedipus to Foucault’s analytic of power (1970s)324, prepares the 
critical ground necessary for the positive elaboration of such a political project; and the 
third and fourth, running from the analytic of power through Deleuze and Guattari’s A 
Thousand Plateaus (1980) to Foucault’s late ethico-politics (1981-1984)325, undertake 
this positive elaboration.  
More specifically, the first segment concerns unreason and schizophrenia as 
absolute exterior limits of the social formation, intensive forms of experience and 
expression that scramble the dominant codifications of social order. Freeing and 
                                                
323 In truth, this first segment could begin before History of Madness, with an article by Deleuze in 1959 on 
Nietzsche and tragedy, “Sens et valeurs” (which would become a chapter in Deleuze’s Nietzsche and 
Philosophy three years later). Warren Montag makes a convincing case for situating this article in 
proximity to Foucault’s original preface to History of Madness, especially with regard to the ideas of 
constitutive division (originary difference, difference in itself) and tragic affirmation: “The placing of ‘the 
refusal, forgetting and silent disappearance of tragedy’ at the center and origin of the Occidental world, 
together with the opposition of ‘the immobile structures of the tragic’ to a ‘dialectics of history,’ suggests 
that Foucault’s reading of The Birth of Tragedy, in its themes and concerns, not to mention the particulars 
of its interpretation of this notoriously obscure text, coincides with, even if it is not derived from, that of 
Deleuze. … For Deleuze, the ‘real opposition’ in The Birth of Tragedy is not the ‘wholly dialectical 
opposition of Dionysos and Apollo, but the more profound opposition of Dionysos and Socrates’ (Deleuze 
1959: 15). Moreover, Deleuze’s hostility to any notion of the dialectic compels him to argue that in fact 
Nietzsche has advanced a thoroughly non-dialectical account of the Dionysian-Apollonian relation, that is, 
the ‘original’ (Deleuze places the term in quotation marks) contradiction between a ‘primitive’ unity and 
individuation. We can already see the paradox at the heart of Deleuze’s reading (which, further begins to 
suggest its relevance for Foucault): the contradiction between these terms is original and thus there can be 
no inquiring back before, even as one of the terms is said to be primitive or primary in relation to the other. 
Deleuze suspends the possibility of a unity that would precede its division into two parts.… Diversity and 
difference are original: unity is always secondary and derivative…. The Nietzschean tragic for Deleuze is 
‘affirmative’: not only the affirmation of original difference, but even the affirmation of the difference 
between the same and the different, the multiple and the one. The tragic affirms the essential diversity of 
being and becoming” (Montag, “‘Foucault and the Problematic of Origins’: Althusser’s Reading of Folie et 
déraison,” §20). 
324 In particular, I have in mind Foucault’s two major books from this period, Discipline and Punish (1975) 
and History of Sexuality Volume 1 (1976), as well as his lecture courses at the Collège de France (especially 
those running from Psychiatric Power in 1974 through The Birth of Biopolitics in 1979) and numerous 
other essays and interviews (in Dits et écrits, 1954-1988, some of which are translated in Power: Essential 
Works of Foucault Volume 3), extending until “The Subject and Power” (1982). 
325 See Foucault, Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth. In particular, I will focus on “Friendship as a Way of Life” 
(1981), “The Social Triumph of the Sexual Will” (1981), “Sex, Power, and the Politics of Identity” (1982), 
“On the Genealogy of Ethics: An Overview of Works in Progress” (1983), and “Polemics, Politics, and 




transversally connecting these lines of flight becomes the project of ‘schizo-political’ 
struggle: if History of Madness had politicized the problem of material expression, Anti-
Oedipus, in turn, develops a general theory of society and transformative politics based 
upon this problem. The second segment, in turn, provides a micro-political theory that 
poses the problem of power and resistance in capitalist society in terms of the production 
of two different kinds of multiplicity: one that is denumerable and controllable, and 
another that is non-denumerable and unruly. While the second segment prepares and 
begins the positive articulation of transversal resistance, the third treats of it 
systematically through the concept of minoritarian becoming, understood as the 
collective creation of a transverse multiplicity and instructively exemplified through the 
prison movement. Finally, the fourth segment singularizes this concept by developing a 
particular example through which the operation of power would be thwarted: namely, the 
Foucauldian project of becoming-queer. 
Taken in its full trajectory, what emerges over the course of this Foucault-Deleuze 
block of becoming is a theory of transversal political struggle. Whereas Foucault’s 
literary politics of transgression had posited a form of exteriority since collapsed by 
capitalism, transversal resistance will propose a different response to the problem of 
realizing and sustaining a collective mode of political agency capable of transforming the 
conditions of the social formation. Ultimately, in the account of political agency that I 
will propose, the necessary condition of realization for such agency is articulated through 





4.1 Schizo-Politics: A Transversal Response to the Political Problem of the Two 
Regimes of Madness 
Anti-Oedipus can be understood as the development and sophistication of the core 
project given in History of Madness, for both works pose and respond to a common 
problem as the key for a general social theory and political strategy of contestation: 
namely, the problem of the two regimes of madness.326 The distinction between these two 
regimes is drawn as follows: the first – the ‘breakthrough’ – is characterized as a kind of 
radical limit-experience, expressed through works of art, that ruptures or calls into 
question the order of social reality; the second – the ‘breakdown’ – is characterized as a 
catatonic collapse that follows the initial breakthrough.327 The problem, then, is the 
seemingly inexorable slippage from the first regime to the second: why and how is it that 
the ‘authentically insane,’ as Artaud puts it – those schizophrenic artists who (as Deleuze 
says) “live in an almost unbearable proximity to the real”328 – are deprived the support 
necessary to sustain their intensive mode of becoming, falling instead into the ravages of 
madness and suicide?329 
                                                
326 In this regard, both thinkers are profoundly Artaudian – and indeed, Artaud is a common early reference 
point for both. On Artaud’s thesis regarding Van Gogh and the ‘authentically insane,’ see our discussion of 
Foucault’s History of Madness above in Chapter 3.  
327 Deleuze borrows the terminology of ‘breakthrough’ and ‘breakdown’ from R.D. Laing’s The Politics of 
Experience; he also notes the close connection with Foucault’s account in History of Madness of the 
historical separation of madness as unreason (breakthrough) from madness as mental illness (breakdown). 
See Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, translated by Robert Hurley, Mark Seem, and Helen R. Lane, 131-
2. 
328 Deleuze, “Schizophrenia and Society,” in Two Regimes of Madness, edited by David Lapoujade, 
translated by Ames Hodges and Mike Taormina, 27.  
329 That is, why and how does the schizophrenic ‘visionary’ (Artaud) become consigned to break down into 
“the autistic schizophrenic, who no longer moves, and who can remain motionless for years” (Deleuze, 
“Capitalism and Schizophrenia,” in Desert Islands and Other Texts, 1953-1975, edited by Lapoujade, 240). 
As Deleuze puts it, “What can we do so the break-through does not become a break-down?” (Deleuze, 




For both Foucault and Deleuze, this question speaks to something fundamental 
about the way society functions. Indeed, the problem of the two regimes of madness has 
significant political stakes because the practices that reduce the first form of madness to 
the second are the very constitutive processes by which the social formation is organized 
and reproduced; that is, something about the intensive experience of the schizophrenic 
breakthrough poses a grave danger to the social order, and the expulsion of this threat is 
formative for the foundation and development of society. I will refer to this claim, which 
bears the unmistakable stamp of Artaud’s essay on Van Gogh, as the Artaud thesis. The 
problem of the two regimes of madness thus opens onto a more general theory of the 
constitutive exclusions by which the socius is formed, and it suggests a possible strategy 
of resistance that would privilege the schizoid ‘line of the outside’ as a site for political 
contestation. 
In the last chapter, we saw how Foucault poses the problem of the two regimes of 
madness in terms of an opposition between unreason and mental illness. The political 
task that follows from this initial formulation of the problematic is to provide the 
conditions of material expression that would support and sustain the limit-experience of 
unreason. However, as we have also seen, the resultant literary politics of transgression 
runs aground of the problem of capitalism, leading Foucault to direct his conception of 
political resistance away from unreason and literature toward an analytic of power. 
Foucault’s analytic of power, however, is first made possible by the work of 
Deleuze and Guattari in Anti-Oedipus. On the one hand, Anti-Oedipus is profoundly 
continuous with History of Madness, for unreason and schizophrenia are analogous in at 




direct relation to the outside,330 breakthroughs always in danger of breaking down into 
mental illness;331 historically, as absolute exterior limits of the socius, the exclusion of 
which is constitutive to the functioning of society; and politically, as the basis for 
conceiving a strategy of resistance to the violence of this social production. However, 
what Deleuze and Guattari add is an analysis of schizophrenia conducted specifically in 
relation to capitalism, which allows them to go beyond Foucault’s transgressive politics 
toward a transversal politics of connection. 
Anti-Oedipus articulates the two regimes of madness as two forms of schizophrenia: 
(1) “the schizo-as-entity,” the broken down or catatonic schizophrenic subject 
corresponding to mental illness; and (2) schizophrenia as process, that is, the pure, 
universal process of production, or decoded flows of desire. In turn, Deleuze and Guattari 
formulate their version of the Artaud thesis: these decoded flows or lines of flight of the 
schizophrenic process threaten to scramble the social codes and thus subvert the 
functioning of the socius, since social formations organize and reproduce themselves on 
the basis of ordering, coding, or re-territorializing flows of desire.332 Thus, schizophrenia 
– as a pure process of desiring-production – is exorcised from the socius, forming its 
                                                
330 “There is a schizophrenic experience of intensive quantities in their pure state, to a point that is almost 
unbearable – a celibate misery and glory experienced to the fullest, like a cry suspended between life and 
death, an intense feeling of transition, states of pure, naked intensity stripped of all shape and form. … A 
harrowing, emotionally overwhelming experience, which brings the schizo as close as possible to matter, to 
a burning, living center of matter” (Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, 19). 
331 Echoing Foucault’s questions in History of Madness concerning why those who attempted the test of 
unreason are consigned to fall into madness or suicide, Deleuze and Guattari write: “How is it possible that 
the schizo was conceived of as the autistic rag – separated from the real and cut off from life – that he is so 
often thought to be? Worse still: how can psychiatric practice have made him this sort of rag, how can it 
have reduced him to this state of a body without organs that has become a dead thing – this schizo who 
sought to remain at that unbearable point where the mind touches matter and lives every intensity, 
consumes it?” (ibid, 19-20). 
332 “The prime function incumbent upon the socius, has always been to codify the flows of desire, to 
inscribe them, to record them, to see to it that no flow exists that is not properly dammed up, channeled, 




absolute exterior limit. This movement of exclusion is integral to the very formation of 
society. 
Like Foucault then, Deleuze and Guattari offer a general social theory and history 
of limits based on the Artaud thesis. Further, they distinguish three social formations on 
the basis of how they order decoded flows of desire. ‘Primitive’ societies ward off the 
threat of schizoid deterritorialization by coding their flows, operating on the basis of 
mobile and finite blocks of debt that weave together an open system of alliances and 
filiations. ‘Imperial’ societies, in turn, over-code these flows, raising them into a new 
alliance and direct filiation with an eminent transcendent unity (the despotic State). 
‘Capitalist’ societies, however, have a fundamentally different relation to the threat 
of schizoid decoding, for like the process of schizophrenia, capitalism operates on the 
basis of decoded flows (e.g., decoded flows of money and decoded flows of labor).333 
The crucial difference between capitalism and schizophrenia is that the former 
axiomatizes the flows it decodes and thus subjects desiring-production to an ever more 
rigorous form of control. The deterritorializing “process is continually interrupted, or the 
tendency counteracted, or the limit displaced.”334 Rather than expelling the schizoid 
decoded flows as an exterior limit in the manner of primitive and imperial societies, 
capitalism displaces them by interiorizing them at the heart of social production, 
harnessing their force by converting them into capital. And this is just how the capitalist 
                                                
333 In this way, capitalism and schizophrenia are “one and the same economy, one and the same production 
process,” (ibid, 245) for “the decoding and the deterritorialization of flows define the very process of 
capitalism” (ibid, 320). 
334 Ibid. Thus, capitalism is the relative limit of all pre-capitalist societies – “it effects relative breaks, 
because it substitutes for the codes an extremely rigorous axiomatic that maintains the energy of the flows 
in a bound state on the body of capital” – whereas schizophrenia is the absolute limit of every social 




machine operates, by “directly apprehending” decoded flows “in a codeless axiomatic”335: 
for any deterritorialized flow, such as that produced by a tragic work of unreason, an 
axiom can be added that absorbs it into a flow of capital.336 Indeed, this is precisely why 
Foucault’s literary politics of transgression failed. 
This function of capitalism, in turn, is how Deleuze and Guattari account for the 
problem of the two regimes of madness.337 The sick schizo is an effect of the double 
process of production by which capitalism “axiomatizes with the one hand what it 
decodes with the other.”338 It is through this process that capitalism re-territorializes the 
flows it decodes so as to keep them from “escaping the system.”339 As a result, it falls to 
the lot of schizophrenic subjects alone to express the force of an absolute de-
territorialization, and “a flow of madness … is defined thus because it is charged with 
representing whatever escapes the axiomatic and the applications of reterritorialization in 
other flows.”340 Because this charge is too great to sustain, lacking the conditions of 
material expression that would support it, the schizoid breakthrough is consigned to a 
catatonic breakdown. 
                                                
335 Ibid, 337. 
336 “Then what becomes of the ‘truly’ schizophrenic language and the ‘truly’ decoded and unbound flows 
that manage to break through the wall or absolute limit? The capitalist axiomatic is so rich that one more 
axiom is added – for the books of a great writer whose lexical and stylistic characteristics can always be 
computed by means of an electronic machine, or for the discourse of madmen that can always be heard 
within the framework of a hospital, administrative, and psychiatric axiomatic” (ibid, 246). 
337 Deleuze and Guattari pose this problem in strikingly Foucauldian terms: “Why does [capitalist 
production] confine its madmen and madwomen instead of seeing in them its own heroes and heroines, its 
own fulfillment? And where it can no longer recognize the figure of a simple illness, why does it keep its 
artists and even its scientists under such close surveillance – as though they risked unleashing flows that 
would be dangerous for capitalist production and charged with a revolutionary potential, so long as these 
flows are not co-opted or absorbed by the laws of the market?” (ibid, 245). 
338 Ibid, 246. 
339 Thus, for example, the decoded flow of labor is maintained “in the axiomatic framework of property,” 
and decoded libidinal flows are maintained “in the applied framework of the family” (ibid, 320). 




The schizo-political strategy of resistance that follows from this theory of society 
has two objectives. The first extends Foucault’s project in History of Madness: namely, 
“undoing all the reterritorializations that transform madness into mental illness,”341 and 
thus contesting the normalizing techniques of subjection and division that organize social 
reality. It is the second objective, however, that opens for the first time onto the thought 
of transversal resistance, namely, “liberating the schizoid movement of 
deterritorialization in all the flows, in such a way that this characteristic can no longer 
qualify a particular residue as a flow of madness, but affects just as well the flows of 
labor and desire, of production, knowledge, and creation in their most profound 
tendency.”342  
Given that the capitalist social formation produces a multiplicity of social flows and 
functions on the basis of their decoding and axiomatization, schizo-political resistance 
aims to undo the re-territorialization of these flows by freeing the de-territorializing 
tendency proper to each. Here it is essential that these lines of de-territorialization be 
interconnected, such that they “become parts and cogs of one another in the flow that 
feeds one and the same desiring-machine, so many local fires patiently kindled for a 
generalized explosion.”343 In other words, the transversal connections between de-
territorialized flows are what produce revolutionary force, since desire becomes  
productive (a desiring-machine) through the connection of decoded flows.344  
                                                
341 Ibid, 321. 
342 Ibid. 
343 Ibid, 137. 
344 See ibid, 224. Cf.: “Desire is revolutionary because it always wants more connections and assemblages” 




Thus, to the capitalist, axiomatic conjugation of decoded flows, schizo-politics 
would oppose a transversal connection of decoded flows, one that propels their collective 
becoming-revolutionary.345 Through this transversal weave of lines of flight, the form of 
intensive limit-experience proper to the schizoid breakthrough would receive its 
conditions of material expression: 
Here, madness would no longer exist as madness, not because it would have been 
transformed into ‘mental illness,’ but on the contrary because it would receive the 
support of all the other flows, including science and art – once it is said that 
madness is called madness and appears as such only because it is deprived of this 
support, and finds itself reduced to testifying all alone for deterritorialization as a 
universal process. It is merely its unwarranted privilege, a privilege beyond its 
capacities, that renders it mad.346 
 
 
4.2 Foucault’s Debt to Deleuze: The Question of Transversal Resistance and the 
Micropolitical Problem of Power 
The schizo-political concept of resistance as the de-territorialization and transversal 
connection of flows therefore provides a response to both the problem of the two regimes 
of madness and the challenges of contesting capitalist social production more generally. 
If the re-territorializing and integrative operations of capitalism function on the basis of 
                                                
345 Deleuze and Guattari elaborate on the distinction between connection and conjugation in A Thousand 
Plateaus: “At this point, we must introduce a distinction between the two notions of connection and 
conjugation of flows. ‘Connection’ indicates the way in which decoded and deterritorialized flows boost 
one another, accelerate their shared escape, and augment or stoke their quanta; the ‘conjugation’ of these 
same flows, on the other hand, indicates their relative stoppage, like a point of accumulation that plugs or 
seals the lines of flight, performs a general reterritorialization, and brings the flows under the dominance of 
a single flow capable of overcoding them.” (Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 220) I would 
emphasize that while this distinction between connection and conjugation is sharpened in A Thousand 
Plateaus, the concept of ‘transversal connection’ is already operative in Anti-Oedipus, particularly in regard 
to ‘subject-groups’ constructed as ‘transverse multiplicities’: see, e.g., Anti-Oedipus, 280, 287, 309, 319, 
and 349. 




totalizing axiomatization,347 then the appropriate form for contestation to take will be a 
de-territorializing and de-totalizing revolutionary movement, the force of which is 
generated through proliferating and connecting lateral lines of alliance. 
However, the key problem remains how exactly to conceive and create this kind of 
transversal political project. This is precisely how Deleuze poses the question to Foucault 
in their exchange, “Intellectuals and Power,” from 1972:  
We must set up lateral affiliations and an entire system of networks and popular 
bases; and this is especially difficult. …[T]he present revolutionary movement has 
created multiple centers, and not as the result of weakness or insufficiency, since a 
certain kind of totalization pertains to power and the forces of reaction. … But how 
are we to define the networks, the transversal links between these active and 
discontinuous points, from one country to another or within a single country?348  
 
Foucault’s response to Deleuze indicates to what extent his analytic of power is made 
possible by Anti-Oedipus, for the question of how to connect lateral lines of struggle 
bespeaks a more basic problem of how to understand the nature and operations of power: 
Isn’t this difficulty in finding adequate forms of struggle a result of the fact that we 
continue to ignore the problem of power? … If the reading of your books (from 
Nietzsche to what I anticipate in Capitalism and Schizophrenia) has been essential 
for me, it is because they seem to go very far in exploring this problem: under the 
ancient theme of meaning, of the signifier and the signified, etc., you have 
developed the question of power, of the inequality of powers and their struggles.349 
 
                                                
347 On the “co-opting power of capitalism” that derives from the totalizing function of the capitalist 
axiomatic, see ibid, 236. 
348 Deleuze, “Intellectuals and Power,” in Foucault, Language, Counter-Memory, Practice, 212-6, my 
emphasis. 
349 Foucault, ibid, 212-4. It is notable that in crediting Deleuze with developing the problematic of power, 
Foucault refers to Nietzsche and Philosophy and Anti-Oedipus, for both works articulate a view of 
resistance as the active-affirmative force by which a “new form of life” (Deleuze, Nietzsche and 
Philosophy, translated by Janis Tomlinson, 185) or mode of existence is produced. In other words, whether 
conceived through Nietzsche’s figure of the overman or the connective de-territorializing process of 
schizophrenia, political struggle is an intrinsically creative project, one that breaks with the forces of 
reaction (ressentiment, micro-fascism, totalization) by enabling an intensification and enrichment of what 





Most fundamentally then, what Anti-Oedipus enables for Foucault is the 
development of a micro-political conception of power, anticipating his subsequent 
formulation, in History of Sexuality, Volume 1, of power “as the multiplicity of force 
relations immanent in the sphere in which they operate and which constitute their own 
organization….”350 Indeed, Foucault credits Deleuze with casting the problem of power 
(and thus of resistance) in terms of the thousand tiny points of its exercise.351 That is, 
rather than deriving from a central, unitary position, such as the State or ruling class, 
power must be grasped as an immanent multiplicity: one which constitutes the material 
basis for the ‘molar’ organization of a society’s institutional arrangements, but which 
functions by directly investing bodies and acting upon their forces, operating at what 
Deleuze and Guattari refer to as the ‘molecular’ level.352  
Thus, for instance, Anti-Oedipus poses the question of power in terms of the 
political problem of desire and its direct investment of the socio-historical field, which 
requires a functionalist, microphysical analysis of ‘desiring-machines’ and their 
                                                
350 Foucault, History of Sexuality, Volume 1, 92. 
351 “Each struggle develops around a particular source of power (any of the countless, tiny sources…)” 
(Foucault, “Intellectuals and Power,” 214). 
352 See, for example, Deleuze and Guattari’s discussion of paranoia and schizophrenia as the two poles of 
social libidinal investment: “It might be said that, of the two directions in physics – the molar direction that 
goes toward the large numbers and the mass phenomena, and the molecular direction that on the contrary 
penetrates into singularities, their interactions and connections at a distance or between different orders – 
the paranoiac has chosen the first: he practices macrophysics. And it could be said that by contrast the 
schizo goes in the other direction, that of microphysics, of molecules insofar as they no longer obey the 
statistical laws: waves and corpuscles, flows and partial objects that are no longer dependent upon the large 
numbers; infinitesimal lines of escape [fuite], instead of the perspectives of the large aggregates” (Deleuze 
and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, 280). In A Thousand Plateaus, Deleuze and Guattari will explicitly draw the 
connection between their notion of the molecular and Foucault’s notion of discipline: “It requires a whole 
organization articulating formations of power and regimes of signs, and operating on the molecular level 





constitutive role in social production.353 In this way, Deleuze displaces a transcendent, 
hierarchical or representational conception of power in favor of one that is immanent, 
decentralized, and direct. 
This micro-political theory of bodies and forces in turn enables a properly 
transversal conception of resistance in terms of a multiply-centered revolutionary354 
movement. The key to answering Deleuze’s question about how to define the lateral 
alliances between various political struggles is to first develop an adequate understanding 
of the common mode of power they are allied against, for the “generality of the struggle 
specifically derives from the system of power itself, from all the forms in which power is 
                                                
353 On the “molecular, micrological, or microphysical” analysis of desiring-production – which is 
conducted in terms of “the molecular elements that form the parts and wheels of desiring-machines,” and 
which “searches for the way in which these machines function, for how they invest and underdetermine the 
social machines they constitute on a large scale” – by contrast to a representational, Oedipalizing analysis – 
which frames desiring-machines in terms of “what they mean” by referring them to “large molar 
aggregates,” e.g., the family – see Anti-Oedipus, 182-3. In addition to anticipating Foucault’s ‘microphysics 
of power,’ this passage illustrates Foucault’s comment, cited above, that ‘under the ancient theme of 
meaning,’ Deleuze has ‘developed the question of power, of the inequality of powers and their struggles.’ 
354 While this is not the place to develop a full account of Foucault’s evolving views on revolution, it 
should be noted that the term is not uncommonly used by Foucault during the early 1970s, as here in 
“Intellectuals and Power.” In fact, Foucault defines the aims of the political activist group that he helped to 
organize, the GIP (Groupe d’information sur les prisons, or Prison Information Group), precisely in terms 
of “revolutionary action”: see Foucault, “Par delà le bien et le mal,” Dits et écrits I: 1099; cf. Foucault’s 
remarks on the “truly revolutionary forces” of minoritarian struggle in “Michel Foucault on Attica: an 
Interview,” Social Justice, vol. 18, no. 3 (45), Attica: 1971-1975 A Commemorative Issue (Fall 1991), 34. 
By the time of 1976, Foucault will have modified his view on what constitutes revolution, defining it in 
general as a transformation in the codification of the multiplicity of power relations, with the consequence 
that “there are as many types of revolutions as there are possible subversive codifications of power 
relations” (Foucault, “Entretien avec Michel Foucault,” Dits et écrits II, 151, my translation). In the year or 
two that follow, confronted by the increasingly bleak fate of revolutionary leftist politics (whether China, 
the USSR, the Soviet satellite countries, Cuba, Vietnam and Cambodia, etc.), Foucault’s view will darken 
on the concept of revolution: see Foucault, “La torture, c’est le raison,” Dits et écrits II, 397-8; cf. “Non au 
sexe roi,” Dits et écrits II, 266-7. By 1978, he will have essentially stopped using the concept of 
revolutionary politics, associating it with a hierarchical, centralized and totalizing strategy, and advocating 
instead the “immediacy” and “anarchic” quality of transversal, minoritarian struggles; see “La philosophie 
analytique de la politique,” Dits et écrits II, 542-7). And even on the topic of the Iranian revolutionary 
movement of 1978-1979, he will distinguish between “revolution” (institutionalized in the Islamic Republic) 
and “revolt” (the collective movement of popular political uprising); see, e.g., “Useless to Revolt?” In this 
regard, the distinction that Foucault draws between revolution and minoritarian struggle, or between 
revolution and revolt, is consistent with the distinction Deleuze and Guattari make between revolutions and 
becoming-revolutionary; thus, there will be no inconsistency between Foucault’s transversal minoritarian 




exercised and applied.”355 If this mode of power is grasped as an immanent multiplicity, 
then different resistance struggles will be both singular, with respect to the immediate 
conditions in which power is exercised over them, and connectable, insofar as they stand 
in immanent relation to one another by virtue of suffering the same regime of power. 
Speaking of all those who are subjected to the exercise of a power they find intolerable, 
and still by way of response to Deleuze, Foucault writes:  
In engaging in a struggle that is properly their own, whose objectives they clearly 
understand and whose methods only they can determine, they enter into a 
revolutionary process. They naturally act as allies of the proletariat, because power 
is exercised the way it is in order to maintain capitalist exploitation. They 
genuinely serve the cause of the proletariat by fighting in those places where they 
find themselves oppressed. Women, prisoners, conscripted soldiers, hospital 
patients, and homosexuals have now begun a specific struggle against the 
particularized power, the constraints and controls, that are exerted over them. … 
And these movements are linked to the revolutionary movement of the proletariat to 
the extent that they fight against the controls and constraints which serve the same 
system of power.356 
 
It is often thought that unlike that of Deleuze and Guattari, Foucault’s political 
philosophy does not deal with the problem of capitalism per se. Yet seen in light of this 
dialogue with Deleuze, all of Foucault’s critical histories – from History of Madness and 
Birth of the Clinic to Discipline and Punish and History of Sexuality, Volume 1 – take as 
their object a common system of power the strategic function of which, in Foucault’s 
view, is to ‘maintain capitalist exploitation.’ Thus, the localized forms of resistance that 
Foucault supports, and for which his intellectual work is intended to provide arms, are 
transversally connectable precisely insofar as they find common cause against the 
functioning of the capitalist formation. To the extent that these oppositional movements 
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singularize their proper modes of struggle, they ‘enter into a revolutionary process’ or, to 
use Deleuze’s later terminology, effect their own becoming-revolutionary; and to the 
extent that they form a lateral network ‘linked to the revolutionary movement of the 
proletariat,’ these struggles constitute a collective becoming-revolutionary that traverses 
the socius and contests the relations of power that reproduce capitalist social production.  
It is likely in terms of this shared view on minoritarian political resistance, then, 
that Deleuze will later speak of the “common cause,”357 more profound than any 
methodological difference, that connects his work with Foucault’s. Perhaps we can also 
begin to see why Foucault, in a footnote at the beginning of Discipline and Punish, writes 
that he “could give no notion by reference or quotations what this book owes to Gilles 
Deleuze and the work he is undertaking with Félix Guattari.”358 Though Foucault does 
not detail this debt, to which he had already alluded in “Intellectuals and Power,” another 
indication of its import can be gleaned from a passage in Psychiatric Power, where 
Foucault distinguishes between “two absolutely distinct types of power corresponding to 
two systems, two different ways of functioning: the macrophysics of sovereignty, the 
power that could be put to work in a post-feudal, pre-industrial government, and then the 
microphysics of disciplinary power….”359  
Foucault here combines two sets of distinctions established by Anti-Oedipus: that 
between a macro- and microphysics of power, on the one hand, and the despotic and 
capitalist social formations, on the other. Historically, sovereign power is exercised in the 
societies that precede industrial capitalism – those which Deleuze and Guattari term 
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358 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 309. 




“barbarian” and analyze in terms of “the ‘megamachine’ of the State,” which over-codes 
primitive social flows and extracts surplus value from them360 –, and this form of power 
functions by imposing levies, whether on the products, stores or services of its 
subjects.361 By contrast, disciplinary power, which emerges alongside early industrial 
capitalism, more insidiously invests the social field, for it functions through the 
“exhaustive capture of the individual’s body, actions, time, and behavior. It is a seizure of 
the body, and not of the product....”362 Disciplinary institutions, such as prisons, schools, 
factories, and asylums, are thus so many apparatuses of capture,363 by which power 
apprehends “bodies themselves with their materiality and their forces.”364  
                                                
360 Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, 195-6. 
361 In other words, levying is the overcoding activity of surplus value extraction proper to the sovereign or 
despot. For Foucault’s analysis of the basic levying-deductive function of sovereign power, see Foucault, 
Psychiatric Power, 42. 
362 Ibid, 46. 
363 In Psychiatric Power (six years before the publication of Deleuze and Guattari’s A Thousand Plateaus), 
Foucault in fact uses the term ‘apparatus of capture’ twice to refer to the institution of the asylum: 
specifically, with regard to “neurology’s clinical apparatus of capture,” (ibid, 307) which was the 
neuropathological technique developed in response to the widespread problem of simulation among 
psychiatric patients, and which made possible “a clinical analysis, an analysis in terms of physical 
ascription, of the individual’s intentional attitude. Consequently, a capture of the subject’s attitude, of the 
subject’s consciousness, of the will itself within his body, becomes possible. … It was the will, in fact, on 
which and to which disciplinary power had to be applied; it really was the vis-à-vis of disciplinary power…. 
Neuropathology now provides the clinical instrument by which it is thought the individual can be captured 
at the level of the will itself” (ibid, 302). It is notable that Foucault refers to the “untruthfulness of 
simulation, madness simulating madness,” as “the anti-power of the mad confronted with psychiatric power” 
(ibid, 136) and “the militant underside of psychiatric power …[,] the insidious way for the mad to pose the 
question of truth forcibly on a psychiatric power that only wanted to impose reality on them” (ibid, 138). 
With respect to the historical regime of power, the neuropathlogical apparatus of capture is thus the 
strategic response to the collective resistance struggles among the mad themselves, which is to say, the 
operation of disciplinary power by which so many lines of flight are reterritorialized. By genealogically 
analyzing the exercise of power in strategic terms, Foucault gives primacy (both historically and, as it were, 
logically) to collective forms of resistance (lines of flight) in relation to apparatuses of capture (see 
Foucault’s final lecture in Psychiatric Power (February 6, 1974), pp. 297-323). This important point is 
often missed in interpretations of Foucault’s analytic of power, including Deleuze’s in “Desire and Pleasure” 
(see Deleuze, Two Regimes of Madness, 122-134) and A Thousand Plateaus (see 530-1, fn. 39). By the 
time of his more considered view in Foucault, however, Deleuze will emphasize that Foucault’s “final 
word on power is that resistance comes first” (Deleuze, Foucault, 89). I would simply note that this had 
been Foucault’s ‘first word’ all along, as early as the tragic expression of unreason in History of Madness. 




In other words, to borrow from Deleuze’s later terminology, sovereign power is the 
diagram of force relations that corresponds to the despotic social formation; and insofar 
as these relations are juridically organized and centralized through the State, sovereign 
power is macro-physical in its functioning. By contrast, disciplinary power is the diagram 
proper to the industrial capitalist social formation; and it constitutes “a micro-physics of 
power” insofar as it does not merely impose a system of levies upon the products of a 
populace, but takes hold directly as an “infinitesimal power over the active body”365 and 
thus as “a specific mode of subjection … in which the body itself is invested by power 
relations.”366 Therefore, if the global thesis of Discipline and Punish is that the 
widespread changes in the techniques, apparatuses, and legal coding of punishment, 
contemporary with the historical shift from the classical to the modern period, reflect a 
more fundamental transformation in the regime of power by which Western societies are 
organized and governed; then it will be Deleuze and Guattari’s micro-political conception 
of power and analysis of social formations that enable Foucault to map this mutation  
from sovereign to disciplinary power. 
Moreover, the debt can be specified further, for between Deleuze and Foucault 
there emerges a concept of power as productive, operating through the double technique 
of (1) individualizing subjection and (2) the denumeration of human multiplicities. In 
contradistinction to sovereign power, the “chief function of the disciplinary power is to 
‘train’, rather than to select and to levy…. It ‘trains’ the moving, confused, useless 
multitudes of bodies and forces into a multiplicity of individual elements …. Discipline 
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‘makes’ individuals, it is the specific technique of a power that regards individuals both 
as objects and as instruments of its exercise.”367 By shaping a disorderly mass into a 
multiplicity of “necessary and sufficient single units,”368 discipline produces the very 
form of the modern individual; and by directly investing the body to capture and control 
its forces, discipline fabricates this individual as “the obedient subject, the individual 
subjected to habits, rules, orders, an authority that is exercised continually around him 
and upon him, and which he must allow to function automatically in him.”369 Insofar as it 
thus “allows both the characterization of the individual as individual and the ordering of a 
given multiplicity,”370 disciplinary power performs a simultaneously individualizing and 
totalizing productive function: it constitutes a “political technology of the body”,371 by 
which the movements, activities, and forces of bodies are controlled and developed, and 
by which an unruly, unproductive or dangerous multitude is transformed into an 
organized, useful, governable multiplicity.  
The relational arrangements by which the modern social formation is hierarchically 
segmented and the mode of self-relation by which the obedient subject is constituted, thus 
result from and reproduce the same regime of power. Indeed, Foucault credits Deleuze 
with the general form of this fundamental insight in the preface to the English translation 
of Anti-Oedipus, framing that work as an ethico-political project contesting the 
individualizing and totalizing effects of power through the creation of new kinds of 
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multiplicity and practices of subjectivation.372 Anticipating his own declaration five years 
later in “The Subject and Power” that “the political, ethical, social, philosophical problem 
of our days” is “to promote new forms of subjectivity through the refusal of this kind of 
individuality that has been imposed on us for several centuries,”373 Foucault lists as one 
of Anti-Oedipus’s “essential principles” that “[t]he individual is the product of power. 
What is needed is to ‘de-individualize’ by means of multiplication and displacement, 
diverse combinations. The group must not be the organic bond uniting hierarchized 
individuals, but a constant generator of de-individualization.”374 
If Discipline and Punish is so indebted to Deleuze, then it is because Anti-Oedipus 
enables the problem of power to be posed in terms of an immanent microphysics of 
bodies and forces: one which emerges historically with industrial capitalism and 
ultimately functions to maintain capitalist exploitation by producing individuals as 
normalized subjects within hierarchically ordered multiplicities, thereby investing, 
capturing, and controlling bodies’ powers of activity. Further, we have seen that such an 
analytic of power is necessary to address the question of transversal resistance insofar as 
                                                
372 Foucault’s preface was published in 1977, just as he was developing his focus on ethics as a critical 
political activity. Compare, for example, his characterization of Anti-Oedipus as “a book of ethics, the first 
book of ethics to be written in France in quite a long time” (Foucault, “Preface,” Anti-Oedipus, xiii), with 
his description from the same year of the ethos of critical thought as a form of virtue: “There is something 
in critique which is akin to virtue. And in a certain way, what I wanted to speak to you about is this critical 
attitude as virtue in general” (Foucault, “What is Critique?”, 43). 
373 Foucault, “The Subject and Power,” 336. 
374 Foucault, “Preface,” Anti-Oedipus, xiv. Deleuze and Guattari refer to this qualitatively different mode of 
multiplicity as a ‘subject-group’ (by contrast to a ‘subjugated-group’), and its relational composition is 
transversal in nature: “A subject-group, on the contrary, is a group whose libidinal investments are 
themselves revolutionary; it causes desire to penetrate into the social field, and subordinates the socius or 
the form of power to desiring-production; …it opposes real coefficients of transversality to the symbolic 
determinations of subjugation, coefficients without a hierarchy or a group superego” (Deleuze and Guattari, 
Anti-Oedipus, 348-9). It is notable that for Deleuze and Guattari, this distinction between ‘subjugated-
groups’ and ‘subject-groups’ – that is, between hierarchical, denumerable multiplicities and transversal, 
non-denumerable multiplicities – tracks with the distinction between macro- and microphysics, or between 




the connectivity of struggles against power is derived from the commonality of the 
system they contest. Whence the double task of Discipline and Punish: (1) to analyze the 
historical exercise of disciplinary power as a political technology for the production and 
administration of denumerable and controllable human multiplicities; and (2) to diagram 
the reciprocally conditioning relations between this micro-political regime of power and 
capitalism. Such a genealogical project will provide the critical propaedeutics for 
conceiving and creating a transversal form of struggle better suited than Foucault’s earlier 
politics of literary transgression to resist the exercise of power in capitalist society. 
 
4.3 Assembling Denumerable Multiplicities: The Anti-Transversal Function of 
Disciplinary Power 
Foucault’s first task, the analysis of disciplinary practices, illuminates the tactical 
importance of transversality from the sides of both power and resistance. In order to 
minimize the economic inefficiencies and political dangers of mass phenomena, 
discipline operates as “an anti-nomadic technique”375 that fixes and distributes somatic 
singularities, “arrests or regulates movements.”376 In turn, in order to further defuse the 
threats of resistance intrinsic to any collection of bodies and forces – “agitations, revolts, 
spontaneous organizations, coalitions[,] anything that may establish horizontal 
conjunctions”377 – discipline constructs a striated space, one arranged according to 
“hierarchical networks” and structured by inserting “as solid separations as possible … 
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between the different elements at the same level.”378 This double operation of discipline 
as anti-nomadic and striating is achieved through the technique of “partitioning,” which 
functions according to the “principle of elementary location” to “break up collective 
dispositions” and “analyse confused, massive or transient pluralities”: “Each individual 
has his own place, and each place, its individual.”379     
It is thus by means of the partitioning of space that discipline is exercised as a 
“cellular” power, satisfying “the first condition for the control and use of an ensemble of 
distinct elements”:380 namely, the individualizing and totalizing distribution of bodies 
into a grid of separated cells that abolishes all collective effects of transversal group 
interaction. Within such an arrangement, which terminates “any relation that is not 
supervised by authority,”381 individuals are both isolated and assembled “in a strict 
hierarchical framework, with no lateral relation, communication being possible only in a 
vertical direction.”382 Whether the disciplinary apparatus of capture be a school, 
factory383, hospital, or prison, each individual (the student, worker, patient, or prisoner) is 
only ever set into relation with a centralized source of power, be it a teacher, overseer, 
doctor, or warden.384 
                                                
378 Ibid, 220. 
379 Ibid, 143. Foucault continues: “Disciplinary space tends to be divided into as many sections as there are 
bodies or elements to be distributed. One must eliminate the effects of imprecise distributions, the 
uncontrolled disappearance of individuals, their diffuse circulation, their unusable and dangerous 
coagulation; it was a tactic of anti-desertion, anti-vagabondage, anti-concentration.” 
380 Ibid, 149. 
381 Ibid, 239. 
382 Ibid, 238. 
383 The factory in particular develops a more complex system of partitioning, one which is specifically 
suited for dividing and distributing labor power so as to control and maximize its production; see ibid, 145. 
384 See Foucault’s discussion of this anti-transversal function, by which panopticism minimizes any 




Indeed, it is precisely the blockage of transversal relations between the distinct 
elements of a disciplinary multiplicity that secures both the individualization of the 
former and the denumerability of the latter. Nowhere is this as clear as in Foucault’s 
discussion of Jeremy Bentham’s Panopticon, which, as “the diagram of a mechanism of 
power reduced to its ideal form,” provides the “generalizable model of functioning” for 
the mode of power exercised in disciplinary society.385 Within a panoptic arrangement, 
which consists architecturally of a central watchtower surrounded by rings of partitioned 
cells, each individual is confined and isolated in his own cell, the front of which is subject 
to continual surveillance from without, and the side walls of which prevent the individual 
“from coming into contact with his companions. He is seen, but he does not see; he is the 
object of information, never a subject in communication. The arrangement of his room, 
opposite the central tower, imposes on him an axial visibility; but the divisions of the ring, 
those separated cells, imply a lateral invisibility. And this invisibility is a guarantee of 
order.”386  
While the political effect by which individuals, as objects of a constant ‘axial 
visibility,’ internalize and reproduce the operation of power may be what is best known 
in Foucault’s analysis of panopticism, it is in fact the structure of ‘lateral invisibility’ that 
makes this system of subjection possible. If discipline is a technique for producing a 
certain order and functioning of human collectivities, then what ‘guarantees’ this order – 
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within generalized panopticism by virtue of the fact that we live within a disciplinary system” (Foucault, 
Psychiatric Power, 79). 




that is, what secures the use and control of a disciplinary multiplicity – will be the series 
of lateral blockages between subjected individuals:  
The crowd, a compact mass, a locus of multiple exchanges, individualities merging 
together, a collective effect, is abolished and replaced by a collection of separated 
individualities. From the point of view of the guardian, it is replaced by a 
multiplicity that can be numbered and supervised [une multiplicité dénombrable et 
contrôlable]; from the point of view of the inmates, by a sequestered and observed 
solitude. Hence the major effect of the Panopticon: to induce in the inmate a state of 
conscious and permanent visibility that assures the automatic functioning of 
power.387 
 
A primary operation of panoptic arrangements, and thus a first condition for the 
exercise of power, is to block transversal connections and thereby defuse the economic 
and political dangers of inefficiency and revolt. This basic diagrammatic feature of 
panopticism is the key to the smooth functioning of any disciplinary apparatus: in 
factories, the severance of transversal ties prevents worker theft, coalitions, distractions, 
and accidents; in schools, cheating, talking, and time-wasting amongst students; in 
asylums, the danger of madmen harming each other or creating collective disturbances; in 
hospitals, the risk of contagion among patients; and in prisons, the threat of complots to 
escape or hatch future crimes.388 
 Foucault’s micro-analytic of power thus allows the political problem of 
transversality to be framed in terms of two different forms of multiplicity. We have seen 
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the sovereign exercise of punitive power in public executions; the political resistance of these lines of flight, 
in turn, prompts as a strategic response the emergence of disciplinary punitive power. See Discipline and 
Punish, 59-65.  




that by Foucault’s own lights, Anti-Oedipus had already posited a basic theoretical 
opposition between the group as ‘a constant generator of de-individualization’ and the 
group as ‘the organic bond uniting hierarchized individuals.’389 The relation between 
these two modes of collectivity is now given historical precision: the essential operation 
of disciplinary power is to transform a non-denumerable multiplicity, a plexus of 
‘multiple exchanges’ where ‘individualities merge together,’ into ‘a denumerable and 
controllable multiplicity.’ In other words, in order for panoptic processes of 
individualizing subjection to achieve ‘the automatic functioning of power,’ a transient 
multitude that generates effects of de-individualization through the multiplication of 
lateral relations must be reassembled into a hierarchically segmented ‘collection of 
separated individualities.’ And this is achieved in the first instance by debarring 
transversal connections through the partitioning of disciplinary space.  
It is therefore through the concept of the transversal, its blockage or proliferating 
connections, that power and resistance in disciplinary society can be grasped in their most 
fundamental operations. In both cases, what is at issue is the construction of multiplicities: 
on the side of power and the segmented space of its apparatuses of capture, the formation 
of denumerable multiplicities that individualize obedient subjects; and on the side of 
resistance, the creation of transverse or non-denumerable multiplicities that give rise to 
de-individualizing processes of collective subjectivation. 
 
                                                




4.4 Foucault’s Economico-Political Thesis: Capitalism, Modern Power, and the 
Divided Plebe 
In order to understand how this incipient transversal politics of connection would 
respond specifically to the problem of capitalism, we must consider the second task of 
Discipline and Punish, the analysis of the relations between power and the capitalist 
social formation. We have seen that disciplinary power arises concurrently with the 
industrialization of economic production and includes the factory among its set of 
institutions. Far from being merely historically overlapping processes, however, a 
biconditional relation obtains between (1) the development of capitalism and (2) the great 
mutation in the technology of power through which the ‘macrophysics of sovereignty’ 
was supplanted by the ‘microphysics of disciplinary power.’  
The very development of discipline as a set of individualizing techniques for 
organizing and controlling human multiplicities must be grasped in relation to “the well-
known historical conjuncture” at the origins of industrial capitalism. This would be the 
conjuncture between, on the one hand, the “increase in the floating population” resulting 
from “the large demographic thrust of the eighteenth century,” and on the other, “the 
growth in the apparatus of production,” the increasing extension and complexity of which 
had driven up costs and required greater profitability.390 The administrative methods over 
the first process, the accumulation of displaced human populations, “made possible a 
political take-off” of “a subtle, calculated technology of subjection” that superseded 
traditional forms of sovereign power.391 The techniques for developing the second 
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process, capital accumulation,392 precipitated “the economic take-off of the West.”393 
Between these two processes, in turn, there obtained a relation of historical 
interdependency and reciprocal determination: “it would not have been possible to solve 
the problem of the accumulation of men without the growth of an apparatus of production 
capable of both sustaining them and using them; conversely, the techniques that made the 
cumulative multiplicity of men useful accelerated the accumulation of capital.”394  
However inseparable these processes turned out to be, the double accumulation of 
human beings and capital still had to be actively brought into conjunction. Hence the 
importance of discipline: the “primary, massive, overall function” of “the disciplinary 
systems,” arising in the 18th century, was “to adjust the multiplicity of individuals to the 
apparatuses of production, or to the State apparatuses which control them, or again, to 
adjust the combination of men to the accumulation of capital.”395 That is, as an emergent 
‘technology of subjection,’ disciplinary power was necessary to help bring about the 
‘well-known historical conjuncture’ that made the development of capitalism possible, 
operating, in the language of Deleuze and Guattari, a “conjunction of deterritorialized 
flows”396 (population flows and flows of capital) and thereby playing a constitutive role 
in the capitalist formation. 
We can begin then, to better understand Foucault’s perhaps surprising claim in 
“Intellectuals and Power” that ‘power is exercised the way it is in order to maintain 
capitalist exploitation.’ Indeed, it is important to stress just how central this claim is to 
                                                
392 By ‘capital accumulation,’ I mean, generally speaking, the investment and increased returns of money-
capital through the processes of industrial production and market exchange. 
393 Ibid, 220.  
394 Ibid, 220-1. 
395 Foucault, Psychiatric Power, 110. 




Foucault’s analytic of power, which advances what I will term the economico-political 
thesis. We encountered this thesis in the Introduction: if, in capitalist society, the political 
refers to the problem of the accumulation of human beings and the economic refers to the 
problem of capital accumulation, then the fundamental operation of modern power will 
be economico-political insofar as its ‘primary function’ is to adjust the ‘accumulation of 
men’ to the ‘accumulation of capital.’397 
                                                
397 Disciplinary power can thus be understood as an efficient cause of the development of capitalism insofar 
as it organized the floating population and integrated it into the economic apparatus in order to expand 
aggregate productive force. According to Foucault, this causal relation is suggested by Marx’s analysis of 
how the division of labor was established through the disciplinary organization of factories and workshops 
(see “Les mailles du pouvoir” in Dits et écrits II: 1001-1020; translated into English, though without the 
discussion following Foucault’s remarks, as “The Meshes of Power” in Space, Knowledge and Power: 
Foucault and Geography, edited by Jeremy W. Crampton and Stuart Elden, translated by Gerald Moore, 
153-162). Discipline structures and mobilizes the work force according to a hierarchical and cellular system 
of partitioning and surveillance, aiming to maximize the composite forces of production (see Discipline and 
Punish, 221; cf. ibid, 145). Yet if the disciplinary formation of the space and process of production made 
possible the division of labor that is integral to capitalism, conversely, the expansion of industrial 
production and capital accumulation are what rendered a division of labor, and hence the techniques to 
achieve it, necessary in the first place: “The division of labour was, at the same time, the reason for which 
this new workshop discipline had to be invented; but inversely we can say that this workshop discipline 
was the condition for the division of labour being able to take hold. Without this workshop discipline, 
which is to say without the hierarchy, without the overseeing, without the supervisors, without the 
chronometric control of movements, it would not have been possible to obtain the division of labour” 
(Foucault, “The Meshes of Power,” 157). Thus, a relation of reciprocal causation obtains between 
disciplinary power and the division of labor: if discipline is an efficient cause in the development of the 
industrial division of labor, this division of labor, in turn, as ‘the reason for which this new workshop 
discipline had to be invented,’ serves as a final cause in the development of disciplinary power. That is, 
discipline is the means by which the industrial division of labor could take hold, and this division of labor 
is that for the sake of which these disciplinary means were ‘invented.’ This relation can also be posed in 
terms of mutual conditioning: discipline made the realization of the division of labor possible, in the strong 
sense that there could have been no industrial division of labor without disciplinary power; and this 
division of labor made discipline necessary, in the equally strong sense that the development of capitalism 
historically determined the rise of this modality of disciplinary power (see Discipline and Punish, 221). 
This is not to say that all disciplinary techniques are historically determined only by the capitalist 
requirement of the division of labor, for they first emerged in the Christian tradition of pastoral power in 
the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries (see Foucault, “La philosophie analytique de la politique,” in Dits et 
écrits II, 549-50; cf. “Le pouvoir, une bête magnifique,” in Dits et écrits II, 375-6); nor is it to slip into 
economism and reduce micropolitical power in the autonomy of its exercise and subsequent proliferation to 
a base of economic production ‘in the final analysis.’ Rather, the claim is that the exigencies of capitalist 
production explain the emergence of disciplinary power as the dominant form of political power and social 
control in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. In other words, discipline may have existed in pockets 
independently of capitalism, but the major transformation in the exercise of power by which discipline 




The economico-political function of disciplinary power operates at the 
microphysical level of bodies and their forces. In order to assemble the floating 
population into a well-organized workforce, individuals must be transformed into useful 
laborers and fitted to the apparatus of production, which in turn requires that they first be 
rendered controllable. As “the unitary technique by which the body is reduced as a 
‘political’ force at the least cost and maximized as a useful force,”398 discipline thus 
produces and trains individuals as politically docile, but economically productive 
agents.399 Through the chronometric control of bodies’ actions and forces, which makes 
possible the “maximal extraction of time” and maximal development of aptitudes, 
discipline transforms the time of human existence into labor time and the somatic force of 
individuals into labor power,400 integrating the two in production and thereby satisfying 
“a condition of possibility of hyperprofit”401: “in order for there to be hyperprofit, …[a] 
web of microscopic, capillary political power had to be established at the level of man’s 
very existence, attaching men to the production apparatus, while making them into agents 
of production, into workers.”402  
Thus, through this micro-politics of disciplinary power, which realizes the 
becoming-commodity of the time and corporeality of human life, capitalism penetrates 
                                                
398 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 221. 
399 See Foucault: “it is largely as a force of production that the body is invested with relations of power and 
domination; but, on the other hand, its constitution as labour power is possible only if it is caught up in a 
system of subjection…; the body becomes a useful force only if it is both a productive body and a subjected 
body” (ibid, 26). This relation of mutual conditioning can also be put in terms of the reciprocal causation 
we saw at work in the industrial division of labor: political subjection is the efficient cause for producing an 
economically useful agent of production; and economic production is the final cause for developing a 
generalizable system of political subjection. 
400 Foucault, “Truth and Juridical Forms”, in Power, 81-2. 
401 The word ‘hyperprofit’ translates Foucault’s term sur-profit, which he takes to be equivalent to surplus 
value, i.e., profit that allows for expanded investment. See ibid, 86. 




ever “more deeply into our existence”403; and this process is necessary for the accelerated 
accumulation of capital and its attendant forms of exploitation. Conversely, the 
expanding scale of capital accumulation provided the impetus for the multiplication of 
disciplinary forms of subjection. If the requirements of industrial capitalism had 
determined the emergence of factory discipline historically, this particular disciplinary 
form, once established as a technique for producing, controlling, and using denumerable 
human multiplicities, could then be abstracted as a general technology of power and 
applied to any number of domains: “The growth of a capitalist economy gave rise to the 
specific modality of disciplinary power, whose general formulas, techniques of 
submitting forces and bodies, in short, ‘political anatomy,’ could be operated in the most 
diverse political regimes, apparatuses or institutions.”404  
Thus, in effect, the process of capitalist economic production enabled the 
individualizing techniques of disciplinary power to proliferate throughout the social field, 
constituting a general mechanism of continuous political control and operating in a 
variety of governmental regimes (e.g., liberalism, communism) and extra-economic 
institutions (e.g., schools, hospitals, prisons, asylums, families). Moreover, the dispersal 
of disciplinary techniques outside workhouses and factories not only enabled an 
                                                
403 Ibid, 86. Indeed, according to Foucault, this disciplinary micro-politics is what, in fact, makes it possible 
for labor to appear to be the concrete essence of human being. Foucault’s argument here suggests that, at 
least as regards the early Marx (and much of the Marxist tradition), the critique of political economy has 
not been carried far enough, for it retains a naturalized ontology of labor. That is, the very category of labor, 
which Marx takes to be constitutive of human being, must itself be called into question, since this purported 
concrete essence, taken to be universal, is in fact the historically contingent product of the power relations 
proper to capitalist society. “In order for men to be brought into labor, tied to labor, an operation is 
necessary, or a complex series of operations, by which men are effectively – not analytically but 
synthetically – bound to the production apparatus for which they labor. It takes this operation, or this 
synthesis effected by a political power, for man’s essence to appear as being labor. … I’m referring not to a 
state apparatus, or to the class in power, but to the whole set of little powers, of little institutions at the 
lowest level” (ibid, 86-7). 




intensification of social controls, but also in turn re-enforced the capitalist system of 
economic production.  
A particularly pertinent example of this is the modern police. According to Foucault, 
what distinguished industrial capitalism from other economic forms (e.g., feudalism and 
mercantilism) was the emergence of a new kind of wealth, one which was no longer 
chiefly monetary, but rather invested in the industrial apparatus of production itself.405 
However, since this widespread investment of wealth in constant capital came into daily 
contact with the increasingly pauperized masses, it became more vulnerable, continually 
subject to the threats of theft and sabotage. Thus, as the potential for economico-
politically subversive action increased, so did the need for more sophisticated 
mechanisms of subjection, which is to say, for the development of a “continuous, 
atomistic and individualizing power” that would function more effectively than the 
“lacunary, global power” of sovereignty.406 The various popular illegalisms to which 
sovereign power had turned a blind eye had to be brought under closer scrutiny: whence 
the emergence of the police as an organ for the exercise of power, as in the case of the 
London police, which “was born of the need to protect the docks, wharves, warehouses, 
and stocks.”407 
In this way, the economic exigency to safeguard the productive apparatus gave rise 
to the development of an entire system of political power: namely, “panopticism,” which 
placed the “plebeian, popular, working, peasant population” under “general, continuous 
                                                
405 Foucault, “Truth and Juridical Forms,” 68-9. As examples of feudal and mercantile forms of monetary 
wealth, Foucault mentions land fortunes, cash money, and bills of exchange; his examples of industrial 
wealth invested in constant capital include “stocks of goods, raw materials, imported objects, machines, 
and workshops” (ibid, 68). 
406 Foucault, “The Meshes of Power,” 158-9. 




surveillance,”408 and which was therefore crucial for protecting and strengthening not 
only the wealth but the “social hegemony”409 of the bourgeoisie. Such hegemony 
required, as a means of controlling the potentially dangerous underclasses, a socio-
economic, political and cultural partition to be instituted between: (1) the proletariat; and 
(2) what Foucault variously refers to as “the non-integrated part of the marginal 
population,”410 the “marginal plebeian,”411 and “the non-proletarianized plebe.”412 In 
effect, this diction stresses that proletarianization – as a process – is both productive and 
exclusionary, generating and exacerbating a division within the greater plebeian 
population that is necessary for the functioning of capitalism: “there is within the global 
mass of the plebe a divide between the proletariat and the non-proletarianized plebe, and 
I believe institutions like the police, the justice system, and the penal system, are one of 
the means used for endlessly deepening this divide, which capitalism requires.”413  
                                                
408 Foucault, “À propos de l’enfermement pénitentiaire,” in Dits et écrits I, 1305, my translation. 
409 Foucault, “The Eye of Power,” in Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-
1977, edited by Colin Gordon, translated by Gordon et al, 156. For Foucault, it is, indeed, the 
micropolitical technology of disciplinary power that enabled the bourgeoisie to remain the socially (and 
economically) dominant class following the French Revolution: “The bourgeoisie is perfectly well aware 
that a new constitution or legislature will not suffice to assure its hegemony; it realises that it has to invent 
a new technology ensuring the irrigation by effects of power of the whole social body down to its smallest 
particles. And it was by such means that the bourgeoisie not only made a revolution but succeeded in 
establishing a social hegemony which it has never relinquished” (ibid). 
410 Foucault, “Le grande enfermement,” in Dits et écrits I, 1171, my translation. 
411 Ibid, 1174, my translation. 
412 Foucault, “Table ronde,” in Dits et écrits I, 1202, my translation. Cf. Foucault, “Sur la justice populaire: 
Débat avec les maos,” Dits et écrits I, 1219, 1220; the phrase is rendered by its English translator, John 
Mepham, as “non-proletarianised common people” and “non-proletarianised people” in “On Popular 
Justice: A Discussion with Maoists,” Power/Knowledge, 14, 16.  
413 Foucault, “Table ronde,” 1202, my translation. Foucault continues: “Because, at bottom, what capitalism 
is afraid of, rightly or wrongly, since 1789, since 1848, since 1870, is sedition, insurrection.” This claim 
about sedition, which also appears in “On Popular Justice,” will be attenuated one year later, when Foucault 
comes to the view that protecting the wealth invested in industrial production was a more fundamental 
concern than sedition for the bourgeoisie in maintaining the divide between the proletarianized and non-
proletarianized plebe. See “À propos de l’enfermement pénitentiaire,” Dits et écrits I, 1303-5. Nevertheless, 
the danger of seditious force will remain for Foucault an important strategic determinant in the 
development of panopticism. See, e.g., “The Birth of Social Medicine,” in Power, 143-4, 152; see also the 




In addition to protecting the extensive investment of wealth in industrial capital, the 
triple panoptic system of “courts-police-prison”414 performs three political functions in 
service of bourgeois social hegemony. First, “it is a factor in ‘proletarianisation’: its role 
is to force the people to accept their status as proletarians and the conditions for the 
exploitation of the proletariat.”415 Thus, for example, the criminalization, policing, and 
confinement of those parts of the population who remain unproductive (e.g., the 
unemployed, vagabonds, mendicants) enforced and normalized the general moral and 
economic imperative to work. In turn, by granting to workers a limited set of political 
rights, “the bourgeoisie obtained from the proletariat the promise of good political 
conduct and the renunciation of open rebellion.”416 In this way, panopticism facilitated 
the process of proletarianization, by which a docile and useful labor force was constituted 
and attached to the apparatus of economic production.  
Second, the reverse side of this process, the criminalization of the unproductive, 
produces marginalized or non-proletarianized groups, some of which can themselves be 
formed by means of the courts-police-prison system into artificial populations of use to 
capitalism. The panoptic exercise of political controls enables the isolation of the ‘violent’ 
and ‘dangerous’ elements of the plebeian population,417 those who pose a threat similar to 
that of an unruly crowd or non-denumerable multitude, that is, “widespread plotting, a 
whole network of communications, within which individuals exchanged different 
                                                
414 Foucault, “On Popular Justice,” 14. 
415 Ibid. 
416 Foucault, “Le grande renfermement,” 1171, my translation. 
417 Foucault names as examples “farmers who were forced by debts to leave their land, peasants on the run 
from tax authorities, workers banished for theft, vagabonds or beggars who refused to clear the ditches, 
those who lived by plundering the fields, the small-time thieves and the highwaymen, those who, in armed 
groups, attacked the tax authorities and, more generally, agents of the state, and finally those who – on days 




roles.”418 Historically, the three major ways of excluding the non-proletarianized plebe, 
all of which support the dominant economico-political system, were expulsion through 
colonization, conscription into the army, or confinement in prison. The prison, in 
particular, serves as an effective method of marginalization, insofar as it manufactures a 
delinquent population, which can then be “mobilize[d]” by the bourgeoisie “as soldiers, 
policemen, racketeers and thugs, and use[d] … for the surveillance and repression of the 
proletariat.”419 Further, this delinquent segment of the non-proletarianized plebe can be 
employed as scabs or temporary workers in the event of strikes or fluctuating economic 
demands, forming a particularly manipulable component of the ‘reserve army of labor’ 
required by capitalism.420 Thus, with regard to the new penal system at the beginning of 
the nineteenth century, “the real aim was to create a specific criminalized sphere, a sector 
that must be isolated from the rest of the population. … [T]he capitalist system claims to 
combat criminality …by means of this carceral system that precisely produces criminality. 
… [T]he criminal produced by the prison is a useful criminal, useful for the system.”421  
Third, and consequently, by deploying these various “means for setting into 
opposition the plebe which is proletarianized and that which is not,”422 the courts-police-
prison system cleaves the common masses and defuses any potentially subversive forces 
of popular resistance: “Thus, the divide is ceaselessly reproduced and reintroduced 
between the proletariat and the non-proletarianized world because contact between the 
                                                
418 Ibid, translation slightly modified. 
419 Ibid, 16. 
420 See Foucault, “Michel Foucault on Attica,” 30-1. For more on the constitution of a ‘reserve army of 
labor’ and its role in the history of confinement practices – specifically, in the transformation from the 
Great Confinement of the classical period to the rise of modern prisons and asylums – see Foucault, “La 
folie et la société,” in Dits et écrits II, 497-9.  
421 Foucault, “La torture, c’est la raison,” Dits et écrits II, 392-4, my translation. 
422 Foucault, “On Popular Justice,” 16, translation modified. Cf.: “ways of creating antagonism between the 




two was thought to be a dangerous ferment of insurrection.”423 The plebeian population, 
taken in its rent entirety, “find[s] itself disarmed,” no longer “dangerous as ferment, as 
hotbed of insurrection and possible sedition for the bourgeoisie.”424 In such a manner – 
the popular masses partitioned and the accumulation of human beings, controlled – the 
dividing practices instituted through the panoptic system of political power secure the 
social hegemony of the bourgeoisie. 
 
4.5 Connecting the Non/Proletarianized Plebe: Transversal Struggle and the Prison 
Movement 
We can therefore see the battle lines drawn for the earliest formulation of 
transversal resistance: since the opposition between the non-proletarianized and 
proletarianized plebe is fundamental to the economico-political operation of power in 
capitalist society, a transformative politics will seek to undermine this division by 
crossing over it, creating points of contact as so many bonds of potentially 
insurrectionary ferment between the marginalized and proletarianized segments of the 
underclasses. Such is already the project suggested in “Intellectuals and Power,” where 
the problem is one of constructing lateral lines of alliance, and where the aim is for the 
non-proletarianized (‘women, prisoners, conscripted soldiers, hospital patients, and 
homosexuals’) to ‘enter into a revolutionary process’ that can be ‘linked to the 
revolutionary movement of the proletariat’ insofar as the controls they resist ‘serve the 
same system of power.’  
                                                
423 Foucault, “Table ronde,” 1202, my translation. 




Such, in turn, will be the project of the Prison Information Group, an activist group 
organized by Foucault and joined by Deleuze, which took as its “prime objective” the 
“reintegration into political struggles” of “that fringe of the lower class,” thereby seeking 
to connect the revolts of the non-proletarianized plebe to a greater strategy of popular 
resistance so as to help enable “different strata of the people … to overcome conflicts and 
oppositions that had been established and maintained between them by the capitalist 
system.”425 If, at least for a time, Foucault places particular emphasis on prison revolts 
around the world as a form of minoritarian struggle – such revolts orienting both his 
political activism in the early 1970s and his genealogy of disciplinary power426 –, this 
will be precisely to the extent that the prison is the chief remaining mechanism for 
marginalizing and making use of the non-proletarianized population.427 Thus, what the 
prison revolts “call into question” is “the status of the marginal plebeian in capitalist 
society.”428 And therefore, in turn, the historico-critical function of Foucault’s analytic of 
power, aiming to “give direction to this incipient political struggle,” will be to map out 
the contingent political operations by which the marginal plebe has been produced, 
offering “a critique of the system that explains the process by which contemporary 
society marginalizes a part of the population.”429     
In sum: the strategy of this early transversal politics, informed by a genealogical 
critique of the economico-political operation of power by which the popular masses are 
                                                
425 Foucault, “Michel Foucault on Attica,” 31. 
426 On the role of the “prison revolts [that] have occurred throughout the world” as the contemporary 
anchor for Foucault’s “history of the present,” see Discipline and Punish, 30-1. 
427 The overthrow of colonialism and the changing function of the modern military eliminated direct 
colonization and the army as methods of mass expulsion; see Foucault, “On Popular Justice,” 17-8. 
428 Foucault, “Le grand enfermement,” 1174, my translation. 




set against each other, will be to resist these dividing practices by allying different 
minoritarian struggles and the workers’ movement, establishing the basis of solidarity for 
creating such lateral linkages through the critical diagnosis of the common system of 
power they all struggle against. Thus, insofar as the individualizing and normalizing 
techniques of subjection proper to the modern microphysics of power – which irrigate 
“the whole social body down to its smallest particles,”430 and which deepen the division 
between the marginalized and proletarianized – function to adjust the double 
accumulation of human beings and capital, the myriad forms of resistance to the thousand 
tiny points of power’s exercise will be aligned with the proletarianized plebe. As Deleuze 
puts it to Foucault, “Every revolutionary attack or defense, however partial, is linked in 
this way to the workers’ struggle.”431  
However, to see what is specifically transversal about these connective relations 
among and between the minoritarian and proletarianized plebe, we must distinguish this 
political strategy from the traditional form of class struggle posed in terms of 
‘exploitation’: “as soon as we struggle against exploitation, the proletariat not only leads 
the struggle but also defines its targets, its methods, and the places and instruments for 
confrontation…. This means total identification.”432 The ‘reintegration’ of the marginal 
plebe ‘into political struggles’ does therefore not mean assimilation to the proletariat. On 
the contrary, insofar as proletarianization itself effectively consolidates the dominant 
social order, what is needed is not the becoming-proletariat of the non-proletarianized 
plebe, but rather the becoming-minor of the proletariat. To create transversal connections 
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between the marginalized and proletarianized plebe would thus be to enable the 
radicalization of the latter, for the “truly revolutionary forces” that “exist in our society 
today” are “made up of just those strata who are poorly integrated into society, those 
strata who are perpetually rejected, and who, in turn, reject the bourgeois moral 
system.”433  
Indeed, as Foucault will later point out, it was the events of May 1968 that had 
demonstrated the practical and theoretical deficiencies of the assimilative tendency of 
Marxist thought to re-territorialize the multitude of resistance movements within the 
province of class conflict. What was singular in these events is that the exercise of power 
itself was called into question on a host of fronts that fall outside the traditional political 
domain, thereby problematizing the diffuse and variegated operation of power; Foucault 
gives as examples “questions about women, about relations between the sexes, about 
medicine, about mental illness, about the environment, about minorities, about 
delinquency.”434 In other words, minoritarian struggles generate their political force 
precisely from the immediacy and specificity of the relations of power they call into 
question: hence Foucault’s claim that it is by singularizing their proper forms of 
resistance that the marginalized ‘enter into a revolutionary process.’ The failed attempt to 
re-inscribe these questions within the vocabulary of class exploitation thus demonstrated 
the “manifest powerlessness on the part of Marxism to confront these problems.”435 
What emerges, then, from this new kind of political problematization are precisely 
the forms of struggle that Foucault will champion as modes of resistance to the 
                                                
433 Foucault, “Michel Foucault on Attica,” 34. 
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techniques of subjection by which the exercise of modern power traverses the social field: 
“opposition to the power of men over women, of parents over children, of psychiatry over 
the mentally ill, of medicine over the population, of administration over the ways people 
live.”436 Because the same immanent microphysics of power functions in ‘the most 
diverse political regimes, apparatuses or institutions’ – or, to speak with Deleuze, because 
these various concrete assemblages effectuate the same diagram of force relations – the 
first defining trait of minoritarian forms of oppositional struggle is that they are 
“‘transversal’ struggles, that is, …they are not confined to a particular political or 
economic form of government”437 but, rather, find common strategic cause more 
generally as “struggles against the ‘government of individualization.’”438  
Since, whatever the singular conditions of its domain of exercise, this ‘government 
of individualization’ operates by blocking lateral relations, the counter-tactics of political 
struggle will have a double task: negatively, to “attack everything that separates the 
individual, breaks his links with others, splits up community life, forces the individual 
back on himself, and ties him to his own identity in a constraining way”439; and positively, 
to create non-denumerable multiplicities constituted through the ‘multiplication’ and 
‘diverse combinations’ of transversal connections, giving rise to new relational forms and 
modes of collective subjectivation.  
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Foucault’s analytic of power thus provides the critical propaedeutics necessary for 
developing a transversal politics of connection. In the next chapter, we will develop the 
positive elaboration of such a politics, which receives perhaps its most systematic 
theoretical treatment through Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of minoritarian becoming, 





CHAPTER 5. TOWARD A THEORY OF TRANSVERSAL POLITICAL AGENCY: 
COLLECTIVE MINORITARIAN BECOMINGS 
5.1 The Prison Movement and the Problem of Collective Subjectivation: Reconceiving 
the ‘Plebe’ 
We have seen that the aim of Foucault’s early transversal politics is the 
singularization of forms of minoritarian struggle that would contest the exercise of power 
by undermining the division, maintained through the panoptic courts-police-prison 
system and integral to capitalism’s functioning, between the proletariat and the non-
proletarianized plebe. Indeed, it is this division among the plebe, rather than the 
opposition between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, that orients transversal resistance, 
for the very class identity of the proletariat is itself the effect of processes of 
proletarianization that consolidate the social hegemony of the bourgeoisie. The chief 
objective of transversal politics is to foster connections capable of sparking 
insurrectionary ferment across the social field, not by integrating the marginal plebe into 
class struggle as defined by the proletariat, but by providing the former with the resources 
for articulating and developing its own forms of struggle, and in such a way that the 
becoming-revolutionary of the latter is made possible.440  
The strategy, in other words, is to intensify or enrich the relational fabric of the 
plebeian population so as to multiply and relay the sites of popular contestation to
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power’s exercise, problematizing the dividing practices that support the economico-
political function of power. I will refer to this as the connective strategy of transversal 
resistance, which remains a fundamental feature of both Foucault and Deleuze’s politics 
long after the prison movement.  
Before charting the later developments of this strategy, however, it is worth 
considering the case of the Prison Information Group (GIP) in more detail, both as 
regards its stated objectives and ultimate limitations. In the last chapter’s discussion of 
the anti-transversal operation of disciplinary power, we saw how a system of lateral 
invisibility satisfies the first condition for the panoptic organization of a disciplinary 
space, guaranteeing the productive, controlled ordering of a human multiplicity by 
isolating its elements and subordinating them to a centralized authority. Such is the 
cellular technique of partitioning by which a potentially unruly mass is transformed into a 
denumerable and controllable set of individuals – or, as we have seen Deleuze and 
Guattari put it, into a ‘subjugated group,’ a rigidly hierarchized and individualizing form 
of collectivity. In the case of prisons, where inmates become the objects of a form of 
knowledge (criminology, sociology, psychiatry, psychology, etc.) of which they are also 
subjects (to the extent they internalize it), the prisoner “must not speak and be listened to, 
but rather must reply to questions that he is posed so that his responses can then be 
examined. The condemned effectively exist in the plural only by virtue of a ‘scientific’ 
discourse held by any given official. … Thus can it be assured that they will form nothing 




of reflection [jamais un mouvement collectif porteur lui-même de sa proper 
reflexion].”441  
The aim of the GIP is thus to facilitate a counter-network of transversal connections 
that would cross over and thereby undermine the instituted system of lateral blockage and 
normalizing individualization, a connective strategy operating on two levels: (1) 
establishing lines of communication and possible alliance among prisoners themselves, 
both within and between prisons; and (2) enabling the construction of such lines between 
prisoners and the greater population. As Foucault puts it: 
We want to break up the double isolation in which the inmates find themselves: 
through our inquiry, we want for them to be able to communicate with each other, 
to relay to each other what they know, and to speak with each other from prison to 
prison, cell to cell. We want for them to address themselves to the population and 
for the population to speak to them. These experiences, these isolated revolts must 
be transformed into communal knowledge and coordinated practice.442 
 
The means employed by the GIP may seem relatively modest, e.g., distributing 
questionnaires among, and collecting and publishing the responses of, the inmate 
population, so that they could have the occasion to both speak out and speak to one 
another about the conditions of their own confinement. However, the objective of this 
project was much farther-reaching: namely, to help enable prisoners to constitute 
themselves as what Deleuze and Guattari in Anti-Oedipus term a ‘subject-group,’ or what 
they will later call a ‘collective assemblage of enunciation.’ In other words, the point was 
to spark a process of collective subjectivation, whereby those who compose a 
marginalized population would generate a political counter-force by transforming the 
                                                
441 Foucault, “Préface, in Livrozet (S.), De la prison à la révolte,” Dits et écrits I, 1264, my translation. 




conditions of what can be said, and by whom, regarding the intolerable exercise of power 
over them. 
Because inmates had only ever been, as Foucault puts it in Discipline and Punish, 
‘the object of information, never a subject in communication,’ the attempt to transform 
the prison population into an assemblage of enunciation should be understood as an effort 
to realize a new form of collective political agency by intervening in the field of 
discursive practices.443 By forming a counter-discourse, a set of relays through which 
‘isolated revolts’ would be connected to compose ‘communal knowledge and coordinated 
practice,’ the aim was for prisoners to singularize their own mode of struggle, contesting 
the mechanisms by which the panoptic structure of ‘double isolation’ had effectively 
rendered them silent and invisible. In this way, a political group subject could emerge 
through the construction of a shared form of expression: one bearing witness to a set of 
otherwise marginalized experiences of ‘the intolerable,’444 and articulating a form of  
otherwise excluded reflection proper to those over whom power is exercised intolerably.  
                                                
443 As Deleuze puts it: “It’s an oversimplification, but the goal of the GIP was for the inmates themselves 
and their families to be able to speak, to speak for themselves. That was not the case before. Whenever 
there was a show on prisons, you had representatives of all those who dealt closely with prisons: judges, 
lawyers, prison guards, volunteers, philanthropists, anyone except inmates themselves or even former 
inmates. Like when you do a conference on elementary school and everyone is there except the children, 
even though they have something to say. The goal of the GIP was less to make them talk than to design a 
place where people would be forced to listen to them, a place that was not reduced to a riot on the prison 
roof, but would ensure that what they had to say came through” (Deleuze, “Foucault and Prison,” Two 
Regimes of Madness, 277). 
444 “Intolérable” is the title of the collection of five booklets published by the GIP between February 1971 
and January 1973, the opening slogan of which reads: “Courts cops hospitals asylums school military 
service the press the TV the State and first of all the prisons are intolerable” (cited and translated by 
Alberto Toscano, “The Intolerable-Inquiry: The Documents of the Groupe d’information sur les prisons,” 
Viewpoint Magazine, Issue 3: Workers’ Inquiry, September 25, 2013). Toscano continues: “Refusing the 
horizon of ‘reformism,’ they [the GIP] declare that allowing prisoners to speak on their own behalf, and 
using the group to transmit their speech and writing to other prisoners, is ‘the only means to unify in the 
same struggle the inside and outside of the prison’ (16). It is not a matter of inculcating the ‘consciousness 
of oppression,’ which could hardly be absent, nor knowledge of who the enemy is, a daily experience; 
rather, it is a question of countering the manner in which the means of formulating, expressing, and 




In other words, as it had been in History of Madness, the political problem for 
Foucault is again that of providing the conditions of material expression for an intensive 
form of excluded experience – that “most intense point of a life, the point where its 
energy is concentrated, … where it comes up against power, struggles with it, attempts to 
use its forces or evade its traps”445 –, only now that experience is collective and directly 
constitutes a kind of limit-relation with power. This is the limit-experience of political 
uprising, which we will examine in greater detail in Chapter 6; and the form of critical 
thought that attends it is a kind of subversive minoritarian knowledge, “a thinking [pensée] 
of infraction intrinsic to the infraction itself; a certain reflection on the law tied to the 
active refusal of the law; a certain analysis of power and law practiced by those who daily 
struggle against law and power.”446 The objective of the GIP is for such thinking, which 
Foucault calls a “philosophy of the people,” to acquire, “through revolt and struggles, the 
force to express itself [la force de s’exprimer].”447 In turn, insofar as this counter-
discourse would call into question the divisions sustaining the more general economico-
political function of power in capitalist society, the prison movement could be allied to 
other forms of minoritarian struggle: hence the importance of establishing lines of 
communication between prisoners and the outside world. 
                                                
445 Foucault, “Lives of Infamous Men,” Power, 162.  
446 Foucault, “Préface,” Dits et écrits I, 1266-7, my translation. 
447 Ibid, 1267, my translation. This last phrase might be translated more naturally as “the strength to express 
itself.” However, I have opted for the word ‘force’ in order to anticipate Foucault’s parallel analysis of the 
popular revolts in Iran, where Shiite Islam figures as a “form of expression” that transforms or realizes the 
affective discontent of the people as “a force” (Foucault, “Téhéran: la foi contre le chah,” Dits et écrits, II, 




However, Foucault himself was disappointed by what he deemed to be the failure of 
the GIP,448 ultimately concluding that the production and capitalization of a delinquent 
population – which, as we saw in Chapter 3, was central to the separation instituted 
between the marginal plebe and the proletariat – had so thoroughly divested criminality 
of its subversive force that “[d]elinquents serve economic and political society.”449 It is 
almost as though Foucault, having turned from literature to criminality as a more concrete 
(thus shareable) form of transgression, in turn is compelled to call into question the very 
“political value of transgression,”450 or at least of the structure of exteriority it implies.  
In any event, the shortcomings of the prison movement mirror the failings of 
Foucault’s literary politics to the extent that in both cases, what had previously 
constituted an exterior form of contestation to society has been interiorized by the 
capitalist social formation and converted into an instrument of economic or political 
utility:  
Until the late 18th century, it was possible for there to exist an uncertainty, a 
permanent passage running from crime to political confrontation. Theft, arson, 
assassination were all ways of attacking the established power. From the 19th 
century, …the real aim [of the new penal system] was to create a specific 
criminalized sphere, a sector that must be isolated from the rest of the population. 
Therefore, this sector lost a large part of its critical political function. And this 
sector, this separated minority was used by power to inspire fear in the rest of the 
population, so as to control revolutionary movements and sabotage them. For 
example, labor unions. … Furthermore, it was lucrative, for instance, with 
                                                
448 See Deleuze, “Foucault and Prison,” Two Regimes of Madness, 277. For his part, Deleuze emphasizes 
the ways in which the GIP had succeeded in transforming the conditions for the production of statements 
about the prison by prisoners; see ibid, 277-280. In Chapter 6, we will have reason to revisit the triple 
function of the GIP as a mode of political-intellectual activism: (1) a visionary function of seeing the 
intolerable there where it remains invisible; (2) an enunciative function of transforming the conditions of 
what can be said, and by whom, regarding the intolerable; and (3) an amplifying function of circulating and 
relaying the statements of those who suffer the intolerable. This triple function will inform Foucault’s 
articulation of “philosophical journalism,” the form of intellectual activism that guided his involvement in 
political resistance struggles from, e.g., the Iranian uprisings to the Polish worker’s movement.   
449 Foucault, “La torture, c’est le raison,” Dits et écrits II, 395, my translation. 




prostitution, or the trafficking of women and arms, and now with drug trafficking. 
At present, since the 19th century, criminals have lost any sort revolutionary 
dynamism. I am convinced of it.451 
 
The criminalized segment of society thus failed to generate the kind of political 
movement that could enter into transversal alliances with other minoritarian struggles, or 
with the worker’s struggle, and thereby counteract the divisions that neutralize and 
control the plebeian population.  
We may put Foucault’s conclusion more generally by saying that the early effort to 
realize a transversal politics was ultimately inadequate insofar as it did not give rise to a 
sufficient process of collective subjectivation, whereby a human multiplicity would form 
itself in such a way as to constitute transformative political agency.452 In other words, the 
Prison Information Group was unable to create the conditions for the emergence of a new 
assemblage of enunciation, at least one capable of modifying the exercise of power; for 
the delinquent population largely proved to have already been produced and organized as 
a subjugated group by capitalist society, and, as Deleuze puts the point on a separate 
occasion, “[c]ounter-information is only effective when it becomes an act of 
resistance.”453   
Further, without diminishing the import of the divisions that rive the social field, 
and despite his critical displacement of the traditional Marxist binarism, Foucault will 
also come to implicitly criticize the class-based analysis that had informed his own view 
                                                
451 Foucault, “La torture, c’est le raison,” 392-3, my translation and emphasis.  
452 A more developed account of what such agency consists of – including its conditions of possibility, 
realization, and sustainability – will be the topic of the following chapter.  
453 Deleuze, “What is the Creative Act?”, Two Regimes of Madness, 322. Deleuze here is discussing the 
more general political function of art, which constitutes a form of “counter-information” since it is opposed 
to “the controlled system of the order-words used in a given society,” but is only effective in becoming 




of the divided plebe.454 In an interview with Jacques Rancière in 1977, he suggests that 
the plebe itself must be reconceived, no longer as a macro-political statistical aggregate, 
but as an intensive vector or micro-political movement of revolt: 
No doubt the ‘plebe’ should not be conceived as the permanent ground of history, 
the final goal of all forms of subjection, or the inextinguishable hotbed of all revolts. 
No doubt there is no sociological reality of the ‘plebe.’ But there is certainly always 
something, in the social body, in classes, in groups, in individuals themselves that in 
a way escapes relations of power; something that is not a more or less docile or 
resistant prime matter, but a centrifugal movement, inverse energy, or breakthrough 
[l’échappée]. ‘The’ plebe no doubt does not exist, but there is something ‘of the’ 
plebe [il y a ‘de la’ plèbe]. There is something of the plebe in bodies and in souls; it 
is there in individuals, in the proletariat, in the bourgeoisie, but with irreducibly 
diverse extension, forms, and energies. This plebeian part [part de plèbe] is less the 
exterior with regard to power relations than their limit, their other side, their 
backlash; it is what responds to every one of power’s advances with a movement to 
free itself; it is thus what drives every new development of power networks. … To 
take the point of view of the plebe, which is that of the other side or limit in relation 
to power, is thus indispensable for analyzing power’s apparatuses [dispotifs]; it is 
from this perspective that the functioning and developments of power can be 
grasped.455 
 
If the plebe is still to be considered the source of political contestation, this will no 
longer be as a molar structure or macro-sociological entity – e.g., as the set of radical 
underclasses in Foucault’s earlier account of the plebe as marginalized population 
segment; or as the proletarian class in Marxism’s account of the plebe as universal patient 
of domination and agent of historical revolution –, but instead as a kind of molecular 
                                                
454 We have seen Foucault’s appeal to class, for instance, in his analysis of the social hegemony of the 
bourgeoisie. For additional examples of Foucault’s invocation of class as the basis for political analysis, see 
his statement from 1971 that “I am simply trying to make visible, to allow to appear and to be transformed 
in a discourse readable to all, what is unbearable for the least privileged classes in the current system of 
justice. … [I]t is according to the class to which one belongs, according to the possibilities of fortune, 
according to social positions that one obtains justice” (Foucault, “Un problème m’intéresse depuis 
longtemps, c’est celui du système penal,” Dits et écrits I, 1074; cited and translated by Toscano, “The 
Intolerable-Inquiry”). See also “Rituals of Exclusion,” an interview from the same year where Foucault 
equates “the government” with “the bourgeois class whose interests are represented by the government” 
(Foucault, “Rituals of Exclusion,” Foucault Live (Interviews, 1966–84), edited by Sylvère Lotringer, 
translated by John Johnston, 69). 




counterforce, the germ of insurrection that traverses the social field. The plebe should not 
be understood as a substantive group identity, but as a processual quality referring to the 
‘breakthrough’ or ‘centrifugal movement’ of that which ‘escapes relations of power,’ 
which is why Foucault emphasizes the term ‘of the’ plebe rather than ‘the’ plebe. In other 
words, Foucault reframes the plebe as an intensive, micro-political concept rather than an 
extensive, macro-political one. Indeed, we could speak here of a becoming-plebe, 
designating what Foucault several years earlier had referred to as “the force of flight,”456 
or what, as we will examine shortly, Deleuze and Guattari had already named ‘line of 
flight’ in Anti-Oedipus.457  
Moreover, in the same move, Foucault also recasts the concept of the outside,458 
which had been privileged in his early vertical politics of transgression; for ‘centrifugal,’ 
                                                
456 See Foucault, “The Force of Flight,” Space, Knowledge, Power: Foucault and Geography, edited by J. 
Crampton and S.Elden, translated by Gerald Moore, pp. 169-172. In this article, a review of a series of 
paintings by Paul Rebeyrolle, Foucault describes the final, climactic painting in the ‘irreversible sequence’ 
as “the charting [tableau] of transversality” (171; cf. “La force de fuir,” Dits et écrits I, 1270).  
457 In Anti-Oedipus, the French phrase ligne de fuite, which refers to the molecular, schizophrenic 
breakthrough, is translated as “line of escape”: see, for example, Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, pp. 
277, 278, 281, 307, 315, 316, 318, and 377. In A Thousand Plateaus, the same phrase is translated as “line 
of flight,” which is the more common formulation and the one retained here. 
458 In A Thousand Plateaus, and with reference to Foucault and Blanchot, Deleuze and Guattari will term 
this subversive activity of thinking “counterthought” or “outside thought” (Deleuze and Guattari, A 
Thousand Plateaus, 376). More than ‘thought of the outside,’ the term ‘outside thought’ makes clear that 
‘outside’ does not refer to an object of thought, but rather qualifies the activity of thinking, designating the 
very trajectory or material force of thought itself. Such is the properly ‘nomadic’ mode of thought, which 
confronts and contests the dominant “images of thought” (ibid) or systems of knowledge that prevail in 
given historical periods, e.g., Nietzsche in his double critique of God (the form of thought organizing the 
classical episteme) and man (the form of thought organizing the modern episteme). As we have seen, this is 
the subversive function unreason was to play for Foucault in History of Madness, from Bosch, Goya, and 
Sade to Nietzsche and Artaud. And in A Thousand Plateaus, in addition to Nietzsche, ‘outside thought’ also 
finds its exemplar in Artaud, who articulates a “thought grappling with exterior forces instead of being 
gathered up in an interior form, operating by relays instead of forming an image; an event-thought, a 
haecceity, instead of a subject-thought, a problem-thought instead of an essence-thought or theorem; a 
thought that appeals to a people instead of taking itself for a government ministry” (ibid, 378, my 
emphasis). Moreover, this reference to Artaud is the very same made by Deleuze in Difference and 
Repetition, where Artaud names a form of ‘genital thought’ (Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, translated 
by Paul Patton, 114), a thought without image that destroys the image in favor of pure intensity, 




literally ‘center-fleeing,’ refers to a line of force whose movement is directed outward. 
The thought of the outside is still a thought of resistance, but the outside is no longer a 
spatial category, instead qualifying a mode of trajectory. Thus, the ‘part de plèbe’ is not 
‘exterior’ to power or somewhere else beyond it, but rather is a vector of force that breaks 
from and flees the exercise of power, constituting the latter’s ‘limit.’ 
In turn, if plebeian breakthroughs form the limit of power, or that which is 
ultimately irreducible to its exercise, this is because their ‘inverse energy’ is what the 
‘functioning and developments of power’ aim to – but can never fully – block, defuse, or 
capture. As we have already seen in the case of discipline, power functions by organizing, 
inciting, and controlling the actions and forces of individuals, which Foucault by 1977 
had begun formulating generally as ‘governmentalization,’ or the set of techniques for 
governing the conduct of men.459 But since power is thus, as Foucault will later put it, “a 
set of actions on possible actions,”460 the possibility of acting-otherwise must remain 
relatively open to those upon whom power is exercised. 461 That is, in order for a relation 
of power to obtain, resistance in the form of human beings composing and conducting 
                                                
459 See, for example, Foucault, “What is Critique?”, 44ff. 
460 Foucault, “The Subject and Power,” 341. 
461 This is a necessary feature of Foucault’s relational concept of power: by contrast to a state of domination, 
in which all agency of the patient of domination is destroyed, or a relation of violence, which acts directly 
upon bodies, a power relation, as an action on other actions, necessarily presupposes the agency of the one 
whose actions are acted upon. See Foucault, “The Subject and Power”: “In effect, what defines a 
relationship of power is that it is a mode of action that does not act directly and immediately on others. 
Instead, it acts upon their actions: an action upon an action, on possible or actual future or present actions. 
A relationship of violence acts upon a body or upon things; it forces, it bends, it breaks, it destroys, or it 
closes off all possibilities. Its opposite pole can only be passivity, and if it comes up against any resistance 
it has no other option but to try to break it down. A power relationship, on the other hand, can only be 
articulated on the basis of two elements that are indispensable if it is really to be a power relationship: that 
‘the other’ (the one over whom power is exercised) is recognized and maintained to the very end as a 
subject who acts; and that, faced with a relationship of power, a whole field of responses, reactions, results, 
and possible inventions may open up” (ibid, 340). I would suggest that this passage is a clarification of 
Foucault’s formulation six years earlier in History of Sexuality of the “relational character” of power and 
analytic necessity of resistance: “Where there is power, there is resistance, and yet, or rather consequently, 




themselves differently must be a permanent possibility, one which explains the status 
accorded these centrifugal movements as the motive force that ‘drives every new 
development of power networks.’ These lines or forces of flight therefore acquire a 
strategic primacy with respect to the operation of power, anticipating Foucault’s better-
known assessment five years later in “The Subject and Power” that his analytic approach 
“consists in taking the forms of resistance against different forms of power as a starting 
point…[,] using this resistance as a chemical catalyst so as to bring to light power 
relations, locate their position, find out their point of application and the methods 
used.”462  
‘To take the point of view of the plebe’ is thus to adopt the perspective from the 
limit or degree zero of power’s exercise – from that point which no operation of power 
can fully capture or control, save by destroying it and thereby ending the relation – so as 
to better disclose how relations of power have been constituted (their singular historical 
contingency, rather than universal necessity), how they actually function, and how they 
might be subverted. Here sounds an echo, to which we will return in Chapter 6, of the 
earlier perspective of vertical critique (discussed in Chapter 3), which situated itself at the 
limit or degree zero of history in order to apprehend the reactive or exclusionary founding 
gesture that reveals a form of positivism as other than what it purports to be.463 
                                                
462 Foucault, “The Subject and Power,” 329. 
463 To take an example from this chapter that could be reread in light of Chapter 3, the vertical mode of 
critique could be applied to the emergence of the new penal system in the early nineteenth century, 
showing that while this system announced its objective as the humane reformation of punitive practices and 
transformation of individuals, buttressed by the epistemic warrant of the human sciences, its real function 
was to produce a criminalized sector of the population as the economico-political instrument of power. And 
indeed, such is precisely the perspective of genealogical analysis, which, as we will see in Chapter 6, 




Forces of contestation, then, do not issue from a site that would be radically exterior 
to the social formation, but rather course immanently throughout the ‘social body’ itself. 
They cut across the lines of molar segmentarity or division, traversing individuals, groups, 
and classes; and in each case these forces are singularized and therefore ‘irreducibly 
diverse’ with respect to their local conditions. The connective strategy continues to 
animate the project of transversal politics, but in order to more adequately respond to the 
problem of collective subjectivation, the lateral lines of alliance to be created will have to 
begin at the micro-political level of intensive becomings or lines of flight, rather than the 
molar level where these forces have already been integrated into and rigidified as group 
or class aggregates.464 In other words, the movements to be connected will be molecular 
impulses to revolt that can arise ‘in individuals, in the proletariat, in the bourgeoisie,’ 
rather than macropolitical campaigns waged on the terrain of group identity, or in the 
name of a set of class (or underclass) interests.465 
                                                
464 Later in this chapter, in our discussion of Foucault’s ethico-politics of becoming-queer, we will see an 
example of the connective strategy applied to the micropolitical domain in this way, namely, through a 
project of affective intensification as the basis for creating new forms of community, modes of relation, 
collective practices of subjectivation, etc. In Chapter 6, we will also see the micropolitical or molecular 
connective strategy operative in Foucault’s analysis of the Iranian uprising, where Shiite Islam, as a 
singularized form of popular political struggle, serves as the non-hierarchical “form of expression” that 
realizes as “a force” “the thousands of discontentments, hatreds, miseries, and despairs” (Foucault, 
“Téhéran: la foi contre le chah,” 688, my translation). 
465 The point is not that macropolitics is dispensable; as Deleuze and Guattari, for example, are at pains to 
point out, micropolitics would be nothing if it did not act back upon and transform the macro. Rather, the 
point is that agential force springs from the micropolitical, which, in addition to granting micropolitics a 
kind of strategic and analytic privilege, also indicates how any macropolitical group should organize itself, 
i.e., without blocking or capturing its lines of flight. (The latter is the problem of constructing non-
hierarchical institutional forms, which was also the original problem in response to which Guattari, in order 
to build an alternative ‘schizoanalytic’ institution for treating schizophrenics, had proposed the concept of 
transversality.) See, for example: “It is, of course, indispensable for women to conduct a molar politics, 
with a view to winning back their own organism, their own history, their own subjectivity: ‘we as 
women…’ makes its appearance as a subject of enunciation. But it is dangerous to confine oneself to such a 
subject, which does not function without drying up a spring or stopping a flow. … It is thus necessary to 
conceive of a molecular women’s politics that slips into molar confrontations, and passes under or through 




The plebe, in sum, is reconceived as so many vectors of centrifugal force: a 
multiplicity of lines of flight, which constitute an immanent limit-relation to power; the 
perspective of which illuminates the functioning of power; and the transversal connection 
of which forms the new strategy of resistance to power. To put the point in the language 
of Deleuze and Guattari from A Thousand Plateaus, published three years later in 1980, 
the plebe is reconceived as a mass, rather than a class.466 And indeed, it is the second 
volume of Capitalism and Schizophrenia, taking up and responding to Foucault’s 
microphysics of force relations, that will provide a more fully developed theoretical 
treatment of this kind of transformative transverse multiplicity. 
 
5.2 The Line of Flight and Revolutionary Subject-Groups: The Case of George Jackson 
Deleuze and Guattari’s account of transversal politics in A Thousand Plateaus can 
be understood as a development of two related concepts already at work in Anti-Oedipus: 
namely, (1) the line of flight and (2) the subject-group, understood in qualitative 
contradistinction to the subjugated group. While we have already encountered both 
concepts, let us return to them in more detail, for they contain the key to understanding 
how transversality, as the principle of “connection-creation”467 by which non-
                                                
466 See, for example: “If we consider the great binary aggregates, such as the sexes or classes, it is evident 
that they also cross over into molecular assemblages of a different nature, and that there is a double 
reciprocal dependency between them. For … social classes themselves imply ‘masses’ that do not have the 
same kind of movement, distribution, or objectives and do not wage the same kind of struggle. Attempts to 
distinguish mass from class effectively tend toward this limit: the notion of mass is a molecular notion 
operating according to a type of segmentation irreducible to the molar segmentarity of class. Yet classes are 
indeed fashioned from masses; they crystallize them. And masses are constantly flowing or leaking from 
classes. Their reciprocal presupposition, however, does not preclude a difference in viewpoint, nature, scale, 
and function” (ibid, 213-4). 




denumerable multiplicities are formed, serves as a condition for the realization of 
transformative political agency. 
We initially encountered the phrase ligne de fuite in Chapter 3, with Foucault using 
it somewhat obscurely to indicate the movement by which literature frees language from 
its representational function.468 That is, the ‘line of flight’ first refers to the vertical mode 
of speech or writing as a decoded flow of language, or as language escaping its social 
codification, no longer consumable as the horizontal conveyance of meaning. Foucault’s 
thesis was that this ‘secret verticality’ or ‘structural esotericism’ of literature rendered it 
intolerable to the culture whose codes it threatened and whose conditions of thought it 
undermined: “Such speech is transgressive … in its play,” that is, through the “obscure 
and central liberation of speech at the heart of itself, its uncontrollable flight to a region 
that is always dark, which no culture can accept immediately.”469 Thus, already in 
Foucault’s early work, a line of flight suggests the expressive realization of that which is 
irreducible to and subversive of the social formation. 
In Anti-Oedipus, Deleuze and Guattari begin to use the concept more systematically. 
Though the term does not appear as ubiquitously as it will in A Thousand Plateaus, ‘line 
of flight’ refers to the radical schizophrenic line, or decoded flows of desire in their pure 
state, which, as we saw in Chapter 3, are warded off by primitive and imperial societies 
(through processes of coding and overcoding, respectively) and axiomatized by capitalist 
societies. In other words, ‘line of flight’ describes the trajectory of the first regime of 
                                                
468 To my knowledge, the term ‘ligne de fuite’ is first used in this sense by Foucault in 1963 in “Distance, 
aspect, origine,” a review of some of the literature of the Tel Quel group.  
469 Foucault, “Madness, the Absence of an Œuvre,” in History of Madness, 545, second italics mine. It may 
bear repeating that it was Deleuze who encouraged Foucault to publish this short essay, originally written 
in 1964, as an appendix to the second edition of History of Madness in 1972, the same year Anti-Oedipus 




madness: what had designated an expressive ‘line of force’ in Foucault, a transgressive 
vertical vector connecting unreason and literature, here becomes “the schizophrenic line 
of flight or breakthrough,”470 or “the pure schizophrenic process of 
deterritorialization.”471 If the problem of the two regimes of madness concerns how to 
prevent the schizoid breakthrough from descending into a catatonic breakdown, then, 
anticipating A Thousand Plateaus, this problem can be reposed as follows: how can the 
deterritorializing force of a line of flight be sustained, without it either becoming 
reterritorialized and defused in social institutions (e.g., in the asylum as an ‘apparatus of 
capture,’ to use Foucault’s term from Psychiatric Power), or else collapsing into what 
Deleuze and Guattari will call a ‘line of abolition’ (e.g., in suicide)?472 As we saw in the 
last chapter, the key to answering this question will lie in the concept of transversal 
connection. 
Now, we have also seen that Anti-Oedipus poses the political problem of desire in 
terms of the direct libidinal investments of the socio-historical field, offering a 
microphysical analysis of how ‘desiring-production’ is constitutive of social production. 
On this account, there are two qualitatively different ways in which desire invests the 
social, that is, two kinds of “unconscious social investment”473: on the one hand, a 
                                                
470 Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, 316-7, translation slightly modified. Cf.: “In Search of Lost Time as 
a great enterprise of schizoanalysis: all the planes are traversed until their molecular line of flight is reached, 
their schizophrenic breakthrough” (ibid, 318, translation slightly modified). 
471 Ibid, 283. 
472 As will be discussed below, this problem can be more generally translated into the register of A 
Thousand Plateaus as follows: how can a process of positive absolute deterritorialization (lines of flight 
freed, connected, composing a transverse or non-denumerable multiplicity) be sustained, without it either 
becoming a negative relative deterritorialization (lines of flight blocked, reterritorialized through rigid 
segmentation), or else becoming a negative absolute deterritorialization (lines of flight deprived connection, 
turning into lines of destruction)? 




“segregative”474 kind, corresponding to the pole of “paranoiac molar investment”475; and 
on the other hand, a “nomadic”476 kind, corresponding to the pole of “the molecular 
schizophrenic line of flight.”477 Segregative investments capture desire in centralized 
molar aggregates, such as the nuclear family and its oedipal triangle, and organize 
subjugated groups, i.e., human multiplicities that are both hierarchical and 
individualizing.478 By contrast, nomadic investments are of a “schizorevolutionary type” 
and “follow the lines of flight of desire,” assembling “groups-in-fusion … at the 
periphery,”479 which is to say, composing minoritarian subject-groups by freeing and 
connecting decoded flows of desire. The project of schizo-politics, intervening at the 
molecular level of the social field, will be to facilitate nomadic investments of desire and 
thereby, through the transversal ‘fusion’ of lines of flight, to prepare a multiply-centered 
revolutionary movement.480 Just what such a politics consists in, will be the aim of this 
chapter to elucidate. 
                                                
474 Ibid, 277. 
475 Ibid, 315. 
476 Ibid, 277. 
477 Ibid, translation slightly modified. 
478 Deleuze and Guattari’s analysis of the oedipal function of the family – that is, as the production of a 
distinctively hierarchical and individualizing form of collective organization – might be fruitfully read 
alongside Judith Butler’s analysis of the “heterosexual matrix,” the hierarchical and individualizing 
framework or set of conditions, instituted through the nuclear family, in and through which normalizing (in 
this case, hetero-normalizing) forms of identity and processes of subjectivation are produced and 
naturalized. See, for example, Butler, Gender Trouble. Butler explains her term ‘heterosexual matrix’ as 
follows: “I use the term heterosexual matrix throughout the text to designate that grid of cultural 
intelligibility through which bodies, genders, and desires are naturalized. I am drawing from Monique 
Wittig’s notion of the ‘heterosexual contract’ and, to a lesser extent, on Adrienne Rich’s notion of 
‘compulsory heterosexuality’ to characterize a hegemonic discursive/epistemic model of gender 
intelligibility that assumes that for bodies to cohere and make sense there must be a stable sex expressed 
through a stable gender (masculine expresses male, feminine expresses female) that is oppositionally and 
hierarchically defined through the compulsory practice of heterosexuality” (Butler, Gender Trouble, 194, n. 
6). 
479 Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, 277, translation slightly modified. 





Generally, then, we may say that the concept of the line of flight provides the 
evaluative criterion for distinguishing two kinds of human multiplicity. If, as we have 
seen Foucault put it, there is a qualitative difference between the group as “the organic 
bond uniting hierarchized individuals” and the group as “a constant generator of de-
individualization”481; and if lines of flight constitute so many vectors of 
deterritorialization, which, as we saw in last chapter’s epigraph and will detail below, 
impel the co-becoming and de-individualization of the points they pass transversally 
between and sweep away; then how a group relates to its lines of flight will reflect the 
kind of group it is.  
In short, subjugated groups are organized by blocking, excluding, or capturing lines 
of flight, whereas subject-groups are composed by ‘following,’ quickening, and 
connecting them. This is related to why classes, as molar aggregates in which desire is 
represented as ‘interest,’ cannot provide a suitable basis for revolutionary political 
movements; for “the revolutionary knows that escape [la fuite] is revolutionary,”482 a 
form of active resistance to power’s operations of capture, and such lines of flight are 
molecular processes. That is, transformative agency is realized at the micropolitical level: 
“In the subjugated groups, desire is still defined by an order of causes and aims, and itself 
weaves a whole system of macroscopic relations that determine the large aggregates 
under a formation of sovereignty. Subject-groups on the other hand have as their sole 
cause a rupture with causality, a revolutionary line of flight….”483 
                                                
481 Foucault, “Preface,” Anti-Oedipus, xiv. 
482 Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, 277. 
483 Ibid, 377, translation slightly modified. We will return in detail in Chapter 6 to an analysis of what is 
meant here by ‘rupture with causality,’ which designates the evental and intensive force of becoming that is 




A particularly salient example of such a ‘revolutionary line of flight’ comes by way 
of Deleuze’s involvement with the GIP. As Michelle Koerner has argued, Deleuze’s 
development of the line of flight concept emerges, at least in part, from his ‘encounter’ 
with George Jackson, a radical black thinker, writer, and militant killed during a San 
Quentin prison riot on August 21, 1971.484 When Deleuze and Guattari first introduce the 
phrase lignes de fuite in Anti-Oedipus, speaking of the revolutionary force of ‘the lines of 
flight of desire,’ they refer to Jackson in doing so: “What matters is to break through the 
wall, even if one has to become black like John Brown. George Jackson. ‘I may take 
flight, but all the while I am fleeing, I will be looking for a weapon!’”485  
                                                
484 See Koerner, “Line of Escape: Gilles Deleuze’s Encounter with George Jackson,” Genre 44.2 (2011), 
157-80. The ‘assassination’ of Jackson had been the topic of the GIP’s third publication, which, though 
originally authored anonymously (as all the GIP’s publications were), includes pieces by Foucault and 
(likely) Deleuze. See Toscano, “The Intolerable-Inquiry”: “Intolérable 3 internationalizes the scope of the 
GIP, to present a dossier on the assassination of Black Panther prison militant George Jackson and the 
conditions of American prisons (this will also be the object of Michel Foucault’s later interview about his 
visit to Attica). Responding to the far more explicitly political character – the ‘revolutionary function’ (154) 
– of the US prison movement, the … booklet begins with a trenchantly lyrical preface by Jean Genet, with 
ample quotes from Jackson’s Soledad Brother, Blood in my Eye and other texts. … This is followed by two 
1971 interviews with Jackson, where he stresses the military side of his vision, but also makes allusion to 
the Maoist need to inquire into order to ‘try to painstakingly determine what each one can do for the 
construction of the commune’ (170), to ‘reconstruct the world of the people’ (177). The GIP follows this 
with a text on the ‘war’ in the prisons…, ‘The Masked Assassination,’ which provides a summary of the 
events leading up to Jackson’s death, and of the campaign of disinformation and counter-offensive. … A 
further text analyses the aftermath and underlines (perhaps under Deleuze’s pen) Jackson’s ‘line of flight’ 
as proof that power is not a seamless moloch, that ‘everything escapes power, beginning with what it does, 
what it conspires about but does not dominate. The murder of Jackson is one of these things, a line of flight, 
as Jackson would have said, to which revolutionaries commit themselves’ (209). The final text in 
Intolérable 3, ‘Jackson’s Place in the Prison Movement’, echoing some of Foucault’s own reflections on 
the marginal plebs (let’s not forget that ‘the Lumpen’ was a key political category for the Black Panther 
Party), advances Jackson’s idea of prisons as a fulcrum for the creation of revolutionaries as a positive 
challenge to the incorporation of bourgeois ideologies about crime into the labour movement.” 
485 Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, 277. They quote this line again eight years later in A Thousand 
Plateaus, still in reference to the revolutionary political force of lines of flight: “It is on lines of flight that 
new weapons are invented to be turned against the heavy arms of the state. ‘I may be running, but I’m 
looking for a gun as I go’ (George Jackson)” (Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 204, translation 
slightly modified). The actual quote from Jackson, which is slightly distorted in its retranslation back to 
English from the French, reads as follows: “I may run, but all the while that I am, I’ll be looking for a stick” 




The ‘breakthrough,’ still an intensive experience or decoded flow of desire, is also a 
breakout or uprising, which is to say, direct collective contestation. Indeed, on Koerner’s 
reading, for Jackson, who depicted his own prison writings as “a message from the 
hunted running blacks to those people of this society who profess to want to change the 
conditions that destroy life,”486 ‘running’ or taking flight is a life-affirming expression 
and experience of revolt. Since power in “the contemporary racist, capitalist social order” 
is “essentially predatory,” operating through techniques of policing and capture to bring 
about the “disproportionate criminalization of peoples of color, the poor, and working-
class populations,”487 to free or follow a line of flight is thus to actively resist what 
Jackson calls “captive society.”488 As Deleuze puts it in 1977, again with reference to 
Jackson, “[n]othing is more active than an escape.”489  
Moreover, Jackson offers precisely the kind of ‘philosophy of the people’ of which 
Foucault speaks, i.e., ‘a certain analysis of power and law practiced by those who daily 
struggle against law and power’; for he “reject[s] moralizing political discourses that 
separate ‘criminal mentality’ from ‘revolutionary mentality’” and instead “affirms that 
aspect of criminality that expresses a desire to escape intolerable social conditions of 
captivity.”490 In a manner that may well have informed Foucault’s own views on the 
privileged position of the marginal plebe, “Jackson repeatedly situates the ‘lumpen-
proletariat’ — from the kid on the street to the convict doing life in prison — on the front 
                                                
486 George Jackson, Soledad Brother: The Prison Letters of George Jackson, 328; cited by Koerner, “Line 
of Escape,” 166. 
487 Koerner, “Line of Escape,” 167-8. 
488 Jackson, Soledad Brother, 13; cited by Koerner, “Line of Escape,” 168. 
489 Deleuze, “On the Superiority of Anglo-American Literature,” Dialogues II, 27. 




line of the class and race war.”491 The minoritarian political project to singularize a mode 
of struggle proper to the criminalized plebe would thus aim to transform the ‘criminal 
mentality’ into a ‘revolutionary’ one, which was precisely a main aspiration of the 
GIP.492  
In turn, one way for such a project to be realized would be the collective becoming-
revolutionary of blackness, or what Deleuze and Guattari term ‘becoming-black,’ since, 
on Jackson’s view, the contemporary social formation “codes blackness as criminality”493 
so as to maintain the “existing conditions of capture, enslavement, and incarceration.”494 
The line of flight as decoded flow of insurrectionist desire – the desire to escape the 
intolerable – would thus impel a radical process of subjectivation, transvaluing the 
categories of blackness and criminality alike. To ‘become black like John Brown’ (Anti-
Oedipus), a militant white anti-racist abolitionist, is to absolutely reject the dominant 
social order by precipitating what Deleuze and Guattari will call “the becoming-minor of 
the major”495 (in this example, the becoming-black of the white), which is to say, by 
quickening “an escape from the norms of the ‘majority standard’ and a disinvestment 
                                                
491 Ibid. For Foucault’s views on George Jackson’s killing, which he declared a political assassination, and 
Jackson’s greater place as a revolutionary within the prison movement, see Foucault, Catharine von Bülow, 
and Daniel Defert, “The Masked Assassination of George Jackson,” in Warfare in the American Homeland: 
Policing and the Prison, edited by Joy James, 140-158. This article directly quotes Jackson on the political 
privilege of the ‘lumpen’ or marginal plebe. Moreover, it characterizes the situation of Jackson’s 
incarceration – “[t]en years in prison for seventy dollars” – as a “political experience” (156), a term which, 
as we will see in Chapter 5, designates for Foucault precisely the vertical limit-experience of uprising.  
492 Cf.: “Jackson has already said it: What is happening in the prisons is war, a war having other fronts in 
the black ghettos, the army, and the courts. … Jackson’s death is at the origin of the revolts that exploded in 
prisons, from Attica to Ashkelon. Prison struggle has now become a new front of the revolution.” (Foucault, 
von Bülow, and Defert, “The Masked Assassination of George Jackson,” 140, 156-7)  
493 Koerner, “Line of Escape,” 168. 
494 Ibid, 164. 




from social arrangements that privilege whiteness: ‘Non-white: we all have to become 
that, whether we are white, yellow, or black.’”496  
Becoming-black and becoming-nonwhite can therefore be understood as 
micropolitical processes, what A Thousand Plateaus will theorize as ‘minoritarian 
becomings,’ the basis for which is not inclusion in a substantive group identity by way of 
‘organic bond’ (Foucault), but solidarity against the racially coded dividing practices of 
power in ‘captive society’: “Even blacks, as the Black Panthers said, must become-black. 
… Becoming-minoritarian is a political affair and necessitates ... an active micropolitics. 
… As Faulkner said, to avoid ending up a fascist there was no other choice but to 
become-black.”497 Just as with Foucault’s intensive or micropolitical rearticulation of 
becoming-plebe – where what one becomes (‘of the’ plebe, de la plebe) refers to a vector 
of escape or ‘centrifugal movement’ of revolt, rather than membership in a 
macrosociological aggregate –, so, too, blackness refers to the processual quality of that 
which flees or breaks with an oppressive arrangement of power relations.  
Minoritarian becoming is always a matter of transforming a segregative schema of 
social relations through the creation of nomadic counter-practices of collective 
subjectivation. The fascist mode of group subjection, paranoid about purity, organizes 
race reactively in terms of exclusion, as in the historical ‘one-drop rule’ for determining 
whiteness in the United States. By contrast, the processes of becoming-nonwhite or 
becoming-black would actively resist the hierarchical racial segmentation of society by 
breaking free from the codes governing the normalized identities of raced subjugated 
                                                
496 Koerner, “Line of Escape,” 177-8; the sentence by Deleuze and Guattari that Koerner quotes is from A 
Thousand Plateaus, 470. 




groups – e.g., by rejecting the value of purity in favor of the heterogeneity of ‘diverse 
combinations’ (Foucault) –, creating connections that cross over and undermine the molar 
lines of division segmenting the social field.  
Such is the kind of subject-group formed by the collectivity of San Quentin 
prisoners who spoke out in the wake of Jackson’s assassination, announcing the 
compositional principle of their own alliance in terms of the ‘daily struggle’ against 
intolerably predatory conditions of ‘prison-slavery,’ and seeking to construct a network 
of popular supports on the outside:  
We, the twenty-seven united black, brown, and white prison-slaves of the maximum 
security cellblock of San Quentin penitentiary, are the victims of an assassination 
conspiracy, exactly like the one which ended the life of our comrade G.L. Jackson 
…. In this prison, there are black, brown, and white comrades who don’t belong to 
any particular political organization. All that we are asking for is the support of the 
people in our daily struggle. … What we are affirming now is this: we need 
everyone’s help, whether s/he is an outlaw, a pimp, a prostitute, a priest or a doctor 
of philosophy. … We are not grieving, we are not crying over the death of our 
beloved comrade George Jackson. He brought courage to our hearts and spirits, and 
he taught us how to pursue his ideals. He made the ultimate sacrifice, and his black 
blood is the nourishment that gives us the resolution to fight against the crushing 
forces of oppression.498  
 
Jackson’s line of becoming-black, i.e., the collective micropolitical process he initiated to 
revolutionize the criminal mentality, thus helped to singularize a local form of 
minoritarian struggle (that of the criminalized plebe), giving rise to a racially complex, 
unified prison movement allied through the shared desire to insurrect against a common 
regime of power.  
Indeed, on Foucault’s view, it is precisely due to Jackson’s efficacy as an agent of 
political transformation that he was targeted for assassination. Both outside the prison, 
                                                
498 Cited in Foucault, von Bülow, and Defert, “The Masked Assassination of George Jackson,” 151-2. This 




through the expressive force of his writings, which indicted the racial and economico-
political injustice of ‘captive’ (or what Foucault would call ‘carceral’) society; and inside 
the prison, where “he helped to develop” his fellow prisoners’ “political consciousness … 
so that they could fight, by all means necessary, fascist methods of repression and 
dehumanization”499; Jackson unleashed a nomadic investment of desire, preparing so 
many schizorevolutionary lines of flight whose connection would generate subversive 
political force. “He was killed specifically when the time he had announced and worked 
for came, when a growing awareness among ‘the blacks, the browns, and the whites’ 
allowed for the identification of the deceptive traps of organized racism. This process 
marked the beginning of the formation of a unified resistance front, specifically within 
the prisons.”500  
In sum, the case of George Jackson illustrates the concept of the line of flight as an 
active-affirmative force of revolt, or of insurrectionary desire, taking form through a 
collective process of minoritarian becoming that would contest the exercise of power 
proper to the dominant social order (in this case, the racist, capitalist social formation). 
And even though, as we have seen, the prison movement was unable to realize the 
political agency to which it aspired, the basic form of transversal politics will remain: that 
is, the project of constructing revolutionary subject-groups, or quickening processes of 
becoming-revolutionary, by freeing and connecting lines of flight. 
 
                                                
499 Foucault, von Bülow, and Defert, “The Masked Assassination of George Jackson,” 156.  




5.3 The Principle of Transversal Connection: A Double Condition for Transformative 
Political Agency 
All the analytical pieces should now be in place to present the general project of 
transversal politics in A Thousand Plateaus. The opening distinction is that drawn 
between the two kinds of human multiplicity, only Deleuze and Guattari will now refer to 
‘subjugated groups’ as “arborescent” or “macro-multiplicities,” and to ‘subject-groups’ as 
“rhizomatic” or “micro-multiplicities.”501 The basic organizational features of 
arborescent multiplicities are hierarchical centralization, totalization, and rigid 
segmentation, whereas rhizomes are centrifugal, open, and mutable. Macro-multiplicities 
cut off or capture their lines of flight, blocking lateral relations among their constituent 
elements (everything flowing along hierarchical and centralized lines), whereas the line 
of flight is the very constitutive force of micro-multiplicities. Indeed, rhizomatic 
multiplicities are “defined by the outside: by the abstract line, the line of flight or 
                                                
501 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 33. It should be noted that Deleuze and Guattari do not 
limit this distinction to human multiplicities, but apply it to the category of multiplicity more generally. The 
difference in kind between the two multiplicities can be traced back to the distinction Deleuze makes, both 
in Bergsonism and Difference and Repetition, between metric (extensive, quantitative, numerical) and non-
metric (intensive, qualitative, continuous) multiplicities: see, e.g., Bergsonism, 38-43; and Difference and 
Repetition, 238. Deleuze and Guattari make this conceptual connection to Bergson explicit in the passage 
from A Thousand Plateaus just cited: “And in Bergson there is a distinction between numerical and 
extended multiplicities and qualitative or durational multiplicities. We are doing approximately the same 
thing when we distinguish between arborescent multiplicities and rhizomatic multiplicities. Between 
macro- and micromultiplicities. On the one hand, multiplicities that are extensive, divisible, and molar; 
unifiable, totalizable, organizable; conscious or preconscious – and on the other hand, libidinal, 
unconscious, molecular, intensive multiplicities composed of particles that do not divide without changing 
in nature, and distances that do not vary without entering another multiplicity and that constantly construct 
and dismantle themselves in the course of their communications, as they cross over into each other at, 
beyond, or before a certain threshold. The elements of this second kind of multiplicity are particles; their 
relations are distances; their movements are Brownian; their quantities are intensities, differences in 
intensity” (Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 33). Cf. ibid, 483-4. While this distinction in kind 
between multiplicities takes political form in the schizoanalysis of subjugated groups and subject-groups, I 
would argue it becomes more fully politically developed through Foucault’s analysis of the denumerating 




deterritorialization according to which they change in nature and connect with other 
multiplicities.”502  
The first two principles of rhizomatic composition are therefore “connection” and 
“heterogeneity,”503 which describe, as it were, both the endogenous and exogenous 
construction of micro-multiplicities, since a rhizomatic multiplicity itself composed of 
heterogeneous connections is in turn transformed by entering into new heterogeneous 
connections with other rhizomes.504 This line of ‘connection-creation’ or, to use 
Guattari’s term, heterogenesis – the line of flight or deterritorialization that defines a 
micro-multiplicity, both its consistency and trajectory – is a line of co-becoming or 
“transversal communication.”505 In short, the transversal line designates the force of 
flight, or collective process of becoming, constitutive of a rhizomatic multiplicity.  
Formally, the difference in kind between the two types of multiplicity can be 
analyzed in terms of the different modes of relation that obtain in each case between lines 
and points. “What constitutes arborescence is the submission of the line to the point,” 
whereas the “line of becoming” proper to a rhizomatic multiplicity “is not defined by 
points that it connects, or by points that compose it; on the contrary, it passes between 
points, it comes up through the middle, it runs perpendicular to the points first perceived, 
transversally to the localized relation to distant or contiguous points.”506 Arborescent 
                                                
502 Ibid, 9. 
503 Ibid, 7. 
504 One of Deleuze and Guattari’s fondest examples of such a heterogeneous connection is the “a-parallel 
evolution” (ibid, 10) or “block of becoming” (ibid, 238) between the Drakaea or ‘Hammer Orchid’ and the 
Thynnid wasp, “a becoming-wasp of the orchid and a becoming-orchid of the wasp”: “Each of these 
becomings brings about the deterritorialization of one term and the reterritorialization of the other; the two 
becomings interlink and form relays in a circulation of intensities pushing the deterritorialization ever 
further” (ibid, 10). 
505 Ibid, 11. 




multiplicities thus form ‘punctual’ or ‘unilinear systems,’ while rhizomes form 
‘multilinear systems.’ 
 
5.3.1 Arborescence, Striation, Segmentarity 
Deleuze and Guattari summarize the features of a punctual or unilinear system as 
follows: 
(1) Systems of this kind comprise two base lines, horizontal and vertical; they serve 
as coordinates for assigned points. (2) The horizontal line can be superposed 
vertically and the vertical line can be moved horizontally, in such a way that new 
points are produced or reproduced…. (3) From one point to another, a line can (or 
cannot) be drawn, but if it can it takes the form of a localizable connection; 
diagonals thus play the role of connectors between points of different levels or 
moments…. These systems are arborescent, mnemonic, molar, structural; they are 
systems of territorialization or reterritorialization. The line and the diagonal remain 
totally subordinated to the point because they serve as coordinates for a point or as 
localizable connections for two points, running from one point to another.507 
 
A unilinear or punctual system forms a coordinate grid, such as the Cartesian 
coordinates, by which a space becomes measurable, which is to say, homogeneous.508 In 
such a system, diagonal lines are subordinated to the points they conjoin, where one point 
is located along the horizontal baseline and the other, along the vertical. (It should be 
noted that the notion of verticality operative here is not the special Foucauldian kind 
                                                
507 Ibid, 295.  
508 On this point, see, for example, Ed Casey: “Measurability implies the sheer homogeneity of space, its 
strict regularity as isometric and isotropic (i.e., its homogeneity of measurement and direction, respectively)” 
(Casey, The Fate of Place, 140). Casey’s project is to articulate a philosophical history of the concept of 
“place,” including its reduction or exclusion at the hands of “space” (due in large part to the advent of 
Newtonian physics) and its recovery in certain 20th century thinkers, e.g., Deleuze and Guattari. Regarding 
the modern mathematization of space brought about by Gassendi and Newton, Casey continues: “The 
leveling-down of space to strict dimensionality and measurability, isotropism and isometrism, and 
homogeneity and immobility signifies that no vestige of the particularity of place, its peculiar qualities and 
special tropisms, remains within the monolithic space with which it is now increasingly identified. … In 
other words, the inherent dynamism of place, its power to act or simply to resist, has given way to the 
supineness of space regarded as an indefinitely passable, indeed a passive, medium” (ibid, 140-1). For 




treated in Chapter 2 above and again in Chapter 5 below, but rather designates a 
hierarchical axis of power.) The form of relation proper to this conjoining, which Deleuze 
and Guattari here term a ‘localizable connection,’ is precisely what, as we saw in Chapter 
3, they elsewhere specify as conjugation in contradistinction to connection: that is, a form 
of relation between “decoded and deterritorialized flows” that, rather than enabling them 
to “boost one another [and] accelerate their shared escape,” instead institutes “their 
relative stoppage, like a point of accumulation that plugs or seals the lines of flight, 
performs a general reterritorialization, and brings their flows under the dominance of a 
single flow capable of overcoding them.”509  
We have already encountered such a system in Foucault’s analysis of the ‘anti-
nomadic’ (Discipline and Punish) denumerating function of disciplinary multiplicities, 
realized through the cellular partitioning of space that individualizes elements by 
blocking their lateral connections. Take the Panoptic arrangement: on any given row 
(horizontal circular ring), any single cell is isolated from every other cell along that 
horizontal line, cut off through the system of lateral invisibility; but every point along the 
horizontal line is also subject to a permanent axial visibility, the axis of which is defined 
by the diagonal line that establishes a ‘localizable connection’ or ‘conjugation’ between 
the cell and the central watchtower; and the watchtower, in turn, constitutes a point along 
                                                
509 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thouand Plateaus, 220. Since Deleuze and Guattari initially use the terms 
‘connection’ and ‘conjugation’ interchangeably in A Thousand Plateaus, only to later introduce this 
technical – and, indeed, essential – distinction between the two, it can sometimes pose an exegetical 
challenge to keep the terminology consistent. In the passage cited above on punctual systems, the operative 
distinction is between ‘localizable connection’ and ‘non-localizable connection,’ where the latter refers to a 
‘line-block of becoming’ that sweeps away the points it connects, i.e., a line of flight in processual 
movement or ‘continuous variation’ and therefore non-localizable. This distinction between ‘localizable 
connection’ and ‘non-localizable connection’ is analogous to the technical distinction drawn between 




the vertical baseline, the apex of the “verticon.”510 This system institutes a unidirectional 
hierarchical flow running from a centralized authority to the individuals subjected to it; 
and the ‘line and the diagonal remain totally subordinated to the point’ because the 
diagonal line’s function is to set into fixed relation a horizontal point with a vertical 
one.511  
The subordination of the diagonal, which is also the stoppage of the transversal, 
thus designates the subjugation of the group.512 Deleuze and Guattari refer to this 
organizational principle of punctual or unilinear systems as the ‘striation’ of space: “a 
system in which transversals are subordinated to diagonals, diagonals to horizontals and 
verticals, and horizontals and verticals to points…, expresses the formal conditions under 
which a space is striated.”513 The construction of striated space, in turn, is the technique 
the State employs for its basic stratifying operation – that is, for the production of what 
                                                
510 Ibid, 295. 
511 The prison example of a punctual or unilinear system is quite simple; more complex is the disciplinary 
grid of ‘individualizing partitioning’ that developed in the factory. What is at issue is still the construction 
of a ‘denumerable and controllable multiplicity,’ that is, still “a question of distributing individuals in a 
space in which one might isolate them and map them; but also of articulating this distribution on a 
production machinery that had its own requirements. The distribution of bodies, the spatial arrangement of 
production machinery and the difference forms of activity in the distribution of ‘posts’ had to be linked 
together. … At the emergence of large-scale industry, one finds, beneath the division of the production 
process, the individualizing fragmentation of labour power; the distributions of the disciplinary space often 
assured both” (Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 144-5). In turn, and in a way made possible by Foucault’s 
analysis, Deleuze and Guattari posit the disciplinary ‘Work model’ (“discipline free action”) as the means 
by which the State appropriated or captured the war machine, by which they mean “not only the 
disciplining of men” through the modern military, “but also the industrial production of weapons”: “But the 
State apparatus, in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, found a new way of appropriating the war 
machine: by subjugating it before all else to the Work-model of the construction site and factory, which 
were in the process of developing elsewhere, but more slowly. The war machine was perhaps the first thing 
to be striated, to produce an abstract labor-time whose results could be multiplied and operations divided” 
(Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 490). Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of striated space would 
thus seem to come by way of Foucault’s analysis of disciplinary partitioning. 
512 To put the point differently, there are two opposing modes of the diagonal: (1) the subordinated diagonal, 
corresponding to arborescent or denumerable multiplicities, and (2) the freed diagonal or transversal, 
corresponding to rhizomatic or non-denumerable multiplicities. Thus, the subordinated diagonal just is the 
stoppage of the transversal, and the freed diagonal, in turn, just is the line’s escape from subordination. 




we have seen Foucault, in a passage also cited by Deleuze and Guattari in their 
“Apparatus of Capture” chapter, term ‘denumerable and controllable multiplicities’514:  
The State … operates by stratification; in other words, it forms a vertical, 
hierarchized aggregate that spans the horizontal lines in a dimension of depth. In 
retaining given elements, it necessarily cuts off their relations with other elements, 
which become exterior, it inhibits, slows down, or controls those relations…. Thus 
the central power of the State is hierarchical…; the center is not in the middle (au 
milieu), but on top, because the only way it can recombine what it isolates is 
through subordination.515 
 
Formally speaking, to stratify is to organize a hierarchically centralized multiplicity, 
a pyramidal unilinear system of reterritorialization in which the vertical axis ‘spans’ or 
extends over ‘the horizontal lines in a dimension of depth,’ that is, along the diagonal. 
The diagonal is subordinated to the horizontal and vertical it conjugates; and each 
‘localizable connection’ between a vertical point of authority and an isolated horizontal 
point constitutes an individualizing relation of subjection. A punctual or unilinear system 
is therefore a denumerable multiplicity – totalizing and individualizing, ‘recombining 
what it isolates through subordination’ –, the order or governability of which is 
guaranteed by striating space, ‘cutting off’ or ‘controlling’ the relations among its 
constituent elements and preventing ‘any relation that is not supervised by authority’ 
(Foucault). In other words, the subordinated diagonal designates the exclusive relational 
                                                
514 We discussed this passage from Discipline and Punish – on how ‘the crowd, a compact mass, a locus of 
multiple exchanges, individualities merging together, a collective effect, is abolished and replaced by a 
collection of separated individualities…, replaced by a denumerable and controllable multiplicity’ – in 
Chapter 4. Deleuze and Guattari make this reference in their chapter “Micropolitics and Segmentarity” 
when discussing the distinction between a ‘quantum flow’ and a ‘molar segmented line.’ See Deleuze and 
Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 536-7, n. 16. 




modality of an arborescent multiplicity (conjugation), the defining formal feature of what 
Foucault, regarding the asylum, first termed an “apparatus of capture.”516  
In short, the subordination of the diagonal expresses the operation of capture, 
whether the ‘apparatus of capture’ in question refers to a specific disciplinary institution 
or, as for Deleuze and Guattari six years later, to the State more generally.517 Proper to 
both cases is the striation of space as a technique for governing human multiplicities, that 
is, for controlling the conduct of human beings as part of the economico-political 
operation of power, maximizing individuals’ productive utility and political docility – 
which is also to say, maximizing their force as agents of social production while 
minimizing their force as agents of political transformation. 
 In perfect agreement with Foucault, then, and following his ‘microphysics of 
power,’ Deleuze and Guattari depict this specifically modern form of power, which 
emerges in close historical connection with the developments of capitalism, as one that is 
“immanent and melds with the ‘real,’ operating through normalization” to organize the  
 
                                                
516 Foucault, Psychiatric Power, 302, 307. 
517 On the striating operation of the State, see Deleuze and Guattari: “One of the fundamental tasks of the 
State is to striate the space over which it reigns, or to utilize smooth spaces as a means of communication in 
the service of striated space. It is a vital concern of every State not only to vanquish nomadism but to 
control migrations and, more generally, to establish a zone of rights over an entire ‘exterior,’ over all of the 
flows traversing the ecumenon. If it can help it, the State does not dissociate itself from a process of capture 
of flows of all kinds, populations, commodities or commerce, money or capital, etc. There is still a need for 
fixed paths in well-defined directions, which restrict speed, regulate circulation, relativize movement, and 
measure in detail the relative movements of subjects and objects. That is why Paul Virilio’s thesis is 
important, when he shows that ‘the political power of the State is polis, police, that is, management of the 
public ways,’ and that ‘the gates of the city, its levies and duties, are barriers, filters against the fluidity of 
the masses, against the penetration power of migratory packs,’ people, animals, and goods” (Deleuze and 




social formation according to a system of division or “rigid segmentarity.”518 There are, 
in turn, three modes of rigid segmentarity, which structure the relational fabric of the 
social field, including its forms of individual and collective subjection: (1) a binary mode, 
corresponding to “the great major dualist oppositions” between molar aggregates, e.g., 
“social classes, but also men-women, adults-children,” whites-nonwhites, heterosexuals-
homosexuals, etc.; (2) a circular mode, corresponding to a kind of centralized geopolitical 
segmentarity, a series of centers proceeding from the most immediate locality (“my 
affairs, my neighborhood’s affairs”) to the most global (“my city’s, my country’s, the 
world’s…”); and (3) a linear mode, corresponding to the imbricated series of disciplinary 
institutions through which individuals pass, “in the family, in school, in the army, on the 
job. School tells us, ‘You’re not at home anymore’; the army tells us, ‘You’re not in 
school anymore’…” 519 
 
5.3.2 Multiplicities of Becoming: Collective Lines of Flight and the Danger of Abolition 
By contrast, then, to the punctual or unilinear systems of arborescent subordination, 
the project of transversal politics will concern the construction of ‘multilinear’ systems, 
                                                
518Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 130. Deleuze and Guattari later cite Foucault’s 
‘microphysics of power’ in their “Micropolitics and Segmentarity” chapter (A Thousand Plateaus, 537, n. 
16.). Cf. “Attention has recently been focused on the fact that modern power is not at all reducible to the 
classical alternative ‘repression or ideology’ but implies processes of normalization, modulation, modeling, 
and information that bear on language, perception, desire, movement, etc., and which proceed by way of 
microassemblages.” (Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 458). For confirmation that they are 
indeed referring to Foucault here, see “Desire and Pleasure,” where Deleuze presents as “[o]ne of the major 
theses of Discipline and Punish” that “power arrangements rely neither on repression nor on ideology. 
Breaking away from these kinds of alternatives, more or less accepted by everyone, D and P formed a 
concept of normalization, and of disciplines” (Deleuze, “Desire and Pleasure,” Two Regimes of Madness, 
122). Elsewhere in A Thousand Plateaus, a work abundant in references to Foucault, Deleuze and Guattari 
explicitly situate Foucault’s analysis of disciplinary power at the molecular level: “It requires a whole 
organization articulating formations of power and regimes of signs, and operating on the molecular level 
(societies characterized by what Foucault calls disciplinary power)” (Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand 
Plateaus, 67; cf. ibid, 224, on “Foucault’s analysis of ‘disciplines’ or micropowers”). 




beginning with the imperative to “[f]ree the line, free the diagonal”520: “In a multilinear 
system, …the line breaks free of the point as origin; the diagonal breaks free of the 
vertical and the horizontal as coordinates; and the transversal breaks free of the diagonal 
as a localizable connection between two points.”521 The transversal thus performs a 
destratifying function522 that runs precisely counter to the denumerative function of 
modern power (by which potentially unruly collectivities are transformed into 
controllable collections of hierarchically ordered individuals). Take, for example, the 
case of George Jackson: the transversal, the line of flight as active-affirmative force of 
revolt, ‘breaks free of’ its subjection as subordinated diagonal, initiating a collective 
process of minoritarian becoming that contests the relational modality of the prison, i.e., 
the unilinear system of power’s exercise.  
Indeed, if the category of becoming is so important for transversal politics, this is 
because “[b]ecoming is the movement by which the line frees itself from the point and 
renders points indiscernable,” constituting “a nonlocalizable relation sweeping up the two 
distant or contiguous points.”523 Becoming, as what Deleuze and Guattari call a ‘line-
block’ of connection, is non-localizable precisely because it ‘sweeps’ away the points it 
passes between, impelling a joint process of transformative subjectivation: “Between 
things does not designate a localizable relation going from one thing to the other and 
back again, but a perpendicular direction, a transversal movement that sweeps one and 
the other away….”524 
                                                
520 Ibid, 295. 
521 Ibid, 297. 
522 On “destratifying transversality” and “transversals of destratification,” see ibid, 335-6. 
523 Ibid, 293-4. 




This ‘transversal movement,’ as the principle of non-localizable connection, thus 
designates the destratifying trajectory of the line of flight as block of becoming, 
deterritorializing and transporting the points it sets into relation by passing between. Such 
is the compositional principle for rhizomatic or non-denumerable multiplicities, which is 
to say, for the group as ‘a constant generator of de-individualization’ (Foucault): “The 
diagonal frees itself, breaks or twists. The line … passes between things, between points. 
It belongs to a smooth space. … [I]t constitutes … multiplicities of masses or packs, not 
of classes; anomalous and nomadic multiplicities, not normal or legal ones; multiplicities 
of becoming, or transformational multiplicities, not countable [dénombrable] elements 
and ordered relations….”525  
Indeed, the case of George Jackson may echo again here, for the subject-group of 
prisoners of which Jackson was a co-founder was named ‘Wolf Pack,’526 and “the pack or 
wolf-multiplicity” (with its attendant processes of “becoming-wolf”527) serves as Deleuze 
and Guattari’s first example in A Thousand Plateaus of a rhizomatic multiplicity: “The 
pack, even on its own turf, is constituted by a line of flight or of deterritorialization that is 
a component part of it, and to which it accredits a high positive value,” by contrast to an 
arborescent multiplicity that “integrates these lines in order to segment them, obstruct 
them, ascribe them a negative sign.”528 The difference in kind between a micro-
multiplicity and a macro-multiplicity, like the contradistinction of connection and 
                                                
525 Ibid, 505. 
526 See, for example, Joy James, Imprisoned Intellectuals: America’s Political Prisoners Write on Life, 
Liberation, and Rebellion, 84. 
527 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 29. 




conjugation, can thus be understood as the difference, respectively, between ‘positive 
deterritorialization’ and ‘negative deterritorialization.’  
Let us take the traits of the rhizomatic multiplicity each at a time. Like the 
peripheral ‘groups-in-fusion’ of the ‘schizorevolutionary type’ in Anti-Oedipus, which 
assemble by ‘following the lines of flight of desire,’ such a multiplicity is ‘nomadic,’ 
composing itself along a freed diagonal or transversal line. This is the line of connection-
creation, by which a micro-multiplicity connects with other micro-multiplicities and 
thereby changes in nature, creating something new. In this way, the rhizome is a 
‘transformational’ multiplicity, a ‘multiplicity in becoming.’ For the same reason, it is 
also an ‘anomalous’ multiplicity, which is to say, it is defined by its relation to the 
outside, its centrifugal vector, rather than by a normalizing, hierarchical center.529 And it 
is thus a pack- or mass-multiplicity, constituted by its component line of 
deterritorialization, by contrast to the arborescent group structure of classes; for if a pack 
has a ‘leader,’ it occupies not the center but the outermost limit, where the function of a 
limit is not to divide but to connect to the outside (the George Jackson function). 
However, the concept of a micro-multiplicity must be complicated further, for if the 
principle of transversal connection provides the evaluative criterion for distinguishing 
                                                
529 On the anomalous as “Outsider” and “phenomenon of bordering,” by contrast to the normal, see A 
Thousand Plateaus: “The abnormal can be defined only in terms of characteristics, specific or generic; but 
the anomalous is a position or set of positions in relation to a multiplicity. … Lovecraft applies the term 
‘Outsider’ to this thing or entity, the Thing, which arrives and passes at the edge, which is linear yet 
multiple …. If the anomalous is neither an individual nor a species, then what is it? It is a phenomenon, but 
a phenomenon of bordering. … Thus there is a borderline for each multiplicity; it is in no way a center but 
rather the enveloping line or farthest dimension, as a function of which it is possible to count the others, all 
those lines or dimensions constitute the pack at a given moment (beyond the borderline, the multiplicity 
changes nature)” (ibid, 244-5). As Deleuze and Guattari note, the initial distinction between anomal 
(‘anomalous’) and abnormal (‘abnormal’) was made by Foucault’s teacher, Georges Canguilhem, whose 
work The Normal and the Pathological greatly impacted Foucault’s own analysis of normalization, e.g., in 




macro- and micro-multiplicities, it also performs a second selective function by 
distinguishing two kinds of micro-multiplicity. Deleuze and Guattari stress that it would 
be an error to assume there is anything intrinsically ‘better’ about the molecular than the 
molar, in the sense of a moral good. The privilege micropolitics enjoys over 
macropolitics is strategic, since the former is the potential site of transformative political 
agency;530 but this is not an inherent normative privilege, as is exemplified by what 
Deleuze and Guattari call “microfascism,” a properly molecular form of subjection by 
which “desire desire[s] its own repression.”531 Indeed, mass-multiplicities can even be 
said to pose the greatest peril. “What makes fascism so dangerous is its molecular or 
micropolitical power, for it is a mass movement: a cancerous body rather than a 
totalitarian organism.”532  
In other words, the danger of being reterritorialized and appropriated by an 
apparatus of capture is not the only one facing the line of flight; there is another “moment 
that must be confronted, the moment the transversal turns into a line of abolition.”533 This 
is the moment of breakdown, the destructive force which, for example, we have seen to 
be characteristic of the second regime of madness: “the line of flight crossing the wall, 
…but instead of connecting with other lines and each time augmenting its valence, 
turning to destruction, abolition pure and simple, the passion of abolition.”534 In the case 
of the two regimes of madness problem, the line of abolition marks the collapse into 
                                                
530 This claim, again, follows from the primacy that both Foucault and Deleuze accord resistance with 
respect to the constitution of the social field and the ‘development of power networks’ (Foucault); for 
“[f]rom the viewpoint of micropolitics, a society is defined by its lines of flight, which are molecular” 
(Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 216).  
531 Ibid, 215. 
532 Ibid. 
533 Ibid, 299. 




suicide or catatonia, precisely because the schizophrenic flow of madness is unable to 
bear the charge of being the sole expression of an absolute deterritorialization; that is, the 
schizoid line of flight is deprived possible connections with other lines of flight, with the 
deterritorializing tendencies of other social flows, and thus falls unsupported. (As we 
discussed last chapter, this is the schizopolitical formulation of the problem of material 
expression.) In the case of fascism, the line of abolition becomes collective, traversing the 
social field and constituting a mass-multiplicity whose libidinal forces (what Anti-
Oedipus calls ‘desiring-production’) are invested in a pure process of destruction. In 
general, the line of abolition is what the line of flight becomes when, by failing to make 
connections with other lines of flight, it cannot satisfy the conditions of its own 
sustainability. What was a line of connection-creation then turns instead to 
annihilation.535  
The line of flight thus faces a double danger: (1) from the molar domain, the threat 
of capture, which, figured by the subordinated diagonal, would undermine the line of 
flight’s conditions of realization by blocking the transversal, preventing the construction 
of lateral alliances; and (2) from within the molecular domain, the threat of abolition, 
which would undermine the line of flight’s conditions of sustainability by setting it on a 
course of destruction. At issue in both cases is a threat to the connective force of the line 
of flight. Conversely, generating such force forms the strategic objective of transversal 
politics.  
                                                
535 In other words, what was an absolute positive deterritorialization becomes an absolute negative 
deterritorialization: “For the stakes here are indeed the negative and the positive in the absolute” (ibid, 510), 




The principle of connection – “the way in which decoded and deterritorialized 
flows boost one another, accelerate their shared escape”536 – can therefore be understood 
as the transversal solution to the political problem of material expression, now articulated 
as the problem of maintaining and quickening the creative-affirmative force of the line of 
flight, ‘augmenting its valence’. That is, transversality, as the relational mode of 
connection-creation, constitutes both a condition of realization and of sustainability for 
the line of flight (as well as for the micro-multiplicity the destratifying trajectory of 
which that line defines).  
The transversal condition of realization goes unmet when the diagonal is 
subordinated, the line of flight neutralized by striated space or rigidly segmented in 
binary, circular, or linear modes. In other words, in the absence of transversal connection, 
the centrifugal vector of escape is not realized as force, i.e., as transformative agency 
capable of acting back upon the macropolitical conditions of social production; for 
“molecular escapes and movements would be nothing if they did not return to the molar 
organizations to reshuffle their segments, their binary distributions of sexes, classes, and 
parties.”537 In turn, even when the conditions of realization have been met, in the absence 
of creating other transversal connections, the force of flight cannot be sustained, 
descending into a line of abolition. That is, the transversal condition of sustainability goes 
unsatisfied when the line of flight cannot connect to other lines, instead turning cancerous, 
an auto-destructive force of mutation.  
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Deleuze and Guattari refer to the project of meeting this double condition of 
realization and sustainability as one of constructing a ‘plane of consistency’:  
It is the plane, in other words, the mode of connection, that provides the means of 
eliminating the empty and cancerous bodies…, of rejecting the homogeneous 
surfaces that overlay smooth space, and neutralizing the lines of death and 
destruction that divert the line of flight. What is retained and preserved, therefore 
created, what consists, is only that which increases the number of connections….538  
 
The transversal principle of connection thus yields the practical imperative to augment 
the positive valence of lines of flight by multiplying their connective force, and it 
provides the selective criterion539 for evaluating between the “fascisizing” and 
revolutionizing tendencies of mass-multiplicities. A nomadic, anomalous, 
transformational multiplicity “becomes revolutionary” when, “by connecting” “a number 
of minority elements,” it “invents a specific, unforeseen, autonomous becoming.”540 To 
use Deleuze and Guattari’s example, such was the case with the events of May 1968 in 
France, through which a molecular phenomenon of transformative political agency was 
realized ‘by connecting a number of minority elements’ – indeed, by connecting the very 
minoritarian singularities that we have seen championed by Foucault as transversal 
struggles against individualizing subjection, e.g., “the youth, women, the mad, etc.”541  
The connective strategy of transversal politics can thus be understood as the project 
to realize and sustain transformative political force by ‘inventing’ collective processes of 
                                                
538 Ibid, 508. 
539 This is the second moment of selection, distinguishing between two forms of micro-multiplicity; the first 
moment of selection is the difference in kind between micro- and macro-multiplicities.  
540 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 106. Such, for example, is the project of a revolutionary or 
nomadic war machine: to construct a smooth space, to occupy that space, and to thereby distribute and 
compose oneself as a people in that space. See Deleuze and Guattari’s chapter, “Treatise on Nomadology – 
The War Machine”: “But more generally, we have seen that the war machine was the invention of the 
nomad, because it is in essence the constitutive element of smooth space, the occupation of this space, 
displacement within this space, and the corresponding composition of a people” (ibid, 417). 




minoritarian becoming. As we have seen in our previous discussions of becoming-plebe 
and becoming-black, and as is suggested by the anti-essentialist language of 
‘invention,’542 ‘minoritarian’ refers not to a substantive identity – one grounded in a 
macrosociological entity (race, sex/gender, class, sexuality, age generation), the 
organization of which would result from rigid binary segmentation –, but rather to a 
processual quality of becoming, that is, a connective mode of relation. And it is the 
transversal logic of this mode of relation, finally, that provides the fundamental criterion 
for distinguishing a non-denumerable or minoritarian multiplicity from a denumerable or 
majoritarian one: whereas a majority always constitutes a denumerable set,  
…the minority is defined as a nondenumerable set, however many elements it may 
have. What characterizes the nondenumerable is neither the set nor its elements; 
rather, it is the connection, the “and” produced between elements, between sets, and 
which belongs to neither, which eludes them and constitutes a line of flight. The 
axiomatic manipulates only denumerable sets, even infinite ones, whereas the 
minorities constitute “fuzzy,” nondenumerable, nonaxiomizable sets, in short, 
“masses,” multiplicities of escape and flux. … What is proper to the minority is to 
assert a power of the nondenumerable….543 
 
If, as we saw in Chapter 4, the initial formulation of schizo-politics sets into 
opposition the transversal connection and axiomatic conjugation of decoded flows, the 
later formulation of transversal resistance will articulate this connective project in terms 
of harnessing the minoritarian ‘power of the nondenumerable’ to contest the axiomatic 
manipulation of ‘denumerable and controllable’ (Foucault) human multiplicities. The 
non-denumerability proper to the minority – the group as ‘multiplicity of escape and flux,’ 
a ‘constant generator of de-individualization’ (Foucault) – constitutes a counter-force to 
the dominant social order by transforming the schema of possible social relations.  
                                                
542 As we will see in the following section, Foucault also stresses the verb ‘invent,’ by contrast to ‘discover,’ 
in his elaboration of creating a collective practice of becoming-queer. 




In other words, minoritarian becoming, as a collective process of subjectivation, 
gives rise to something like ‘a people,’ that is, to new forms of community whose very 
mode of composition would challenge the rigid segmentation of the social formation.544 
And just as the strategy proposed in “Intellectuals and Power” was for minorities 
(‘women, prisoners, conscripted soldiers, hospital patients, and homosexuals’) to ‘enter 
into a revolutionary process’ by singularizing their own forms of struggle, which could 
then become laterally allied against a common regime of power to form a multiply-
centered resistance movement; so, now, the aim advanced in A Thousand Plateaus is to 
realize and sustain precisely those moments “the axiomatic cannot tolerate: when people 
demand to formulate their problems themselves, and to determine at least the particular 
conditions under which they can receive a more general solution.”545 
 
5.4 Foucault’s Transversal Ethico-Politics: The Case of Becoming-Queer 
“For example, no ‘gay liberation movement’ is possible as long as homosexuality is 
caught up in a relation of exclusive disjunction with heterosexuality … instead of 
bringing to light their reciprocal inclusion and their transverse communication in the 
decoded flows of desire….”  
— Deleuze and Guattari546 
 
“Here again, a line of subjectivation is a process…. It is a line of flight. It escapes the 
previous lines; it escapes from them. … Foucault’s research was going to show that 
processes of subjectivation eventually took on other modes than the Greek mode, for 
example in Christian apparatuses, modern societies, etc. Couldn’t we cite apparatuses 
                                                
544 Deleuze and Guattari give the example here of minoritarian nationalization: “Whether it be the infinite 
set of the nonwhites of the periphery, or the restricted set of the Basques, Corsicans, etc., everywhere we 
look we see the conditions for a worldwide movement: the minorities recreate ‘nationalitarian’ phenomena 
that the nation-states had been charged with controlling and quashing” (ibid, 470). In Chapter 6, we will 
consider Foucault’s own analysis of a ‘nationalitarian’ popular movement, namely, the Iranian revolution.  
545 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 471. 




where subjectivation no longer goes through aristocratic life or the aestheticized 
experience of free men but through the marginalized existence of the ‘excluded’?” 
bringing to light their reciprocal inclusion and their transverse communication in the 
decoded flows of desire….”  
— Deleuze547 
 
5.4.1 Sexuality, Biopower, and the Politics of Friendship 
It remains, finally, for us to detail a positive example of what a politics that 
harnesses the ‘power of the nondenumerable’ might look like, and how it would contest 
the exercise of power in capitalist society. I will thus conclude this chapter by providing 
an account of Foucault’s late ethico-politics, which articulates precisely such a 
transversal project of minoritarian becoming: namely, what may be termed becoming-
queer. As the concrete development of what was presented formally in A Thousand 
Plateaus, this project suggests another line in the Foucault-Deleuze block of becoming; 
and as Foucault’s effort to singularize a form of minoritarian struggle, it serves as a 
further response to the question of transversal resistance posed to him by Deleuze a 
decade prior. 
To understand how an ethical practice of queer subjectivation constitutes a mode of 
resistance, and hence a politics, it must first be situated in relation to Foucault’s analysis 
of biopower in the introductory volume of History of Sexuality (1976), completed the 
year after Discipline and Punish. The concept of biopower refers to the mode of power 
which takes life, whether that of the individual or the population, as its object of 
production and control. Drawing again from the distinction first made in Anti-Oedipus 
between micro- and macrophysics, Foucault characterizes modern biopower as a “bi-
                                                




polar technology” that develops historically along two axes: (1) the micropolitical axis of 
discipline, which he now refers to as “an anatomo-politics of the human body,” by which 
the “body as a machine” is rendered docile and useful; and (2) the macropolitical axis of 
administrative regulation, of “a bio-politics of the population,” by which the “species 
body” as a statistical aggregate is managed and governed with respect to the conditions of 
its basic biological processes.548 
Like disciplinary power, which in fact constitutes one of its two poles, biopower 
serves historically as a necessary condition for capitalism insofar as it makes possible the 
“adjustment of the accumulation of men to that of capital, the joining of the growth of 
human groups to the expansion of productive forces and the differential allocation of 
profit….”549 In other words, as with discipline, the basic operation of biopower is 
economico-political. This is why Foucault’s economico-political thesis holds for modern 
power generally, whether the disciplining of individuals in panoptic assemblages, or the 
bio-political regulation of the population. As Deleuze will later point out, at issue in both 
                                                
548 Foucault, History of Sexuality, Vol. 1, 139; Foucault lists as examples of these biological processes 
“propagation, births and mortality, the level of health, life expectancy and longevity.” Following Foucault’s 
terminology here, strictly speaking, we must distinguish between ‘biopower’ and ‘bio-politics,’ the latter 
being subordinate to the former as one of its axes, which is to say, as one set of techniques and 
corresponding domain of application through which the general political technology of biopower is 
exercised. Moreover, it should be emphasized that to characterize anatomo-politics and bio-politics, 
respectively, as the micro- and macro-political poles of biopower is not simply to reduce the difference 
between them to a quantitative matter of size. Rather, the qualitative difference between discipline and 
what Foucault will later call ‘security power’ (notably, in Security, Territory, Population) is maintained to 
the extent that each domain has its proper set of laws by which phenomena are governed: the macro-
physical with its statistical aggregates governed according to the regulation of probabilistic tendencies, and 
the microphysical with its “somatic singularities” (Foucault, Psychiatric Power, 44) governed according to 
individualizing techniques of control. It is also worth noting that Foucault retains this ‘bi-polar’ schema of 
the macro- and micro-political six years later in “The Subject and Power,” when he writes of pastoral 
power that “the multiplication of the aims and agents of pastoral power focused the development of 
knowledge of man around two poles: one, globalizing and quantitative, concerning the population; the 
other, analytical, concerning the individual” (Foucault, “Subject and Power,” 335, translation modified. 
The English translation has “roles” rather than “poles,” but this is an error, as is both clear from the context 
and confirmed by the French text, “pôles”; cf. Dits et écrits II, 1050). 




cases is a form of power exercised upon human multiplicities: on the one hand, an 
anatomo-politics that functions to impose a certain conduct on a particular multiplicity of 
individuals, where that multiplicity is limited in number and space;550 and on the other, a 
bio-politics that functions to administer the conditions of life processes in a particular 
multiplicity, where that multiplicity is a more expansive and open population.551 
Accordingly, rather than being opposed to one another, discipline and bio-politics are 
distinct but complementary strategies through which power operates in capitalist 
society.552 Their convergent points of reciprocal support or mutual articulation form 
crucial nodes in the modern diagram of force relations.553 
                                                
550 I would point out that although discipline as a cellular form of power is developed and exercised in 
enclosed spaces (factories, schools, prisons, hospitals, asylums, barracks, etc.), panopticism – as an abstract 
function and disciplinary technique for controlling the conduct of individuals through a system of 
hierarchical division and surveillance – ultimately becomes dispersed throughout the socius: “The panoptic 
schema, without disappearing as such or losing any of its properties, was destined to spread throughout the 
social body; its vocation was to become a generalized function” (Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 207). 
For more on the generalized diffusion of panoptic techniques and ‘swarming of disciplinary mechanisms’ 
throughout the social field, see ibid., 205-9, 211-2, and 215-6. For Foucault’s discussion of how the police 
were a central means for relaying this disciplinary or panoptic mode of power to a more open form of 
human multiplicity or population, see ibid., 213-4. 
551 See Deleuze, Foucault, 72. Cf. Deleuze: “In brief, the two pure functions in modern societies will be 
‘anatomo-politics’ and ‘bio-politics,’ and the two bare matters those of a particular body and a particular 
population” (ibid). 
552 Foucault expounds on this point: “This bio-power was without question an indispensable element in the 
development of capitalism; the latter would not have been possible without the controlled insertion of 
bodies into the machinery of production and the adjustment of the phenomena of population to economic 
processes. But this was not all it required; it also needed the growth of both these factors, their 
reinforcement as well as their availability and docility; it had to have methods of power capable of 
optimizing forces, aptitudes, and life in general without at the same time making them more difficult to 
govern. If the development of the great instruments of the state, as institutions of power, ensured the 
maintenance of production relations, the rudiments of anatomo- and bio-politics, created in the eighteenth 
century as techniques of power present at every level of the social body and utilized by very diverse 
institutions (the family and the army, schools and the police, individual medicine and the administration of 
collective bodies), operated in the sphere of economic processes, their development, and the forces working 
to sustain them. They also acted as factors of segregation and social hierarchization, exerting their influence 
on the respective forces of both these movements, guaranteeing relations of domination and effects of 
hegemony” (ibid., 140-1). 
553 Cf. Deleuze and Guattari’s analysis of “power centers,” the function of which is to conjugate 
micropolitical and macropolitical axes, i.e., to serve as sites of conversion or adjustment between molecular 




Now, if the apparatus of sexuality is of especial importance to Foucault’s analytic 
of biopower, it is because the category of sex/sexuality serves as just such a site of 
convergence between anatomo- and bio-politics, located “at the pivot of the two axes 
along which developed the entire political technology of life. On the one hand it was tied 
to the disciplines of the body: the harnessing, intensification, and distribution of forces, 
the adjustment and economy of energies. On the other hand, it was applied to the 
regulation of populations, through all the far-reaching effects of its activity.”554 Insofar as 
it thus constitutes a vital tactical conjuncture through which biopower controls and 
governs the conduct of individuals and groups, sexuality also becomes privileged 
strategic terrain for forms of counter-conduct that would contest this exercise of power.  
Foucault’s transversal ethico-politics therefore intervenes at precisely this pivot 
point of biopower. As resistance to the ‘government of individualization,’ such a politics 
challenges the techniques of subjection by which the apparatus of sexuality binds the 
individual to herself and divides her from others through a normalizing form of identity. 
Since, as we have seen Foucault suggest in his preface to Anti-Oedipus, such a process of 
de-individualization takes shape through a mode of collective subjectivation that is itself 
made possible by the construction of non-hierarchical group formations, it follows that 
any politics of de-subjection will require the production of new relational forms – an 
open network of “polymorphic, varied, and individually modulated relationships.”555  
                                                
554 Foucault, History of Sexuality Vol. 1, 145. Foucault continues: “It fitted in both categories at once, 
giving rise to infinitesimal surveillances, permanent controls, extremely meticulous orderings of space, 
indeterminate medical or psychological examinations, to an entire micro-power concerned with the body. 
But it gave rise as well to comprehensive measures, statistical assessments, and interventions aimed at the 
entire social body or at groups taken as a whole” (ibid, 145-6). 




Accordingly, when Foucault champions something like a queer cultural movement 
as a shared form of ethico-political practice, he emphasizes precisely this task of creating 
new modes of social relation: 
Another thing to distrust is the tendency to relate the question of homosexuality to 
the problem of ‘Who am I?’ and ‘What is the secret of my desire?’ Perhaps it would 
be better to ask oneself, ‘What relations, through homosexuality, can be established, 
invented, multiplied, and modulated?’ The problem is not to discover in oneself the 
truth of one’s sex, but, rather, to use one’s sexuality henceforth to arrive at a 
multiplicity of relationships. … Therefore, we have to work at becoming 
homosexuals and not be obstinate in recognizing that we are. The development 
toward which the problem of homosexuality tends is the one of friendship.556 
 
The ‘question of homosexuality,’ then, does not refer to an inherent property, much less a 
substantive nature, of being homosexual. The problem posed by homosexuality, which 
Foucault names ‘friendship,’ is not to discover an essential self-relation but, rather, to 
facilitate the production, transformation, and proliferation of a ‘multiplicity of 
relationships,’ the schema for which cannot be given in advance. 
Indeed, far from constituting the kind of identity politics for which it is sometimes 
mistaken, which would be centered in molar forms of social identification and their 
corresponding, rigidly segmented group interests, the Foucauldian question of 
homosexuality and its philial project concern an active task of becoming, a collective 
process of subjectivation that I am calling ‘becoming-queer.’557 This practice of 
becoming takes shape through the construction of friendship, understood as a mode of 
relation with two fundamental features: (1) as a “relationship that is still formless,” 
friendship must be “invent[ed] from A to Z,” for its structure is unmoored from 
                                                
556 Ibid, 135-6, my emphasis. 
557 Cf.: “We have to understand that with our desires, through our desires, go new forms of relationships, 
new forms of love, new forms of creation. … We don’t have to discover that we are homosexuals. … 
Rather, we have to create a gay life. To become” (Foucault, “Sex, Power, and the Politics of Identity,” in 




institutional supports and its meaning, ungoverned by dominant social codes; and (2) 
with regard to its positive content, this relation between friends encompasses “the sum of 
everything through which they can give each other pleasure,”558 which is to say, the 
shared creation of a reciprocal circuit of care.559  
Foucault gives as an example of the formlessness of friendship the relation between 
two men of “noticeably different ages” who, without a “code [that] would allow them to 
communicate… [and] with nothing to assure them about the meaning of the movement 
that carries them toward each other,”560 must together invent the very terms of that 
relation – which is to say, must invent themselves as friends who are constituted through 
the movement arising between them. Indeed, the space of this in-between is precisely that 
of a non-localizable connection in A Thousand Plateaus, where ‘Between things does not 
designate a localizable relation, but a transversal movement that sweeps one and the other 
away.’ Friendship should not be conceived as a line running back and forth from one 
fixed point to another but, rather, as a perpendicular vector passing between the friends 
and impelling their co-becoming. By contrast to a relation that would obtain between pre-
existing terms, such as a contractual relation independent parties enter into, the friendship 
                                                
558 Foucault, “Friendship as a Way of Life,” 136. The last phrase reads in the original French: “la somme de 
toutes les chose à travers lesquelles, l’un à l’autre, on peut se faire plaisir.” What the English translation 
cannot quite preserve is the reflexive sense in which both participants in the relation experience pleasure in 
and through the other, but in such a way that the distinction between self and other becomes blurred. It is 
not so much that I experience pleasure that you give to me, and vice versa – as though friendship were an 
exchange relation – but that there is the experience of a shared pleasure in the conduit that courses between 
us. (Note that the impersonal on in ‘on peut se faire plaisir’ is the same grammatical subject that Foucault, 
following Blanchot, uses with reference to the thought of the outside.) The inventive formation of the 
relation transforms both terms of the relation.  
559 With respect to a collective ethos of co-constitutive care and pleasure, cf. “On the Genealogy of Ethics: 
an Overview of Work in Progress”: “What I want to ask is: Are we able to have an ethics of acts and their 
pleasures which would be able to take into account the pleasure of the other? Is the pleasure of the other 
something that can be integrated in our pleasure, without reference either to law, to marriage, to I don’t 
know what?” (Foucault, “On the Genealogy of Ethics,” in Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth, 258). 




relation is itself dynamically constitutive of its proper terms. That is, friendship is an 
auto-poetic relation, which is de-individualizing, insofar as the subject-position of an 
original self in relation to the other is displaced in favor of a constituent movement of 
joint becoming.  
Of course, just as with the marginal and proletarianized plebe, this movement does 
not mean ‘total identification,’ which would collapse the betweenness of the friends’ 
transversal trajectory.561 Rather, their co-becoming defines the coordinates of a shared 
mode of life for which differentiation serves as a genetic principle. In contradistinction to 
institutional or oppositional forms of social difference (rigid binary segmentarity), philial 
differentiation affirms difference in its positivity as transversal connection. Thus, to 
return to Foucault’s example, the age differential between friends, precisely because it 
deprives them of a socially coded way of relating, makes the invention of a new relational 
form possible, which propels both friends outside their age-based subject-positions. In 
this way, the mode of life proper to collective processes of becoming-queer constitutes a 
decoded flow of desire, a deterritorializing line of creative mutation that cuts across the 
striated space of the social field: 
Is it possible to create a homosexual mode of life? This notion of mode of life 
seems important to me. Will it require the introduction of a diversification different 
from the ones due to social class, differences in profession and culture, a 
diversification that would also be a form of relationship and would be a ‘way of 
life’? A way of life can be shared among individuals of different age, status, and 
social activity. It can yield intense relations not resembling those that are 
institutionalized. It seems to me that a way of life can yield a culture and an 
ethics.562 
 
                                                
561 Indeed, Foucault is specifically critical of the erotic model of the “lovers’ fusion of identities” (Foucault, 
“Friendship as a Way of Life,” 137). 




If the project of becoming-queer generates an ethics, it will be the very kind that 
Foucault attributes to Anti-Oedipus: namely, an ethics of immanence, which realizes the 
affective intensification of relationships ‘by means of multiplication and displacement, 
diverse combinations.’ If this project generates a culture, it will be in the expansive sense 
of “a culture that invents ways of relating, types of existence, types of values, types of 
exchanges between individuals which are really new and are neither the same as, nor 
superimposed on, existing cultural forms.”563 To displace prevailing cultural forms 
through a radical production of the new entails a creative collective practice that crosses 
over the historical lines of division between segmented group identities and interests. 
Thus, echoing Deleuze and Guattari’s claim in the epigraph above regarding the inclusive 
disjunction and ‘transverse communication’ between homo- and heterosexuality, 
Foucault argues that if such a movement of cultural invention is to fundamentally 
transform collective modes of life throughout the social formation, “then gay culture will 
not only be a choice of homosexuals for homosexuals – it would create relations that are, 
at certain points, transferable to heterosexuals. …[N]onhomosexual people can enrich 
their lives by changing their own schema of relations.”564 
 Indeed, independently of any molar structure of identification, it is the transversal 
form of the friendship relation, its perpendicular movement as a line of 
deterritorialization, that enables the process of becoming-queer to enrich the relational 
fabric or, in the language of Deleuze and Guattari, to effect a collective becoming-
intensive of the social formation. As Foucault puts it, “Homosexuality is a historic 
                                                
563 Foucault, “The Social Triumph of the Sexual Will,” in Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth, 159-60. 
564 Ibid, 160. In this way, becoming-queer exemplifies a ‘becoming-minor of the major’ in the sense that 




occasion to reopen affective and relational virtualities, not so much through the intrinsic 
qualities of the homosexual but because the ‘slantwise’ [‘en biais’] position of the latter, 
as it were, the diagonal lines he can lay out in the social fabric allow these virtualities to 
come to light.”565 The agential force of this queer mode of collective subjectivation stems 
from its slanting trajectory, its position ‘en biais’ – a term which, following the meaning 
of biais in sewing, suggests the threading of a diagonal direction across the gridded 
texture of a fabric. 
For Foucault, then, the problem of friendship – articulated through the question of 
homosexuality – can be put as follows: how, by virtue of the transversal movement of 
becoming-queer, can ‘diagonal lines’ be woven into the ‘social fabric,’ such that they 
create the conditions of material expression for a multiplicity of ‘affective and relational 
virtualities’ to be realized? This indeed echoes the two Foucauldian problems previously 
posed in the 1960s and 1970s. We have seen how, in History of Madness, the central 
issue at the heart of the modern world concerned the insupportability and constitutive 
division of the intensive experience of unreason, the expression of which becomes the 
charge of modern literature. We have also seen how, in the analytic of power, the critical 
question regarded how to construct lateral lines of alliance as a counter-network of 
resistance to the relations of power exercised in capitalist society. Now, connecting and 
extending aspects of both projects, the problem of Foucault’s immanent ethico-politics 
becomes that of creating transversal lines of alliance that would contest the functioning of 
power by providing a system of supports for the production of previously excluded 
modes of relation and intensive experience. 
                                                




5.4.2 The Connective Strategy of Becoming-Queer: Minoritarian Resistance to 
Neoliberal Governmentality 
The problem of friendship and the project of becoming-queer to which it gives rise, 
thus provide a Foucauldian response to the question of how to construct a non-
denumerable multiplicity constituted through the transversal connection of decoded flows 
or lines of flight of desire: in other words, a micropolitical connective strategy that would 
both disrupt the operation of power and make possible radically new forms of existence. 
For indeed, “what makes homosexuality ‘disturbing’” is precisely what makes Foucault’s 
ethics of immanence a politics of resistance: namely, the decoded form and 
deterritorializing force of “the homosexual mode of life,” including 
…everything that can be troubling in affection, tenderness, friendship, fidelity, 
camaraderie, and companionship, things that our rather sanitized society can’t allow 
a place for without fearing the formation of new alliances and the tying together of 
unforeseen lines of force. … Institutional codes can’t validate these relations with 
multiple intensities, variable colors, imperceptible movements and changing 
forms.566 
 
Just as the extra-institutional formlessness of friendship and its genetic principle of 
affirmative differentiation make possible the creative movement of co-becoming between 
friends; so too the transformative political force of becoming-queer derives from its 
destratifying trajectory with respect to the institutionalized set of relations that segment 
the social formation. In this regard, Foucault’s philial project specifically contests the 
operation of biopower. As we have seen, biopower’s function is to govern the population 
by normalizing and controlling the conduct of individuals and groups, and it does so 
through the denumeration and regulation of human multiplicities and the dispersion of 
                                                




techniques of subjection. On both fronts – that is, the macro-level of social institutions 
and the micro-level of subjection – the project of becoming-queer functions as a form of 
resistance.  At the micro-level, this is because the invention of minoritarian modes of co-
becoming constitutes a de-individualizing process of collective subjectivation, while at 
the macro-level, this is because the creation of these new forms of relation challenges the 
institutional relational framework through which the conditions of a population are 
administered.  
This latter point, moreover, must be emphasized, for modern power’s techniques of 
administration over the population operate by limiting and simplifying the field of 
possible social relations:  
In effect, we live in a legal, social, and institutional world where the only relations 
possible are extremely few, extremely simplified, and extremely poor. There is, of 
course, the relation of marriage, and the relation of family, but how many other 
relations should exist, should be able to find their codes not in institutions but in 
possible supports, which is not at all the case! … We live in a relational world that 
institutions have considerably impoverished. Society and the institutions which 
frame it have limited the possibility of relationships because a rich relational world 
would be very complex to manage [gérer]. We should fight against the 
impoverishment of the relational fabric.567 
 
It is no coincidence that the verb Foucault uses in reference to this governmental function 
of power, ‘gérer’ (to manage or administer), is the same he reserves to depict biopower’s 
“function of administering life,”568 since the ‘impoverishment of the relational fabric’ is a 
bio-political strategy for rendering the population a governmentalizable object of 
regulation and control.  
                                                
567 Foucault, “The Social Triumph of the Sexual Will,” 158, my emphasis. 
568 Foucault, History of Sexuality Vol. 1, 138; see also, ibid., 139. In both cases, the French phrase “gérer la 





Indeed, as Foucault had pointed out two years earlier (1979), the very 
institutionalization of the social domain, the historical formation of “civil society,” is 
“absolutely correlative” to “the technology of liberal governmentality,”569 which is itself 
the “framework of political rationality”570 for the exercise of biopower. The constitution 
of ‘civil society’ in the second half of the 18th century responds to a central political 
problem for the liberal art of governing: given that economic subjects of interest are 
irreducible to juridical subjects of right, how can the governability of “these individuals, 
who inhabit the space of sovereignty as subjects of right and, at the same time, as 
economic men, …be assured” in order for “governmentality to preserve its global 
character over the whole space of sovereignty”571? The answer, Foucault argues, is that 
civil society – as “the emergence of a new object, a new domain,” which will also be 
called “society” and “the nation”572 – functions as a field of political unity that integrates 
the economic and juridical aspects of the subject, making possible the 
governmentalization of homo economicus and the intensification of power’s exercise by 
way of its extension through social institutions: “An omnipresent government, a 
government which nothing escapes, a government which conforms to the rules of right, 
and a government which nevertheless respects the specificity of the economy, will be a 
government that manages civil society, the nation, society, the social.”573   
                                                
569 Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics:, 296-7. 
570 Ibid, 317. 
571 Ibid, 294-5. 
572 Ibid, 295-6. 
573 Ibid, 296. Foucault continues: “Homo economicus and civil society are therefore two inseparable 
elements. Homo economicus is, if you like, the abstract, ideal, purely economic point that inhabits the dense, 
full, and complex reality of civil society. Or alternatively, civil society is the concrete ensemble within 
which these ideal points, economic men, must be placed so that they can be appropriately managed. So, 





It is therefore this mode of liberal governmentality that impoverishes the relational 
fabric so as to render the population and the individuals composing it governable, 
operating at both the micro- and macro-political levels: that is, (1) by means of 
individualizing techniques of subjection, producing homo economicus as the form of a 
self-corporatizing individual whose “life itself … must make him into a sort of permanent 
and multiple enterprise”574; and (2) through the institutionalization of a set of social 
relations that can be administered and controlled, i.e., the production of civil society, 
which “generaliz[es] the ‘enterprise’ form within the social body or social fabric,” 
“extending the economic model of supply and demand and of investment-costs-profit so 
as to make it a model of social relations and of existence itself, a form of relationship of 
the individual to himself, time, those around him, the group, and the family.”575 In this 
way, moreover, biopower performs its economico-political function, integrating the 
                                                
574 Ibid, 241. For more on homo economicus as the liberal mode of subjection that produces the form of the 
modern individual as “someone who is eminently governable,” see ibid., 270-1. Foucault does suggest that 
there is a certain strain of American neoliberalism, exemplified by Gary Becker’s analysis of drug policy, 
that gives rise to “the image, idea, or theme-program of a society … in which there is an environmental 
type of intervention instead of the internal subjugation of individuals” (ibid, 259-60). In this case, homo 
economicus is still the form of individual subject who is governmentalizable, in the sense that “power gets 
a hold on him to the extent, and only to the extent, that he is a homo economicus” (ibid, 252), but the point 
of power’s exercise is at the environmental level of the conditions of action, rather than at a microphysical 
level of the disciplined body (as in the case of classical liberal governmentality). Though the argument 
cannot be developed here, I would suggest that Foucault reads Becker as a critical virtuality of neoliberal 
thought, rather than endorsing neoliberalism in general, especially its actual economico-political forms.  
575 Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics, 241-2. For Foucault’s discussion of the bio-political exercise by 
means of which liberal governmentality “takes on the task of continuously and effectively taking charge of 
individuals and their well-being, health, and work, their way of being, behaving, and even dying, etc.”, see 
ibid, 62. See also Foucault’s discussion of noso-politics, which operates through the “medicalization of the 
family” to adjust the subjection of individuals to the apparatus of social and economic production: “The 
biological traits of a population become relevant factors for economic management, and it becomes 
necessary to organize around them an apparatus that will ensure not only their subjection but the constant 
increase of their utility” (Foucault, “The Politics of Health in the Eighteenth Century,” in Power, 96). Cf. 
“The Birth of Social Medicine,” especially on modern medicine as a “biopolitical strategy” which 





double accumulation of human populations and capital, while consolidating relations of 
social hegemony and stratification. 
The tendency of this liberal logic of socio-relational vitiation, which leaves the 
institution of the restrictive nuclear family with a totalizing hold on the field of social 
relations, receives perhaps its starkest articulation in Margaret Thatcher’s famous 
statement that “there is no such thing as society: there are individual men and women, 
and there are families.”576 But of course, what appears here as a claim about social 
ontology, in fact describes the contingent effect of a political operation proper to liberal 
governmentality – one which has only been accelerated by neoliberalism’s ‘ethos of 
privatization,’577 and which constitutes exactly the kind of government of 
individualization (‘separating the individual, breaking his links with others, splitting up 
community life’) that transversal struggles are allied against.  
Indeed, just as we saw with disciplinary power (e.g., the lateral invisibility 
foundational to panoptic arrangements, or the prevention by the courts-police-prison 
system of points of contact between the proletarianized and non-proletarianized plebe), so 
too with biopower, it is by means of blocking transversal connections that the relational 
arrangements of the social field are rigidly segmented and controlled. Accordingly, the 
call for a collective, transversal project of queer subjectivation – for the creation of ‘a 
culture and an ethics’ that would multiply lateral, extra-institutional connections, as so 
                                                
576 Margaret Thatcher, “Interview for Woman’s Own,” Sept. 23, 1987. 
577 I borrow this term from Jason Read: “Privatization is not just neoliberalism’s strategy for dealing with 
the public sector, what David Harvey calls accumulation by dispossession, but a consistent element of its 
particular form of governmentality, its ethos, everything becomes privatized, institutions, structures, issues, 
and problems that used to constitute the public. It is privatization all the way down” (Read, “A Genealogy 




many freed ‘diagonal lines’ of minoritarian becoming traversing and intensifying the 
‘social fabric’ – is a call to resist the bio-political exercise of neoliberal governmentality.  
In sum: if power operates through the impoverishment of the social fabric so as to 
more effectively manage a population, then contestation will take the form of enriching 
the relational fabric of society, creating ‘new alliances and tying together unforeseen 
lines of force.’ The Foucauldian project of becoming-queer can thus be understood as a 
transversal ethico-politics aiming to establish, through the creation of a non-
institutionalized network of supports, the conditions of material expression for new 
modes of existence and culture, “new forms of community”578 that challenge the 
neoliberal techniques of control (individualizing subjection, relational vitiation), through 
which biopower manages the conduct and conditions of the population.
                                                
578 Deleuze, Foucault, 151, n. 45, translation modified. Deleuze’s phrase, nouvelles formes de communauté, 




CHAPTER 6. INTENSITY, UPRISING, CRITIQUE: FOUCAULT’S POLITICAL 
PHILOSOPHY OF AGENCY 




6.1 Return to Verticality: In Defense of the Limit-Experience 
Over the course of the last three chapters, we have seen how Foucault’s political 
thought develops in response to the problem of material expression: first indexed on the 
concept of verticality, which issued into the abandoned literary politics of transgression, 
this problem, set within the specific context of the capitalist social formation, finds a 
more adequate solution through the articulation of transversal politics, an articulation 
itself made possible by Foucault’s philosophical friendship with Deleuze.  
It might seem to be implied by this chronological presentation that verticality is 
surpassed by transversality as the conceptual basis for Foucault’s theory of political 
agency or transformation. Such a conclusion would indeed cohere with the generally 
accepted view that Foucault’s early fascination with the notion of transgression, and with 
the category of the ‘limit-experience’ more generally, can be reduced to something like 
an aspect of intellectual adolescence he later outgrew; for example, this view is expressed 
clearly in Ian Hacking’s assertion that the tragic experience of unreason from History of
                                                




Madness attests to a “romantic illusion” that Foucault will correct and “strip” from his 
subsequent, more “mature” works.580  
Without denying the auto-critical transformations of Foucault’s thought, I will, in 
effect, argue against the general view that minimizes the abiding philosophical 
significance, for his work, of the limit-experience. One of the chief objectives of the 
present chapter will be to show how, rather than rejecting the concept of verticality along 
with his literary politics, Foucault in fact modifies and redeploys it: the vertical form of 
limit-experience is recast intensively through an analysis of revolt as the degree zero of 
power’s exercise, which makes political agency possible (and serves as the ultimate 
anchor for concretely realized human freedom); and the vertical form of critique is 
elaborated as necessary for both the sustainability of collective uprising (or the 
revolutionary process of collective subjectivation) and the ethico-political agency of 
thought. In other words, rather than being eclipsed by transversality, the concept of the 
vertical becomes its integral complement, allowing a more complete analysis of the set of 
                                                
580 Ian Hacking, “Preface,” History of Madness, xii. Hacking elaborates: “A romantic fantasy lurks here, the 
purity of the possessed, those who not only speak the truth in paradox, like the fools in Shakespeare, but 
who are also themselves the truth. The fantasy leaps out at you from the 1961 preface, in words suppressed 
in 1964: ‘a madness whose wild state can never be reconstituted; but in the absence of that inaccessible 
primitive purity …’ (p. xxxiii). There it is: the inaccessible primitive purity. ... One of these books is 
governed by an idea of déraison, in which there lurks a dream of madness in the wild, as something 
prediscursive, inaccessible, pure. … Once Foucault’s idea of archaeology had matured, it appears that an 
archaeology can only be of what is said. If so, the second book (of the two identical texts) is no longer an 
archaeology of silence. It is the work of an author who is no longer obsessed by the fear of madness and 
dread of unreason. He has made peace with both, and has moved on to the greatest of his archaeologies, 
The Order of Things (1966)” (ibid, xi-xii). It is worth noting in passing the irony that Hacking refers to The 
Order of Things as exemplary of a Foucauldian archaeology that would be ‘stripped’ of all reference to a 
limit-experience in its ‘primitive purity’; for in the preface of that work, Foucault characterizes his 
undertaking as “an attempt to analyse” “the pure experience of order and its modes of being,” “this 
experience of order in its pure primary state,” where one encounters ‘the il y a of order’ as that which is 
“most fundamental of all: anterior to words, perceptions, and gestures” (Foucault, The Order of Things, xx). 
The point of noting this, of course, is not to detract from The Order of Things, but to suggest the persistent 




necessary conditions for political agency, which is to say, of the solution to the political 
problem of material expression.  
Still, before pursuing this line of approach, it is worth considering at some length a 
possible objection to it. As we saw in Chapter 3, whether in its experiential or critical 
mode, verticality implies a kind of limit-relation to history: e.g., the work of the dreaming 
imagination as ‘that which in existence is most irreducible to history’; the limit-
experience of unreason at the degree zero of history, i.e., that the exclusion of which 
enables the horizontal unfolding of reason or western culture; and the vertical critique of 
this horizontal history, which uncovers arbitrary division and contingency at the ‘origin’ 
of what takes itself to be grounded in universal necessity. Generally speaking, the vertical 
formulation of the problem of material expression may be put as follows: how can that 
which is irreducible to history nevertheless act upon and transform the conditions of 
history, that is, the historical conditions of social production? Now, in the case of 
literature, we have already seen Foucault come to reject one way of conceiving this 
vertical irreducibility, namely, as exteriority to the social formation. Why should we not 
also think that this criticism would apply to the other instances of experiential verticality, 
such as dreams and unreason, which are explicitly ‘transcendent’ forms of limit-
experience?  
In other words, why should we not accept the widely held view that Foucault’s 
youthful interest in limit-experiences was merely a naïve romanticism, a vestige of 
transcendent thought that will be shed through his subsequent analyses of discourse and 




offers a self-criticism of his notion of experience in History of Madness581 and (2) 
suppresses the original preface of that work (which contained the crucial reference to the 
‘constant verticality’ that ‘confronts Western culture with what it is not,’ disrupting 
‘reason in its horizontal becoming’), ostensibly in response (and concession) to Derrida’s 
famous critique?582 In short, if, from the beginning, the conceptual basis of verticality is 
given by a form of experience that becomes philosophically suspect or expendable, why 
return to verticality at all? 
 
6.1.1 The Sublime Function of the Limit-Experience: The Project of Desubjectivation 
In order to address this possible set of objections, let us begin by responding to 
point (1) above. When Foucault retrospectively criticizes his “very floating”583 use of the 
term “experience” in History of Madness, it is not the limit-experience of unreason that 
he specifically distances himself from, so much as his recurrent appeals to a kind of 
collective cultural perception or consciousness of madness, e.g., the ‘Great Fear’ said to 
have gripped the classical period.584 In the editor’s introduction to History of Madness, 
Jean Khalfa is thus correct to point out that such an invocation of “experience” borrows 
                                                
581 See, for` example, Paolo Savoia, “Madness,” The Cambridge Foucault Lexicon, 277-278. 
582 See, for example, Jean Khalfa, “Introduction,” History of Madness, xxiii. 
583 Foucault, “Preface to The History of Sexuality, Volume Two,” Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth, 202. 
584 See, for example, Psychiatric Power: “It seems to me that, above all, I was trying to study the image of 
madness produced in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the fear it aroused, and the knowledge 
formed with reference to it, either traditionally, or according to botanical, naturalistic, and medical models, 
etcetera. It was this core of representations, of both traditional and non-traditional images, fantasies, and 
knowledge, this kind of core of representations that I situated as the point of departure, as the site of origin 
of the practices concerning madness that managed to establish themselves in the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries. In short, I accorded a privileged role to what could be called the perception of madness” 
(Foucault, Psychiatric Power, 12-13). Notice that this self-criticism does not apply to the modern works of 
unreason in the 19th and 20th centuries, that is, the tragic lineage running from Sade through Hölderlin and 




from the “vocabulary of the phenomenological approach,”585 which explains why 
Foucault will later reproach himself for having offered what was “still an analysis of 
representations”586 and therefore “still close to admitting an anonymous and general 
subject of history.”587 However, where Khalfa errs is in identifying this 
phenomenological notion of experience with the tragic or transgressive concept of the 
limit-experience in the original preface.  
Indeed, in an important interview with Duccio Trombadori from 1978, in which 
Foucault emphasizes the essential and persistent impact of Nietzsche, Bataille, and 
Blanchot on his thought, he explicitly distinguishes phenomenological experience from 
limit-experiences:  
The phenomenologist’s experience is basically a certain way of bringing a reflective 
gaze to bear on some object of ‘lived experience,’ on the everyday in its transitory 
form, in order to grasp its meanings. For Nietzsche, Bataille, Blanchot, on the other 
hand, experience is trying to reach a certain point in life that is as close as possible 
to the ‘unlivable,’ to that which can’t be lived through. What is required is the 
maximum of intensity and the maximum of impossibility at the same time. … 
Moreover, phenomenology attempts to recapture the meaning of everyday 
experience in order to rediscover the sense in which the subject that I am is indeed 
responsible, in its transcendental functions, for founding that experience together 
with its meanings. On the other hand, in Nietzsche, Bataille, and Blanchot, 
experience has the function of wrenching the subject from itself, of seeing to it that 
the subject is no longer itself, or that it is brought to its annihilation or its 
dissolution. This is a project of desubjectivation. The idea of a limit-experience that 
wrenches the subject from itself is what was important to me in my reading of 
Nietzsche, Bataille, and Blanchot….588 
 
                                                
585 Khalfa, “Introduction,” History of Madness, xx. 
586 Foucault, Psychiatric Power, 12. 
587 Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge, translated by Sheridan Smith, 16. 
588 Foucault, “Interview with Michel Foucault,” Power, 241, my emphasis. In another interview given in 
the same year, Foucault again clarifies the seminal importance, for his thought, of the project of de-
subjectivation as elaborated by Bataille, Blanchot, and Klossowski, whom he credits with being “the first to 
emphasize the problem of the subject as a basic problem of philosophy and of modern thought” (Foucault, 
“The Stage of Philosophy,” New York Magazine of Contemporary Art and Theory, Issue 1.5 – Scenes of 




Foucault thus opposes the limit-experience to phenomenological experience in 
much the same way that, as we saw in Chapter 2, the experience of the sublime in Kant 
can be opposed to ordinary empirical experience: that is, as a maximally intensive 
experience of the impossible that ruptures both the unity of the subject – taken in its 
transcendental function as the founding act of meaning, or, in Kantian terms, as the 
‘formal unity of consciousness in the synthesis of the manifold of representations’ – and 
the unity of the object, taken as the world of ‘everyday experience.’ This is also akin to 
the opposition we encountered in Chapter 3, where Foucault contrasts the anthropological 
analytic of finitude, made possible by Kant’s Copernican turn, to the radicalization of this 
finitude through the limit-experience of transgression, in that instance exemplified in the 
being of literary language (and the thought of the outside that modern literature opens 
onto).589  
In all of these cases, what is essential is the dissolution of the subject position as 
original or constitutive ground. Indeed, the ‘project of desubjectivation,’ first articulated 
by Foucault in terms of the tragic limit-experience of unreason, continues to animate his 
thought, up to and including his late account of transversal political struggle “against the 
                                                
589 See, for example, Foucault’s homage to Bataille, “Preface to Transgression,” where, with regard to the 
thought of transgression, he writes: “Undoubtedly, it can be said that it comes to us through that opening 
made by Kant in Western philosophy when he articulated, in a manner that is still enigmatic, metaphysical 
discourse and reflection on the limits of our reason. However, Kant ended by closing this opening when he 
ultimately relegated all critical investigations to an anthropological question; and undoubtedly, we have 
subsequently interpreted Kant’s actions as the granting of an indefinite respite to metaphysics, because 
dialectics substituted for the questioning of being and limits the play of contradiction and totality. To 
awaken us from the confused sleep of dialectics and of anthropology, we required the Nietzschean figures 
of tragedy, of Dionysus, of the death of God, of the philosopher's hammer, of the Superman approaching 
with the steps of a dove, of the Return. But why, in our day, is discursive language so ineffectual when 
asked to maintain the presence of these figures and to maintain itself through them? Why is it so nearly 
silent before them, as if it were forced to yield its voice so that they may continue to find their words, to 
yield to these extreme forms of language in which Bataille, Maurice Blanchot, and Pierre Klossowski have 





government of individualization,”590 that is, against “the type of individualization linked 
to the state”591 (e.g., in the minoritarian project of becoming-queer). 
Considering the consistently maintained conceptual distinction between the notion 
of experience that Foucault will criticize himself for having employed, and the category 
of the limit-experience; and considering that the philosophical upshot of the limit-
experience, the ‘project of desubjectivation,’ continues to sound in Foucault’s articulation 
of political struggle over two decades later; we can thus conclude that Foucault’s 
retrospective objections to History of Madness do not provide grounds for dismissing the 
vertical limit-experience as a viable political concept. Moreover, lest the particular 
examples of the limit-experience in Foucault’s work appear to be limited to the 1960s (in 
which case it might be argued that the thought remained merely an early influence), in the 
same interview with Trombadori, Foucault explicitly indicates how the major line of his 
archaeological and genealogical project consists in an effort to develop the concept of the 
limit-experience, and specifically the Bataillean experience of transgression, from the 
perspective of a critical history of thought: 
Everything I’ve been concerned with up to now has to do basically with the way 
men in Western societies have produced these experiences – fundamental ones, no 
doubt – which consist in engagement in a process of acquiring knowledge of a 
domain of objects, while at the same time they are constituting themselves as 
subjects with a fixed and determinate status. … I made an effort, in particular, to 
understand how man had transformed certain of these limit-experiences into objects 
of knowledge – madness, death, crime. That is where one reencounters some of 
Georges Bataille’s themes, but applied to a collective history which is that of the 
West and its knowledge. It’s always a question of limit-experiences and the history 
of truth.592 
                                                
590 Foucault, “The Subject and Power,” 330. 
591 Ibid, 336. This is, of course, the negative formulation of the positive project of transversal politics, 
namely, the composition of non-denumerable human multiplicities that would be “constant generator[s] of 
de-individualization” (Foucault, “Preface,” Anti-Oedipus, xiv). 





It is thus no exaggeration to say that, far from the fleeting vestige of an immature 
romanticism, the category of the limit-experience centrally informs the trajectory of 
Foucault’s work, including History of Madness, The Birth of the Clinic (which analyzes 
the appropriation of death as an object of positivist medicine), Discipline and Punish, and, 
no doubt also, The History of Sexuality, Vol. 1.593 These books should be understood in 
the strict sense as historical critiques, that is, as analyses of the historical conditions of 
possibility for the formation of fields of experience, including the constitutive processes 
of what Foucault calls “objectivation” (“determining under what conditions something 
can become an object for a possible knowledge, how it may have been problematized as 
an object to be known, to what selective procedure it may have been subjected, the part of 
it that is regarded as pertinent”) and “subjectivation” (“determin[ing] what the subject 
must be, to what condition he is subject, what status he must have, what position he must 
occupy in reality or in the imaginary, in order to become a legitimate subject of this or 
that type of knowledge”).594  
In other words, Foucault’s critical histories can be read as so many ‘vertical 
reinterpretations’ of how different limit-experiences have been excluded, defused, or 
appropriated as the basis for the formation of dominant regimes of power-knowledge, 
including the production of normalizing and individualizing forms of subjectivity, or 
what we have seen Deleuze and Guattari call the ‘binary segmentation’ of major and 
                                                
593 In the same interview some 10 pages later, Foucault will include sexuality among the list of limit-
experiences: “I’ve already spoken about limit-experiences, and that’s the theme that really fascinated me – 
for me, madness, death, sexuality, and crime are more intense subjects.” (Foucault, “Interview with Michel 
Foucault,” Power, 266, translation modified; the English translation fails to include the word “death,” mort, 
which appears in the French) 




minor identities (the sane and the insane, the healthy and the sick, the law-abiding and the 
criminal, the straight and the queer). 
 
6.1.2 Foucault’s ‘Reply to Derrida’: Toward a Politics of the Limit-Event 
Nevertheless, it remains the case that Foucault did, in fact, remove his original 
preface from the second edition of History of Madness, a gesture which is often depicted 
as a response to Derrida’s forceful critique. Further, in the 1972 edition, Foucault 
replaced what had initially been the lead title, Folie et Déraison (‘Madness and 
Unreason’: a rare example, for the title of a French book, of a second term being 
capitalized), with what had been at first just the subtitle, Histoire de la folie à l’âge 
classique (‘History of Madness in the Classical Age’). Thus, one might continue to press 
the objection as follows: even if Foucault’s retrospective self-criticism refers to his overly 
phenomenological account of the collective perception of madness, rather than to the 
tragic limit-experience of unreason; and even if the general category of the limit-
experience persists in informing his critical project; his editorial decisions still suggest a 
critical distance taken from his early notion of experiential verticality, and thus cast doubt 
on the viability of reconstructing a vertical politics. In order to answer this more difficult 
objection, we must take a closer look at Derrida’s “Cogito and the History of Madness” 
(presented in 1963, two years after the publication of History of Madness) and the 
question of Foucault’s putative tacit concession nine years later.  
Derrida’s essay challenges Foucault’s history of madness on two levels. The first, 




Foucault’s project: namely, its attempt “to write a history of madness itself,”595 whether 
as an ‘archeology of silence’ or in terms of a constitutive division between reason and 
madness that would be the birth of western culture. For Derrida, this attempt, insofar as 
Foucault’s history is itself necessarily a work of reason, is consigned to failure in advance: 
either madness would have to be the subject of the work, which is impossible, since to 
speak the language of madness would require that one actually be mad, and, following 
Foucault’s own formula, where there is madness there is no work; or madness would 
have to be the object of the work, in which case it would already have been ineluctably 
appropriated by reason, and Foucault would thus be recommitting the very gesture of 
violence that he condemns. Madness, then, as disqualified subject or already-captured 
object: either way, it is impossible to render a history of madness in which the truth of 
madness itself would speak.596  
In turn, the second level of Derrida’s critique takes aim at a three page passage on 
Descartes’s First Meditation, which appears at the beginning of Foucault’s second 
                                                
595 Jacques Derrida, “Cogito and the History of Madness,” in Writing and Difference, translated by Alan 
Bass, 39. Derrida elaborates: “In writing a history of madness, Foucault has attempted—and this is the 
greatest merit, but also the very infeasibility of his book—to write a history of madness itself. Itself. Of 
madness itself. That is, by letting madness speak for itself. Foucault wanted madness to be the subject of 
his book in every sense of the word: its theme and its first-person narrator, its author, madness speaking 
about itself. Foucault wanted to write a history of madness itself, that is madness speaking on the basis of 
its own experience and under its own authority, and not a history of madness described from within the 
language of reason, the language of psychiatry on madness – the agonistic and rhetorical dimensions of the 
preposition on overlapping here – on madness already crushed beneath psychiatry, dominated, beaten to the 
ground, interned, that is to say, madness made into an object and exiled as the other of a language and a 
historical meaning which have been confused with logos itself” (ibid). 
596 It is worth noting that this line of criticism fails to mark the distinction Foucault makes between 
unreason – which, precisely, is given or rather seizes the power of expression, by contrast to the madness 
that the poets of unreason end up succumbing to – and madness qua mental illness: to speak in the tragic 
language of unreason, to compose and structure one’s work and thought so as to express the tragic insight 
of that broken lineage, is a far cry from appropriating madness through a form of reason that would 
‘confine it in mental illness’. Indeed, to fail to distinguish between unreason and mental illness in this way, 
as Derrida and those who follow him do, is exactly to re-enact the forgetting, to unwittingly restage the 
oblivion of the limit-experience of the tragic; and it is also to miss the central problem (of material 
expression) and project (to articulate the conditions for realizing and sustaining this expression) at the heart 




chapter, “The Great Confinement.” Here, Foucault suggests that the exclusion of madness 
proper to the classical period, realized at a socio-institutional level through widespread 
practices of internment, becomes realized at the epistemico-discursive level through the 
surreptitiously grounding decision taken by the meditating subject to dogmatically refuse 
the possibility of being mad as a skeptical reason for doubt. Derrida argues that 
Foucault’s reading is both unfaithful to Descartes and symptomatic of the founding 
impossibility of History of Madness: unfaithful, because Foucault does not sufficiently 
attend to the Cartesian ‘order of reasons,’ according to which the madness hypothesis is 
first surpassed by an equivalent but more universally accessible reason for doubt (the 
dreaming hypothesis) and then covered by the evil genius hypothesis (which is the 
madness hypothesis hyperbolized); and symptomatic, because whereas Foucault suggests 
that the Meditations enact an exteriorization of madness (the madness to which he would 
give voice, or at least whose silencing he would uncover), in fact, they open onto the 
“mad audacity” proper to philosophy itself, namely, the ability of the basic metaphysical 
truth of the Cogito to withstand the test of madness, to be “valid even if I am mad.”597  
In other words, for Derrida, what Foucault in his preface calls “the obscure common 
root”598 of reason and madness – the “degree zero of the history of madness, when it was 
undifferentiated experience, the still undivided experience of the division itself”599 – is 
not a tragic limit-experience expelled by philosophy as the latter’s first condition. Rather, 
before any historical act of founding division would have been instituted, this common 
root is embedded in the very ground of philosophy, in the “supreme self-confidence” and 
                                                
597 Derrida, “Cogito and the History of Madness,” 67. 
598 Foucault, History of Madness, xxxiii. 




“hyperbolic audacity of the Cartesian Cogito,” “this zero point” or “impenetrable point of 
certainty” that makes possible any “project of thinking.”600   
It would thus seem that much of the force of Derrida’s critique is directed against 
Foucault’s original preface. Nevertheless, most of the attention in the Foucault-Derrida 
debate has centered around their competing interpretations of Descartes, and this, for the 
apparently straightforward reason that Foucault – by removing his original preface from 
the second edition of History of Madness; and by focusing his well-known rejoinder, an 
essay entitled “My Body, This Paper, This Fire” and appended to that second edition, on 
the disputed passage from the First Meditation – seems to have largely conceded 
Derrida’s first line of criticism. In point of fact, however, Foucault penned two responses 
to Derrida in 1972: the aforementioned appendix is a revision of an earlier essay, which 
first appeared in the Japanese journal Paideia under the simple title “Reply to 
Derrida.”601 This initial response is shorter than the more famous second version, and its 
exegetical engagement with Descartes’s text, less developed; but what it shows, which 
tends to drop out of the later text, is not only that Foucault does marshal an answer to 
Derrida’s first set of charges, but that he does so in the strongest of terms, clarifying the 
philosophical and political significance of the debate. 
Two considerable issues are at stake here: (1) whether or not reason has its ground 
in a constitutive exclusion, which would leave the rational project itself unjustified, with 
                                                
600 Derrida, “Cogito and the History of Madness,” 67-8. 
601 “Reply to Derrida” was first translated into English in 2006 as an appendix to History of Madness, 
which may account in part for why, at least in the Anglophonic world, this essay has remained so 
uncommented upon. Still, it is perhaps indicative of a more general attitude – to wit, that the first essay is 
merely a rough draft of the second – that in his introduction, Jean Khalfa, the editor and co-translator of 
History of Madness, says nothing about the content of “Reply to Derrida” other than describing it as “an 




no foundation other than one of arbitrary violence; and (2) whether philosophical 
discourse can enter into relation with what is radically outside it, or whether, with Derrida, 
“the exterior (is) the interior,”602 “there is nothing outside the text,”603 and the supposed 
radicality of exteriority is always already contained within, made possible by, and 
reiterated through philosophy itself. In the first case, Derrida challenges the core of 
Foucault’s project as a counter-history (and, specifically for our purposes, as vertical 
critique), while in the second, he rejects the very concept of the ‘thought of the outside’ 
that was so integral to Foucault’s work throughout the 1960s (and to the vertical form of 
the limit-experience).  
Foucault’s answer in “Reply to Derrida,” unique to this essay, is to argue that if 
Derrida cannot conceive of a form of thought that would open onto the outside – if he is 
“so preoccupied with remaining in the interiority of philosophy” that he cannot 
“recognize this external event, this limit event, this primary division”604 by which the 
positivity of reason is predicated on the exclusion of madness –, then this is because 
Derrida’s own thought is determined by three “postulates” that serve as the traditional 
armature for the institution of philosophy in France.605 First, every form of knowledge or 
rational discourse “entertains a fundamental relation with philosophy,”606 which confers 
on the former its epistemic justification as rational or as knowledge (philosophy as law of 
discourse). Second, any mistake made in regard to philosophy is not an error in argument 
                                                
602 Derrida, “Cogito and the History of Madness,” 46. 
603 Foucault, “My Body, This Paper, This Fire,” Aesthetics, Method, and Epistemology, 416. Cf.: “There is 
nothing outside of the text [there is no outside-text; il n’y a pas de hors-texte]” (Derrida, Of Grammatology, 
translated by Gayatri Spivak,158). 
604 Foucault, “Reply to Derrida,” in History of Madness, 589, my emphasis. 
605 It is worth keeping in mind that in between Derrida’s critique and Foucault’s replies, the revolts of 1968 
had taken place, in which the university as a functionary of power had become the object of political 
struggle. 




so much as “a blend of Christian sin and Freudian slip,”607 a moral fault inadvertently 
revealing a wayward inner logic that only philosophy can disclose and correct 
(philosophy as totalization of meaning and moralization of truth). Third, philosophy, as 
“the repetition of an origin that is more than originary, and which infinitely exceeds, in its 
retreat, anything that it could say in any of its historical discourses,”608 is sealed off from 
any event, any encounter with singular forces outside it that it would not have been able 
to master in advance (philosophy as impermeable to the event).  
In other words, Foucault’s reply to the first part of Derrida’s critique is to disclose 
the dominant conditions of discourse that make his charge possible – and then to call 
these conditions themselves into question. Indeed, for Foucault, the three postulates 
summarize everything in the intellectual domain from which he had tried “for so long”609 
to free himself.  
In opposition to them, he advances three counter-theses, following from the method 
of ‘archaeology’ that he had developed in the intervening years since Derrida’s essay. 
First, philosophy is not foundational for knowledge; on the contrary, the formation of 
philosophy as a kind of knowledge is itself subject to historico-epistemic conditions that 
are exterior to it. Second, “the systematicity which links together forms of discourse, 
concepts, institutions, and practices is not of the order of a forgotten radical thought that 
has been covered over and hidden from itself, nor is it a Freudian unconscious,”610 but 
rather, the unconscious of knowledge is constituted by a specific set of rules governing 
the emergence of statements and discursive practices. Third, far from being impermeable 
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to events, thought itself can be understood as an event (e.g., a singular, transformative 
epistemic event, such as the Copernican turn), and the history of thought can be analyzed 
in terms of “the ‘events’ that can come about in the order of knowledge, and which 
cannot be reduced either to the general law of some kind of ‘progress’, or the repetition 
of an origin”611; it is in this sense that Foucault refers to History of Madness as “the 
analysis of an event.”612 He then applies this archaeological method to the exegetical 
dispute over the First Meditation, arguing that the foundational exclusion of madness by 
the meditating subject can only be apprehended when the text is read as a meditative 
technique, that is, as a series of discursive events modifying the subject, rather than 
through the traditional lens of the ‘order of reason’ imported by Derrida. 
If, for Foucault, what is at stake philosophically in this debate with Derrida is the 
evental status of thought, then conversely, the political stakes concern the thought of the 
event. In an interview given just three months prior to the publication of “Reply to 
Derrida,” Foucault identifies the categories of power and the event as central to the kind 
of counter-knowledge that, as we saw in Chapter 4, he will later call a ‘philosophy of the 
people’:  
Under the categories of what has alternately been called ‘truth,’ ‘man,’ ‘culture,’ 
‘writing,’ etc., it is always a matter of warding off the shock of that which happens 
[ce qui se produit]: the event. … In the broadest sense, the event and power are 
what are excluded from knowledge, such as it is organized in our society. This is to 
be expected, since class power (which determines this knowledge) must appear 
inaccessible to the event; and the event, in its dangerous aspect, must be dominated 
and dissolved in the continuity of a class power that remains unnamed. On the other 
hand, the proletariat develops a form of knowledge where it is a question of the 
struggle for power, of what must be done to give rise to the event, respond to its 
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urgency, or avoid it, etc.; this is a knowledge that is absolutely inassimilable to the 
first kind, since it is centered around power and the event.613 
 
The appearance of impermeability to the event is required for the organization of a 
dominant form of power-knowledge that must present itself as natural, necessary, or 
universal so as to cover over its own contingency (hence mutability, fragility); in turn, 
this concealment functions to safeguard the invisibility of power, to mask its exercise and 
its effects on the conditions of the possible. Seen in this light, when Foucault opposes his 
own mode of analysis to Derridean deconstruction by asserting that Derrida “does not 
know the category of the singular event,”614 at issue is less a methodological question615 
than the implied political charge that Derrida’s thought is determined by, and unwittingly 
reinforces, ‘class power.’  
Thus, far from tacitly conceding Derrida’s essential claim that ‘the exterior (is) the 
interior,’ and thereby abandoning the thesis of constitutive exclusion along with his 
original preface, Foucault instead situates Derrida’s critique itself, and his philosophical 
project more generally, within the regime of power-knowledge that functions by 
excluding the double thought of the singular event – ‘this external event, this limit event, 
this primary division’ – and power. By positioning Derrida as “the most profound and the 
most radical”616 contemporary example of philosophy qua dominant discourse, Foucault 
thus seeks to flip deconstruction on its head, effectively charging it with being a 
monolithic, logocentric, totalizing form of discourse that forecloses any relation to an 
                                                
613 Foucault, “Revolutionary Action: ‘Until Now’”, Language, Counter-memory, Practice, 220-1, 
translation modified, my emphasis; cf. “Par-delà le bien et le mal,” Dits et écrits I, 1094. 
614 Foucault, “Reply to Derrida,” 577. 
615 Such may be suggested by Foucault’s better known polemical statement in his second response to 
Derrida that deconstruction is “a historically well determined little pedagogy” (Foucault, “My Body, This 
Paper, This Fire,” Aesthetics, Method, and Epistemology, 416). 




outside and thus to difference as such, which is to say, to the singular event as production 
of the new and force of transformation.  
By contrast, what is needed, and what Foucault will seek to elaborate, is a form of 
counter-knowledge ‘centered around power and the event’: a kind of minoritarian 
philosophy (‘of the people’), which Deleuze and Guattari, referring to Foucault, call 
“outside thought” or “counterthought,”617 and which Foucault, referring to Deleuze, calls 
“thought of the multiple – of the nomadic and dispersed multiplicity”.618 Indeed, it is 
precisely the “intensive thought” of Deleuze – about which Foucault writes: “new 
thought is possible; thought is again possible”619 – that enables Foucault to recast the 
concept of verticality, to which our next section will turn.  
However, before concluding our consideration of the possible set of objections to 
verticality’s return, the fact must still be addressed: in 1972, Foucault suppressed the 
original preface of History of Madness, containing the key reference (in that work) to 
experiential verticality, as well as the original title, containing the capitalized word 
“Unreason.” What, then, did he reject exactly? I would suggest there are at least three 
reasons for this self-distancing, all of which are addressed by (and help explain) the 
subsequent conceptual developments of verticality. 
First, the form of expression proper to the limit-experience of unreason – that 
through which experiential verticality is realized – is the work of art, especially the work 
of literature. Accordingly, Foucault effectively abandons this aspect of his earlier project 
when he abjures his literary politics (by the end of 1970); it then becomes a matter of 
                                                
617 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 376-7. 
618 Foucault, “Theatrum Philosophicum,” Aesthetics, Method, and Epistemology, 358. 




relocating the vertical form of limit-experience, from intellectual works to the collective 
experience of political uprising.  
Second, Foucault rejects the element of transcendence and its residual appeal to a 
kind of existential authenticity that had characterized his early notion of the vertical limit-
experience (e.g., the tragic axis of the death dream, or the invocation of Artaud and his 
notion of the ‘authentically insane’). He then reformulates the irreducibility of 
experiential verticality in terms of intensity (what Deleuze calls the ‘intensive,’ as 
opposed to the ‘extensive,’ or ‘becoming,’ as opposed to ‘history’): in the will to revolt, 
the vertical limit-experience becomes immanent, collectively realized and “transformed 
into a force,”620 and the degree zero refers to the absolute limit of power’s exercise. 
Third, with respect to critical verticality, while Foucault does not reject the general 
notion of constitutive division, he does distance himself from what in the original preface 
had suggested a certain primordiality of the limit-experience, which, preceding the 
chronological order of history, would be realized in history as something like the return 
of the repressed.621 Foucault maintains the critical concept of the degree zero as vertical 
limit, 622 but he does so from the genealogical perspective that takes ‘origin’ to refer to a 
site of emergence in the immanent plane of force relations, which is to say, as a singular, 
                                                
620 Foucault, “Tehran: Faith against the Shah,” in Janet Afary and Kevin B. Anderson, Foucault and the 
Iranian Revolution: Gender and the Seductions of Islam, 202. 
621 It is this aspect of early Foucauldian verticality that, as we saw in Chapter 3, Althusser identified with 
Foucault’s ‘transcendentalist tendency.’ 
622 To the double nature of the concept of verticality, with its two aspects, experiential and critical, there 
correspond two notions of the degree zero as vertical limit: (1) the experience of the limit, which refers to 
the experiential degree zero, whether the vertical experience of originary exclusion (as in History of 
Madness’s original preface) or of the absolute limit of power’s exercise (as in the will to revolt, the 
experience of the intolerable); and (2) the experience at the limit, which refers to the critical degree zero, 
the vertical perspective on the emergence of singular events as sites of transformative force (as in the 





transformative event whose upsurge constitutes the entrance of force into history; such is 
the production of the new, which is also a rupture in the historical conditions of social 
production that constitutes the very possibility of political agency. 
In sum, Foucault removed his original preface from History of Madness in response 
to two problems. The first is the problem of transcendence, which prompts the vertical 
limit-experience to be reconceived intensively, both with respect to the limit itself, i.e., 
the degree zero (of history, of power’s exercise), and with respect to the relation to that 
limit (whether the genealogical perspective on history, or the collective experience of 
political uprising). The second is the problem of material expression, since a new “form 
of expression”623 other than literature must be conceived that would satisfy the conditions 
of realization for this intensive experiential verticality to be ‘transformed into a force,’ 
prompting the conceptual convergence of vertical and transversal politics in Foucault’s 
theory of revolt. Detailing Foucault’s response to these problems will ultimately provide 
us the resources for constructing an account of the necessary conditions for political 
agency. 
 
6.2 Middle Experience: The ‘Vertical Dimension of Intensities’ 
6.2.1 The Verticality of Deleuzian Repetition: Evental Thought and Eternal Return 
In Chapter 3, we saw how Deleuze offered Foucault a way out of the impasse 
resulting from the collapse of literary politics in the face of the problem of capitalism. 
What must now be shown is how this ‘way out’ is twofold, corresponding to the double 
thought of power and the event that is excluded from the dominant organization of 
                                                




knowledge in society and affirmed by minoritarian counter-thought. On the one hand, as 
we have seen, the thought of power, which Foucault credits Deleuze with having 
explored,624 initiates the line of transversal politics. On the other hand, for Foucault, 
Deleuze also opens the thought of the event, preparing a renewal of vertical politics by 
allowing the irreducibility proper to verticality to be conceived immanently, as the 
irreducibility of the intensive to the extensive. 
Now, although not named as such, we have already encountered one formulation of 
the Deleuzian concept of the event: namely, the breakthrough, the “revolutionary line of 
flight,” “the revolutionary break” that “cannot be achieved except at the cost of, and by 
means of a rupture with, causality.”625 Similarly, with respect to Deleuze’s earlier event 
philosophy, discussed by Foucault in his review of Logic of Sense and Difference and 
Repetition (“Theatrum Philosophicum,” published in November 1970), events are in 
some sense irreducible to the macrophysical causal order in which they are realized: 
“Physics concerns causes, but events, which arise as its effects, no longer belong to it.”626 
Perhaps we can already begin to sense how verticality, which from the first had 
concerned a basic irreducibility to history and the “rational concatenation of causes,”627 
would align with the thought of the event. It is as though Foucault, just as he is rejecting 
                                                
624 See “Intellectuals and Power,” cited in Chapter 4: “If the reading of your books (from Nietzsche to what 
I anticipate in Capitalism and Schizophrenia) has been essential for me, it is because they seem to go very 
far in exploring this problem: under the ancient theme of meaning, of the signifier and the signified, etc., 
you have developed the question of power, of the inequality of powers and their struggles” (Foucault, 
“Intellectuals and Power,” Language, Counter-Memory, Practice, 213-4). 
625 Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, 377. In our next section’s discussion of the vertical limit-
experience of revolt, we will return to this conception of the event as ‘revolutionary line of flight’ in order 
to better understand the sense in which causality is ruptured. 
626 Foucault, “Theatrum Philosophicum,” 349.  




the vertical exteriority of literature628, finds in Deleuze’s ‘intensive thought’ of 
“incorporeal materiality”629 a new way to conceive verticality, indexed no longer on an 
ontology of literary language but an evental metaphysics of force, or what Foucault calls 
“a metaphysics of the incorporeal event”630: “a metaphysics freed from its original 
profundity as well as from a supreme being”; “a metaphysics where it is no longer a 
question of the One Good but of the absence of God”; a metaphysics, in short, that 
“revolves around atheism and transgression” and recalls “Sade and Bataille”631.  
Indeed, it is precisely in terms of the transgressive sublime function – that is, the 
dissolution of the subject achieved through an intensive limit-experience of thought – that 
Deleuze can be situated in relation to Sade and Bataille, as well as other vertical thinkers 
in between, such as Nietzsche and Artaud. While there is a longer story to tell than is 
presently possible concerning Deleuze’s metaphysics of intensive difference in 
Difference and Repetition, the specifically vertical nature of what he calls ‘repetition for 
itself’ indicates how Deleuze’s thought – which Foucault describes as “genital thought, 
intensive thought, affirmative thought, acategorical thought”632 – enables Foucault to 
recast the concept of verticality. 
For Deleuze, there are two basic “forms of repetition”: the first, a “repetition of the 
Same, explained by the identity of the concept or representation,” is a “horizontal,” 
                                                
628 The interview in which Foucault calls into question his own literary politics, “Folie, littérature, société,” 
was published in December 1970, based on an interview given during Foucault’s trip to Japan from 
September to October of that year. As cited in Chapter 3, in the same interview, Foucault discusses his 
interest in the shared, specifically vertical structure of literature and madness. See Foucault, Dits et écrits I, 
981ff. 
629 Foucault, “Theatrum Philosophicum,” 346. 
630 Ibid, 352. 
631 Ibid, 347-8. 




“extensive,” “ordinary” repetition; the second is a “vertical,” “intensive,” “singular”633 
repetition in which difference itself is what repeats. Now, in general, repetition consists in 
“elements that are absolutely identical (if they are not identical, then there is no 
repetition), but yet must also be different (if they are not distinguishable, then we once 
again have no repetition, as we only have one event).”634 In the first, horizontal form of 
repetition, “when we find ourselves confronted by identical elements with exactly the 
same concept,”635 repetition is representational: the common concept is what accounts for 
the identity of the elements (the sense in which they are the same), while their difference 
must be referred to the subject of representation, to “a change … produced in the mind 
which contemplates….”636 
In other words, as was the case with phenomenological experience, horizontal 
repetition is grounded in the synthetic activity of a constitutive subject; and as was the 
case in our discussion of vertical and horizontal language in early Foucault, horizontality 
                                                
633 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, 24. Deleuze first uses the term vertical to qualify the second form of 
repetition in reference to Binswanger and schizophrenia: “Take an uncovered or bare repetition (repetition 
of the Same) such as an obsessional ceremony or a schizophrenic stereotype: the mechanical element in the 
repetition, the element of action apparently repeated, serves as a cover for a more profound repetition, 
which is played in another dimension, a secret verticality in which the roles and masks are furnished by the 
death instinct. Theatre of terror, Binswanger said of schizophrenia” (ibid, 17-8, my emphasis). Deleuze 
then refers to the work of Raymond Roussel (who also appears as a tragic poet of unreason in History of 
Madness, and to whom Foucault dedicated a book-length study, Death and the Labyrinth, in 1963) and 
Charles Péguy as exemplary of the vertical form of repetition: “Both Peguy and Roussel take language to 
one of its limits: in the case of Roussel, that of similarity and selection, the ‘distinctive feature’ between 
billard and pillard; in the case of Peguy, that of contiguity or combination, the famous tapestry points. Both 
substitute a vertical repetition of distinctive points, which takes us inside the words, for the horizontal 
repetition of ordinary words repeated” (ibid, 22). For additional instances of this distinction between 
horizontal and vertical repetition, see ibid, 84 (“one is actual, the other virtual; one is horizontal, the other 
vertical”) and 287 (“One is static; the other dynamic. One is extensive, the other intensive. One is ordinary; 
the other distinctive and involving singularities. One is horizontal; the other vertical”). See also: “Every 
origin is a singularity and every singularity a commencement on the horizontal line, the line of ordinary 
points on which it is prolonged like so many reproductions or copies which form the moments of a bare 
repetition. It is also, however, a recommencement on the vertical line which condenses singularities and on 
which is woven the other repetition, the line of the affirmation of chance” (ibid, 202). 
634 Henry Somers-Hall, Deleuze’s Difference and Repetition, 56. 
635 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, 23. 




indicates the representational function of thought, in this instance, discursive cognition. 
By contrast, in the second, vertical form of repetition, the identical element that is 
repeated is not some one thing, cognizable under a concept with extension in the ordinary 
world of objects. Rather, the identical element repeated is repetition itself, repetition 
eternally repeating – and thus performing precisely the kind of infinitely recursive, auto-
doubling function that, as we saw in Chapter 2, is distinctive of verticality. Further, and 
for the same reason, the difference ‘between’ elements is understood not by reference to 
the subject of representation, but to an auto-differing of the element of repetition with 
itself: that is, what is repeated, what recurs in ‘repetition for itself,’ is ‘difference in itself,’ 
a pure process of becoming that disperses the fixed identity of the subject. To better 
understand this latter point, let us consider the limit-case, privileged by Deleuze, of 
Nietzsche’s eternal recurrence. 
The thought of the eternal return, first introduced in the penultimate paragraph of 
Book Four of The Gay Science, begins as a meditation on becoming.637 Arising in the 
hour of one’s ‘loneliest loneliness,’ the thought is posed by one’s ‘demon’ as a 
hypothetical test: how would you be affected if you heard that the absolute entirety of 
past and present existence, including your own in its irreversible necessity and singularity, 
were to be eternally repeated and endlessly re-lived? Would you be crushed by the weight 
of resentment, sorrow, and spite, or would you rejoice and declare the good news and its 
daimonic bearer divine? Most simply, then, the thought of the eternal return opens as an 
ethical test of self-affirmation – all things are so tightly entwined that to affirm yourself, 
                                                
637 See Nietzsche, The Gay Science, §341: “The greatest weight.” This paragraph immediately precedes 
Nietzsche’s introduction of Zarathustra in “Incipit tragoedia” (ibid, §342), a passage we encountered in our 




you must affirm the absolute infinity of past and present time – and yields the practical 
maxim: act in such a way that you can will or desire your action to be repeated an infinite 
number of times. 
One who is able to pass this test is thus able to ‘will the past,’ which for Nietzsche 
is the ultimate criterion of becoming-active, the distinguishing mark of the transmutation 
of reactive force by which ressentiment is overcome.638 But since the past invariably 
issues into the present, one can only will the past absolutely if one can affirm the very 
passage and transience of time itself: the infinite movement of destruction and creation, 
the eternal rhythm of passing away and returning, the pure process of becoming. This 
speculative affirmation of what Deleuze calls ‘the being of becoming’ doubles as a 
practical ethical affirmation: one can only will the past by affirming the necessity of its 
role in effectuating the present; by affirming this present moment itself in both its 
singular necessity (this instant could not be any different than it is without altering the 
entirety of the infinite past) and necessary passage; and by thus incorporating the past 
into the futural movement of one’s own active self-becoming.  
To say Yes to the eternal return, then, is to will or desire the repetition of the past as 
an affirmation of the future – which is to say, precisely Deleuze’s concept of ‘repetition 
for itself,’ or vertical repetition, in Difference and Repetition, “making repetition the 
category of the future.”639 In other words, the infinite past is affirmed in the very activity 
of becoming by which the future, too, is affirmed: the affirmation of the open Moment 
                                                
638 This transmutation of reactive force into active-affirmative force will play a key role in the collective 
process of becoming-revolutionary that animates popular revolt. For our previous discussion of 
“ressentiment” and reactive force in Nietzsche, see Chapter 3. 




and the eternity it expresses640 achieves the synthesis of time as the double affirmation of 
past and future.641 By affirming oneself in one’s movement of radical self-becoming, one 
affirms one’s very being as becoming, as a singular expression of the being of becoming 
by which existence itself is affirmed and affirms itself. And it is this thought of radical or 
pure becoming, the ontological primacy of the being of becoming, that explains 
Foucault’s claim that Deleuze’s metaphysics ‘revolves around atheism and transgression,’ 
i.e., around a fundamental groundlessness conceived through an intensive movement of 
thought by which the representational or phenomenological subject position is undone: 
“Repetition in the eternal return never means continuation, perpetuation or prolongation, 
nor even the discontinuous return of something which would at least be able to be 
prolonged in a partial cycle (an identity, an I, a Self) but, on the contrary, … presupposes 
the dissolution of all prior identities.”642  
We can thus see how Deleuze, for Foucault, opens anew the possibility for vertical 
thought – ‘genital thought, intensive thought, affirmative thought, acategorical thought’ –, 
breaking with the representational operation of discursive cognition through the idea of 
eternal recurrence. As Foucault writes, “We must avoid thinking that the return is the 
form of a content that is difference,” which would be to conceive the eternal return on the 
                                                
640 See Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Third Part, “On the Vision and the Riddle,” §2. 
641 “The synthetic relation of the moment to itself as present, past and future grounds its relation to other 
moments. The eternal return is thus an answer to the problem of passage. And in this sense it must not be 
interpreted as the return of something that is, that is ‘one’ or the ‘same’. We misinterpret the expression 
‘eternal return’ if we understand it as ‘return of the same’. It is not being that returns but rather the 
returning itself that constitutes being insofar as it is affirmed of becoming and of that which passes. It is not 
some one thing which returns but rather returning itself is the one thing which is affirmed of diversity or 
multiplicity. In other words, identity in the eternal return does not describe the nature of that which returns 
but, on the contrary, the fact of returning for that which differs. This is why the eternal return must be 
thought of as a synthesis; a synthesis of time and its dimensions, a synthesis of diversity and its 
reproduction, a synthesis of becoming and the being which is affirmed in becoming, a synthesis of double 
affirmation” (Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy, translated by Janis Tomlinson, 48). 




horizontal model of repetition; “rather, from an always-nomadic and anarchic difference,” 
or difference in itself, “to the unavoidably excessive and displaced sign of recurrence,” or 
repetition for itself, “a lightning storm was produced which will bear the name of 
Deleuze: new thought is possible; thought is again possible.”643  
Such thought is genital, a reference to Artaud,644 insofar as it is “an event-thought 
… instead of a subject-thought,” “grappling with exterior forces instead of being gathered 
up in an interior form”645; intensive, insofar as what occurs in the idea of vertical 
repetition is the auto-intensification of thought itself, thought increasing its proper power 
of activity by passing through the test of the eternal return; affirmative, insofar as it is by 
affirming eternal recurrence, as the being of becoming, that thought effects its own 
becoming-active; and a-categorical, insofar as such thought functions as an ‘a-
presentational’646 singularity or degree of power, a “thought-event”647 generating force, 
by contrast to representational or discursive thought, e.g., the Kantian understanding, 
which operates through apprehensive and recognitive syntheses to subsume objects of 
intuition under concepts. Indeed, the example of Kant is doubly relevant, for the thought 
of vertical repetition is precisely akin to the experience of the sublime, which, all while 
undoing the foundational structure of the transcendental subject, elevates thought to its 
                                                
643 Foucault, “Theatrum Philosophicum,” 367. 
644 On Artaud as the thinker of genital thought, i.e., an imageless thought that both destroys the dominant 
image of thought and creates thought anew, see Deleuze: “Artaud pursues in all this the terrible revelation 
of a thought without image, and the conquest of a new principle which does not allow itself to be 
represented. … He knows that thinking is not innate, but must be engendered in thought. He knows that the 
problem is not to direct or methodically apply a thought which pre-exists in principle and in nature, but to 
bring into being that which does not yet exist (there is no other work, all the rest is arbitrary, mere 
decoration). To think is to create – there is no other creation – but to create is first of all to engender 
'thinking' in thought. For this reason Artaud opposes genitality to innateness in thought” (Deleuze, 
Difference and Repetition, 147). Cf. ibid, 114. 
645 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 378. 
646 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, 24. 




greatest intensity, to thought’s own absolute, which is for it a ‘soul-stirring delight’ 
(Kant). 
In short, like the vertical line of flight in early Foucault that frees language from its 
horizontal function as communication, Deleuze opens a form of outside thought through 
the idea of vertical repetition that frees thought itself from its representational function. 
 
6.2.2 Vertical Intensity and the ‘Liberation of Difference’ 
In this light, let us turn, finally, to the passage in “Theatrum Philosophicum” where 
Foucault, referring to Difference and Repetition, first casts “the vertical dimension” in 
terms of intensities. Foucault begins by depicting “the functioning of the concept,” the 
hallmark of discursive cognition, as that which allows the multiplicity of the manifold to 
be ordered according to a table of representations: “For the concept to master difference, 
perception must apprehend global resemblances (which will then be decomposed into 
differences and partial identities) at the root of what we call ‘diversity’ [le divers].”648  
The concept allows any singularity encountered to be recognized, represented as an 
intelligible objet of intuition on the basis of its resemblance to other representations 
(falling under the same concept), from which it can then, in turn, be comparatively 
differentiated. In other words, once the extensity of a singularity is established (that is, 
identified as an object of intuition subsumed under a concept), its intensity can be 
captured or represented as a relative quantity (greater or less): “Each new representation 
must be accompanied [s’accompagne] by those representations which display the full 
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range of resemblances; and in this space of representation (sensation - image - memory), 
likenesses are put to the test of quantitative equalization and graduated quantities, and in 
this way the immense table of measurable differences is constructed.”649 This ‘immense 
table’ is, indeed, how representational thought organizes the manifold as a denumerable 
and orderable multiplicity, ‘mastering difference’ by reducing it to a hierarchical metric 
of comparison. And as with horizontal repetition, where the necessary difference between 
identical elements is ultimately located in a modification of the mind who contemplates 
them, so too, discursive cognition refers back to a subject – in this case, the subject of 
“good sense” – that serves as “the world’s most effective agent of division in its 
recognitions, its establishment of equivalences, its sensitivity to gaps, its gauging of 
distances, as it assimilates and separates.”650  
It will thus come as no surprise that when Foucault articulates verticality in terms of 
intensity, he does so in calling for the overcoming of “the philosophy of representation”: 
“Let us pervert good sense and allow thought to play outside the ordered table of 
resemblances; then it will appear as the vertical dimension [une verticalité] of intensities, 
because intensity, well before its gradation by representation, is in itself pure 
difference…. One must give rise to thought [Il faut penser la pensée] as intensive 
irregularity. Dissolution of the Me.”651 As in Foucault’s earlier formulation, ‘verticality’ 
refers to that which is ‘outside’ the ‘space of representation’ and ‘before’ the procedures 
ordering the latter (in this case, by capturing pure difference and reducing it to a measure 
of comparative ‘gradation’); in some sense, then, vertical irreducibility is still understood 
                                                
649 Ibid, translation modified. 





in terms of exteriority and anteriority. Further, verticality retains its transgressive sublime 
function, dissolving the identity of the subject, or undoing what Bataille called le moi-
sujet. However, rather than to a quasi-primordial experience of transcendence, ‘the 
vertical dimension’ refers now to an intensive vector of thought652: both the thought of 
intensity (intensity as le pensé, or that which is thought) and thought as intensity 
(intensity as la pensée, or thought itself), befitting the auto-implicative structure of 
verticality.653  
Moreover, as intensity, this vertical vector of thought ‘is in itself pure difference,’ a 
singular event or ‘intensive irregularity’ productive of the new. We have seen how this 
holds in the eternal return, where what recurs in vertical repetition is difference in itself 
as the being of becoming; it also holds for intensity generally, insofar as “intensity 
affirms difference”654 in its positivity as intensive singularity. This characteristic of 
intensity distinguishes it from essential properties, which presuppose difference as 
negation, as in the proposition, “if x differs from y, x is not y.”655 Henry Somers-Hall 
explains this point through the example of “the Aristotelian notion of definition”: “when 
we want… to talk about the essence of man, we d[o] so by attributing a property to him 
called a difference. This difference allow[s] us to divide the genus into two opposed 
                                                
652 In this regard, the intensive reformulation of verticality (1970) anticipates an analogous reformulation of 
transversality (1977), which we discussed last chapter in the context of Foucault’s reconceptualization of 
‘the plebe’ (and the outside) as a centrifugal vector of force.  
653 This point can also be put in terms of “the event of thought [la pensée] and the incorporeality of what is 
thought [le pensé]” (Foucault, “Theatrum Philosophicum,” 354). 
654 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, 234. 




classes: the rational and the non-rational. Negation [i]s thus fundamental to the process of 
definition, and to the specification of properties.”656  
Such is the operation of constitutive division at the level of thought, akin to the 
dividing practices of ‘binary segmentarity’ (Deleuze and Guattari) at the level of the 
social formation: that is, a procedure for the “subjection of difference”657 by which 
essential identities are formed through exclusive disjunction between binary opposites. 
Indeed, this is a general feature of categorical thinking, or what Foucault calls “the 
philosophy of representation,” in which “the relationship of two predicates, like red and 
green, is merely the highest level of a complex structure: the contradiction between red 
and not-red (based on the model of being and non-being) is active on the lowest level; the 
nonidentity of red and green (on the basis of a negative test of recognition) is situated 
above this; and this ultimately leads to the exclusive position of red and green (in the 
table where the genus color is specified).”658 
Thus, when Foucault, concluding that “[d]ifference can only be liberated through 
the invention of an acategorical thought,”659 characterizes Deleuze’s atheistic-
transgressive metaphysics as ‘a-categorical’ and ‘affirmative,’ he describes in effect a 
form of ‘counterthought’ (Deleuze and Guattari), one taking as its domain of analysis the 
                                                
656 Somers-Hall, Deleuze’s Difference and Repetition, 177. 
657 Foucault, “Theatrum Philosophicum,” 359, translation modified. It is worth quoting the fuller passage: 
“The most tenacious subjection [assujettissement] of difference is undoubtedly that maintained by 
categories. By showing the number of different ways in which being can express itself, by specifying its 
forms of attribution, by imposing in a certain way the distribution of existing things, categories create a 
condition where being maintains its undifferentiated repose at the highest level. Categories dictate the play 
of affirmations and negations, establish the legitimacy of resemblances within representation, and 
guarantee the objectivity and operation of concepts. They suppress anarchic difference, divide differences 
into zones, delimit their rights, and prescribe their task of specification with respect to individual beings. 
On one side, they can be understood as the a priori forms of knowledge, but, on the other, they appear as an 
archaic morality, the ancient decalogue that the identical imposed upon difference” (ibid).  
658 Ibid, 357. 




‘vertical dimension of intensities,’ which is to say, the evental field of productive 
difference. In such a way does Deleuze, in addition to having explored the thought of 
power, advance the thought of the singular event – which advance thereby enables 
verticality itself to be rethought intensively. As we will see, it is this intensive-vertical 
dimension, precisely, that will be the locus of agential force, designating a condition for 
the possibility of political agency, and, as Foucault will say of revolt, “a last anchor point” 
for “[a]ll the forms of established or demanded freedom....”660  
We can also begin to see how verticality and transversality conceptually interrelate, 
for vertical counter-thought is perfectly consistent with the later, transversal formulation 
of subversive minoritarian counter-discourse. Take, for example, a principle aim of 
transversal politics discussed last chapter, namely, to provide the conditions for a 
“philosophy of the people” to achieve for itself, “through revolt and struggles, the force 
to express itself”661: this kind of project can now be characterized in terms of constructing 
a collective form of expression that would realize, as force, what is experienced by ‘the 
people’ at the vertical level of intensity. That is, if transversal connection satisfies a 
condition for the realization of political agency, it will do so by providing a form of 
expression adequate to solving the vertical problem of material expression (i.e., how that 
which is irreducible to history can nevertheless transform the conditions of history), 
conceived now in intensive terms through the ‘incorporeal materiality’ of the event. This, 
as we will see, is precisely what is at issue in Foucault’s account of political uprising. 
                                                
660 Foucault, “Useless to Revolt?”, 449.  




 Finally, before taking leave of “Theatrum Philosophicum,” it is worth briefly 
remarking on Foucault’s first sentence introducing Difference and Repetition: “Instead of 
denouncing the fundamental omission that is presumed to have inaugurated Western 
culture, Deleuze, with the patience of a Nietzschean genealogist, points to the variety of 
small impurities and paltry compromises.”662 In effect, Foucault here sets Deleuze apart 
from, if not in opposition to, the lineage of thought running from Heidegger to Derrida, 
that is, the critique of metaphysics as the forgetting of Being (that ‘fundamental omission 
that is presumed to have inaugurated Western culture’). Instead, Foucault aligns Deleuze 
with the Nietzschean tradition of genealogy, anticipating his own seminal essay several 
months later, “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History.”663  
However, it is difficult to not also hear in Foucault’s phrasing an implicit self-
distancing from his original preface to History of Madness, where, again with reference 
to Nietzsche, Foucault writes: “At the centre of these limit-experiences of the Western 
world is the explosion, of course, of the tragic itself – Nietzsche having shown that the 
tragic structure from which the history of the Western world is made is nothing other than 
the refusal, the forgetting and the silent collapse of tragedy.”664 In both Foucault’s 
preface from 1961 and his allusion to Heidegger in 1970, what is in question is a 
fundamental forgetting taken to be constitutive of the history of Western culture: in the 
first case, however, it is a thesis advanced by Foucault, whereas in the second, it is one 
against which he favorably contrasts Deleuze. 
                                                
662 Foucault, “Theatrum Philosophicum,” 355. 
663 Foucault’s remarks implicitly contrasting Deleuze from Derrida might also be read as anticipating his 
own responses to Derrida, published just over a year later. 




I would thus suggest that there is a conceptual displacement from the early period 
of Foucault to the middle period, which is made possible, at least in part, by the impact of 
Deleuze on Foucault, and which can be marked, with respect to Foucault’s intellectual 
ancestry, by his shift in emphasis from the Nietzsche of Birth of Tragedy to that of the 
Genealogy. At issue in this displacement – which is something like the becoming-
immanent of Foucault’s thought – will be a rethinking, in intensive terms, of the relation 
between vertical critique and history: which is also to say, a rethinking of the ‘limit event’ 
(‘external event, primary division’) that would no longer appeal to a quasi-primordial 
origins story, nor to an attendant experience of transcendence, but to the emergence of 
singular events within an immanent field of force relations. 
 
6.3 Middle Critique: The ‘Vertical’ Relation of Genealogy to History 
6.3.1 The Contingency and Singularity of Evental Emergence 
In important respects, there is a clear continuity between Foucault’s earlier analysis 
of Nietzschean interpretation (in “Nietzsche, Freud, Marx,” the essay Foucault presented 
at the 1964 Nietzsche conference organized by Deleuze) and his turn to genealogy.665 In 
both cases, Foucault locates in Nietzsche a form of vertical critique that would disclose 
the singular and contingent conditions for what is taken to be grounded in universal 
necessity: e.g., revealing the ‘ideal depth’ of conscience or consciousness, taken as the 
essence of human being, to be in fact the historical effect of force relations, and 
                                                
665 It is interesting to compare the series of terms composing the titles of the two essays, “Nietzsche, Freud, 
Marx” and “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History.” If it is true that the second essay is in some sense a 
development of the first, then one might read “Genealogy” as replacing “Freud,” and “History” as replacing 
“Marx.” In other words, Freud would be replaced by Nietzsche’s genealogical account of drives and 
instincts; and Marx – or more accurately, traditional Marxist historians – would be replaced by Nietzsche’s 




specifically, of the reactive forces of ressentiment, which, blocked from discharging 
themselves in herd society, are re-directed inward, bringing about “the internalizing of 
man” from which there “first grows in man that which he later calls his ‘soul.’”666  
Indeed, this example, which we discussed in Chapter 2, illustrates a basic principle 
of genealogical critique, already active in Foucault’s earlier formulation of vertical 
interpretation: namely, what we might call the contingency thesis. Articulated as an anti-
essentialist critique of original identity, this thesis holds that “behind things,” there is 
“not a timeless and essential secret but the secret that they have no essence…. What is 
found at the historical beginnings of things is not the inviolable identity of their origin; it 
is the dissension of other things. It is disparity.”667  Thus, for instance, genealogy situates 
the ‘soul’ as a chance effect of history, and specifically, of a relation between forces 
(thus indicating a constitutive ‘disparity’ or difference).  
The same can be said for the modern moral values installed through the singular 
event that Nietzsche calls the ‘slave revolt in morality’: to discover the ‘historical 
beginnings’ of ‘good’ and ‘evil’ is to show how they are founded not in universal moral 
truth, but in the ‘dissension’ from or rejection of an older system of values; indeed, it is to 
show how the modern ‘good’ is but the derivative, reactively-formed contrast concept of 
‘evil,’ which is itself the negative transvaluation of what had previously constituted the 
‘good’ (the overflowing strength, etc., of noble morality). As for the purported freedom 
                                                
666 Nietzsche, Genealogy of Morality, Second Treatise: §16, 57. It is worth noting here that in his earlier 
essay on Nietzsche, Foucault refers to “the whole play of reactive forces that Deleuze has analyzed so well 
in his book on Nietzsche” (Foucault, “Nietzsche, Freud, Marx,” 277). 
667 Foucault, “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History,” 371. In a manner consistent with the vertical reinterpretation 
of history in History of Madness, Foucault applies the contingency thesis to reason itself: “Examining the 





of the ‘soul,’ “genealogical analysis shows that the concept of liberty is an ‘invention of 
the ruling classes’ and not fundamental to man’s nature or at the root of his attachment to 
being and truth.”668 That is, rather than pertaining to the essence of the soul or the 
original truth of man’s identity, the ‘concept of liberty’ is itself the effect of a power-
knowledge regime, which is to say, a strategic instrument deployed in a struggle between 
disparate forces. 
In turn, from the application of the contingency thesis to the case of the ‘soul’, there 
follows another basic feature of genealogy, which was already active in Foucault’s 
formulations of experiential verticality: namely, the dissolution of the subject: “Where 
the soul pretends unification or the Me [le Moi] fabricates a coherent identity, the 
genealogist sets out to study the beginning – numberless beginnings, whose faint traces 
and hints of color are readily seen by a historical eye. The analysis of descent permits the 
dissociation of the Me, its recognition and displacement as an empty synthesis, in 
liberating a profusion of lost events.”669 Just as the vertical limit-experience ruptures the 
unity of the ego-subject (moi-sujet), so, too, genealogy performs the transgressive 
sublime function, “shattering the unity of man’s being….”670 However, it does so through 
its movement as vertical critique, “follow[ing] the complex course of descent,” which is 
to say, “maintain[ing] passing events in their proper dispersion” so as to reveal “that truth 
or being lies not at the root of what we know and what we are but the exteriority of 
accidents.”671  
                                                
668 Ibid. 
669 Ibid, 374, my emphasis. 
670 Ibid, 379. 




In other words, recalling Foucault’s depiction seven years prior of the interpretive 
excavator who, by “descend[ing] along the vertical line and show[ing] that this depth of 
interiority is in reality something other than what it says,” “restore[s] the glittering 
exteriority that was covered up and buried”672; and anticipating Foucault’s proposal 13 
years later for “a historical ontology of ourselves” as the “historical investigation into the 
events that have led us to constitute ourselves and to recognize ourselves as subjects of 
what we are doing, thinking, [and] saying”673; genealogy dispels the self’s pretense to an 
inner essence or original identity by disclosing the contingent external events that have 
determined our forms of knowledge and modes of being, “reintroduc[ing] into the realm 
of becoming everything considered immortal in man.”674 Indeed, this includes locating 
the intensive dimension of our affective experience within the evental field of becoming, 
for genealogy “must seek [events] … in what we tend to feel is without history – in 
sentiments, love, conscience, instincts…. We believe that feelings are immutable, but 
every sentiment, particularly the noblest and most disinterested, has a history.”675 
The ‘analysis of descent’ thus reveals the historical contingency of the events that 
have constituted our field of possibility, or the set of conditions for what we can say, 
think, feel, do, and become.676 This descending ‘vertical line’ of critique (tracking with 
Nietzsche’s term Herkunft, “descent”) is, in turn, complemented by an ascending vertical 
line of analysis, which isolates what Foucault, following Nietzsche’s term Entstehung, 
                                                
672 Foucault, “Nietzsche, Freud, Marx,” 273. 
673 Foucault, “What is Enlightenment?”, 315. 
674 Foucault, “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History,” 379.  
675 Ibid, 369, 379. 
676 It is in this context that both Foucault and Deleuze locate the transformative project of Nietzsche’s 
overman: “We would need another sensibility, another way of feeling. … Another becoming, another 




calls “emergence, the moment of arising. It stands as the principle and the singular law of 
an apparition.”677 In other words, genealogical critique follows a double vertical 
movement of (1) descent and (2) emergence; and while the work of the former is ‘to 
maintain passing events in their proper dispersion’ so as to demonstrate the contingency 
of what has constituted contemporary reality, the task of the latter is to grasp these events 
in the singularity of their ‘arising.’678  
By locating the event in its singular ‘apparition’ or “eruption,”679 crossing over the 
“threshold of emergence”680 and entering into history, genealogy thus allows Foucault to 
re-articulate what, in History of Madness, he had termed the ‘degree zero’ of history. At 
issue in both cases is an event – what Foucault, in his first reply to Derrida a year later, 
will call a ‘limit event’ – that is constitutive or transformative of history, yet in some 
sense irreducible to it. This irreducibility designates a kind of limit-relation to history; 
and the form of analysis its perspective makes possible, whether ‘vertical reinterpretation’ 
or what Foucault will now call ‘effective’ history (following Nietzsche’s wirkliche 
Historie, another term for genealogy), contests the traditional conception of history:  
The traditional devices for constructing a comprehensive view of history and for 
retracing the past as a patient and continuous development must be systematically 
dismantled. … An entire historical tradition (theological or rationalistic) aims at 
                                                
677 Foucault, “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History,” 376. Note that Foucault’s term apparition, which connotes 
the phantasmatic, suggests a connection here with Deleuze’s concept of the phantasm, discussed by 
Foucault in “Theatrum Philosophicum.” The notion of phantasm also appears in Nietzsche’s Genealogy 
(e.g., II, §12), as cited by Foucault: “If [the world] appears as a ‘marvelous motley, profound and totally 
meaningful,’ this is because it began and continues its secret existence through a ‘host of errors and 
phantasms’” (Foucault, “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History,” 381). 
678 This double movement of descent and arising would seem to be pre-figured in “Nietzsche, Freud, Marx” 
by the counter-intuitive imagery, discussed in Chapter 3, of the descending interpreter whose interpretation 
is itself an ascending projection: “For if the interpreter must go to the bottom himself, like an excavator, the 
movement of interpretation is, on the contrary, that of a projection [surplomb], of a more and more elevated 
projection….” (Foucault, “Nietzsche, Freud, Marx,” 273)  
679 Foucault, “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History,” 380. 




dissolving the singular event into an ideal continuity – as a theological movement or 
a natural process. ‘Effective’ history, however, deals with [fait resurgir] events in 
terms of their most unique characteristics, their most acute manifestations.681  
 
Like the notion of horizontal history in Foucault’s work on madness, which refers 
to a teleological and progressivist understanding of historical time, traditional history 
assumes the “suprahistorical perspective” of “a history whose function is to compose the 
finally reduced diversity of time into a totality fully closed upon itself….”682 Foucault 
also refers to this as “de-eventalized history,” which explains its objects of analysis by 
ascribing them “the most unitary, necessary, inevitable, and (ultimately) extrahistorical 
mechanism or structure available,” e.g., “[a]n economic mechanism, an anthropological 
structure, or a demographic process….”683 By contrast, the function of genealogy is to 
“record the singularity of events outside of any monotonous finality,”684 throwing into 
relief the disruptive and anarchic difference that they introduce into the field of history. 
 
                                                
681 Foucault, “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History,” 380. 
682 Ibid, 379. Foucault, who would appear to have a certain view of Hegel in mind (as he also did in his 
formulation of horizontal history in History of Madness), continues: “...a history that always encourages 
subjective recognitions and attributes a form of reconciliation to all the displacements of the past; a history 
whose perspective on all that precedes it implies the end of time, a completed development” (ibid). 
683 Foucault, “Questions of Method,” Power, 228. For Foucault, de-eventalized history is epitomized by 
structuralism, which he characterizes as “the most systematic effort to evacuate the concept of the event, 
not only from ethnology but from a whole series of other sciences and in the extreme case from history. In 
that sense, I don’t see who could be more of an antistructuralist than myself” (Foucault, “Truth and Power,” 
Power, 115). 
684 Foucault, “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History,” 369. Foucault will later refer to this method as 
“eventalization,” composed of two functions that echo the analyses of descent and emergence: “First of all, 
a breach of self-evidence. It means making visible [faire surgir] a singularity at places where there is a 
temptation to invoke a historical constant, an immediate anthropological trait, or an obviousness that 
imposes itself uniformly on all. … A breach of self-evidence, of those self-evidences on which our 
knowledges, acquiescences, and practices rest: this is the first theoretico-political function of 
‘eventalization.’ Second, eventalization means rediscovering the connections, encounters, supports, 
blockages, plays of forces, strategies, and so on, that at a given moment establish what subsequently counts 




6.3.2 Limit-Event: The Becoming-Force of Vertical Intensity in and against History 
Indeed, it is here in particular that we can discern the impact of Deleuze on 
Foucault’s turn to genealogy, for the analysis of emergence is conducted in terms of a 
differential multiplicity of force relations. Anticipating Foucault’s comment the following 
year to Deleuze that reading his works, from Nietzsche and Philosophy to Anti-Oedipus, 
had been “essential” because, “under the ancient theme of meaning…, you have 
developed the question of power, of the inequality of powers and their struggles,”685 
Foucault writes: 
Genealogy, however, seeks to reestablish the various systems of subjection: not the 
anticipatory power of meaning, but the hazardous [hasardeux] play of dominations. 
Emergence is always produced in a particular state of forces. The analysis of the 
Entstehung must delineate this interaction, the manner of the struggle that these 
forces wage against each other or against adverse circumstances…. Emergence is 
thus the entry of forces; it is their eruption, the leap from the wings to center 
stage….686 
 
If the affirmative-intensive thought of vertical repetition in Deleuze’s metaphysics 
is a matter of freeing difference from subjection to categorical thinking, the genealogical 
project of vertical critique is a matter of meticulously analyzing ‘various systems of 
subjection.’ However, this analysis, undertaken with “the acuity of a glance … that is 
capable of liberating divergence and marginal elements,”687 is specifically attentive to the 
inversions of force relations, which constitute systematic transformations by which 
something new is produced (e.g., the slave revolt in morality). And this emergence of the 
new, this ‘entry of forces’ is not to be explained teleologically by reference to final 
causes (‘the anticipatory power of meaning’), but strategically and contingently in terms 
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of aleatory struggles; for an event just is “the reversal of a relationship of forces…. The 
forces operating in history do not obey destiny or regulative mechanisms, but the luck of 
the battle. They do not manifest the successive forms of a primordial intention and their 
attention is not that of a conclusion, for they always appear through the singular 
randomness of events.”688  
Forces, then, ‘operate in history’; yet their singular, evental ‘eruption’ into history 
can neither be predicted nor ultimately explained by means of the laws of historical 
causation, whether the latter be conceived ‘theologically’ as ‘destiny’ or ‘rationalistically’ 
as ‘mechanism.’689 It is therefore the element of force itself that is irreducible to history, 
for the event is precisely that which is constitutive of history without being derivable 
from it. That is, the event functions as a kind of immanent degree zero of history; and 
rather than owing to a form of quasi-primordial transcendence, the anteriority of this 
degree zero refers to the ontological primacy of intensive difference; for the event, as a 
reversal of forces itself productive of force, is nothing other than a singular expression of 
what Deleuze calls ‘the being of becoming,’ and what, with reference to Foucault fifteen 
years later, he will term the “perpetual becoming” of forces: “there is a becoming of 
forces which doubles history.”690 As Foucault puts it, “The world such as we are 
acquainted with it is not this ultimately simple configuration where events are reduced to 
accentuate their essential traits, their final meaning, or their initial and final value. On the 
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689 The side of theological destiny would include the philosophy of history, which Foucault characterizes in 
“Theatrum Philosophicum” as making a theological error regarding historical causation and therefore 
“fail[ing] to grasp the event” (Foucault, “Theatrum Philosophicum,” 351-2); the side of rationalistic 
mechanism would include structuralism, as noted above.  




contrary, it is a profusion [myriade] of entangled events,”691 which is to say, a differential, 
non-denumerable multiplicity of force relations.  
In such a way, the irreducibility distinctive of verticality is recast intensively in 
terms of evental becoming, a thought expressed by Deleuze and Guattari in What is 
Philosophy? when they write: “becoming … is born in History, and falls back into it, but 
is not of it. … What History grasps of the event is its effectuation in states of affairs or in 
lived experience, but the event in its becoming … escapes History.”692 And indeed, we 
can begin to see here how the transversal analysis of lines of flight, as centrifugal vectors 
of force, will connect to the vertical analysis of intensity: namely, as the intensive vector 
of becoming which ‘escapes History.’ 
Further, in addition to helping Foucault address the problem of transcendence by 
providing an immanent conception of degree zero, this reformulation of irreducibility, as 
the limit-relation between the event and history, suggests a possible solution to the 
vertical problem of material expression. We have seen that Foucault, with Deleuze, 
conceives the ‘vertical dimension of intensities’ through the ‘incorporeal materiality’ of 
the event; and since events now appear as becomings of force, or as singular expressions 
of the ‘perpetual becoming’ of forces, we can characterize the event as the incorporeal 
materiality of becoming. On the other hand, “History is the concrete body [le corps même] 
of becoming,”693 which is to say, the very corporeal materiality of becoming. Now, if the 
problem of material expression concerns how that which is irreducible to history can 
                                                
691 Foucault, “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History,” 381. 
692 Deleuze and Guattari, What is Philosophy?, translated by Hugh Tomlinson, 110. It should be noted that 
Deleuze and Guattari’s use of the term ‘lived experience,’ or le vécu, refers to the phenomenological 
conception of experience, and thus does not pertain to the political limit-experience of revolt in Foucault’s 
sense. 




nevertheless act upon and transform history, then we have provisionally discovered the 
general outline of a solution: the difference between the incorporeality of the event and 
the corporeality of history accounts for how the former is irreducible to the latter, while 
their common materiality accounts for how one could act upon the other.694 
 
6.3.3 The Transformative Force of Vertical Thought as Genealogical Critique 
Genealogy would thus be that form of critique which apprehends, as so many 
singular events, what we might call the ‘becoming-force’ of the intensive-vertical 
dimension in history.695 This is one sense in which effective history can be understood as 
a form of vertical critique. More specifically: just as with intensive thought, in which 
‘intensity’ refers to both what is thought (le pensé) and thought itself (la pensée), the 
‘verticality’ in vertical thought also refers to both what is thought (the thought of 
verticality) and thought itself (thought as verticality)696; and when genealogy apprehends 
the ‘becoming of forces’ that ‘doubles history,’ it functions in the first sense, as the 
thought of verticality. However, as is suggested by its double vertical movement of 
descent and emergence, genealogy also functions as vertical thought in the second sense, 
which Foucault makes explicit in writing that effective history 
                                                
694 The relation between the event and history, or the incorporeal materiality of becoming and the corporeal 
materiality of becoming, is akin to the respective relation in Anti-Oedipus between desiring-production and 
social production: an irreducible priority is accorded the former term, and a dependency accorded the latter 
term, even though in fact neither term is separable from the other, nor can access be gained to the former 
absent the latter. 
695 In the next section, we will develop a detailed example of Foucault’s analysis of this becoming-force of 
vertical intensity, namely, the case of the Iranian uprising. 
696 Indeed, the cases of intensive thought and vertical thought are really one and the same, insofar as we are 
dealing specifically here with the intensive formulation of verticality. Thus, the thought of verticality will 
be the thought of the evental becoming-force of intensity; and as we will see, thought as verticality, i.e., in 
the vertical relation of genealogy to history, imbues thought itself with transformative or productive agency, 




…has no fear of looking down, but it looks from above and descends to seize the 
various perspectives, to disclose dispersions and differences, to leave things 
undisturbed in their own dimension and intensity. … Effective history studies what 
is closest, but in an abrupt dispossession, so as to seize it at a distance …. The final 
trait of effective history is its affirmation of a perspectival knowledge. … 
Nietzsche's version of historical sense is explicit in its perspective and 
acknowledges its system of injustice. Its perception is slanted, being a deliberate 
appraisal, affirmation, or negation …. Through this historical sense, knowledge is 
allowed to create its own genealogy in the act of cognition; and wirkliche Historie 
composes a genealogy of history as the vertical projection of its position [La 
wirkliche Historie effectue, à la verticale du lieu où elle se tient, la généalogie de 
l'histoire].697 
 
There are two ways in which genealogical critique itself, taken as a form of thought, 
performs a vertical function. The first is related to the contingency thesis and the 
hermeneutical vector of descent: by contrast to traditional historians’ “pretension to 
examine things farthest from themselves,”698 the genealogist examines ‘what is closest,’ 
what is constitutive of her actuality, and thereby conducts what Foucault calls a ‘history 
of the present’; in doing so, however, the genealogist de-familiarizes this present, 
dispossessing it of what was taken to be natural, normal, or necessary. As Foucault will 
put the point thirteen years later in his essay “What is Enlightenment?”, the genealogist 
problematizes the present by asking: “In what is given to us as universal, necessary, 
obligatory, what place is occupied by whatever is singular, contingent, and the product of 
arbitrary constraints?”699  
In this manner, genealogical critique calls into question the self-evidence of 
contemporary reality’s horizon of intelligibility. Foucault will characterize as vertical the 
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point of view that carries out this function of de-familiarization – as, for example, in his 
review essay eight years later on a book by the journalist Jean Daniel, who poses the 
question of “what is concealed under that precise, floating, mysterious, utterly simply 
word ‘today’. Jean Daniel wrote L’Ere des ruptures [The Age of Ruptures] from a vertical 
viewpoint on his journalist’s trade,”700 as “a quest for those subtler, more secret, and 
more decisive moments when things begin to lose their self-evidence,”701 moments which 
disclose “that everything one perceives is evident only against a familiar and little-known 
horizon, that every certainty is sure only through the support of a ground that is always 
unexplored.”702 
The second vertical function performed by genealogy, related to its role as an 
ungrounding critique of the conditions of the present,703 is the auto-doubling relation it 
establishes with respect to history. In Chapter 3, we saw how Foucault defined the being 
of literary language in terms of the auto-superposition of a language ‘erected vertically 
above itself,’ by contrast to the ordinary form of language as communication or 
horizontal conveyance of meaning. The same kind of distinction can be drawn here 
regarding history.704 By contrast to the horizontal (progressivist, teleological) form of 
history, which presupposes a totalizing perspective beyond history (from which vantage 
                                                
700 Foucault, “For an Ethic of Discomfort,” Power, 443. 
701 The comparison here is to “those moments, which happen in life, when what one was most sure of is 
suddenly revealed to be a mistake.” (Foucault, “For an Ethic of Discomfort,” 447) 
702 Foucault, “For an Ethic of Discomfort,” 448. 
703 Cf.: “But the true historical sense confirms our existence among countless lost events, without a 
landmark or a point of reference.” (Foucault, “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History,” 381) Cf. also Nietzsche’s 
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infinite nothing? Do we not feel the breath of empty space?” (Nietzsche, The Gay Science, §125) 




point the contingent singularity of events could be reduced either to the meaning of a 
final cause or original intention, or to the generality of a mechanism), effective history, as 
the ‘genealogy of history,’ is defined in terms of the auto-superposition of a history 
erected vertically above itself: à la verticale du lieu où elle se tient, ‘in a vertical relation 
to where it takes up position,’ to where it takes up itself taking up position, etc. We see 
here the recursive, auto-doubling function proper to verticality, only now this function is 
performed by virtue of Nietzschean perspectivism. Genealogy affirms itself as a 
‘perspectival knowledge,’ that is, as a form of knowledge immanently emplaced within 
its own domain of inquiry, actively intervening within this domain with an evaluative eye 
toward transforming it; and indeed, as a critical history of the present, the genealogist is 
implicated in her own genealogy, situated within that present and equally the object of 
evaluation and transformation. 
In turn, from this twofold vertical function of genealogical critique as de-
familiarizing and auto-doubling, two implications follow that are fundamental for 
Foucault’s thought. First, critical thought is work that one conducts upon oneself as a 
practice of self-transformation. In this way, and in a manner that obliquely recalls 
Foucault’s existential poetics sketched at the end of “Dream and Existence,”705 vertical 
critique is akin to vertical experience, for the “transformation of one’s self by one’s own 
knowledge is … something rather close to the aesthetic experience.”706 Indeed, genealogy 
is in essence a kind of auto-critique, later formulated as “a historical ontology of 
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locate the guiding ethical principle that “we have to create ourselves as a work of art” (Foucault, “On the 
Genealogy of Ethics: An Overview of Work in Progress,” Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth, 262). 




ourselves,”707 through which the self becomes de-familiarized and ungrounded, 
encountering itself as a stranger or double: “History becomes ‘effective’ to the degree 
that it introduces discontinuity into our very being …. ‘Effective’ history leaves nothing 
around the self …. It will uproot its traditional foundations and relentlessly disrupt its 
pretended continuity. This is because knowledge is not made for understanding; it is 
made for cutting.”708  
In such a way does vertical critique perform the transgressive sublime function, 
unmooring and undoing the form of the subject (what Deleuze calls the ‘man-form’), and 
thereby opening up new possible modes of becoming or processes of subjectivation. In 
other words, as Foucault will later put it, vertical critique constitutes a kind of 
“philosophical ethos,” “a limit-attitude” that “takes the form of a possible crossing-over 
[franchissement],” “separat[ing] out, from the contingency that has made us what we are, 
the possibility of no longer being, doing, or thinking what we are, do, or think,” and 
thereby “seeking to give new impetus, as far and wide as possible, to the undefined work 
of freedom.”709 
Relatedly, the second implication, following from genealogy’s immanent vertical 
perspectivism, is that critical thought, as an instrument ‘made for cutting,’ is itself 
generative of force, constituting an event. That is, ‘effective’ history should be 
understood literally, as an activity of thought that is itself productive of the new, 
effectuating or realizing the actual: “In reality, knowledge is an event that falls under the 
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is not to discover the roots of our identity, but to commit itself to its dissipation. It … seeks to make visible 
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category of activity….When Nietzsche speaks of the perspectival character of knowledge, 
he is pointing to the fact that … knowledge is always a certain strategic relation in which 
man is placed. … One can speak of the perspectival character of knowledge because 
there is a battle, and knowledge is the result of this battle.”710 If perspectivism thus refers 
to knowledge as a ‘strategic relation’ transforming the field of forces in which it 
intervenes, then the verticality of genealogy’s perspective on history will refer 
specifically to the transformative strategy of auto-critique as itself a form of struggle, 
mapping “the lines of fragility” of the present, in which one is embedded, in order “to 
make a topographical and geological survey of battle”711 that gives rise to ‘a possible 
crossing-over.’ And insofar as the auto-transformative force of this critical undertaking, 
“as work carried out by ourselves upon ourselves as free beings,” constitutes what 
Foucault calls ‘the practice of freedom,’712 vertical critique will satisfy a condition of 
possibility for ethico-political agency. 
Foucault’s turn to genealogy therefore directs the trajectory of his own intellectual 
activism, composing what we might call a ‘strategics of truth’: “I would like to produce 
effects of truth which might be used for a possible battle, to be waged by those who wish 
to wage it, in forms yet to be found and in organizations yet to be defined. … Telling the 
truth so that it might be attackable. Deciphering a layer of reality in such a way that the 
lines of force and the lines of fragility come forth, the possible points of resistance and 
attack….”713 It is precisely in this sense that Deleuze will characterize Foucault as a 
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and Truth, 281ff.  




cartographer, mapping the ‘lines of force’ constitutive of the social field (which Deleuze, 
following Foucault’s analysis of Bentham’s Panopticon, calls the ‘diagram’) so as to 
make possible the connection and quickening of a multiplicity of counter-currents of 
resistance.714 Indeed, this strategics of truth constitutes, at the level of critical thought, the 
very connective strategy that orients transversal resistance, working to prepare the 
conditions for so many emergent lateral lines of alliance to be forged between 
minoritarian struggles.  
We can thus begin to elaborate how vertical critique supports and sustains 
transversal politics, enumerating the set of functions defining the intellectual’s role in 
facilitating political agency. Like a political analogue to Artaud’s notion of the ‘superior 
lucidity’ of the ‘authentically insane,’715 the first function of Foucault’s intellectual 
activism, proper to vertical critique, can be called the visionary function: that is, to see the 
intolerable there where it remains unseen, and to make it visible. It is in this regard that 
Deleuze will later refer to Foucault as “a kind of seer. And what he saw was actually 
intolerable. … For Foucault, to think was to react to the intolerable, the intolerable things 
one experienced.”716 Further, since the intolerable itself marks a limit, that threshold 
where actuality cannot but be transformed, the function of “thinking as vision, as 
capturing the intolerable” is also one of “thinking at something’s limit. It was two things: 
seeing something unseen and thinking something that was almost at a limit.”717 Indeed, as 
in the case of the GIP, the ability to see an unseen limit is to possess a kind of evental 
vision, what Deleuze calls Foucault’s “keen political intuition”: “Political intuition, for 
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me, is the feeling that something is going to happen and happen here, not somewhere else. 
A political intuition is a very rare occurrence. Foucault sensed that there were little 
movements, small disturbances in the prisons. He was not trying to take advantage of 
them or cause them. He saw something.”718  
To perform the visionary function is thus to intuit and make visible the experience 
of the intolerable, thereby disclosing a limit that is also the site of an emergent singular 
event; as we will detail in the next section, this is the absolute limit of power’s exercise, 
the degree zero of the political that is both the source of revolt and ‘last anchor point’ for 
‘all the forms of established or demanded freedom.’ Further, to reveal the intolerable as 
intolerable is thus also, through the vertical operation of de-familiarization, to compel us 
to no longer tolerate what passes as normal, “to sharpen intolerance to the facts of power” 
to which we are inured; it is “an art of bringing out the exorbitant in the ordinary, and the 
revolting brutality in what we tolerate out of habit. … It is a matter of multiplying ‘points 
of repulsion’ in the political fabric and extending the surface of possible dissidences.”719 
In this way, the visionary dimension of intellectual activism indicates how vertical 
critique can act as a catalyst for the connective strategy of transversal politics.   
Second, the intellectual performs an enunciative function, helping to establish or 
secure the conditions for the emergence of a form of expression, or what we have seen 
Deleuze and Guattari call a ‘collective assemblage of enunciation,’ through which a 
minoritarian population would compose a subversive form of counter-discourse. As we 
discussed in Chapter 4, this function is exemplified in the GIP’s aim to “produce new 
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conditions for statements”720 – in that instance, for statements made by inmates and their 
families about the exercise of power in prison. The enunciative function, in turn, is 
complemented by a third, to which it is closely linked: namely, an amplifying function by 
which counter-discursive statements would be amplified, relayed, and circulated, set into 
connection with other minoritarian collectivities subjected to a common regime of power. 
To use Deleuze and Guattari’s language, the amplifying function enables a multiplicity of 
lines of flight to connect to one another, augmenting their valence and magnifying their 
efficacy as transformative force. Or, as Foucault puts it: “The voices of an incalculable 
number of speaking subjects must resonate and give voice to an innumerable experience. 
… All sorts of experience must be given voice; we must lend an ear to aphasiacs, to the 
excluded, to the moribund,” to all those “who effectively confront the dark and solitary 
face of struggle. I believe the task of a practitioner of philosophy living in the West is to 
lend an ear to all these voices.”721  
In sum: by re-articulating vertical critique genealogically as a historico-critical 
analysis of the immanent field of force relations, Foucault develops the double thought of 
power and the event – the very thought that, as we have seen, is central to subversive 
counter-knowledge as ‘a philosophy of the people’ –, since both power and the event are 
conceived as functions of interactions between forces (the former as their dominant 
codification, the latter as their transformative reversal). And this thought, which 
consummates the ‘intensive turn’ characteristic of the middle period of verticality, forms 
the basis for Foucault’s subsequent elaboration of both a transversal politics of 
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connection (beginning with the problem of power in capitalist society) and, as we will see 
next, a vertical politics of revolt. 
 
6.4 Late Experience: The ‘Vertical Relation’ of Political Uprising to History 
“There are more ideas on the earth than intellectuals often imagine. And these ideas are 
more active, stronger, more resistant, and more impassioned than politics is capable of 
conceiving. One must attend to the birth of ideas and to the exhibition of their force: not 
in books that would pronounce them, but in the events in which they manifest their force, 
in the struggles that one conducts for ideas, against them or for them. It is not ideas that 
motor the world. But it is precisely because the world contains ideas (and because it 




6.4.1 The Vertical Experience of the Intolerable: The Fact of Revolt as the Ratio 
Cognoscendi of Freedom 
As indicated in the initial epigraph to this chapter, Foucault directly situates his 
account of “political experience” within the tradition of the limit-experience descended 
from Nietzsche and Bataille. The name he will give to this specific kind of experience is 
soulèvement – a term often translated as ‘revolt,’ but the vertical imagery of which, as a 
movement of elevation coming from below, is better conveyed by the word ‘uprising.’ In 
addition to serving as the exemplar of evental emergence, political uprising, as an 
individual or collective response to the intolerable, is the form that vertical experience 
will take after Foucault has recast the concept of verticality itself immanently in terms of 
‘the dimension of intensities.’ 
In Chapter 4, the prison movement provided an example of political uprising, 
analyzed as the breakout or breakthrough of what Deleuze and Guattari call “a 
                                                




revolutionary line of flight” (e.g., the case of George Jackson). Such a centrifugal vector 
of revolt, as a “revolutionary break” or “rupture with causality,”723 can now be 
understood as a limit-event, or a singular event that transforms the conditions of the 
possible. Indeed, what Deleuze and Guattari characterize in Anti-Oedipus in terms of 
desiring-production – that is, “the order of desire and its irruption,” which alone 
“accounts for the reality this rupture [with causality] assumes at a given moment, at a 
given place”724 –, they articulate 12 years later, on the topic of May 1968, in terms of that 
dimension of revolt which is irreducible to historical causation:  
In historical phenomena such as the revolution of 1789, the Commune, the 
revolution of 1917, there is always one part of the event that is irreducible to any 
social determinism, or to causal chains. Historians are not very fond of this aspect: 
they restore causality after the fact. Yet the event is itself a splitting off from, or a 
breaking with causality; it is a bifurcation, a deviation with respect to laws, an 
unstable condition which opens up a new field of the possible.725  
 
We see here the irreducibility to history that is the hallmark of the vertical 
dimension, framed as that aspect of the insurrectionary event which exceeds ‘any social 
determinism’ or ‘causal chains,’ i.e., which can be neither explained nor predicted by the 
existing set of social, economic, and political conditions and processes. Like the entry of 
force into history through the singular emergence of the event, political uprising is a 
production of the new, and specifically, of ‘a new field of the possible’: the event “is an 
opening onto the possible,” but “the possible does not pre-exist, it is created by the 
event.”726 That is, rather than actualizing a latent but extant possibility, the event of revolt 
transforms the very conditions of the possible, doing so creatively by realizing something 
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new. “The event creates a new existence, it produces a new subjectivity”; and because it 
thus “passes as much into the interior of individuals as into the depths of a society,”727 the 
event must be grasped from the perspective of an experience that opens onto new modes 
of life. 
In effect, then, political uprising performs the de-familiarizing function proper to 
the contingency thesis of vertical critique, disclosing the contemporary horizon of 
possibility (what we can say, think, do, feel, become), in its mutability and fragility, as 
the historical product of struggles between forces. And if historical ontology opens ‘the 
possibility of no longer being, doing, or thinking what we are, do, or think’ (Foucault), 
thereby satisfying a condition of possibility for ethico-political agency; the ‘possible’ that 
the event of popular revolt creates – ‘a new existence, a new subjectivity’ – is what 
Deleuze and Guattari call “the composition of a people,”728 a process of collective 
becoming-revolutionary. Further, just as the visionary function of intellectual activism is 
to perceive and make visible the intolerable where it has remained unseen, “what counts” 
in the event of political uprising – that which is singular and transformative, however 
surrounded it may be by “slogans, idiocies, illusions” – is “a visionary phenomenon, as if 
a society suddenly saw what was intolerable in it and also saw the possibility for 
something else. It is a collective phenomenon in the form of: ‘Give me the possible, or 
else I’ll suffocate…’”729 Thus, what is visionary in revolt is exactly what is also 
irreducible: the experience, both individual and collective, of the intolerable and its 
possible overcoming, that is, of the limit and the practice of freedom.  
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As we have discussed in the previous two chapters, it is just this sort of ‘collective 
phenomenon,’ distinctive of non-denumerable multiplicities, that the anti-transversal 
operation of power aims to prevent, defuse, or control.730 Indeed, we can begin to see 
how the transversal and vertical threads our analysis converge: if the principle of 
transversal connection designates the conditions for the realization and sustainability of 
the line of flight; the ‘visionary phenomenon’ of revolt indicates how the irreducible 
verticality of political experience is a necessary condition of possibility for the line of 
flight, or for political agency, understood as the transformation of the conditions of social 
production.  
However, before we are positioned to provide a fuller account of political agency, 
we must first develop Foucault’s conceptual treatment of revolt, analyzing more precisely 
how uprising constitutes a vertical limit-experience. It is straightforward enough to 
establish that revolt takes a vertical form: Foucault makes this explicit in a brief homage 
to the philosopher and journalist Maurice Clavel, written in the wake of the Iranian 
Revolution, when he describes uprising generally as “that which, in history, escapes from 
history…. What escapes from history is the instant, the fracture, the tearing, the 
interruption. … Uprising … lifts human beings into a vertical relation to their land and 
their humanity [Le soulèvement ... dresse les hommes à la verticale de leur terre et de 
leur humanité].”731 The collective experience of revolt is thus structurally akin to the 
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Kantian sublime, opening a rupture or “fracture of the present”732 through the auto-
elevating movement by which a person or a people confronts their proper humanity. And 
indeed, just as, for Kant, the sublime functions as the ratio cognoscendi of human 
freedom, calling us to a duty that “elevates a human being above himself (as part of the 
sensible world)”733; so, too, political uprising is an experience of the irreducibility of 
human agency that makes possible the practical realization of freedom.  
In an important essay on the uprising in Iran, published the week following his 
piece on Clavel, Foucault articulates this irreducibility in terms of a limit-relation that 
obtains between revolt and both history and politics:  
Revolts belong to history. But, in a certain way, they escape from it. The impulse 
[mouvement] by which a single individual, a group, a minority, or an entire people 
says, ‘I will no longer obey,’ and throws the risk of their life in the face of an 
authority they consider unjust seems to me to be something irreducible. Because no 
authority is capable of making it utterly impossible … [a]nd because the man who 
rebels is finally inexplicable; it takes a wrenching-away that interrupts the flow of 
history, and its long chains of reasons, for a man to be able, ‘really,’ to prefer the 
risk of death to the certainty of having to obey.734  
 
Recalling the ‘centrifugal movement’ of becoming-plebe as an intensive vector of 
insurrectionary force, as well as the ‘constant verticality’ of unreason that disrupts the 
horizontal flow of history and its ‘rational concatenation of causes,’ political uprising is 
‘something irreducible,’ emerging at the degree zero of both (1) power and (2) history.  
In the first case, revolt is the political experience of the exercise of power as being 
both intolerable and, in the end, mutable. One stakes one’s life on the refusal to continue 
with what had been tolerated until now, on the demand for transformation, the possibility 
                                                
732 Ibid, 790, my translation. 
733 Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, 5:86. 
734 Foucault, “Useless to Revolt?”, 449, my emphasis. “Vivre autrement le temps” appeared in Le Nouvel 
Observateur the week of April 30-May 6, 1979; “Inutile de se soulever?” (“Useless to Revolt?”) appeared 




of which is concretely created in the very demand for it. This insurrectionary ‘impulse,’ 
this movement of restiveness capable of traversing the social fabric (‘a single individual, 
a group, a minority, or an entire people’), is something that no exercise of power is 
‘capable of making utterly impossible’: for, as we saw in Chapter 4, unlike a relation of 
violence (acting directly on bodies) or a state of domination (in which those subjected 
have no field of possible action available to them), power is defined as ‘a set of actions 
on possible actions’; and it therefore requires the relative agency of those whose actions 
are acted upon.735 Thus, to render impossible the will to revolt, which would necessitate 
taking the lives of all those who stake theirs insurrecting, would be tantamount to 
destroying the power relation itself.  
That is, the very will to revolt – ‘to prefer the risk of death to the certainty of having 
to obey’ – constitutes the absolute limit of power’s exercise; and it is for this reason that 
“[a]ll the forms of established or demanded freedom, all the rights that one asserts, even 
in regard to the seemingly least important things, no doubt have a last anchor point there, 
one more solid and closer to experience than ‘natural rights.’”736 
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In the second case, like the emergence of a singular event as the becoming-force of 
vertical intensity, uprising is both “‘outside’ history and in history,”737 ‘belonging’ to it 
but also ‘escaping’ from it. The will to revolt of the one who insurrects is ultimately 
‘inexplicable’ according to the laws of historical causation: her experience, desire, and 
action can neither be explained according to a rational predictive calculus, nor derived 
from a set of historical (read: pre-existing social, economic, political, cultural) conditions 
and their ‘long chains of reasons.’ Borrowing from the historian François Furet’s work on 
the French Revolution, Foucault articulates this irreducibility in terms of the “distinction 
between the totality of the processes of economic and social transformation,” i.e., the 
long historical duration of material conditions, flows, structures, and practices in which 
all events are situated, “and the specificity of the revolutionary event,” i.e., “the 
specificity of what people experienced deep inside, but also of what they experienced 
[vivent] in that sort of theater that they put together from day to day and which 
constituted the revolution.”738  
The importance of framing this distinction in terms of what ‘belongs’ to history and 
what ‘escapes’ it is that the latter, the singularity of the revolutionary event as individual 
and collective experience, can neither be reduced to nor derived from the former, the set 
of macropolitical conditions and processes. To use Deleuze and Guattari’s language, the 
intensive or molecular dimension cannot be reduced to, or explained in terms of, the 
extensive or molar dimension. Nor is the specificity or experience of the event merely 
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occasional (as the contingent occasion for a historically determined process) or 
epiphenomenal (as the subjective aspect of an objective process, with the former exerting 
no causal force on the latter); for the collective daily staging of the revolt (protests, 
marches, strikes, sit-ins, vigils, stands of civil disobedience taken, etc.) is what actually 
‘constitutes the revolution.’ For example, in the case of Iran, when “a people rose up in 
revolt[,] it rose up, of course, in a context of crisis, of economic difficulties, etc., but the 
economic difficulties in Iran at that time were not sufficiently great for people to take to 
the streets, in the hundreds of thousands, in the millions, and face the machine-guns bare-
chested. That’s the phenomenon that we have to talk about.”739  
It is in the following sense, then, that the singular event is both ‘in’ and ‘outside’ 
history: the phenomenon of revolt is double, containing both an extensive dimension (in 
the above example, the conditions of macroeconomic crisis) and an intensive one (what 
constitutes the singularity of the uprising); and it is the latter that is privileged from the 
(genealogical) perspective of the transformative emergence in history of evental force. 
The same can be said at the level of the insurrectionary individual, who, in the vertical 
experience of political uprising, “was double: he had his political calculation, which was 
this or that, and at the same time he was an individual caught up in that revolutionary 
movement, or rather that Iranian who had risen up against his king. And the two things 
did not come into contact, he did not rise up against his king because his party had made 
this or that calculation.”740  
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In other words, to choose the possibility of death rather than the certainty of 
injustice is neither the result of a calculation of interests nor of determining structures, 
but the expression of an irreducible agency; and indeed, this “fact” that “people do revolt” 
is “how subjectivity (not that of great men, but that of anyone) is brought into history, 
breathing life into it.”741The irreducibility, to power and history, of the will to revolt is 
thus a necessary condition for the possibility of political agency and the practice of 
freedom: “If societies persist and live, that is, if the powers that be are not ‘utterly 
absolute,’ it is because, behind all the submissions and coercions, … there is the 
possibility of that moment when life can no longer be bought, when the authorities can no 
longer do anything, and when, facing the gallows and the machine guns, people 
revolt.”742  
Once again, the parallel with Kant is apt, for Foucault’s reference to ‘facing the 
gallows’ echoes the famous “gallows” example from the Critique of Practical Reason, 
where Kant aims to illustrate how the fact of reason discloses to us our moral duty (that 
which ‘elevates a human being above himself’) and thereby our freedom. Like the man 
who, given the choice between acting unjustly and facing the gallows, realizes that he has 
within him the power to refuse the former, to prefer death to the certainty of committing 
injustice, and thereby is made cognizant of his inner freedom; and in turn, like the 
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experience of the dynamical sublime, where, confronted in our fragile vulnerability by 
nature’s overwhelming power, we become aware of an indomitable power of a different 
order within ourselves, capable of resisting even nature’s might; the limit-experience of 
political uprising – the will to revolt as the desire to risk death and disobey rather than 
suffer certain injustice – discloses to those who insurrect an irreducible agency that no 
form of power can ever render impossible or utterly dominate. For the ‘fact of reason,’ 
Foucault thus substitutes the ‘fact of revolt’ as a kind of ratio cognoscendi of human 
freedom. 
If the principle of connection is the transversal condition of realization and 
sustainability for political agency, the irreducibility of uprising is its vertical condition of 
possibility: “Hence, precisely, the need to grasp what is irreducible in such a movement – 
and deeply threatening for any despotism, whether that of yesterday or that of today.”743 
However, we must still inquire further into how the vertical and the transversal relate, 
which will require taking a closer look at the examples of revolt in which Foucault was 
engaged. 
 
6.4.2 March and May 1968: Becoming-Revolutionary and the Problem of Collective 
Subjectivation 
Before the GIP, Foucault’s first direct encounter with political revolt occurred in the 
student uprisings in Tunisia in March 1968, which he describes as “a real [véritable] 
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significations that the uprising had,” and those in the West who “discredit the fact of the uprising because 




political experience for me.”744 Foucault lived and taught in Tunisia from 1966 to 1968, 
and from the beginning, he was “deeply impressed”745 by the political activism and 
courage of the students there. Remarking, in a letter from December 1966, on the 
reception of Althusser’s thought among the Tunisian students, Foucault writes: “It’s 
curious to see what is for us pure theoretical discourse suddenly become verticalized [se 
verticaliser] here in an almost immediate imperative.”746 Twelve years later, in his 
interview with Trombadori, Foucault elaborates: “In Tunisia…, everyone appealed to 
Marxism with a radical vehemence [violence] and intensity and with an impressive 
enthusiasm [élan]. For those young people, Marxism didn’t just represent a better way of 
analyzing reality: at the same time, it was a kind of moral energy, a kind of existential act 
that was quite remarkable.”747  
The verticalization of Marxist discourse, elevated to ‘an almost immediate 
imperative,’ thus refers to the role played by critical thought in giving rise to a collective 
political experience: an intensive process of becoming-revolutionary, wherein thought 
both (1) expresses a kind of ethical duty and (2) catalyzes the force of political agency. In 
other words, and again resonating with Kant, vertical critique is the movement by which 
                                                
744 Foucault, “Interview with Michel Foucault,” Power, 279.  
745 Ibid. Foucault elaborates: “That was an experience that greatly affected me: a little before the month of 
May in France, some very intense student revolts occurred there. It was in March 1968 – strikes, 
suspensions of courses, arrests, and a general student strike. The police came into the university, clubbed 
many students, seriously injured several of them, and threw them into prison. Some were sentenced to eight, 
ten, even fourteen years behind bars – some are still in prison. Given my position as a professor and being 
French, I was protected in a way, protected from the local authorities, which allowed me to easily do some 
things and at the same time to get a precise grasp of the French government’s reactions to all that. I had a 
direct idea of what was going on in all the universities of the world. I was deeply impressed by those young 
women and men who exposed themselves to fearful risks by drafting a leaflet, distributing it, or calling for 
a strike” (ibid).  
746 Foucault, in “Chronologie,” Dits et écrits I, 38, my translation. 




thought, disclosing an existentially gripping imperative through a limit-experience, 
makes possible the practical realization of human freedom. 
For Foucault, then, the Tunisian student uprising manifested the vertical form of 
political experience proper to revolt, the will to risk ‘an absolute sacrifice’ when faced 
with the intolerable exercise of power: “what can prompt in an individual the desire, the 
ability, and the possibility for an absolute sacrifice, without there being any reason to 
suspect in their action the least ambition or desire for power and profit? That was what I 
saw in Tunisia, the evidence of the necessity of myth, of a spirituality, the unbearable 
[intolérable] quality of certain situations produced by capitalism, colonialism, and 
neocolonialism.”748 Indeed, it is in just these terms of anti-capitalist struggle that Foucault 
will situate the Iranian uprising a decade later, and the ‘political spirituality’ serving as its 
form of expression for the self-composition of a people. However, it is also, precisely, the 
phenomenon of collective subjectivation that Foucault found wanting in the students 
revolts in Paris that came two months after those in Tunisia: “People in France spoke of 
hyper-Marxism, of a proliferation of theories, of a splintering into small groups. It was 
exactly the opposite, the reverse, the contrary of what had intrigued me [m’a passionné] 
in Tunisia.”749  
Rather than constructing a movement capable of expressing or realizing the shared 
experience of the will to revolt as transformative force, which is to say, as political 
agency, the ‘events of May’ instead devolved into a fractious set of ‘hyper-Marxized’ 
disputes, limited to the kind of institutionalized discursivity for which we have seen 
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time onward, away from those endless discussions, that hyper-Marxization, that irrepressible discursivity 




Foucault reproach Derrida. And indeed, it is on the same grounds that Deleuze and 
Guattari diagnose the failure of French society to realize the transformation made 
possible in May ’68: “When a social mutation appears, it is not enough to draw the 
consequences or effects according to lines of economic or political causality. Society 
must be capable of forming collective agencies of enunciation that match the new 
subjectivity, in such a way that it desires the mutation. … French society has shown a 
radical incapacity to create a subjective redeployment on the collective level, which is 
what ’68 demands….”750  
One might thus conclude about the student revolts in Paris that, on the one hand, 
they provided a necessary condition of possibility for political agency, insofar as they 
constituted a vertical limit-event breaking from historical causation and creating the 
possible it opens onto751; but that, on the other hand, the transversal conditions of 
realization and sustainability for political agency were never met, insofar as no collective 
form of expression or assemblage of enunciation was ever constructed that was adequate 
to realize the vertical-intensive will to revolt as a force of transformation. In other words, 
May ’68 could not offer a (transversal) solution to the (vertical) problem of material 
expression. 
 
                                                
750 Deleuze and Guattari, “May ’68 Did Not Take Place,” 234. 
751 This would at least seem to be the view of Deleuze and Guattari. It is not as clear for Foucault, who, in 
his interview with Trombadori, points out the differences in intensity and stakes between Tunisia and Paris: 
“Actually, when I returned to France in November or December of 1968, I was surprised, astonished, and 
even disappointed, considering what I had seen in Tunisia. In spite of their violence, their passion, the 
struggles had not involved the same cost, the same sacrifices, by any means. There’s no comparison 
between the barricades of the Latin Quarter and the real risk of getting, as in Tunisia, fifteen years of prison” 




6.4.3 A Transversal Form of Material Expression for the Realization of Political 
Agency: The Case of Iran 
It is in this light that we can understand Foucault’s fascination and involvement 
with the popular political uprising in Iran from 1978 to 1979: namely, as a form of revolt 
capable of achieving the conditions of realization for political agency, and thereby 
coming closer to solving the problem of material expression. Emerging at what Foucault 
depicts as the “dark” historical moment when all hope in anti-capitalist revolutionary 
politics had been extinguished by the failures of socialist regimes,752 the Iranian revolt, as 
a “movement that wants to disengage itself from both external domination and internal 
politics,”753 challenged not only a particular government (that of the Shah), but the global 
hegemonic apparatus of capitalism itself. Hence the radicality of the struggle: “It is the 
insurrection of men with bare hands who want to lift the fearful weight, the weight of the 
entire world order that bears down on each of us, but more specifically on them, these oil 
workers and peasants at the frontiers of empires. It is perhaps the first great insurrection 
                                                
752 See Foucault, “La torture, c’est la raison,” Dits et écrits, II, 397-8. In this interview, published in 
December 1977, Foucault names as examples the Soviet block, Cuba, Palestine, China, Vietnam, and 
Cambodia, declaring: “There is no longer a single revolutionary movement, and especially not a single 
‘socialist’ country, with which we could align ourselves and say: ‘that is how it must be done! That is the 
model! That is the line!’ It’s a remarkable state of affairs!” (ibid, 398, my translation). 
753 In Foucault’s characterization of the Iranian revolt, there is something of a defense of anarchism, by 
which I mean a political strategy that operates outside the established institutional political framework so as 
to radically transform the latter without becoming re-incorporated by it. Before writing that the movement 
‘wants to disengage itself from both external domination and internal politics,’ Foucault, as though to 
anticipate charges of ‘spontaneism,’ clarifies: “It is not a spontaneous uprising that lacks political 
organization….” (Ibid, translation modified; the translators insert the word “only” after “not,” which is not 
justified by the French, Il ne s’agit pas d’un soulevement spontané auquel manque une organisation 
politique, and unfortunately alters the meaning of the phrase; see Foucault, “Le chef mythique de la révolte 
de l’Iran,” Dits et écrits, II, 716) The insurrection gave form to a collective desire to break free of both 
relations of domination from the outside and the political system from within; and since the former would 
have been impossible without the latter – that is, since the existing regime was so interlinked with global 
forces of capitalism and ‘modernization’ that to go through established political channels would have 
consolidated these forces, or at the very least, would have remained incapable of directly challenging them 





against global systems, the form of revolt that is the most modem and the most 
insane.”754  
Now, while Foucault’s enthusiasm for the Iranian revolutionary movement is by no 
means uncontroversial, what concerns us is less the question of whether he was “blind to 
the dangers of Islamic government,”755 than the significance that the Iranian uprising held 
for him as an event of collective becoming-revolutionary, by which the self-composition 
of a people would act upon and transform the conditions of the social formation. For what 
interested Foucault in Shi’ism is not its codification in an Islamic state, but the shared 
                                                
754 Foucault, “The Mythical Leader of the Iranian Revolt,” in Afary and Anderson, 222. 
755 Richard Lynch, “Review of Janet Afary and Kevin B. Anderson, Foucault and the Iranian Revolution: 
Gender and the Seductions of Islam,” Foucault Studies, No 4, February 2007, 174. In a well-known critique 
of Foucault, Afary and Anderson charge him with uncritical naivety regarding political Islam, arguing that 
“what continued to override the possibility of a critical perspective was the fact that he was so enamored by 
the ability of the Islamists to galvanize tens of millions of people through such traditions that he ignored the 
dangers” (Afary and Anderson, Foucault and the Iranian Revolution, 125).There is doubtless something 
true in this claim, though, as Foucault himself will point out in response to a similar criticism, one must not 
“merge together all the aspects, all the forms, and all the potentialities [virtualités] of Islam within a single 
expression of contempt, for the sake of rejecting them in their entirety” (Foucault, “Foucault’s Response to 
Atoussa H.,” in Afary and Anderson, 210). In other words, Foucault was interested in a particular critical 
‘virtuality’ of Islam, which imbued it with its potentially revolutionary force; and in this way, just as 
Foucault distinguishes between the positivist and critical Kantian traditions, or between positivist 
economico-political liberalism and critical liberalism, so, too, might we distinguish between positivist 
Islam as a form of government, and critical Islam as a form of collective becoming-revolutionary. Indeed, 
Foucault makes just this sort of distinction when he writes: “Persia has had a surprising destiny. At the 
dawn of history, it invented the state and government. It conferred its models of state and government on 
Islam, and its administrators staffed the Arab Empire. But from this same Islam, it derived a religion that, 
throughout the centuries, never ceased to give an irreducible strength to everything from the depths of a 
people that can oppose state power” (Foucault, “Tehran: Faith against the Shah,” 203). It would be in this 
sense that the Iranian uprising, as a form of experience and subjectivation, is irreducible to the repressive 
regime of the mullahs that took over in the Shah’s wake. Consistent with this, it should be noted that even 
at the beginning of the insurrection, Foucault sounded skeptical notes regarding the positive claims about 
Islamic governance, which he found “not too reassuring” (Foucault, “What are the Iranians Dreaming 
About,” in Afary and Anderson, 206) in their echo of the slogans from the European bourgeois revolutions. 
Afary and Anderson also argue, much less convincingly, that Foucault’s enthusiasm for the Iranian revolt 
betrays both an anti-feminist streak and an ‘Orientialist’ philosophical project. While one can certainly 
maintain that Foucault was insufficiently attentive to problems of gender in political Islam, to portray 
Foucault’s work more generally as anti-feminist is to betray a fundamental misunderstanding of his 
political thought – as, for example, should already be clear from our presentation of his minoritarian 
transversal politics. Similarly, the charge of Orientalism – that Foucault’s histories present a binary 
opposition between Western modernity, which he would criticize, and a romanticized conception of a 
culture that would either be Other than, or before, the modern West – reveals a basic interpretative error, 
namely, the view that Foucault’s critical histories of the present are undertaken in the name of a return to 




critical ethos it inspires when, “in the face of established powers, [it] arms the faithful 
with an unremitting restlessness. It breathes into them an ardor wherein the political and 
the religious lie side by side,”756 enabling a “revolutionary event … which is at the same 
time an inner experience, a sort of constantly recommenced liturgy, a community 
experience….”757 In other words, Shi’ism makes possible the collectivization of a vertical 
limit-experience – like Bataillean transgression, an ‘inner experience,’ but transformed 
into ‘a community experience,’ animated by restive ‘ardor’ and realized by way of the 
ceaseless repetition of public professions of faith through insurrectionary political action.  
Seen from this point of view, the Iranian revolt offers a singular example of how 
vertical and transversal politics can converge so as to satisfy both the conditions of 
possibility and realization for political agency. The shared vertical experience of uprising 
becomes the manifestation or expression of what Foucault calls, to his own surprise, “an 
absolutely collective will,” the like of which “few peoples in history have had,”758 
indicating one kind of solution to the problem of collective subjectivation. What Foucault 
had previously assumed to be “like God, like the soul, something one would never 
encounter” – that is, a transcendent idea for which no corresponding experience would 
ever be possible, and which is itself a historical product of power-knowledge, “a political 
myth” used to “justify institutions” –, he encountered in Iran as a singular event: “This 
collective will, which, in our theories, is always general, has found for itself, in Iran, an 
absolutely clear, particular aim, and has thus erupted into history.”759 And indeed, the 
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transformative force of this singular limit-event was realized, at least in part, through the 
auto-intensifying form of vertical repetition that the popular protests took:   
The demonstrations were repeated, and the machine-guns fired yet again. And this 
occurred in an almost identical way, with, of course, an intensification each time, 
but without any change of form or nature. It’s the repetition of the demonstration. 
… [T]he demonstration, in its very repetition, had an intense political meaning. The 
very word demonstration [manifestation] must be taken literally: a people was 
tirelessly demonstrating [rendait manifeste] its will. There was in these 
demonstrations a link between collective action, religious ritual, and an expression 
of public right. … In the streets of Tehran there was an act, a political and juridical 
act, carried out collectively within religious rituals – an act of deposing the 
sovereign.760 
 
Unlike the generality and theoretical abstraction of the European idea of collective 
will, the singularity of the collective will in Iran, concentrated by the insurrectionary aim 
of ‘deposing the sovereign,’ made manifest a becoming-revolutionary of the people, 
which was also the becoming of a people tout court. Foucault’s epistolary comment 
regarding the Tunisian students – that ‘what is for us pure theoretical discourse suddenly 
verticalizes itself here in an almost immediate imperative’ – can thus be applied to the 
collective will to revolt in Iran, ‘an expression of public right’ achieved through 
‘collective action’ that takes form in the vertical repetition of ‘religious ritual,’ 
intensifying its own transformative effect ‘in its very repetition’ with each subsequent 
staging. And unlike other cases of uprising or revolution, such as May ’68 and the 
Cultural Revolution,761 “the revolt spread without splits or internal conflicts”: to use 
Foucault’s examples, there were neither divisions based on class (the oil workers’ strike 
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was supported by the bazaar bourgeoisie; the “modern industrialized sector” did not 
separate from the “‘traditional’ sector”), nor age generation (the liberation of political 
prisoners did not divide the “old and new oppositionists”), nor culture or political 
ideology (the students, who were “more westernized and more Marxist,” held common 
cause with “the mullahs from the countryside”).762 
Indeed, it is just this complex unity that contains the key for understanding how the 
Iranian revolt exemplified a transversal political movement. Unlike revolutions that are 
led by a vanguard party or some other particular segment of society, where unification is 
a result of hegemony and centralization, on Foucault’s view, the ‘unified collective will’ 
in Iran was achieved through a process of transversal connection, operating by lateral 
proliferation to form a decentralized, non-representational mass multiplicity: 
In Iran, the rejection of the regime is a massive social phenomenon. This does not 
mean that the rejection is confused, emotional, or barely self-conscious. On the 
contrary, it spreads in an oddly [singulièrement] effective manner, from the strikes 
to the demonstrations, from the bazaars to the universities, from the leaflets to the 
sermons, through shopkeepers, workers, clerics, teachers, and students. For the 
moment, however, no party, no man, and no political ideology can boast that it 
represents this movement. Nor can anyone claim to be at its head. This movement 
has no counterpart and no expression in the political order. The paradox, however, 
is that it constitutes a perfectly unified collective will. … It is the same protest, it is 
the same will, that is expressed by a doctor from Tehran and a provincial mullah, by 
an oil worker, by a postal employee, and by a female student wearing the chador. … 
This political will is one of breaking away from all that marks their country and 
their daily lives with the presence of global hegemonies.763 
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Now, Foucault’s qualifying phrase ‘for the moment’ refers to November 26, 1978. 
In historical hindsight, of course, we know that the return and rule of Khomeini in early 
February of 1979 also ushered in a return to the rule of a centralized and repressive 
regime by the end of March. However, just as the “spirituality which had meaning for 
those who went to their deaths has no common measure with the bloody government of 
an integrist clergy,”764 so, too, must we distinguish the acephalous nature of the 
revolutionary movement as a ‘massive social phenomenon’ from the later hierarchy and 
rigid segmentation of the Islamic Republic.765 For the fact that the political agency of the 
revolt went unsustained does not mean that it was never realized; and on Foucault’s 
account, the ‘singularly effective manner’ in which it was realized precisely instantiates 
the connective strategy of transversal politics. That is, the becoming-revolutionary of the 
Iranian people proceeded by means of lateral multiplication throughout the social field, 
creating a network of relays between those who, from a myriad of singular sites, suffer 
the same exercise of power ‘that marks their country and their daily lives with the 
presence of global hegemonies.’  
In such a way, a process of collective subjectivation took form that was capable of 
manifesting itself as a unified will, or, to speak with Deleuze and Guattari, as a 
revolutionary subject-group on the order of desire and its irruption. And indeed, for 
Foucault, what accounts for the singular efficacy of the popular revolt in Iran was how 
Shi’ism, giving rise to “the thousands of political centers that have been spawned in 
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mosques and religious communities in order to resist the shah’s regime,”766 functioned 
precisely as a non-hierarchical collective assemblage of enunciation. As “a matter of 
organization[, a]mong the Shi’ite clergy, religious authority is not determined by a 
hierarchy”; rather, “this power, which essentially resides in the interplay of speaking and 
listening,” comes from articulating a kind of critical ‘philosophy of the people’ that is 
voluntarily “listened to”: “This is true even in the smallest communities, where 
neighborhood and village mullahs gather around themselves those attracted by their 
words. From these volunteers comes their subsistence … and from them comes their 
influence. But from them also comes the unrelenting plea to denounce injustice, to 
criticize the government, to rise up against unacceptable measures…”767 This would be 
the radical critical strand of Shi’ism, its popular-revolutionary ‘virtuality,’ the connective 
force of which was powerful enough to realize the kind of undivided plebe that 
Foucault’s own political activism in the prison movement and beyond had sought to 
promote. 
We should finally be positioned to understand the connection between vertical and 
transversal politics. What makes the Iranian uprising such an instructive example of 
political agency is the way in which Shi’ism provided a transversal solution to the 
vertical problem of material expression: 
…the Shi’ite religion … is much more than a simple vocabulary through which 
aspirations, unable to find other words, must pass. It is today what it was several 
times in the past, the form that the political struggle takes as soon as it mobilizes the 
common people. It transforms thousands of forms of discontent, hatred, misery, and 
despairs into a force. It transforms them into a force because it is a form of 
expression, a mode of social relations, a supple and widely accepted elemental 
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organization, a way of being together, a way of speaking and listening, something 
that allows one to be listened to by others, and to yearn for something with them at 
the same time as they yearn for it.768 
 
To function effectively as a form of popular political struggle is to realize as force 
the ‘thousands of forms of discontent, hatred, misery, and despair,’ which is to say, the 
collective experience of the intolerable; it is to harness and connect an intensive affective 
multiplicity that traverses the social field, in such a way that it can act upon and 
transform the conditions of social production, i.e., the extensive set of political, economic, 
social, and cultural processes of organization. In other words, when it ‘mobilizes the 
common people’ in this way, Shi’ism satisfies the condition of realization for political 
agency, enabling the vertical dimension of intensity, which is irreducible to history, to 
erupt into and transform history as a singular event: namely, as the limit-event of political 
uprising. And Shi’ism is capable of realizing such transformative force, of answering the 
problem of material expression, precisely insofar as it constitutes a popular, ‘supple,’ 
non-hierarchical ‘form of expression’: a collective assemblage of enunciation, ‘a way of 
speaking and listening’ that allows the articulation of a shared experience of the 
intolerable exercise of power, as well as a shared desire for transformation; a mode of 
collective subjectivation, ‘a way of being together’ by which a people composes itself as 
such; and a ‘mode of social relations, a supple elemental organization’ that would 
connect transversally across lines of rigid segmentation, enriching the relational fabric. 
In short, political agency is realized when the experiential verticality of a collective 
will becomes materially expressed as force through a transversal form of expression; in 
                                                




such a way does the incorporeal materiality of intensity become capable of acting upon 
and transforming the corporeal materiality of history.  
Moreover, a Nietzschean analysis of force is doubly appropriate here: for, in 
addition to constituting the emergence of a singular event – a reversal of forces that is 
also the entry of force in history –, popular uprising, as the auto-poeisis of a people, 
transmutes what is reactive in the experience of the intolerable (‘discontent, hatred, 
misery, despair’) into an active-affirmative force.769 Indeed, just as ethico-political 
agency is realized through the activity of vertical critique ‘as work carried out by 
ourselves upon ourselves as free beings’; so, too, the realization of political agency can 
be understood in terms of historico-ontological self-transformation. And in the case of 
Iran, on Foucault’s view, precisely such transformation was made possible by the critical-
creative stand of Shi’ism, understood as a way “of living the Islamic religion as a 
revolutionary force”: 
In rising up, the Iranians said to themselves – and this perhaps is the soul of the 
uprising: “Of course, we have to change this regime and get rid of this man, we 
have to change this corrupt administration, we have to change the whole country, 
the political organization, the economic system, the foreign policy. But, above all, 
we have to change ourselves. Our way of being, our relationship with others, with 
things, with eternity, with God, etc., must be completely changed, and there will 
only be a true revolution if this radical change in our experience takes place.” I 
believe that it is here that Islam played a role. … [A]bove all, in relation to the way 
of life that was theirs, religion for them was like the promise and guarantee of 
finding something that would radically change their subjectivity.770 
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The ‘soul of the uprising’ – that is, the animating principle of revolt, both its 
generative and motive force – is the collective desire for deep self-transformation, for a 
‘radical change’ in both individual and community experience that creates a renewed 
mode of subjectivity. And this transvaluative process of collective subjectivation, by 
which the limit-experience of the intolerable becomes the impetus for the creative 
realization of a new possible, constitutes the very intensive movement of political agency, 
taking form (given expression, becoming realized, lived as force) through the Shi’ite 
religion. 
 
6.4.4 In the Wake of Tehran: Vertical Auto-Critique as Political Agency’s Condition of 
Sustainability 
Now, if the Iranian uprising exemplifies the realization of political agency, a two-
part question remains: was it able to sustain this agential force? – to which we know the 
unfortunate answer, as witnessed by the instatement of ‘the bloody government of an 
integrist clergy’ that had ‘no common measure’ with the spirituality of those who staked 
their lives in revolt –; and if not, why not? 
In Chapter 4, we analyzed the conditions of realization and sustainability for 
political agency in terms of the transversal connection of lines of flight, and we 
concluded that such connection faces two dangers: (1) the molar threat of capture, as in 
institutional appropriation or blockage; and (2) the molecular threat of abolition, as a kind 
of inner tendency toward destruction. In light of the repressive nature of the regime that 




the political agency of the revolt could be explained as a problem of State capture and the 
re-imposition of rigid segmentation. But while doubtless true, this remains an incomplete 
explanation, for account must also be taken of the second, more subtle danger; and in 
keeping with the kind of agential priority we have seen both Foucault and Deleuze accord 
the micropolitical or intensive dimension, the threat of abolition will have heuristic 
privilege insofar as it indicates a necessary condition of sustainability for political agency. 
Shi’ism provided a form of expression capable of realizing a collective process of 
becoming-revolutionary; yet this very form is itself “based on traditions, institutions that 
carry a charge of chauvinism, nationalism, exclusiveness,” so many potential fascisms or 
tendencies toward reactive force, “which have a very powerful attraction for 
individuals.”771 When such destructive virtualities, e.g. misogyny, anti-Semitism, 
xenophobia, homophobia, etc., are activated and take sway, transversal connection no 
longer operates as the popular movement’s principle of composition; and what replaces it 
is precisely a reactive form of group subjection, a hierarchical mode of organization 
where identity is predicated on a prior set of exclusions. Therefore, in order to prevent the 
revolutionary line of flight from collapsing into a line of abolition – which is to say, in 
order to sustain political agency – these reactionary tendencies must themselves be called 
into question and overcome. The movement which is ‘a way of living the Islamic religion 
as a revolutionary force’ must be capable, in turn, of effecting a becoming-revolutionary 
of this religious form of expression itself.  
In other words, if the ‘soul of uprising’ is the collective will for self-transformation, 
then in order for this will to be sustained as an animating force, it must be capable of 
                                                




continuing to transform itself, of staking out its own limits in order to cross over them. 
This is no doubt why Foucault, in the days before Khomeini’s return, distinguishes and 
even prioritizes the molecular problem facing the revolt: “Apart from the problem of the 
immediate succession to the shah, there is another question that interests me at least as 
much: Will this unitary movement, which, for a year now has stirred up a people faced 
with machine-guns, have the strength [force] to cross [franchir] its own frontiers and go 
beyond the things on which, for a time, it has based itself?”772 Having realized itself as 
evental force, the popular revolt is confronted by a new problem: whether or not its 
powers of activity are such that it can apply the radical-critical ‘ardor’ of its ‘unremitting 
restlessness’ to itself, as the catalyst for its own continued becoming.  
In short, what emerges as a necessary condition of sustainability for political agency 
is what was analyzed in the preceding section as a condition of possibility for ethico-
political agency: namely, the limit-attitude of vertical critique. Indeed, this is the form of 
auto-critique that is necessary for historico-ontological transformation, working by means 
of the contingency thesis ‘to give new impetus to the undefined work of freedom.’ In 
Chapter 2, at the end of our discussion of Nietzschean interpretation and Zarathustra’s 
‘ascent into the depths,’ we identified the principle of self-recreative activity as a 
fundamental aspect of critical verticality, the trajectory of the vertical axis containing 
within itself the source of its own motility. Bringing together the vertical and transversal 
components of our analysis, we can now posit, as a solution to the transversal problem of 
political-agential sustainability (i.e., the danger of abolition), a kind of collective vertical 
critique: an auto-transformative practice, at once a “permanent critique” and “permanent 





creation of ourselves,”773 which would select out tendencies toward reactive force insofar 
as they imperil intensive micropolitical processes of connection. As Foucault puts it, “I 
believe that the work of deep transformation can be done in the open and always 
turbulent atmosphere of a continuous [permanente] criticism.”774 
Vertical critique would thus meet a necessary condition for sustaining the 
transversal composition of political agency. The argument for this conclusion can be 
presented in brief:  
1. Transversal connection designates both a condition of realization and a condition 
of sustainability for political agency: that is, the vertical experience of 
insurrection cannot be realized as a force (i.e., the vertical problem of material 
expression cannot be solved) without transversal connection serving as the 
compositional principle for a collective form of expression; and such 
transformative force cannot be sustained, cannot renew its proper process of 
becoming-revolutionary, without transversal connection continuing to function in 
this way.  
2. What threatens the continued functioning of transversal connection, and hence the 
sustainability of political agency, is the danger of abolition; and it is the tendency 
toward reactive force that poses this threat, i.e., that turns the line of flight into a 
line of abolition. 
3. Vertical critique, when it functions effectively as a critical ethos (limit-attitude), is 
the practice or activity of thought that selects out or eliminates these tendencies of 
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reactive force, diagnosing their role in reintroducing rigid segmentation and the 
intolerable exercise of power. 
4. Therefore, vertical critique, when it functions effectively as the limit-attitude, 
satisfies a necessary condition of sustainability for political agency. 
It follows from this argument that one strategic objective for critical thought will be to 
facilitate the sustainability of political agency by advancing the limit-attitude as a 
collective ethos. And it is here, the political role of the intellectual returning to the fore, 
that we encounter Foucault’s late concept of vertical critique. 
 
6.5 Late Critique: The ‘Vertical Relationship of Discourse to its Own Present Reality’ 
“I dream of the intellectual as destroyer of certitudes and universalities, who, in the 
inertias and constraints of the present, locates and marks the weak points, the openings, 
the lines of power; who incessantly displaces himself, doesn’t know exactly where he is 
heading nor what he’ll think tomorrow because he is too attentive to the present; who … 
contributes to posing the question of knowing whether the revolution is worth the effort, 
and which one (I mean which revolution and which effort), it being understood that only 
those who are willing to risk their lives to bring it about can respond to the question.” 
— Foucault775 
 
6.5.1 Vertical Critique as a Necessary Condition ‘For Any Transformation’ 
At the end of section III above, we analyzed the triple political function of the 
intellectual in terms of (1) a visionary function, by which the intolerable would be 
intuited and disclosed as such; (2) an enunciative function, by which the conditions for a 
collective form of expression (or assemblage of enunciation) would be constructed; and 
(3) an amplifying function, by which a set of lateral relays would be facilitated between a 
multiplicity of singular expressions of struggle. If the second and third functions refer to 
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the problem of collective subjectivation and the connective strategy of transversal politics, 
the first function opens onto a vertical politics: what is perceived and made visible, 
before it has erupted into history as force, is the political limit-experience of uprising, the 
intensive germ of revolt the possibility of which no form of power can destroy without 
ending the power relation as such; and it is the vertical perspective of genealogical 
critique, orienting the ‘art of bringing out the revolting brutality in what we tolerate out of 
habit’ so as ‘to sharpen intolerance to the facts of power,’ that affords the mode of vision 
capable of such ‘political intuition.’ 
The intellectual as critical ‘visionary’ will thus take up the characteristically vertical 
perspective in limit-relation to history and power: “one must at the same time look 
closely, a bit beneath history, at what cleaves and stirs it, and keep watch, a bit behind 
politics, over what must unconditionally limit it.”776 It is the vertical experience of the 
intolerable that, ‘beneath history,’ disrupts and breathes life into it (history), making 
political agency possible and constituting the absolute limit of power’s exercise. In turn, 
it is the vertical critique of the intolerable, understood as a historical ontology of the 
present, that de-familiarizes the given horizon of intelligibility so that the intolerable can 
be seen as intolerable, and the operation of power, disclosed in its fragile contingency. In 
this way, critical thought is a necessary condition ‘for any transformation,’ including the 
transformation of the conditions of social production proper to political agency: “A 
critique does not consist in saying that things aren’t good the way they are. It consists in 
seeing on what type of assumptions, of familiar notions, of established, unexamined ways 
of thinking the accepted practices are based. Criticism consists in uncovering that thought 
                                                




and trying to change it …. Understood in these terms, criticism (and radical criticism) is 
utterly indispensable for any transformation.”777 
Vertical critique is thus integral to transformative agency in general. Indeed, what is 
at issue here is the agential force of thought itself, for “[t]hought is freedom in relation to 
what one does, the motion by which one detaches oneself from it, establishes it as an 
object, and reflects on it as a problem.”778 That is, the activity of critical thought impels 
the practice of freedom, understood as the labor of transformation conducted by ourselves 
upon ourselves – what we have been calling ‘ethico-political agency,’ and what, when 
realized collectively as the ‘soul of revolt,’ constitutes political agency. For it is vertical 
critique, “the diagnosis of what today is” through an historical ontology of ourselves, that, 
by “following lines of fragility in the present,” provides a “description … made in 
accordance with these kinds of virtual fracture which open up the space of freedom 
understood as a space of concrete freedom, that is, of possible transformation.”779 This is 
why Foucault refers to thought as “that essential element in human life and human 
relations”780: if “[f]reedom is the ontological condition of ethics,”781 and if thought 
constitutes freedom in relation to action, then thought provides the ontological condition 
of ethics from the perspective of action.  
                                                
777 Foucault, “So Is It Important to Think?”, Power, 457. Lest this position seem to give undue privilege to 
the role of the intellectual, or suggest a kind of historical idealism, it should be noted that critical thought 
here is understood in an expansive sense: for example, an event of revolt, such as the case of May ’68 as 
treated by Deleuze and Guattari, performs the function of critique insofar as it constitutes a collective 
visionary phenomenon by which a new possible is demanded and created. As Foucault puts it in the 
passage cited as the epigraph to the fourth section above, ‘One must attend to the birth of ideas and to the 
exhibition of their force: not in books that would pronounce them, but in the events in which they manifest 
their force, in the struggles that one conducts for ideas, against them or for them.’ 
778 Foucault, “Polemics, Politics, and Problematizations,” 117. 
779 Foucault, “Structuralism and Post-structuralism,” Aesthetics, Method, and Epistemology, 450. 
780 Foucault, “So Is It Important to Think?”, 457. 




In other words, vertical-critical thought meets the necessary precondition for ethical 
agency, which is also and necessarily ethico-political agency insofar as the conditions of 
possibility for what we can do (say, think, become) are circumscribed within the 
historical field of power relations. In turn, as we have seen, the collectivization of the 
limit-attitude, by facilitating and renewing the process of popular auto-transformation, 
would satisfy a condition of sustainability for political agency. In both cases, whether at 
the (ethico-political) level of the conditions of possible action or the (political) level of 
the conditions of social production, agency is understood in terms of transformative force, 
just as ‘concrete freedom’ is cast in terms of a ‘possible transformation,’ which is also to 
say, a transformation of the possible. And in both cases, transformative agency, as the 
practice of freedom, owes its impetus and sustenance to vertical critique, whether such 
critical verticality be depicted as the philosophical ethos proper to historical ontology, i.e., 
the limit-attitude as the experimental practice of auto-critique undertaken in the desire to 
‘radically change one’s subjectivity’; or whether as a ‘visionary phenomenon’ (Deleuze 
and Guattari) disclosing the intolerable as such through a popular movement of 
intransigence that demands – and, in the demand, produces – a new possible. In this light, 
the political experience of uprising itself, whether individual or collective, has a vertical-
critical structure; and in turn, as we will see below, there is a particular sense in which 





6.5.2 Return to Kant: The Verticality of the Critical Attitude and the Philosophy of the 
Event 
Now, we have seen how, for Foucault, the double thought of power and the event is 
fundamental to a ‘philosophy of the people’ that would compose a subversive form of 
counter-knowledge. If the guiding thought or problem of transversal politics, to which the 
enunciative and amplifying functions of the intellectual correspond, is the thought of 
power, then the critical-visionary function of vertical politics, in turn, is oriented by the 
thought of the event. It is no doubt for this reason that in an interview from 1978, just 
before his engagement in the Iranian uprising, Foucault, locating himself within the 
genealogical lineage of Nietzsche, distinguishes his own work from philosophy “in the 
classical sense of the word” (à la Derrida) insofar as he (Foucault) is “interested in the 
event” as a “philosophical category”:  
…it was Nietzsche, I think, who first defined philosophy as an activity that leads to 
an understanding of what’s happening, of what’s happening right now. In other 
words, we are pervaded [traversés] by processes, movements and forces, which we 
don’t know, and it is doubtlessly the philosopher’s task to be a diagnostician of 
these forces, to diagnose contemporary reality. … Philosophy of the present, 
philosophy of the event, philosophy of what is happening right now.782 
 
Directing its line of descent, genealogy, as a historical critique of the present, grasps 
contemporary reality as the degree zero of history, which is to say, as the site of 
emergence of events, understood as the reversal or eruption of forces. As we have seen, 
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Clarifying how such a claim about practicing a ‘philosophy of the present’ squares with the largely 
historical nature of his research, Foucault continues: “It’s true that in my books I try to capture an event 
that I considered, and consider to be important to our present time, although it is a past event. Regarding 
madness, for instance, it seems to me that there was a separation [partage] between madness and non-
madness at a certain moment in the Western world; at another moment there emerged a certain way of 
grasping the intensity of crime and the problem of man raised by crime. All these events, it seems we are 
repeating them. We are repeating them today and I’m trying to grasp the kind of event under whose sign we 




this relation to the present is precisely what accounts for the vertical perspectivism of 
genealogical critique, its de-familiarizing and auto-doubling functions, and its 
transformative efficacy as a strategics of truth: the vertical relation of genealogy to 
history designates a historical ontology of our own present, of ourselves in this present, 
and of what we are doing when we reflect on this present and ourselves within it, such 
that we become capable of transforming both (this present and ourselves).  
Indeed, it is in just this sense that Foucault, in his penultimate lecture course at the 
Collège de France in 1983, will place himself in the intellectual tradition that poses “the 
question of the present as a philosophical event to which the philosopher who speaks of it 
belongs”: that is, “philosophy as the surface of emergence of a present reality, as a 
questioning of the philosophical meaning of the present reality of which it is a part, and 
… as the philosopher’s questioning of this ‘we’ to which he belongs and in relation to 
which he has to situate himself.”783 We see here the recursive auto-doubling function, or 
productive self-referential structure, proper to vertical thought: critical philosophy is both 
itself an event (‘a philosophical event,’ ‘the surface of emergence’ of the “difference … 
today introduce[s] with respect to yesterday”784) and a form of reflection upon itself as an 
event; and it is the analysis of itself as an event that constitutes the very event that it is.785 
                                                
783 Foucault, The Government of Self and Others, 12-3.  
784 Foucault, “What is Enlightenment?”, 305. As Foucault will put the point in his discussion of Kant, both 
the Enlightenment and the French Revolution constitute “self-referring events” (Foucault, The Government 
of Self and Others, 15), that is, events that are not only aware of themselves as such, but whose very force 
is generated from this auto-reference as the entrance of transformative force in history. 
785 Referring back to our discussion of aesthetic reflective judgment in Chapter 2, we could also put this 
point in terms of the ‘tautegorical’ structure of vertical-evental thought: the event is both the content of 
critical philosophy (philosophy of the event) and the form of critical philosophy (philosophy as the event). 
It is in this same sense that intensive-vertical thought is both the thought of the vertical dimension of 
intensity and thought as the vertical dimension of intensity, which is also to say, the thought of thought 




In other words, the ‘philosophy of the event’ is itself an event of philosophy, which is to 
say, the singular emergence of critical thought as a transformative force in history. 
If anything has changed from the middle to the late articulation of vertical critique, 
it is that Foucault now locates this kind of evental philosophy in the minor critical 
tradition of Kant, specifically, in the way that Kant poses the problem of modernity in his 
writings on the Enlightenment and the French Revolution.786 By contrast to the horizontal 
mode in which “the question of modernity had been posed in terms of a longitudinal axis,” 
i.e., in terms of “the polarity between Antiquity and modernity” and their comparative 
evaluation, Kant opens up  
…a new way of posing the question of modernity…, which is no longer in a 
longitudinal relationship with the Ancients, but in what could be called a sagittal 
relationship or, if you like, a vertical relationship of the discourse to its own present 
reality. The discourse has to take its own present reality into account in order, [first], 
to find its own place in it, second to express its meaning, and third to designate and 
specify the mode of action, the mode of effectuation that it realizes within this 
present reality.787 
 
Vertical critique thus appears in Kant as an auto-referential form of thought that analyzes 
(1) the contemporary conditions of its own emergence, (2) the singularity of this 
emergence as a historical event, and (3) the transformative effect that this event of 
thought realizes in the field of actuality.  
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present,” running “from Hegel, through Nietzsche and Max Weber, to the Frankfurt School” (Foucault, 
“The Art of Telling the Truth,” Politics, Philosophy, Culture, 95). For our discussion of the two Kantian 
philosophical traditions, see the Introduction. 




(1) In the first case, the contemporary conditions of the vertical critique of 
modernity788 refer to the Enlightenment itself as a kind of collective critical attitude, the 
general refusal to be unduly governed by arbitrary forms of authority (which refusal 
becomes realized as a political event in the Revolution): in other words, a philosophical 
ethos manifesting the kind of restiveness that animates the will to revolt. Indeed, like the 
‘centrifugal movement’ or vector of escape proper to the line of flight, the Enlightenment, 
as Foucault notes, is defined by Kant “simply as ‘Ausgang,’ as way out, exit, a movement 
by which one extricates oneself from something, without saying anything about what one 
is moving towards.”789 More specifically, this form of escape is “‘man’s way out from his 
self-incurred tutelage,’ …a movement of getting out … which constitutes precisely the 
significant element of our present reality.”790  
(2) Thus, the singularity of the Enlightenment as a historical event, defining 
modernity by the practice of vertical auto-critique, is the breaking-away from a certain 
form of self-maintained subjugation. And by posing the question of the Enlightenment in 
this way, Kant issues a “call for courage” for humanity to lift the “minority condition” in 
which it has been “maintained in an authoritative way” – a condition which, whether in 
the domains of religion, law or knowledge, is defined by humanity’s “incapacity to use its 
                                                
788 In a sense, the vertical investigation of positivism from Foucault’s early period (especially in History of 
Madness and Birth of the Clinic) was already a vertical critique of modernity. However, in that instance, 
the object of vertical critique was not modernity as the philosophical ethos of the critical attitude introduced 
by Kant; rather, it concerned that other, majoritarian Kantian tradition, the ‘analytic of truth’ that gave rise 
to rational positivism (whether in formal logic or political economy). In this way, we can maintain 
consistency between Foucault’s early critique of Kant and his later identification with a certain Kantian 
lineage, since each refers to a different Kantian tradition. Indeed, this apparent ambivalence is already 
contained in Foucault’s early account of Kant, whose Copernican turn introduced the idea of radical 
finitude before territorializing this thought in an anthropological positivism, i.e., the man-form.   
789 Foucault, The Government of Self and Others, 27. 




own understanding precisely without something which would be someone else’s 
direction.”791  
As we saw in Chapter 5, for Foucault, this excessive authority that maintains 
humanity in its subordinate condition is a form of governmentalization: that is, a complex 
set of strategies operating through and organizing the social, political, and economic 
institutions, relations, and practices by which the conduct of a population is managed, and 
“through which individuals are subjugated in the reality of a social practice through 
mechanisms of power that adhere to a truth.”792 On Foucault’s view, governmentalization 
emerges historically in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries as a kind of secularization 
and expansion of the function of pastoral power, according to which every individual is 
bound by a relation of absolute obedience to let themselves be governed in each of their 
actions for the entirety of their lives, and where this submission is mediated by a form of 
truth linking the self-knowledge of the individual to a dogmatic authority.793 Once only 
the province of ecclesiastical institutions, this individualizing technique proliferates in 
every new area where the problem of governing is posed: “how to govern children, how 
to govern the poor and beggars, how to govern a family, a house, how to govern armies, 
different groups, cities, States and also how to govern one’s own body and mind.”794 
Governmentalization thus emerges as an individualizing and totalizing regime of power-
knowledge that produces individuals as subjects in the double sense of being “subject to 
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someone else by control and dependence, and tied to [one’s] own identity by a 
conscience or self-knowledge.”795 
However, according to Foucault, there develops in agonistic tandem with 
governmentalization a “critical attitude” that resists it, a practice or “art of not being 
governed quite so much.”796 The three historical points of anchorage for this critical 
attitude anticipate the three areas where Kant calls for the courage of humanity to 
exercise its own understanding: in the religious domain, a biblical critique that contests 
ecclesiastical rule with respect to the truth of the Scriptures; in the legal domain, a 
juridical critique that asserts the rights of natural law so as to contest unjust political rule; 
and in the domain of knowledge, a scientific critique that contests unjustified 
authoritarian determinations of truth.797 In each of these cases, critique functions to limit 
an excessive authority by challenging the production of knowledge through which the 
latter operates, thereby disrupting the techniques of subjection by which humanity is 
maintained in a minority condition. As “the movement by which the subject gives himself 
the right to question truth on its effects of power and question power on its discourses of 
truth,” and thus as “the art of voluntary insubordination” and “reflected intractability,” 
“[c]ritique would essentially insure the desubjugation of the subject in the context of 
what we could call, in a word, the politics of truth.”798  
(3) We may therefore characterize the transformative effect that the critical 
philosophy of the event realizes in the field of contemporary reality in terms of the 
desubjugating self-transformation of those who rise up against an intolerable form of 
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governmentalization. That is, vertical critique, as the ‘art of reflected intractability,’ 
provides strategic orientation for the intensive will to revolt and renewed impetus for the 
movement of ethico/political agency. Hence the significant stakes of that tradition of 
critical thought to which Foucault belongs: “In its critical aspect – and I mean critical in a 
broad sense – philosophy is that which calls into question domination at every level and 
in every form in which it exists, whether political, economic, sexual, institutional, or what 
have you.”799 On Foucault’s view, it is this critical attitude that Kant reactivates when he 
poses the question of the Enlightenment as both a critical analysis of the present 
condition of humanity and a summons to no longer let what we say, think, and do be 
governed by dogmatic forms of authority. 
 
6.5.3 Epilogue: Parrhesia as the Critical Philosophic Form of Revolt 
From a tragic counter-history of rationalist positivism, through an intensive 
reformulation as the genealogy of force relations, to the critical limit-attitude of historical 
ontology, vertical critique remains the manner in which Foucault conceives the agential 
force of thought as subversive or transformative. This analysis accounts for Foucault’s 
late fascination and identification with Kant’s “What is Enlightenment?”, which Foucault 
himself describes as “something of a blazon, a fetish for me.”800  Further, it sheds light on 
the political stakes, rarely commented upon, of the turn to Antiquity that guided his 
historical research in the 1980s, which is typically presented as a movement away from 
the problem of power toward an interest in pre-Christian ethics (as so many aesthetic and 
                                                
799 Foucault, “The Ethics of the Concern for Self as a Practice of Freedom,” 300-1. 




ascetic practices of self-care). For if the critical attitude designates the manner in which 
thought, realized as “a mode of behavior, a form of will,”801 enables and sustains political 
agency; then the project “to construct a genealogy of the critical attitude in Western 
philosophy”802 must be understood as a political one. And it is just this project – which, 
as the vertical critique (genealogy) of critique, demonstrates the recursive auto-doubling 
function proper to verticality – to which Foucault dedicates his last three lecture courses, 
finding in the ancient Greek concept of parrhesia (‘free speech,’ ‘outspokenness’) “the 
roots of what we could call the ‘critical’ tradition in the West.”803  
Indeed, when, at the beginning of his lecture course in 1983, Foucault situates the 
tradition of vertical critique in Kant, he does so precisely as a means of orienting his 
subsequent interpretation of parrhesia. Whatever else might be said about the 
discontinuity of Foucault’s research program between the first volume of The History of 
Sexuality (1976) and the two volumes that followed eight years later, there is also a clear 
line of philosophical consistency running from beginning to end of Foucault’s work, 
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802 Foucault, Fearless Speech, 170-1. At the beginning of his final lecture course, Foucault himself makes 
quite clear the connection between his interest in parrhesia and the problem of power: “Last year I tried to 
show you that the notion of parrhēsia was first of all and fundamentally a political notion. … [B]y taking 
up again or undertaking the analysis of parrhēsia in the field of political practices, I drew a bit closer to the 
theme which, after all, has always been present in my analysis of the relations between the subject and truth: 
that of relations of power and their role in the interplay between the subject and truth. With the notion of 
parrhēsia, originally rooted in political practice and the problematization of democracy, then later 
diverging towards the sphere of personal ethics and the formation of the moral subject, we have … the 
possibility of posing the question of the subject and truth from the point of view of the practice of what 
could be called the government of oneself and others. And thus we come back to the theme of government 
which I studied some years ago. It seems to me that by examining the notion of parrhēsia we can see how 
the analysis of modes of veridiction, the study of techniques of governmentality, and the identification of 
forms of practice of self interweave” (Foucault, The Courage of Truth, edited by Gros, translated by 
Burchell, 8). 
803 Foucault, Fearless Speech, 170. The three lecture courses in question are The Government of Self and 
Others at the Collège de France (Spring 1983), Fearless Speech at UC Berkeley (Fall 1983; also entitled 
Discourse and Truth: the Problematization of Parrhesia), and The Courage of Truth at the Collège de 




insofar as the lineage of vertical critique runs from Nietzsche (first the Birth of Tragedy, 
then the Genealogy) through Kant ultimately back to the figure of Socrates. For it is 
Socrates who, in refusing to follow the unjust dictates of the Thirty Tyrants, “gives, as a 
philosopher, an example of philosophical resistance to political power, an example of 
parrēsia which will remain for a long time a model of the philosophical attitude towards 
power: the philosopher’s individual resistance.”804  
Parrhesia can be thus understood as the individual form of uprising proper to 
critical philosophy. Recalling Foucault’s experience in the Tunisian student revolts, when 
philosophical discourse was verticalized into an ‘almost immediate imperative,’ in the 
case of parrhesia, the will to revolt – that vertical-intensive mode of political experience 
at the degree zero of power’s exercise – finds as its ground the ethical duty of care: 
“parrhesia is a verbal activity in which a speaker expresses his personal relationship to 
truth, and risks his life because he recognizes truth-telling as a duty to improve or help 
other people (as well as himself).”805  
Foucault analyzes parrhesia according to five characteristics, all of which bring to 
mind the role of Socrates in Plato’s Apology.806 The first two are frankness, or a direct 
and unadorned manner of address, and truth, understood as both the sincerity and content 
of one’s discourse: one speaks frankly and truly, and what one speaks is true. Indeed, the 
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‘personal relationship’ between the parrhesiastes and the truth that he807 speaks, on 
which he stakes his life, demonstrates the auto-doubling structure of verticality: “I tell the 
truth, and I truly think that it is true, and I truly think that I am telling the truth when I say 
it. This doubling or intensification of the statement of the truth by the statement of the 
truth of the fact that I think this truth and that, thinking it, I say it, is what is essential to 
the parrhesiastic act.”808  
The third characteristic of parrhesia is danger, since one incurs a risk, and 
demonstrates the virtue of courage, by frankly speaking the truth. And it is precisely this 
element of risk that distinguishes the truth-telling activity of parrhesia as a disruptive and 
potentially transformative event: “we can say there is parrēsia when the statement of this 
truth constitutes an irruptive event opening up an undefined or poorly defined risk for the 
subject who speaks. … [I]t is a truth-telling, an irruptive truth-telling which creates a 
fracture and opens the risk: a possibility, a field of dangers, or at any rate, an undefined 
eventuality.”809 In turn, the reason that the activity of such truth-telling “demands the 
courage to speak the truth in spite of some danger” is that parrhesia – precisely like the 
‘philosophy of the people’ that Foucault had discussed a decade earlier – is a counter-
discursive mode of critique in relation to the unjust operation of power, “com[ing] from 
                                                
807 Because of the historical specificity of the concept of parrhesia and its almost exclusive application to 
men, Foucault insists on retaining the masculine pronoun: “Responding to a student’s question, Foucault 
indicated that the oppressed role of women in Greek society generally deprived them of the use of 
parrhesia (along with aliens, slaves, and children). Hence the predominant use of the masculine pronoun 
throughout” (Joseph Pearson, Fearless Speech, 12, n. 4). 
808 Foucault, The Government of Self and Others, 64. Cf.: “If we distinguish between the speaking subject 
(the subject of enunciation) and the grammatical subject of the enounced, we could say that there is also the 
subject of the enunciandum – which refers to the held belief or opinion of the speaker. In parrhesia the 
speaker emphasizes the fact that he is both the subject of the enunciation and the subject of the 
enunciandum – that he himself is the subject of the opinion to which he refers” (Foucault, Fearless Speech, 
12-3). 




‘below,’ as it were, and … directed towards ‘above’”: “Parrhesia is a form of criticism 
… in a situation where the speaker … is in a position of inferiority with respect to the 
interlocutor. The parrhesiastes is always less powerful than the one with whom he 
speaks.”810 This fourth characteristic, criticism, explains why Foucault considers 
parrhesia to be something like the original form of critical attitude in the West, 
functioning precisely as a limit to power.811  
Finally, what moves the parrhesiastes to undertake this philosophical practice of 
frankly, truly, and courageously critiquing the undue exercise of power is the feeling of 
ethical duty: “No one forces him to speak, but he feels that it is his duty to do so.”812 
Duty is thus the fifth characteristic of parrhesia, and here, once again, Foucault rejoins 
Kant. If, as we saw in section IV, Foucault effectively substitutes the limit-experience of 
political uprising for Kantian moral feeling as the ratio cognoscendi of human freedom; 
then in turn, we may now conclude that it is moral feeling, disclosing “a specific relation 
to moral law through freedom and duty,”813 which compels the parrhesiastes to rise up 
and stake his life so that the critical truth he speaks may limit or modify the excessive 
effects of power. 
In sum, parrhesiastic truth-telling exemplifies the activity of vertical critique as a 
properly philosophical event of revolt, for “the speaker uses his freedom and chooses 
                                                
810 Foucault, Fearless Speech, 16-8. 
811 See, e.g.: “the function of parrēsia is precisely to be able to limit the power of the masters” (Foucault, 
The Government of Self and Others, 161). Cf: “One of the oldest functions of the philosopher in the West – 
philosopher, I should also say ‘sage’ and perhaps, to use this villainous contemporary word, ‘intellectual’ –, 
one of the principal roles of the philosopher in the West has been to pose a limit, to pose a limit to this ‘too 
much’ of power, to this overproduction of power each time and in every case that it threatens to become 
menacing. The philosopher, in the West, more or less always has the profile of the anti-despot” (Foucault, 
“La philosophie analytique de la politique,” Dits et écrits II, 537, my translation). 





frankness instead of persuasion, truth instead of falsehood or silence, the risk of death 
instead of life and security, criticism instead of flattery, and moral duty instead of self-
interest and moral apathy.”814 In so doing, the parrhesiastes demonstrates three kinds of 
agency: (1) ethical agency, insofar as he freely chooses to speak out on the basis of the 
duty to care for others and himself; (2) ethico-political agency, insofar as his speaking out 
constitutes a practice of freedom by which he shapes his relationship to himself, which 
relationship is itself immanent to the field of power relations; and (3) political agency, 
insofar as such speaking out is ‘an irruptive event which opens a fracture’ and aims to 
transform the conditions of the social order.
                                                




CHAPTER 7.  CONCLUSION: ON THE NECESSARY CONDITIONS FOR 
POLTICAL AGENCY 
In the preface to the second volume of The History of Sexuality, published shortly 
before his death in 1984, Foucault, reformulating the historico-critical enterprise of his 
oeuvre, posits three basic principles of thought. In light of our preceding analysis, these 
principles can be understood as designating thought’s three vertical traits. The first is “the 
principle of irreducibility of thought”: like the vertical dimension of revolt that is 
irreducible to history, thought itself is that irreducible aspect of experience which cannot 
be explained in terms of historical causation; thus, while all forms of experience “may 
perfectly well harbor universal structures” and “may well not be independent of the 
concrete determinations of social existence,” “neither those determinations nor those 
structures can allow for experiences … except through thought.”815 That is, thought 
designates the ineliminable intensive dimension of experience that accounts for the 
possibility of transformative agency, such that “[t]here is no experience that is not a way 
of thinking and cannot be analyzed from the viewpoint of a history of thought,” i.e., from 
the perspective of genealogy, by contrast to the reductive viewpoint of a social 
determinism (e.g., traditional Marxism, structuralist history, etc.).
                                                




Second is “the principle of singularity of the history of thought: there are events of 
thought.”816 In addition to its irreducibility, “thought has a historicity which is proper to 
it,” which entertains “complex relations” with “all the other historical determinations (of 
an economic, social, or political order)”, but which remains distinct from the latter. 
Indeed, this is what Foucault, referring in 1968 to the “axis of description” orienting 
History of Madness and The Birth of the Clinic, had characterized as thought’s “vertical 
dimension,” “the relations that are able to obtain between a form of knowledge and the 
social, economic, political, and historical conditions in which this knowledge is 
constituted.”817  
That is, thought not only has a history, but is itself fundamentally historical and thus, 
as is sometimes said, contingent ‘all the way down’: thought is inseparable from the 
historical field of problematization in which it emerges. Even when functioning critically 
as ‘outside thought’ to work upon and transform what Deleuze calls the dominant ‘image 
of thought’ (e.g., the ‘God-form’ of the classical period and the ‘man-form’ of the 
modern period818), a relation of immanence obtains between thought and the historical 
field of force relations in which it intervenes; indeed, it is in just this sense that the 
intensive reconceptualization of verticality allowed the relation between vertical critique 
and history to no longer be cast in terms of transcendence. In short, the history of thought 
is composed of so many singular events, and thought itself must be grasped as a historical 
force, entering into (potentially transformative) relation with other kinds of forces ‘of an 
economic, social, or political order,’ without being reducible to these. 
                                                
816 Ibid. 
817 Foucault, “Interview avec Michel Foucault,” Dits et écrits I, 684-5, my translation. 




If the first principle of thought refers to its intensive aspect, its incorporeal 
materiality that cannot be reduced to the corporeal materiality of history, the second 
refers to thought’s apparition within this corporeal materiality, embodied in practices 
capable (in principle) of acting upon and transforming the extensive conditions of the 
social formation. And if the first principle is a challenge posed by (critical) philosophy to 
(traditional) history concerning the relation between thought and freedom, conversely, the 
second is a challenge posed by (critical) history to (traditional) philosophy concerning the 
historical contingency and singularity, rather than universal necessity, of thought. 
Finally, connecting the critical strains of both philosophy and history, the third 
principle of thought, echoing the philosophical ethos of historico-critical ontology, is “the 
principle of the history of thought as critical activity”: critique “does not mark out 
impassable boundaries or describe closed systems; it brings to light transformable 
singularities. These transformations could not take place except by means of a working of 
thought upon itself.”819 In other words, it is the auto-critical movement of thought, or the 
auto-affective structure of thought qua critique, that is necessary for transformative 
agency; and this ‘working of thought upon itself’ precisely describes the vertical 
operation of thought, its recursive auto-doubling function, the first instance of which we 
analyzed in the Kantian sublime. If the first and second principles refer, respectively, to 
the aspects of thought that escape and belong to history, the third refers to that aspect of 
thought situated at the limit between them, at the degree zero of history as the becoming-
force of the intensive, or the emergence of a singular event. 
                                                




With this view of the threefold verticality of thought in place, let us conclude by 
outlining the set of necessary conditions for political agency. First, a distinction must be 
drawn between political agency and ethico-political agency. Political agency refers to the 
transformation of the conditions of social production: it is essentially transformative, a 
rupture in a historically determined process or causal sequence. In Deleuzian parlance, 
political agency would thus be a line of flight collectivized and sustained. Ethico-political 
agency, on the other hand, refers to the work that one conducts upon oneself as a free 
being, and thus most basically to a practice of freedom: namely, the activity of thought as 
“freedom in relation to what one does.”820 Ethico-political agency is thus the germ of 
transformation, brought about through vertical critique, that is, through the special 
manner by which thought takes itself up, works upon, and transforms itself. Vertical 
critique, in turn, can play this role by virtue of thought’s two other vertical traits: its 
irreducibility, which accounts for how ‘subjectivity is brought into history, breathing life 
into it’; and its historicity, which explains how it can act upon the conditions of history.   
Political agency and ethico-political agency are therefore distinct, but each can also 
be conceived through the other. On the one hand, political agency can be derived from 
ethico-political agency, since the latter is the germ of all transformation, including the 
collective transformative force of political agency. In other words, there is no agency, 
including political agency, without the element of thought. And this element of thought – 
                                                
820 Foucault, “Polemics, Politics, and Problematizations,” 117. In a sense, this is simply a Kantian account 
of ethical agency conceived as critical autonomy, but the ‘agent’ in question is far more complicated, since 
in addition to being situated as an embodied being, she is emplaced in a historical field of force relations. 
That is, her relation to herself is itself a form or historical product of these force relations, thus political, but 
also mutable by virtue of its very historical contingency, thus doubly political: both an effect of power and 
site of possible resistance. Hence the inseparability of ethical agency and the political, which is to say, 




as freedom in relation to what one does; that is, as opening the concrete space of possible 
transformation in relation to what one does; that is, as the transformation of the possible, 
of the conditions of the possible, in relation to what one does, says, thinks, becomes – just 
is ethico-political agency. This might also be put: ethico-political agency is a 
precondition for political agency. In turn, however, ethico-political agency can be 
understood as a form of political agency, since the latter refers to the transformation of 
the conditions of social production, and what ethico-political agency does is work upon 
the historical conditions of its own social production, separating out what is contingent so 
as to enable the experimental practice of becoming-otherwise. 
There is thus a reciprocal circuit set up between ethico-political agency and political 
agency. Ethico-political agency is a precondition for political agency and is constituted 
through the movement of vertical critique (e.g., the contingency thesis, history of limits, 
limit-attitude), which prepares the vertical political experience (the intolerable) that is 
itself a necessary condition of possibility for political agency. In turn, vertical political 
experience requires a transversal form of expression in order to meet the necessary 
condition of realization for political agency (becoming-force). And this transversal form 
of expression must continue to undergo its own process of becoming-revolutionary – in 
other words, transversal connection must continue to operate as the compositional 
principle of collective subjectivation – in order to meet the necessary condition for the 
sustainability of political agency, a condition requiring vertical critique (which checks 
against the threat of abolition and reactive force) as a kind of collective critical attitude. 




of freedom, understood as thought’s labor of concrete transformation, which is to say, 
again, ethico-political agency. 
In short, with respect to political agency: (1) ethico-political agency and vertical 
experience are its necessary conditions of possibility; (2) transversal connection is its 
necessary condition of realization; and (3) vertical critique is its necessary condition of 
sustainability, reconstituting ethico-political agency in turn. The solution to the vertical 
problem of material expression (how vertical intensity, which is irreducible to history, 
can act upon and transform the conditions of history) is transversal connection as the 
compositional principle of collective subjectivation. In turn, the solution to the 
transversal problem of material expression (how the line of flight can be sustained, 
connected to other lines of flight, rather than collapsing into a line of abolition) is vertical 








Ph.D. Candidate, Philosophy, Purdue University, (expected) May 2015 
Dissertation Committee: Daniel Smith (chair), William McBride, Christopher 
Yeomans, Todd May, Kevin Thompson 
M.A., Philosophy, New School for Social Research, January 2008 
B.A., Philosophy (honors), Haverford College, May 2002 
 
Areas of Specialization 
19th and 20th Century European Philosophy, Social and Political Philosophy 
 
Areas of Competence 
Ethics, Kant, Early Modern Philosophy  
 
Publications 
Refereed Journal Article 
(2014) ‘Toward a Theory of Transversal Politics: Deleuze and Foucault’s Block of 
Becoming,’ Foucault Studies, 17(Special Issue: Foucault and Deleuze): 134-172.  
Invited Article 
(2014) ‘Critique,’ The Cambridge Foucault Lexicon, Eds. Leonard Lawlor and John 
Nale. New York: Cambridge University Press. Pages 87-93. 
Review  
(2014). Review of Rethinking Philosophy and Theology with Deleuze by Brent 
Adkins and Paul R. Hinlicky, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, 2014.03.12.  
Encyclopedia Article 
(2011). ‘Foucault, Michel,’ Encyclopedia of Global Justice, Ed. Deen K. Chatterjee. 
New York: Springer. Pages 365-367. 
 
Teaching Experience 
Instructor, Ethics (Distance Learning), Purdue University, Summer 2011, 2012, 
2013 (2x); Fall 2011, 2012, 2013; Spring 2012, 2013, 2014. 
Instructor, Ethics, Purdue, Spring 2011. 
Instructor, Introduction to Philosophy, Purdue, Spring 2010, Fall 2010. 
T.A., Philosophy and Law, Purdue, Fall 2009. 
T.A., Introduction to Philosophy, Purdue, Fall 2008, Spring 2009. 
Adjunct Lecturer, Western Philosophy I, Dowling College, Spring 2008. 
Adjunct Lecturer, Human Rights, Dowling, Fall 2007 (2x). 
